Journal articles: 'Toleration – Philosophy'

1

Passmore, John. "Fanaticism, Toleration and Philosophy." Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 2 (June 2003): 211–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00175.

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Khameh, Armin. "Political toleration, exclusionary reasoning and the extraordinary politics." Philosophy & Social Criticism 43, no. 6 (August 26, 2016): 646–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453716662499.

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Western societies today are marked by a broad liberal consensus in favor of toleration. Yet, some philosophers have charged that political toleration as a liberal ideal is incoherent. Some have argued that toleration is incompatible with liberal political orders due to egalitarian considerations. Others have suggested that in a truly liberal society, where the state’s justice-based duties of non-interference are the most appropriate response to diversity, political toleration is practically redundant. This article defends political toleration against the above allegations. My goal is twofold: first of all, to formulate a coherent conception of toleration that is fully consistent with the egalitarian spirit of our times and then to demonstrate that, contrary to critics’ claims, political toleration is not an obsolete ideal that belongs to a bygone era. And all this because, I believe, in a liberal constitutional order, political toleration’s specific role is not identical with, and cannot be reduced to, the state’s justice-based duties of non-interference. Accordingly, I argue that political toleration belongs to a specific mode of politics: the extraordinary politics. When the rules of justice are not available, or their application is not feasible, the extraordinary politics, in which toleration plays a role, emerges as the persistent residue of the ordinary politics. Therefore, political toleration and justice-based duties of non-interference should be seen as accompanying practices that represent two modes of politics.

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Wurzburger, Walter S. "Toleration." International Studies in Philosophy 35, no. 4 (2003): 299–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil2003354115.

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Dumitrescu, Marius. "Metaphysical Foundations of the Idea of Tolerance in John Locke's Philosophy." Postmodern Openings 13, no. 3 (August 8, 2022): 134–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.18662/po/13.3/481.

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In this paper we will try to identify the concrete ways in which John Locke describes the limits of toleration between different types of faith and its metaphysical foundations. From the beginning of his text A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke specifies that toleration is, first and foremost, a practical ideal and, secondly, a moral one. As such, toleration must be the essential feature of the true Church because in the field of religious faith any claimed superiority is in fact only the expression of the struggle for power and domination. A theoretical perspective on the idea of religious toleration is also recalled from Lockeˈs radical empiricism, which correlates man's identity with his appearance at birth, for the first time in the world, as a different form from others. Such a view is contrary to metempsychosis which could lead to innate ideas in the human soul about moral principles and especially about God, as Plato or Descartes believed. Starting from the principles of toleration, John Locke's idea was to find those elements through which a fundamental separation between the Church and the State could be achieved. But toleration ceases when the Church and the State merge discreetly until they can no longer distinguish the boundaries between them. We consider that the fundamental principle of religious toleration is based on the idea of reciprocity, i.e. toleration-to-toleration and intolerance-to-intolerance, as Locke stated. This principle is also an essential landmark for a moral law on religious toleration in the contemporary, global world.

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William Tate, John. "Locke, toleration and natural law: A reassessment." European Journal of Political Theory 16, no. 1 (July 24, 2016): 109–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885115609739.

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There is an increasingly prevalent view among some contemporary Locke scholars that Locke's political philosophy is thoroughly subordinate to theological imperatives, centered on natural law. This article challenges this point of view by critically evaluating this interpretation of Locke as advanced by some of its leading proponents. This interpretation perceives natural law as the governing principle of Locke's political philosophy, and the primary source of transition and reconciliation within it. This article advances a very different reading of Locke's political philosophy, perceiving within it competing imperatives that cannot be subsumed by natural law, and are, in some respects, at odds with it. In this way, the article shows how the “theological” interpretation of Locke's political philosophy, centred on natural law, fails to account for some of that philosophy's fundamental features, and is unable to explain some of its key outcomes, with the result that this interpretation falls short of its critical ambitions.

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Bain, Andrew, and Paul Formosa. "Toleration and Some Related Concepts in Kant." Kantian Review 25, no. 2 (April 30, 2020): 167–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415420000035.

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AbstractIn this article we examine Kant’s understanding of toleration by including a study of all instances in which he directly uses the language of toleration and related concepts. We use this study to resolve several key areas of interpretative dispute concerning Kant’s views on toleration. We argue that Kant offers a nuanced and largely unappreciated approach to thinking about toleration, and related concepts, across three normative spheres: the political, the interpersonal and the personal. We examine shortcomings in earlier interpretations and conclude by arguing that the theme of toleration in Kant’s work, while coherent and important, is neither as central nor as peripheral as suggested by previous interpretations. Further, while Kant is critical of the arrogance of toleration in the political sphere, he is more positive toward the role of toleration in the interpersonal and personal spheres since it promotes virtue.

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Nussbaum, Martha. "Radical Evil in the Lockean State: The Neglect of the Political Emotions." Journal of Moral Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2006): 159–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468106065490.

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AbstractAll modern liberal democracies have strong reasons to support an idea of toleration, understood as involving respect, not only grudging acceptance, and to extend it to all religious and secular doctrines, limiting only conduct that violates the rights of other citizens. There is no modern democracy, however, in which toleration of this sort is a stable achievement. Why is toleration, attractive in principle, so difficult to achieve? The normative case for toleration was well articulated by John Locke in his influential A Letter Concerning Toleration , although his attractive proposal thus rests on a fragile foundation. Kant did much more, combining a Lockean account of the state with a profound diagnosis of ‘radical evil’, the tendencies in all human beings to militate against stable toleration and respect. But Kant proposed no mechanism through which the state might mitigate the harmful influence of ‘radical evil’, thus rendering toleration stable. One solution to this problem was proposed by Rousseau, but it has deep problems. How, then, can a respectful pluralistic society shore up the fragile human basis of toleration, especially in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration not only within each state, but also among peoples and states, in this interlocking world?

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Dunne, Michael. "John Locke's Philosophy of Religious Toleration." Maynooth Philosophical Papers 2 (2004): 32–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/mpp200425.

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9

Gilbert, Paul. "Toleration or Autonomy?" Journal of Applied Philosophy 17, no. 3 (November 2000): 299–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00164.

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10

Dalton, Peter. "Liberty, Autonomy, Toleration." Philosophical Papers 15, no. 2-3 (November 1986): 185–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568648609506259.

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11

Fiala, Andrew G. (Andrew Gordon). "Toleration and Pragmatism." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2002): 103–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2002.0011.

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12

Harrison, Jonathan. "Utilitarianism and Toleration." Philosophy 62, no. 242 (October 1987): 421–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100039012.

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I shall (stipulatively) define a free action as one a man is able to do. Various things limit a man's freedom. The most unpopular is the government, or other people who have the power of preventing us from doing what we want. But our freedom is also circumscribed by lack of physical and mental strength or skill, including that of knowing how to manage other human beings. Other factors limiting our freedom are our ignorance, our passions and our habits. Some men say they value their freedom from these things, especially their freedom from passion, so much that they would prefer to be in prison or on the rack rather than be a slave to them, but one suspects they exaggerate.

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13

Cohen, Andrew Jason. "What Toleration Is." Ethics 115, no. 1 (October 2004): 68–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/421982.

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Forst, Rainer. "Toleration and Democracy." Journal of Social Philosophy 45, no. 1 (March 2014): 65–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12046.

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15

Lloyd, Vincent. "Constantinian Toleration." Studies in Christian Ethics 31, no. 3 (April 11, 2018): 296–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946818770329.

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Recent secular theorists of toleration have turned to Christian thought as a resource to overcome problems faced by secular-liberal accounts of toleration. This review essay examines three such projects, one in the tradition of Thomistic virtue ethics, another in the tradition of Frankfurt School critical theory, and another in political theory. While Christian ethics can learn from the methods and theoretical machinery deployed in these studies, each study assumes that the question of toleration is posed from a position of power and privilege. The essay asks what it might mean to consider toleration from the perspective of a marginalized community—like the early Christians.

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16

Clark, Samuel. "No Abiding City: Hume, Naturalism, and Toleration." Philosophy 84, no. 1 (January 2009): 75–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819109000047.

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AbstractThis paper rereads David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as dramatising a distinctive, naturalistic account of toleration. I have two purposes in mind: first, to complete and ground Hume's fragmentary explicit discussion of toleration; second, to unearth a potentially attractive alternative to more recent, Rawlsian approaches to toleration. To make my case, I connect Dialogues and the problem of toleration to the wider themes of naturalism, scepticism and their relation in Hume's thought, before developing a new interpretation of Dialogues part 12 as political drama. Finally, I develop the Humean theory of toleration I have discovered by comparison between Rawls's and Hume's strategies for justification of a tolerant political regime.

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17

Curley, Edwin. "Locke on Religious Toleration." Roczniki Filozoficzne 70, no. 4 (December 30, 2022): 167–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf2204.6.

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The paper analyses and criticizes Locke’s arguments for religious toleration presented in his Letter concerning Toleration. The author argues that the epistemology Locke developed in his Essay concerning Human Understanding made a more constructive contribution to the case for toleration.

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18

Schweighöfer, Stefan. "Zur Begründung der Toleranz bei Shaftesbury, Hutcheson und Smith." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 129, no. 2 (2022): 270–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2022-2-270.

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The idea that human beings possess a moral sense is the characteristic of a certain branch of moral philosophy of the British Enlightenment. In this context, the question of tolerance appears as a condition that enables the moral sense to work properly. This article traces the connection between toleration and morality along Shatesbury's philosophy of politeness, via Hutcheson's conception of a moral philosophy based on “benevolence”, to Smith's development of the “impartial spectator”. Keywords: toleration, politeness, moral sense, humour, benevolence

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19

Horton, John. "Conceptualising toleration." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 23, no. 2 (April 24, 2019): 191–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1609399.

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20

Keenan, James F. "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation." International Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1989): 205–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq19892928.

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21

Apressyan, Ruben. "The Principle of Toleration." Journal of Philosophical Research 37, no. 9999 (2012): 223–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201237supplement39.

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22

McKinnon, Catriona. "Democracy, Equality and Toleration." Journal of Ethics 11, no. 2 (January 25, 2007): 125–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-7979-7.

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23

Gray, John. "Pluralism and Toleration in Contemporary Political Philosophy." Political Studies 48, no. 2 (May 2000): 323–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00262.

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24

Kaul, Volker. "Sources of toleration: Individuals, cultures, institutions." Philosophy & Social Criticism 45, no. 4 (May 2019): 360–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453719843767.

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Nowadays the question of toleration is less related to an international clash of civilizations than to the clashes that take place within the states and polities themselves. The article addresses the sources of toleration in this new global scenario, starting from the following set of questions: Do the sources of toleration differ across time and space? Does toleration have different roots in different civilizational contexts, such as China, India or Islam? Or, is toleration the result of particular institutional frameworks and designs? In this case, does the concept of toleration vary from one institutional setting to the other? Do empires, republics and democracies give rise to different forms of toleration? And last but not least, isn’t toleration rather a matter of individual morality, as many liberal theories sustain? The article distinguishes between three different sources of toleration: individuals, cultures and institutions. Kant and contemporary liberals, as John Rawls who follows him, situate the source of toleration in the individual itself and the capacity for practical reason. More communitarian-oriented thinkers, as Michael Walzer, defend ‘a historical and contextual account of toleration and coexistence’, arguing that ‘the best political arrangement is relative to the history and culture of the people whose lives it will arrange’. The institutionalist account, which goes back to John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration establishing the separation between state and church, holds that it is the right institutional design that grounds toleration. The article concludes that political strategies aiming to cultivate toleration must take into account the causes of intolerance.

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25

Cohen, Andrew Jason. "What the Liberal State Should Tolerate Within Its Borders." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 4 (December 2007): 479–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2008.0000.

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I have previously argued that toleration is best understood as an agent's intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has the power to interfere (see my 2004a). Though I think this is the best available definition, it is only a definition and presents no normative claims about when toleration is warranted — i.e., about what is to be tolerated. As Peter Nicholson notes, ‘Toleration as a moral ideal cannot be value-neutral, and for this reason too it must be distinguished from the descriptive concept of toleration which can and should be valueneutral’ (1985, 161). Having previously offered a value-neutral account of the descriptive concept, I use that analysis here to discuss the moral ideal.

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26

Kisner, Matthew J. "Spinoza’s Defense of Toleration: The Argument From Pluralism." Roczniki Filozoficzne 70, no. 4 (December 30, 2022): 213–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf2204.8.

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Spinoza’s bold, spirited defense of toleration is an animating theme of the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) and an important reason for the significant historical impact of the text. But Spinoza’s arguments for toleration can be challenging to discern. True to its title, the TTP offers two main arguments for toleration, one political, the other theological. This paper argues that Spinoza’s theological argument for toleration is closely connected to a distinct and often overlooked argument from pluralism. This paper examines Spinoza’s argument from pluralism and defends that it is more attractive to similar arguments for toleration offered by Bodin and Bayle. It is more attractive than Bodin’s pluralism argument because Spinoza’s allows that religious beliefs and doctrines of faith have a rational justification, which makes possible a more optimistic picture of the prospects for religious disputation. Spinoza’s pluralism argument is also more attractive than Bayle’s argument because Spinoza’s does not regard religious beliefs as justified by sincerity, which means that he does not need to recognize any problematic rights of erroneous conscience, nor is he forced to accept as justified sincere beliefs in persecution or obviously immoral or irreligious beliefs.

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27

Stenger, Gerhardt. "From Toleration to Laïcité." Dialogue and Universalism 31, no. 2 (2021): 145–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202131225.

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This paper traces the history of the philosophical and political justification of religious tolerance from the late 17th century to modern times. In the Anglo-Saxon world, John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) gave birth to the doctrine of the separation of Church and State and to what is now called secularization. In France, Pierre Bayle refuted, in his Philosophical Commentary (1685), the justification of intolerance taken from Saint Augustine. Following him, Voltaire campaigned for tolerance following the Calas affair (1763), and the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) imposed religious freedom which, a century later, resulted in the uniquely French notion of laïcité, which denies religion any supremacy, and any right to organize life in its name. Equality before the law takes precedence over freedom: the fact of being a believer does not give rise to the right to special statutes or to exceptions to the law.

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Shorten, Andrew. "Toleration and Cultural Controversies*." Res Publica 11, no. 3 (September 2005): 275–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-005-3676-4.

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29

Gardiner, Barry S. "Rawls on Truth and Toleration." Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220272.

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30

Carter, Ian. "Are Toleration and Respect Compatible?" Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 3 (May 10, 2013): 195–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12017.

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31

Ferretti, Maria Paola, and Sune Laegaard. "A Multirelational Account of Toleration." Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 3 (May 22, 2013): 224–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12018.

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32

Mckinnon, C. "Review: Virtue, Reason and Toleration." Mind 111, no. 441 (January 1, 2002): 156–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/111.441.156.

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33

Wang, Pei. "Towards a morally defensible concept of toleration: Insights from ancient Chinese thinking." Philosophy & Social Criticism 45, no. 4 (January 13, 2019): 461–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453718823030.

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The diversification of the world has given us the opportunity to live with different people. This kind of diversification brings not only adventure and excitements but also interaction with people and their habits that we do not agree with. In response, toleration has become the common sense of people in modern society. However, what is the meaning of the word toleration? What moral emotions underlie the practice of toleration? This article puts forward a morally defensible concept of toleration inspired by ancient Chinese thinking. I first discuss the etymology of the word toleration from Anglophone and Chinese perspectives, and then analyse three problematical emotional attitudes towards others (disgust, indifference and hunting for novelty) and critique the spirit of exclusion in the dominant Anglophone understanding of toleration. Finally, I analyse a morally defensible concept of toleration based on the ‘the dao of zhong and shu’ (忠恕之道) that also served as the ideal underpinning political unity and appreciation for cultural diversity in ancient China.

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34

Tate, John William. "Locke and toleration." Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, no. 7 (August 18, 2009): 761–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453709106240.

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35

Newey, Glen. "Toleration as sedition." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (June 2011): 363–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2011.571878.

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36

d'Entrèves, Maurizio Passerin. "Democracy and toleration." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4, no. 3 (September 2001): 49–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230108403356.

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37

Lucci, Diego. "Separating Politics from Institutional Religion." Dialogue and Universalism 31, no. 2 (2021): 67–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202131221.

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Nowadays, more than three centuries after John Locke’s affirmation of the separation between state and church, confessional systems of government are still widespread and, even in secular liberal democracies, politics and religion often intermingle. As a result, some ecclesiastical institutions play a significant role in political affairs, while minority groups and individuals having alternative worldviews, values, and lifestyles are frequently discriminated against. Locke’s theory of religious toleration undeniably has some shortcomings, such as the exclusion of Roman Catholics and atheists from toleration and an emphasis on organized religion in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). However, Locke’s theory of toleration, which presents a Christian’s defense of the civil rights of those who have different religious opinions, still provides powerful arguments for the oft-neglected separation of politics from institutional religion, thereby urging us to leave theological dogmas and ecclesiastical authorities out of political life.

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Antognazza, Maria Rosa. "Leibniz and Religious Toleration." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, no. 4 (2002): 601–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq200276421.

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HALSTEAD, MARK. "Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration." Journal of Philosophy of Education 30, no. 2 (July 1996): 307–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1996.tb00400.x.

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40

Buddeberg, Eva. "Grenzen der Toleranz?" Philosophisches Jahrbuch 129, no. 2 (2022): 232–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2022-2-232.

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In this paper I investigate the limits of toleration using the example of the German debate on dealing with opponents of the covid vaccination. First, I present central elements of Rainer Forst’s conception of tolerance. I then refer to an important historical context of the emergence of tolerance and, using Pierre Bayle’s conception, show that the demand for tolerance of his time was limited to a specific context, but allows for some generalizations. Finally, I argue that we have to tolerate those who see themselves as “Querdenker” (“lateral thinkers”) as long as their opposition does not violate applicable laws and thus endanger the framework of our democratic and constitutional order. Keywords: Toleration, limits of toleration, societal cohesion, covid vaccination, Pierre Bayle, Rainer Forst, Wendy Brown

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Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta, and Federica Liveriero. "Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security." Journal of Ethics 25, no. 2 (March 2, 2021): 161–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-021-09363-5.

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AbstractTraditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence.

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Williams, Bernard. "Subjectivism and Toleration." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (September 1991): 197–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007773.

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Bertrand Russell said more than once that he was uncomfortable about a conflict, as he saw it, between two things: the strength of the conviction with which he held his ethical beliefs, and the philosophical opinions that he had about the status of those ethical beliefs—opinions which were non-cognitivist, and in some sense subjectivist. Russell felt that, in some way, if he did not think that his ethical beliefs were objective, he had no right to hold them so passionately. This discomfort was not something that Ayer noted or discussed in his account of Russell's moral philosophy and ethical opinions, at least in the book that he wrote for the Modern Masters series (RS). Perhaps this was because it was not a kind of discomfort that Ayer felt himself. His own philosophical views about the status of ethics were at all periods at any rate non-cognitivist, and I think that he did not mind them being called ‘subjectivist’. He did indeed argue that the supposed difference between objectivism and subjectivism in ethics did no work, and that philosophers who took themselves to be objectivists could not achieve anything more than those who admitted they were subjectivists. Ayer based this mainly on the idea that the claims made by objectivists for the factuality, objective truth, and so forth of moral judgments added nothing to those judgments—so far as moral conclusions were concerned, the objectivist was saying the same as the subjectivist but in a louder voice.

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Standish, Paul. "Toleration, multiculturalism and mistaken belief." Ethics and Education 1, no. 1 (March 2006): 79–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449640600584995.

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44

Dees, Richard H. "Trust and the Rationality of Toleration." Nous 32, no. 1 (March 1998): 82–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00089.

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45

Fumerton, Richard. "Epistemic Toleration and the New Atheism." Midwest Studies In Philosophy 37, no. 1 (September 2013): 97–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misp.12001.

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46

Digeser, Elizabeth DePalma. "Lactantius, Porphyry, and the Debate over Religious Toleration." Journal of Roman Studies 88 (November 1998): 129–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/300808.

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Did the events surrounding Diocletian's persecution of 303–311 launch a debate over religious toleration? The first suggestion that they did occurs in Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles, a defence of traditional religion and theology in three books. Writing before the persecution, the celebrated Neoplatonist philosopher from Tyre, a man whom several Christian emperors and church councils would soon condemn, asked the question that stood at the heart of the persecution:How can these people [i.e., Christians] be thought worthy of forbearance (συϒϒώμη) ? They have not only turned away from those who from earliest time are referred to as divine among all Greeks and barbarians … and by emperors, law-givers and philosophers—all of a common mind. But also, in choosing impieties and atheism, they have preferred their fellow creatures [i.e., to worshipping the divine]. And to what sort of penalties might they not justly be subjected who … are fugitives from the things of their fathers?

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47

Black, Sam. "Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 4 (December 1998): 473–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10715982.

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It is a noteworthy achievement of Western liberal democracies that they have largely relinquished the use of force against citizens whose lifestyles offend their members’ sensibilities, or alternatively which violate their members’ sense of truth. Toleration has become a central virtue in our public institutions. Powerful majorities are given over to restraint. They do not, by and large, expect the state to crush eccentrics, nonconformists, and other uncongenial minorities in their midst. What precipitated this remarkable evolution in our political culture?The road to toleration originates in the debates provoked by religious dissent in the early modem period. This road was paved in part by a grudging appreciation of the necessity for pragmaticaccommodation. The wars of religion that had devastated the Continent educated the political classes about the costs of persecution. A policy of state-imposed religious intolerance was widely understood to be imprudent.In the early modem period there occurs, however, a shift in the arguments adduced in support of the duty of toleration.

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48

Jones, Peter. "Toleration, Recognition and Identity*." Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 2 (June 2006): 123–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00246.x.

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Edyvane, Derek, and Matt Matravers. "Introduction: Toleration re-examined." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (June 2011): 281–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2011.571873.

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50

Lægaard, Sune. "Toleration out of respect?" Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16, no. 4 (September 2013): 520–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2013.810391.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Toleration – Philosophy'

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