Relevant bibliographies by topics / Tournaments

Academic literature on the topic 'Tournaments'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 29 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Tournaments"

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Kersting, Lee, Robert N. Marley, and Mark J. Mellon. "Tournament Horizon: A Marathon or a Sprint? It Depends Upon the Level of Heterogeneity in Ability Among Employees." Journal of Management Accounting Research 31, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52115.

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ABSTRACT When choosing to implement a tournament to improve employee performance, managers may choose between two horizons: a single tournament (grand tournament) or a series of consecutive shorter tournaments (repeated tournament). This study extends prior research by investigating whether the level of heterogeneity in ability among employees competing in a tournament affects their tournament performance. Heterogeneity in ability refers to the degree of task ability variation within a tournament group. We examine tournament groups where the task ability of tournament participants is homogeneous (similar) or heterogeneous (varied). We find when employees' ability is heterogeneous, repeated tournaments yield greater employee performance than in grand tournaments. However, when employees' ability is homogeneous, we find no difference in employee performance between repeated tournaments and grand tournaments. Our results extend the management accounting literature by documenting that the effect of tournament horizon on employee performance depends upon the degree of heterogeneity in ability among employees.
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Li, Zejun, Chengyuan Wang, Qiong Wang, and Biao Luo. "A review on risk-taking in tournaments." Journal of Modelling in Management 14, no. 2 (May 10, 2019): 559–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jm2-09-2018-0145.

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Purpose This paper aims to summarize antecedents and consequences of risk-taking in tournaments and show the development of tournament optimization considering risk-taking. Moreover, further expansion expectations related to antecedents and consequences of risk-taking in tournaments and tournament optimization considering risk-taking are discussed. Design/methodology/approach A comprehensive bibliographic retrieval and further literature review and systematics re-organization are used to build the framework with respect to risk-taking in tournaments. Then, qualitative analysis is used to present conclusions of existing research. Findings By summarizing various antecedents, different consequences and tournament optimizations with regard to risk-taking in tournaments of existing research, the authors present a series of research opportunities regarding risk-taking in tournaments that can propel the advancement of tournament theory. Originality/value The studies on risk-taking in tournament have been recently received wide attention and are growing vigorously. Based on the summary and re-organization, the framework of literature studying risk-taking in tournaments is built. This literature review also helps researchers learn the advance of risk-taking in tournament and provides fruitful direction for future research on this topic.
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Choi, Jongwoon (Willie), Andrew H. Newman, and Ivo D. Tafkov. "A Marathon, a Series of Sprints, or Both? Tournament Horizon and Dynamic Task Complexity in Multi-Period Settings." Accounting Review 91, no. 5 (December 1, 2015): 1391–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51358.

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ABSTRACT When using a tournament in multi-period settings, firms have discretion in selecting the tournament horizon. For example, firms can use a single tournament (a grand tournament) or a sequence of multiple tournaments, each with a shorter horizon than a grand tournament (a repeated tournament). Firms have also begun to use a combination of both in which a repeated tournament is embedded within a grand tournament (a hybrid tournament). Using an experiment, we investigate whether the effect of tournament horizon on performance depends on the dynamic complexity of the task, which reflects the potential for effort in one period to influence the link between effort and performance in future periods. When dynamic task complexity is low, we find that performance is greatest in the hybrid tournament, followed by the repeated and then the grand tournament. In contrast, when dynamic task complexity is high, we find that performance is greatest in the repeated tournament, followed by the grand and hybrid tournaments, with similar performance in the latter two tournaments. More generally, the results of our experiment suggest that the effect of tournament horizon on performance depends on dynamic task complexity. These results can help firms make better decisions when designing their tournaments by reinforcing the need to align the tournament horizon with the task.
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Berger, Leslie, Kenneth J. Klassen, Theresa Libby, and Alan Webb. "Complacency and Giving Up Across Repeated Tournaments: Evidence from the Field." Journal of Management Accounting Research 25, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 143–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50435.

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ABSTRACT Tournament incentive schemes involve individuals competing against each other for a single or limited number of rewards (e.g., promotion, bonus, pay raise). Although research shows tournament schemes can have positive effects on performance, there is also evidence of dysfunctional intra-tournament behavior by top performers (complacency) and weak performers (giving up). However, few studies have examined behavior in organizational settings, not uncommon in practice, where tournaments are conducted on a repeated basis. We predict that complacency and giving up will generalize to settings where individuals repeatedly compete in successive short-duration tournaments. We test our predictions using archival data from a reservation center of a major hotel chain that employs repeated four-week tournaments where performance does not carryover from one competition to the next. Results show top performers quickly become complacent in response to success in early tournaments. The lowest-performing losers in early tournaments eventually appear to give up, but additional analysis indicates they only do so after unsuccessfully changing task strategy. Our results contribute to a better understanding of individual behavior in settings where individuals repeatedly compete against largely the same group of employees. Our evidence also suggests that tournaments are less effective at sustaining the motivation of the most capable performers and other approaches may be necessary.
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Fisher, David C., and Jennifer Ryan. "Tournament games and positive tournaments." Journal of Graph Theory 19, no. 2 (March 1995): 217–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jgt.3190190208.

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Wapner, Leonard M. "An unexpected characteristic of tournament predictive power." Mathematical Gazette 105, no. 563 (June 21, 2021): 201–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mag.2021.47.

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A tournament is a series of games (matches) among competitors for an overall prize. Beyond sporting events, tournament structure can relate to elections, applicants competing for an employment position, etc. Tournament structure also exists within certain species of birds and mammals where dominance relations develop, forming a tournament-like pecking structure [1]. The format of the tournament depends on the tournament’s objective giving consideration to time, financial, geographical, and other constraints. The two most common formats where players compete pairwise are the single elimination (knockout, sudden death) tournament and the round robin tournament. Our discussion includes both. A third popular format is that of a contest, where all players perform simultaneously only once. Examples of this type include most golf tournaments as well as track and field athletic events. A detailed analysis of contests as they relate to topics discussed here is given in [2].
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Naikoo, T. A. "On scores in tournaments." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica 10, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 257–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ausi-2018-0013.

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Abstract A tournament is an orientation of a complete simple graph. The score of a vertex in a tournament is the outdegree of the vertex. In this paper, we obtain various results on the scores in tournaments.
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Banks, George C., Christopher E. Whelpley, Eean R. Crawford, Ernest H. O’Boyle, and Sven Kepes. "Getting along to get ahead: The role of social context in tournament promotion and reward systems." PLOS ONE 16, no. 9 (September 20, 2021): e0257389. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257389.

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Tournament theory posits that some organizations are modeled after sports tournaments whereby individuals are incentivized to compete and win against other members of the organization. A persistent criticism of tournament theory is that rank-order success of employees is entirely dependent on non-interacting or at least non-cooperating entities. To address what part, if any, cooperation plays in competitive tournaments, this study examines the role of social networks in tournament-style promotion and reward systems. Specifically, we seek to identify the importance of social relationships, such as group dissimilarity, initial tie formation, and tie strength in predicting tournament success. Bringing two largely independent research streams together (one focused on cooperation and one framed around competition), we examine how individuals’ performance interacts with their social relationships—their social networks—to influence their chances of winning a tournament. Using the Survivor television series, we analyze the behaviors of 535 interacting contestants across 30 tournaments. In general, the findings help to illustrate how performance and social networks predict tournament advancement. Interestingly, we find that group dissimilarity based on gender, race, and age, largely does not play a role in advancement in the tournaments. Further, the strength of ties fails to mediate between variables such as group dissimilarity and initial tie formation. We conclude by discussing future directions for theoretical and practical exploration of tournament-style promotion systems. Recommendations include continuing to explore and test the role of social dynamics in compensation and promotion systems.
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Glökler, Thomas, Kerstin Pull, and Manfred Stadler. "Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments?" Games 13, no. 5 (September 30, 2022): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13050065.

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We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output (“variable prize tournaments”) can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament structures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments where prizes depend on contestants’ joint output. Our analysis suggests that the incentives to sabotage in a fixed-prize tournament may be counteracted in a variable-prize tournament such that contestants no longer sabotage, but help one another. We empirically test the implications of our model with the help of a classroom experiment where we compare participants’ choices in a fixed-prize treatment () with those of a variable-prize treatment () in a between-subjects design. Given our parametrization, we expect efforts to be identical in both treatments, and we expect sabotage in the treatment and no sabotage in the treatment. In accordance with the model, we find that participants in the fixed-prize tournament sabotage one another, whereas participants in the variable-prize tournament help one another. At the same time, participants’ effort levels do not vary between the two treatments.
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Sakti, Rachmad Pujo, and Gancar Candra Premananto. "The Effect of Attitude Towards Watching MPL ID Tournaments in Cinema, Subjective Norms, Perceived Behavioral Control, E-WOM, and Involvement on Intention Watching MPL ID Tournaments in Cinema." Southeast Asian Business Review 1, no. 1 (August 23, 2023): 47–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/sabr.v1i1.47209.

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This research examined the effect of attitudes towards watching MPL ID tournaments in cinemas, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, involvement, and E-WOM on intentions to watch MPL ID tournaments in cinemas. This research used a quantitative approach using multiple linear regression analysis testing techniques. The research data were obtained from questionnaires distributed online via Google Forms to respondents with predetermined criteria. These criteria include being at least 18 years old, being a gamer, and having never watched an MPL ID tournament in a cinema. The total number of respondents obtained was 136 respondents. This study uses a 5-point Likert scale. The study results show that attitudes toward watching MPL ID tournaments in cinemas, subjective norms, involvement, and E-WOM affect intentions to watch MPL ID tournaments in cinemas. However, perceived behavioral control does not positively affect the intention to watch the MPL ID tournament in cinemas.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Tournaments"

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Nieken, Petra. "Tournaments, risk and careers /." Aachen : Shaker, 2009. http://d-nb.info/993053238/04.

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Wu, Maoguo. "Promotion tournaments and hierarchy." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2012. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=192271.

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This thesis studies promotion tournaments and hierarchy, through both theoretical and empirical means. The data set utilised through- out the thesis for empirical tests consists of a large panel gathered from a major British financial sector firm. The data set has very detailed and consistent data on job levels, which are particularly well suited for studies of transitions across levels. The thesis first investigates one main assumption of the tournament theory, i.e., hierarchy is relatively fixed, and finds support in empirical results that external hiring number, promotion into level number, promotion out of level number, and exit number are closely related. The thesis then extends the conventional tournament model to a multi-contestant multi-prize setting and sets out to test the theoretical model predictions. Following the predictions, an empirical model of promotion probabilities is tested. Fixity of hierarchy, proxied by external hiring rate and exit rate, along with conventional promotion determinants, are included in the estimation. The results shed light on a distinct finding that fixity of hierarchy plays an important role in promotion outcomes, i.e., vacancies influence promotion probabilities, and incentives vary closely with promotion probabilities. The relation between incentives and promotion probabilities can be characterised as a hump shape. The results also indicate that promotion requirement would even get weakened if a large number of vacancies emerged. The thesis also compares two alternative promotion rules, tournaments versus standards. The theoretical model argues that tournaments and standards have similar incentive effect on inducing effort. In tournaments, maximal incentive occurs for intermediate promotion rates, and lower incentive occurs for lower and higher promotion rates. In standards, maximal incentive occurs when the standard is set so that the chance of promotion is a half, and lower incentive occurs when the standard is set so that the chance of promotion is far from a half. The empirical tests address the extent to which promotions within organisations are driven by relative comparisons of worker performance and comparisons of worker performance against absolute standards. The results provide evidence that relative comparisons become more important at higher hierarchical levels.
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Coregliano, Leonardo Nagami. "Flag algebras and tournaments." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/45/45134/tde-12082015-093248/.

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Alexander A. Razborov (2007) developed the theory of flag algebras to compute the minimum asymptotic density of triangles in a graph as a function of its edge density. The theory of flag algebras, however, can be used to study the asymptotic density of several combinatorial objects. In this dissertation, we present two original results obtained in the theory of tournaments through application of flag algebra proof techniques. The first result concerns minimization of the asymptotic density of transitive tournaments in a sequence of tournaments, which we prove to occur if and only if the sequence is quasi-random. As a byproduct, we also obtain new quasi-random characterizations and several other flag algebra elements whose density is minimized if and only if the sequence is quasi-random. The second result concerns a class of equivalent properties of a sequence of tournaments that we call quasi-carousel properties and that, in a similar fashion as quasi-random properties, force the sequence to converge to a specific limit homomorphism. Several quasi-carousel properties, when compared to quasi-random properties, suggest that quasi-random sequences and quasi-carousel sequences are the furthest possible from each other within the class of almost balanced sequences.
Alexander A. Razborov (2007) desenvolveu a teoria de álgebras de flags para calcular a densidade assintótica mínima de triângulos em um grafo em função de sua densidade de arestas. A teoria das álgebras de flags, contudo, pode ser usada para estudar densidades assintóticas de diversos objetos combinatórios. Nesta dissertação, apresentamos dois resultados originais obtidos na teoria de torneios através de técnicas de demonstração de álgebras de flags. O primeiro resultado compreende a minimização da densidade assintótica de torneios transitivos em uma sequência de torneios, a qual provamos ocorrer se e somente se a sequência é quase aleatória. Como subprodutos, obtemos também novas caracterizações de quase aleatoriedade e diversos outros elementos da álgebra de flags cuja densidade é minimizada se e somente se a sequência é quase aleatória. O segundo resultado compreende uma classe de propriedades equivalentes sobre uma sequência de torneios que chamamos de propriedades quase carrossel e que, de uma forma similar às propriedades quase aleatórias, forçam que a sequência convirja para um homomorfismo limite específico. Várias propriedades quase carrossel, quando comparadas às propriedades quase aleatórias, sugerem que sequências quase aleatórias e sequências quase carrossel estão o mais distantes possível umas das outras na classe de sequências quase balanceadas.
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Nieken, Petra. "Tournaments, risk and careers." Aachen Shaker, 2008. http://d-nb.info/993053238/04.

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Williamson, Craig W. "Tournament-associated mortality and the effects of culling in Wisconsin black bass (Micropterus spp.) tournaments /." Link to full text, 2007. http://epapers.uwsp.edu/thesis/2007/williamson.pdf.

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Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stevens Point, 2007.
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree Master of Science in Natural Resources, College of Natural Resources. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-81).
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Ale‘s, Janez. "Automorphism groups of Walecki tournaments." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0027/NQ51834.pdf.

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Winzen, Stefan. "Close to regular multipartite tournaments." kostenfrei, 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=974007501.

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Souza, Junior Celso Vila Nova de. "Tournaments in the public sector." Thesis, Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/22538.

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Wood, Kathryn L. B. "Multipartite tournaments and the push operation." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0009/MQ41390.pdf.

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Nieken, Petra [Verfasser]. "Tournaments, Risk and Careers / Petra Nieken." Aachen : Shaker, 2009. http://d-nb.info/116131167X/34.

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Books on the topic "Tournaments"

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Callow, Nick. The Ryder Cup: The complete history of golf's greatest competition. London: Carlton, 2012.

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Armentrout, David. Hockey--leagues and tournaments. Vero Beach, Fla: Rourke Press, 1998.

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Price, Brian R. The book of the tournament. 2nd ed. [Union City, Calif.]: Chivalry Bookshelf, 2002.

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Price, Brian R. The book of the tournament. [S.l.]: Chicago Spectrum Press, 1991.

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Savage, Jim. The encyclopedia of the NCAA Basketball Tournament: The complete guide to college basketball's championship event. New York: Dell, 1990.

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Crouch, David. Tournament. London: Hambledon and London, 2005.

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Dimer, J., and W. Schlage. Der zwanzigste, einundzwanzigste, zweiundzwanzigste und dreiundzwanzigste Kongress des Deutschen Schachbundes. Zürich: Editions Olms, 1985.

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McKee, Steve. The call of the game. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.

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Mezhenskiĭ, Ruslan. Nashe Evro: Vse o chempionate Evropy po futbolu v Ukraine i Polʹshe. Kiev: Buks Media Toĭs, 2012.

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Graubart, Julian I. Golf's greatest championship: The 1960 U.S. Open. 5th ed. Lanham, Md: Taylor Trade Pub., 2010.

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Book chapters on the topic "Tournaments"

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Walter, Gilbert G., and Martha Contreras. "Tournaments." In Compartmental Modeling with Networks, 41–46. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1590-5_5.

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Eriksson, Tor. "Tournaments." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 13723–26. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2950.

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Eriksson, Tor. "Tournaments." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–4. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2950-1.

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Govindasamy, Ramu, Joseph A. Herriges, and Jason F. Shogren. "Nonpoint Tournaments." In Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis, 87–105. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8346-6_4.

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Dotú, Iván, Álvaro del Val, and Pascal Van Hentenryck. "Scheduling Social Tournaments." In Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming - CP 2005, 845. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11564751_83.

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Winter, Stefan. "Tournaments und Beförderungsanreize." In Personal, 129–44. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86608-0_6.

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Beygelzimer, Alina, John Langford, and Pradeep Ravikumar. "Error-Correcting Tournaments." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 247–62. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04414-4_22.

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Richardson, Glenn. "Tournaments and hunting." In Early Modern Court Culture, 518–33. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429277986-40.

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Vamplew, Wray. "Tournaments and Leagues." In Sports Economics for Non-Economists, 72–84. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003128632-9.

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Chu, Marcus P. "Leveraging FIFA Tournaments." In Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, 7–38. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_2.

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Conference papers on the topic "Tournaments"

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Suksompong, Warut. "Tournaments in Computational Social Choice: Recent Developments." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/626.

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Tournaments are commonly used to select winning alternatives in scenarios involving pairwise comparisons such as sports competitions and political elections. This survey discusses recent developments in two major lines of work—tournament solutions and single-elimination tournaments—with a focus on how computational social choice has brought new frameworks and perspectives into these decades-old studies.
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Manurangsi, Pasin, and Warut Suksompong. "Fixing Knockout Tournaments With Seeds." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/59.

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Knockout tournaments constitute a popular format for organizing sports competitions. While prior results have shown that it is often possible to manipulate a knockout tournament by fixing the bracket, these results ignore the prevalent aspect of player seeds, which can significantly constrain the chosen bracket. We show that certain structural conditions that guarantee that a player can win a knockout tournament without seeds are no longer sufficient in light of seed constraints. On the other hand, we prove that when the pairwise match outcomes are generated randomly, all players are still likely to be knockout winners under the same probability threshold with seeds as without seeds. In addition, we investigate the complexity of deciding whether a manipulation is possible when seeds are present.
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Manurangsi, Pasin, and Warut Suksompong. "Generalized Kings and Single-Elimination Winners in Random Tournaments." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/46.

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Tournaments can be used to model a variety of practical scenarios including sports competitions and elections. A natural notion of strength of alternatives in a tournament is a generalized king: an alternative is said to be a k-king if it can reach every other alternative in the tournament via a directed path of length at most k. In this paper, we provide an almost complete characterization of the probability threshold such that all, a large number, or a small number of alternatives are k-kings with high probability in two random models. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, all changes in the threshold occur in the regime of constant k, with the biggest change being between k = 2 and k = 3. In addition, we establish an asymptotically tight bound on the probability threshold for which all alternatives are likely able to win a single-elimination tournament under some bracket.
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Chaudhary, Juhi, Hendrik Molter, and Meirav Zehavi. "Parameterized Analysis of Bribery in Challenge the Champ Tournaments." In Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-24}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/299.

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Challenge the champ tournaments are one of the simplest forms of competition, where a (initially selected) champ is repeatedly challenged by other players. If a player beats the champ, then that player is considered the new (current) champ. Each player in the competition challenges the current champ once in a fixed order. The champ of the last round is considered the winner of the tournament. We investigate a setting where players can be bribed to lower their winning probability against the initial champ. The goal is to maximize the probability of the initial champ winning the tournament by bribing the other players, while not exceeding a given budget for the bribes. In previous work is was shown that the problem can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time, and that it is in XP when parameterized by the number of players. We show that the problem is weakly NP-hard and W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of players. On the algorithmic side, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized either by the number of different bribe values or the number of different probability values. To this end, we establish several results that are of independent interest. In particular, we show that the product knapsack problem is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of items in the knapsack, and that constructive bribery for cup tournaments is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of players. Furthermore, we present a novel way of designing mixed integer linear programs, ensuring optimal solutions where all variables are integers.
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Gupta, Sushmita, Saket Saurabh, Ramanujan Sridharan, and Meirav Zehavi. "On Succinct Encodings for the Tournament Fixing Problem." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/46.

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Single-elimination tournaments are a popular format in competitive environments. The Tournament Fixing Problem (TFP), which is the problem of finding a seeding of the players such that a certain player wins the resulting tournament, is known to be NP-hard in general and fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the feedback arc set number of the input tournament (an oriented complete graph) of expected wins/loses. However, the existence of polynomial kernelizations (efficient preprocessing) for TFP has remained open. In this paper, we present the first polynomial kernelization for TFP parameterized by the feedback arc set number of the input tournament. We achieve this by providing a polynomial-time routine that computes a SAT encoding where the number of clauses is bounded polynomially in the feedback arc set number.
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Chen, Yiling, Sharad Goel, and David M. Pennock. "Pricing combinatorial markets for tournaments." In the 40th annual ACM symposium. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1374376.1374421.

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Straub, Tim, Timm Teubner, and Christof Weinhardt. "Risk Taking in Online Crowdsourcing Tournaments." In 2016 49th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2016.235.

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Brcanov, Dejan, Vojislav Petrovic, Theodore E. Simos, George Psihoyios, and Ch Tsitouras. "Kings in Multipartite Tournaments And Hypertournaments." In NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS: International Conference on Numerical Analysis and Applied Mathematics 2009: Volume 1 and Volume 2. AIP, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3241303.

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Lux, Mathias, Pål Halvorsen, Duc-Tien Dang-Nguyen, Håkon Stensland, Manoj Kesavulu, Martin Potthast, and Michael Riegler. "Summarizing E-sports matches and tournaments." In the 11th ACM Workshop. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3304113.3326116.

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Helmuth, Thomas, Lee Spector, and Brian Martin. "Size-based tournaments for node selection." In the 13th annual conference companion. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2001858.2002095.

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Reports on the topic "Tournaments"

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Deng, Shanglyu, Hanming Fang, Qiang Fu, and Zenan Wu. Confidence Management in Tournaments. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27186.

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Reid, K. B. Tournaments in Consensus Methods Based on Voting; Dominance in Tournaments; Centrality in Graphs. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, June 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada349114.

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Ehrenberg, Ronald, and Michael Bognanno. Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2638.

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Rosen, Sherwin. Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1668.

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Soroker, Danny. Optimal Parallel Construction of Prescribed Tournaments. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada603999.

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Glaeser, Edward, Andrew Hillis, Scott Duke Kominers, and Michael Luca. Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22124.

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Bar-Noy, Amotz, and Joseph Naor. Sorting, Minimal Feedback Sets and Hamilton Paths in Tournaments,. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada328575.

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Brown, Jennifer, and Dylan Minor. Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17639.

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Fernandez, Raquel, and Jordi Gali. To Each According To...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5930.

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Schwarz, Michael, and Sergei Severinov. Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15136.

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