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Journal articles on the topic 'Transaction cost economics'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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1

Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction cost economics." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 8, no. 4 (December 1987): 617–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(87)90038-2.

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2

Frolov, D. P. "From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 8 (August 3, 2020): 51–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-51-81.

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The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.
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3

Delmas, Magali, and Alfred Marcus. "Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach." Business and Politics 6, no. 3 (December 2004): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1073.

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This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.
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4

Tan, Rong, Volker Beckmann, Futian Qu, and Cifang Wu. "Governing Farmland Conversion for Urban Development from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Economics." Urban Studies 49, no. 10 (November 10, 2011): 2265–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098011423564.

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This paper considers farmland conversion for the purpose of urban development as a series of transactions and discusses the determinants of appropriate governance structures for governing farmland conversion in terms of process efficiency. Towards this end, the paper develops a theoretical framework for analysing the process of farmland conversion based on transaction cost economics. The framework covers transactions, transaction attributes, governance structures and performance with the aim of minimising transaction costs. The paper also demonstrates the usability of the framework by creating a corresponding quantitative model for a case study in China. Furthermore, it identifies factors that influence the transaction costs associated with farmland conversion in China and explains why the related governance structures are chosen.
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5

Hsieh, Ching-Tang, Hao-Chen Huang, and Wei-Long Lee. "Using transaction cost economics to explain open innovation in start-ups." Management Decision 54, no. 9 (October 17, 2016): 2133–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-01-2016-0012.

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Purpose The basic concept of transaction cost theory is that firms like to conduct transactions in a channel with lower transaction costs. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to use the transaction cost perspective to identify which conditions cause companies to choose between outbound open innovation (hierarchy governance) and inbound open innovation (market governance). Design/methodology/approach Accordingly, transaction cost economics was used to relate the choice and implementation of open innovation using a sample of 250 electronics and information start-ups in China. Structural equation modeling was used to conduct confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate measurement model, while logistic regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. Findings As expected, the dedicated asset specificity, human asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, transaction frequency, and small number exchange were positively associated with outbound open innovation. Originality/value The contribution of this paper lies in explaining the role played by transaction cost economics in the process of open innovation for start-ups through empirical analysis.
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6

Wever, Mark, Nel Wognum, Jacques Trienekens, and Onno Omta. "Managing transaction risks in interdependent supply chains: an extended transaction cost economics perspective." Journal on Chain and Network Science 12, no. 3 (January 1, 2012): 243–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2012.x214.

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The present study examines the management of transaction risks in supply chains. Risk management studies often ignore the wider supply chain context in which individual transactions take place. However, risk management strategies which are suitable to use when only a single transaction is considered may be inappropriate when other transactions in the supply chain are taken into account. This study addresses this issue by examining: (1) how risks arise as a result of interdependencies between the various transactions making up the supply chain; and (2) what types of contractual-based strategies actors can use to manage their risk exposure. To realize these aims, the study applies an extended Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework with a supply chain orientation. The framework illustrates how different types of interdependencies - pooled, sequential and reciprocal - expose companies to different sources of risk. Three strategies companies can use when facing barriers to risk minimization in sequentially interdependent supply chains are analyzed: risk transferring, risk altering and risk sharing. Examples from the agri-food sector are discussed to demonstrate the functioning of these strategies.
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7

Pessali, Huascar F. "Metaphors of Transaction Cost Economics." Review of Social Economy 67, no. 3 (September 2009): 313–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346760801933393.

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8

Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Origins." Journal of Retailing 86, no. 3 (September 2010): 227–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2010.07.006.

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9

Williamson, Oliver E. "Technology and transaction cost economics." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 10, no. 3 (October 1988): 355–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(88)90055-8.

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10

Williamson, Oliver E. "TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: THE PRECURSORS." Economic Affairs 28, no. 3 (September 2008): 7–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00838.x.

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11

Saussier, Stéphane. "Transaction Cost Economics and Contract Duration: An Empirical Analysis of EDF Coal Contracts." Recherches économiques de Louvain 65, no. 1 (1999): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800007703.

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SummaryThis paper studies duration of inter-firm contracts in a transaction cost perspective. The aim of the paper is to test the propositions that can be derived from a transaction-cost framework. We built a non-truncated database representing the entire contractual relationships of Electricité de France (EDF) with its coal carriers and coal unloaders over the period 1977–1997. Section I explores factors that can explain the choice of contract duration. Section II describes the relationships between EDF and its suppliers. In Section III, we test and confirm most propositions derived from transaction-cost theory that relate contract duration to transaction characteristics. We believe this study to be the first attempt (1) to confirm transaction cost economics propositions using French data and (2) to endogenize asset specificity level at stake in transactions.
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12

Foss, Nicolai J. "Why transaction cost economics needs evolutionary economics." Revue d’économie industrielle 68, no. 1 (1994): 7–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rei.1994.1524.

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13

Chen, Chao C., Mike W. Peng, and Patrick A. Saparito. "Individualism, Collectivism, and Opportunism: A Cultural Perspective on Transaction Cost Economics." Journal of Management 28, no. 4 (August 2002): 567–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920630202800405.

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Researchers criticize the transaction cost economics (TCE) paradigm for over-generalizing the assumption of opportunism as human nature. We suggest that opportunistic propensity is affected by cultural prior conditioning of individualism-collectivism (I-C). Specifically, we propose that individualists have a higher opportunistic propensity in intra-group transactions, and collectivists in inter-group transactions. Our cultural specification of opportunism helps TCE to more effectively accommodate some criticisms and more realistically deal with problems of economic organization in today’s global economy.
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14

Noorderhaven, Niels. "The Argumentational Texture of Transaction Cost Economics." Organization Studies 16, no. 4 (July 1995): 605–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/017084069501600407.

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The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the problem of economic organization as formulated by William son also tends to undermine the proposed solution to this problem. The plausi bility of unified governance as a solution to the problem of opportunism in transaction relations with asset specificity is shown to hinge on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be both opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be main tained.
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15

Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression." American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June 1, 2010): 673–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.673.

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16

Maher, M. E. "Transaction cost economics and contractual relations." Cambridge Journal of Economics 21, no. 2 (March 1, 1997): 147–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a013664.

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17

Dickmann, Michael, and Shaun Tyson. "Outsourcing payroll: beyond transaction‐cost economics." Personnel Review 34, no. 4 (August 2005): 451–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00483480510599770.

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18

Pratten, Stephen. "The Nature of Transaction Cost Economics." Journal of Economic Issues 31, no. 3 (September 1997): 781–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1997.11505965.

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19

Klos, Tomas B., and Bart Nooteboom. "Agent-based computational transaction cost economics." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25, no. 3-4 (March 2001): 503–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00034-8.

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20

Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction cost economics and business administration." Scandinavian Journal of Management 21, no. 1 (March 2005): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scaman.2005.02.002.

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21

Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression☆." Journal of Retailing 86, no. 3 (September 2010): 215–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2010.07.005.

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22

Dietrich, Michael. "FIRMS, MARKETS AND TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 38, no. 1 (February 1991): 41–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1991.tb00300.x.

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23

Averyt, William F., and K. Ramagopal. "Strategic disruption and transaction cost economics." International Business Review 8, no. 1 (January 1999): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0969-5931(98)00037-7.

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24

LANGLOIS, RICHARD N. "Transaction-cost Economics in Real Time." Industrial and Corporate Change 1, no. 1 (1992): 99–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icc/1.1.99.

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25

WILLIAMSON, OLIVER E. "Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory." Industrial and Corporate Change 2, no. 1 (1993): 107–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icc/2.1.107.

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26

WILLIAMSON, OLIVER E. "Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory." Industrial and Corporate Change 2, no. 2 (1993): 107–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icc/2.2.107.

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27

Duran, Xavier, and Patrick McNutt. "Kantian ethics within transaction cost economics." International Journal of Social Economics 37, no. 10 (August 31, 2010): 755–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068291011070426.

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28

PESSALI, HUASCAR F. "The rhetoric of Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics." Journal of Institutional Economics 2, no. 1 (April 2006): 45–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137405000238.

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Bounded rationality, opportunism, the primacy of markets and the action of economizing are building blocks of Oliver Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). As in all intellectual exchanges, Williamson has used a range of argumentative devices to set up and negotiate his basic notions and assumptions with economists. Rhetorical analysis is applied here to study his argumentation in a certain institutional context within economics. Negotiations with the mainstream, with the competence view of the firm and within the New Institutional Economics, for instance, have had an impact on the construction of TCE and are given attention here. Difficult decisions have been made in order to forge ahead with TCE, including whether to uphold some notions (e.g. opportunism) at the cost of leaving others behind (e.g. economics of atmosphere). Rhetorical transactions like this have shaped TCE and its recognition in economics and related areas.
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29

See Un, Ryu. "Transaction Behavior in Nonmarket Settings: Revisiting Transaction Cost Economics Theory." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 27, no. 1 (April 30, 2012): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps27102.

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This study focuses on changes in transaction costs over time in nonmarket settings. Traditional Williamsonian transaction cost economics theory shows little concern with time. However, this study reveals that time is a crucial factor in the fluctuation of transaction costs in nonmarket settings: Transaction costs increase in the initial and middle phases of a transaction. But in the long term, they may increase or decrease and are affected considerably by whether the rules, procedures, and protocols governing the transaction are effective ("green tape") or ineffective ("red tape"). In contrast, traditional transaction cost economics assumes a gradual decrease in transaction costs over time. The passage of time and the "red tape" or "green tape" governing the transaction influence stakeholders` transaction behavior in nonmarket settings.
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30

KAN, STEVEN S. "ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND SUBJECTIVIST ECONOMICS." Journal of Enterprising Culture 01, no. 02 (November 1993): 159–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218495893000099.

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While researches along the lines of Austrian, Buchanan, and Coase’s teachings are thriving recently, they are not united. We show that conceptions of entrepreneurship and transaction costs are generally ambiguous regarding important exchange relationships because they are limited to the consideration of one-sided individual choices only. It is argued in the paper that the completion of an exchange necessarily involves at least two individuals acting in the role of the entrepreneur. In addition, transaction costs are subjective and cannot be treated as production or transportation costs. The paper distinguishes the concept of production cost from that of transaction cost, which is necessarily associated with alternative exchange or organizational opportunities, and therefore expands Buchanan’s subjectivist conception of individual cost to that of interactive transaction cost. A new definition of transaction cost and its implications to a testable theory of the determination of institutions are presented in the paper. Thus, in contrast to the general impression that entrepreneurship cannot be taught and studied, we show how it can be possible under our synthesis of entrepreneurship, transaction costs, and subjectivist economics. An example is also given to demonstrate how entrepreneurship can be taught and learned under our proposed framework.
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31

Banterle, A., S. Stranieri, and L. Baldi. "Traceability and vertical co-ordination in the Italian dairy chain: A transaction cost approach." Journal on Chain and Network Science 6, no. 1 (June 1, 2006): 69–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2006.x066.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the introduction of a voluntary traceability system affects the organisation of economic relationships throughout the Italian dairy chain. Using the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics, we assess whether traceability increases the degree of vertical co-ordination and changes the level of the transaction key features, i.e. degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions. A survey was conducted by questionnaire to assess changes in vertical relations, and to underline the different organisational solutions of dairy firms we carried out factor and cluster analysis. The results show increased bilateral dependency among the economic agents as a consequence of the rise in human, physical and site assets. At the same time, growth in the frequency and quantity of information exchanged is observed. Moreover, for medium-sized firms economic incentives play an important role in guaranteeing the safeguarding of transactions, whereas big firms adopt contractual supports.
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32

Sheen, Tae-joong. "Understanding Curriculum Implementation by Transaction Cost Economics." Journal of Curriculum Studies 38, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 153–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.15708/kscs.38.2.7.

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33

Garfamy, Reza Mohammady. "Supply Management: A Transaction Cost Economics Framework." South East European Journal of Economics and Business 7, no. 2 (November 1, 2012): 139–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10033-012-0022-6.

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Abstract Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is an economic theory that provides an analytical framework for investigating the governance structure of contractual relations within a supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to examine existing research in an effort to understand the potential effects of transaction costs on the vertical coordination of a supply chain. The paper arrives at many insights into how supply chains are organized under different governance structures. These insights can certainly be shared via the development and introduction of related propositions. The conceptual typology of contractual relations developed herein can help researchers better understand the scope of both the problems and the opportunities associated with supply management. It will be of value, therefore, not only to researchers who desire to expand their research into this area, but also to those who have already investigated this topic in isolation or with limited scope.
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34

Gibbons, Robert. "Transaction-Cost Economics: Past, Present, and Future?" Scandinavian Journal of Economics 112, no. 2 (June 2010): 263–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01609.x.

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35

Mick, Stephen S. Farnsworth, and Patrick D. Shay. "Accountable Care Organizations and Transaction Cost Economics." Medical Care Research and Review 73, no. 6 (August 3, 2016): 649–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077558716640411.

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Using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach, this paper explores which organizational forms Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may take. A critical question about form is the amount of vertical integration that an ACO may have, a topic central to TCE. We posit that contextual factors outside and inside an ACO will produce variable transaction costs (the non-production costs of care) such that the decision to integrate vertically will derive from a comparison of these external versus internal costs, assuming reasonably rational management abilities. External costs include those arising from environmental uncertainty and complexity, small numbers bargaining, asset specificity, frequency of exchanges, and information “impactedness.” Internal costs include those arising from human resource activities including hiring and staffing, training, evaluating (i.e., disciplining, appraising, or promoting), and otherwise administering programs. At the extreme, these different costs may produce either total vertical integration or little to no vertical integration with most ACOs falling in between. This essay demonstrates how TCE can be applied to the ACO organization form issue, explains TCE, considers ACO activity from the TCE perspective, and reflects on research directions that may inform TCE and facilitate ACO development.
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36

Joskow, P. L. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2002): 95–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.1.95.

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37

Foss, Nicolai J. "Transaction cost economics in Scandinavian business administration." Scandinavian Journal of Management 21, no. 1 (March 2005): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scaman.2005.02.001.

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38

Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction cost economics and the Carnegie connection." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 31, no. 2 (November 1996): 149–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00898-0.

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39

Englander, Ernest J. "Technology and Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 10, no. 3 (October 1988): 339–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(88)90054-6.

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40

O'BRIEN, JONATHAN P., and PATRICK L. MCCLELLAND. "TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND CEO STOCK-HOLDINGS." Academy of Management Proceedings 2008, no. 1 (August 2008): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2008.33718587.

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41

Saravia Matus, Jimmy A., and Silvia Saravia-Matus. "Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure." Corporate Board role duties and composition 12, no. 1 (2016): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv12i1art4.

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This paper extends the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of the equity governance structure by introducing a (hitherto absent) full analysis of the key TCE issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the analysis for the topic of corporate governance and firm performance. We find that when bilateral dependency holds contractual hazards are mitigated as predicted by TCE, but that when it does not contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and managerial discretion costs increase as reflected by lower firm valuation. Importantly, our study documents for the first time a class of transactions where business relationships persist indefinitely even though transaction costs are not minimized.
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42

VORONOVA, Ekaterina Yu, and Аnna А. VEKSHINA. "A model of accounting and analytical support of cost optimization in the context of new institutionalism." International Accounting 25, no. 12 (December 15, 2022): 1360–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/ia.25.12.1360.

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Subject. This article deals with the theoretical and methodological features of the formation of accounting and analytical support for transformation and transaction cost optimization. Objectives. The article aims to indicate the need to classify costs according to their belonging to transactions and disclose the theoretical and methodological features in the context of accounting and analytical cost optimization support. Methods. For the study, we used general scientific methods (analysis, comparison and interpretation) and statistical methods in economics. The results of the study are shown in tabular and graphical forms. Results. The article defines the notion of Transaction Cost and the need to decompose cost into transformation and transaction parts to take measures to optimize the level of costs. It systematizes the theoretical and methodological features of accounting and analytical models for transformation and transaction cost optimization. The article also proposes to integrate digital technologies into the management cost accounting system. Conclusions and Relevance. The article justifies the necessity to break costs into transformation and transaction parts for these types of cost have different approaches to the accounting and analytical support formation for optimization. The organization of accounting and analysis of costs by their belonging to transactions can improve the quality of accounting and analytical support and, consequently, the information base for management decisions. At present, the digital technologies that can be used in financial and operational activities contribute to cost reduction.
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43

Yuan, Dinghuan, Yung Yau, Wenyi Lin, and Jianxin Cheng. "An Analysis of Transaction Costs Involved in the Urban Village Redevelopment Process in China." Buildings 12, no. 5 (May 22, 2022): 692. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/buildings12050692.

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A well-designed institutional arrangement for urban village redevelopment projects (UVRPs) must consider transaction costs, but academic papers discussing it from the perspective of transaction cost economics are lacking. This paper applies theory of transaction cost economics to analyse the types and sizes of transaction costs and who bears these costs during redevelopment when implementing UVRPs in China. This paper finds that transactions in UVRPs have high asset specificity, high uncertainty and low frequency, which easily results in high levels of transaction costs. Based on 439 UVRPs collected from seven cities, this paper finds that UVRPs implemented with top–down institutional arrangements remain prevalent in China. Based on semi-structured interviews with participating parties, this paper proves that the sizes and types of transaction costs and the distribution of these costs borne by different participating parties vary with the change of stage under dissimilar institutional arrangements. This implies that a high level of transaction costs at one stage does not necessarily mean the costs stay high at another stage. Transaction costs have essential implications for process efficiency, so policymakers need to consider transaction costs and use hybrid institutional arrangements to enhance the efficiency and sustainability of policies.
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44

Peneva Todorova, Tamara. "The tragedy of the private: transaction cost considerations." International Journal of Social Economics 41, no. 6 (June 3, 2014): 482–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijse-02-2011-0069.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to weigh the benefits and costs of public property, as opposed to private, from the transaction cost perspective. In the absence of transaction costs, private property has clear advantages over public. However, when the true costs of running an economic system are taken into account, the advantages of private property are not so evident and public property may turn out to be the preferred form of ownership. The paper shows that in high-transaction cost sectors and economies such as the newly emerging markets in Eastern Europe, public property is a cheaper way of organizing economic activities, as it can save on transaction costs. The paper demonstrates these virtues of public ownership in relation to market failure, the provision of public goods, natural monopolies and competitive industries with a high degree of market uncertainty, opportunism and asset specificity. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative paper discussing the advantages of public over private property in the presence of high-transaction costs. Findings – Studying different types of market failure the paper finds that public property is advantageous to private in high-transaction cost systems. Originality/value – Since most of the standard literature emphasizes the advantages of private property, the paper gives an economic explanation to those of public property taking on a new institutional approach and conducting a transaction cost analysis.
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45

Hoang, Dung Phuong, and Thong Huy Vu. "A transaction cost explanation of the card-or-cash decision among Vietnamese debit card holders." International Journal of Bank Marketing 38, no. 7 (March 6, 2020): 1635–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijbm-05-2019-0191.

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PurposeThis research provides a new perspective in explaining cardholders' willingness to use debit cards instead of cash by applying the transaction costs economic theory. This study also expands the adaptation of transaction cost economics theory in explaining consumer behaviour by investigating the moderating effects of income and education level on the relationship between perceived transaction costs and willingness to use debit cards.Design/methodology/approachThe conceptual framework was developed primarily from the transaction cost economics theory. An in-depth interview method was employed to further support hypothesis development and the development of measurement scales. A structural equation model linking asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, frequency of payment, perceived monitoring costs, perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards was tested using data from a sample of 384 Vietnamese debit card holders.FindingsThis study's results support the transaction cost economics theory that asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of payment all positively contribute to the perceived transaction costs associated with debit card usage. However, only environmental uncertainty and perceived adaptation costs have significant negative impact on willingness to use debit cards, with the relationship between environmental uncertainty and willingness to use debit cards being totally mediated by perceived adaptation costs. Moreover, the relationship between perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards becomes less negative among richer and better-educated cardholders.Practical implicationsThe research provides insights into the hidden obstacles for developing cashless economies, thereby supporting policy makers in designing more effective and comprehensive strategies to make debit cards more widely used as a true substitute for cash.Originality/valueThis study provides a new lens in explaining customer willingness to use debit cards, while expanding the transaction costs economics theory by incorporating demographic factors as moderators in the relationship between transaction costs and the card-or-cash choice.
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46

Yang, Zhi Xue. "Research on Trade Model of Transaction Costs Based on Ecommerce." Applied Mechanics and Materials 26-28 (June 2010): 218–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.26-28.218.

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Transaction cost is one of these costs, but mostly mentioned with trade barriers. The trade barrier, also called tariff barracks or non- tariff barracks, focus on the problems that affect transactions in international trade. Transaction cost in economics can be defined as a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. There are a number of kinds of transaction cost have been researched by economists, “search and information costs” (such as those incurred in determining that the required good is available on the market, who has the lowest price.), “Bargaining costs” (the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the transaction, drawing up an appropriate contract and so on.), “Policing and enforcement costs” (the costs of making sure the other party sticks to the terms of the contract, and taking appropriate action if this turns out not to be the case.). Along with the fast development of e-commerce, a new kind of trade barriers, which is called e-commerce barrier, based on information technology appears quietly, in recent years. Though the emergence of this barracks does not been focused by world, it has profoundly affected international trade already.
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47

Miah, Mohammad Dulal, Mohammed Usman, and Yasushi Suzuki. "Economic Considerations of Legal Delimitation: Evidence from Judicial Verdicts in Bangladesh Courts." Jurnal Institutions and Economies 13, no. 3 (August 4, 2021): 115–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/ijie.vol13no3.5.

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The literature on law and economics argues that economic considerations have an important implication for consistent and efficient legal practices. In line with this tradition, this paper aims to analyse legal verdicts through the lens of transaction cost to ascertain if judicial decision takes social cost into account. In so doing, the research draws upon the literature of transaction cost theory, which examines the implications of transaction cost for legal verdicts. Data for the analysis consist of legal verdicts collected from Bangladesh. The paper shows that judicial decisions are influenced by economic matters, especially social and transaction costs. When the issue of these costs is clear, judges take this into consideration in deciding who should own what rights. This research contributes to the literature of law and economics by providing new information, which is believed to help regulators, policymakers, and legal practitioners in deciding value-creating property rights.
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48

Lioukas, Constantinos S., and Jeffrey J. Reuer. "Choosing Between Safeguards: Scope and Governance Decisions in R&D Alliances." Journal of Management 46, no. 3 (August 20, 2018): 359–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206318795240.

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Research on transaction cost economics has emphasized the choice of an appropriate governance structure as an important mechanism in alleviating exchange hazards in interfirm transactions, yet firms may also manipulate the characteristics of a transaction to make it less hazardous in the first place by carefully selecting the activities or assets involved in the transaction. In this paper, we explore this theoretical issue in transaction cost economics by examining how firms design R&D alliances to mitigate appropriation hazards in these interfirm transactions. In particular, we investigate when firms will prefer to limit the scope of functional activities involved in an R&D alliance, thus addressing appropriation hazards directly by manipulating the alliance’s characteristics, versus when they will opt for an equity-based governance structure in order to mitigate appropriation hazards ex post. We argue that firms are more likely to limit the scope of alliance activities rather than choose an equity-based governance structure when there are multiple partners in an alliance and when the partners are from different nations, because monitoring and other control mechanisms become more cumbersome and problematic in these circumstances. In contrast, firms that are direct competitors are more likely to choose an equity-based governance structure in order to mitigate exchange hazards, such as knowledge misappropriation, through carefully monitored knowledge sharing. Empirical analysis of data on R&D alliances in a variety of industries provides support for our arguments regarding alliances involving multiple partners and alliances between competitors. We discuss the implications of our study for research on transaction cost economics.
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Nguvava, Heriel Emanuel. "Influence of Transaction Cost Determinants on Credit Customer Category of Commercial Banks in Tanzania." African Journal of Accounting and Social Science Studies 4, no. 1 (August 18, 2022): 244–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajasss.v4i1.13.

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The provision of credit services in rural areas is a challenge as agriculture and other rural economic activities have unique characteristics of dependence on natural resources, long production cycles and vulnerability to multiple risks. This paper aims to analyse transaction cost as the determinants of the choice of credit customer category for commercial bank’s credit business scale-up in Tanzania. Primary data for this study were collected from 37 registered and licensed commercial banks in January 2018 through structured questionnaires. The main sources of secondary data were peer-reviewed journal articles on transaction cost economics and rural financing. Data were analysed quantitatively through the logistic regression method. Key findings revealed that commercial banks have failed to scale up their credit operations to rural-based customers due to high transaction costs. This fact emanated from commercial banks’ preference of transacting credits directly with individual borrowers instead of using intermediaries, thus multiplying transaction costs, especially when dealing with rural-based borrowers. Therefore, commercial banks believe to be better off with few urban-based credit customers. This study recommended that commercial banks should use multiple credit governance structures (CGSs)\ (methods for credits delivery) to mitigate transaction costs when giving credits. Direct channels should be opted for when dealing with urban-based borrowers since low transaction costs are involved. Indirect channels with intermediaries should be opted for when scaling-up credit operations to rural-based borrowers since they allow the spreading of credit transaction costs throughout the credit supply channel.
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Coronado, Jose Jaime Arana, Jos Bijman, Onno Omta, and Alfons Oude Lansink. "Relationship characteristics and performance in fresh produce supply chains: the case of the Mexican avocado industry." Journal on Chain and Network Science 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2010.x101.

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Inter-organisational relations research has shown that relationship characteristics can influence performance in seller-buyer transactions. Using a transaction cost economics approach, this research shows that relational elements such as expectation of continuity reduce the transaction risks related to behavioural uncertainty or asset specificity. However, transaction costs are not only caused by transaction risks but also by the need to coordinate the individual activities of the buyer and the seller. Inter-organisational coordination is important in transactions with perishable products and products with credence attributes, such as in fresh produce supply chains. To study the impact of different relationship characteristics on the efficiency of transactions in a fresh produce supply chain, we collected and analyzed data from 122 avocado producers in Mexico. We found that information exchange and producer expectation of continuity of the relationship positively affect performance in the seller-buyer transaction. While expectation of continuity leads to lower transaction costs associated with behavioural uncertainty, information exchange facilitates the efficient alignment of interdependent activities.
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