Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'TLS Certificates'

Context. An SSL encrypted client-server communication is necessary to maintain the security and privacy of the communication. For an SSL encryption to work, there should be a security certificate which has a certain expiry period. Periodic renewal of the certificate after its expiry is a waste of time and an effort on part of the company. Objectives. In this study, a new system has been developed and implemented, which sends a certificate during prior communication and does not wait for the certificate to expire. Automating the process to a certain extent was done to not compromise the security of the system and to speed up the process and reduce the downtime. Methods. Experiments have been conducted to test the new system and compare it to the old system. The experiments were conducted to analyze the packets and the downtime occurring from certificate renewal. Results. The results of the experiments show that there is a significant reduction in downtime. This was achieved due to the implementation of the new system and semi-automation Conclusions. The system has been implemented, and it greatly reduces the downtime occurring due to the expiry of the security certificates. Semi-Automation has been done to not hamper the security and make the system robust.

TLS is a vital protocol used to secure communication over networks and it provides an end- to-end encrypted channel between two directly communicating parties. In certain situations it is not possible, or desirable, to establish direct connections from a client to a server, as for example when connecting to a server located on a secure network behind a gateway. In these cases chained connections are required. Mutual authentication and end-to-end encryption are important capabilities in a high assur- ance environment. These are provided by TLS, but there are no known solutions for chained connections. This thesis explores multiple methods that provides the functionality for chained connec- tions using TLS in a high assurance environment with trusted servers and a public key in- frastructure. A number of methods are formally described and analysed according to multi- ple criteria reflecting both functionality and security requirements. Furthermore, the most promising method is implemented and tested in order to verify that the method is viable in a real-life environment. The proposed solution modifies the TLS protocol through the use of an extension which allows for the distinction between direct and chained connections. The extension which also allows for specifying the structure of chained connections is used in the implementation of a method that creates chained connections by layering TLS connections inside each other. Testing demonstrates that the overhead of the method is negligible and that the method is a viable solution for creating chained connections with mutual authentication using TLS.

Certificates are the foundation of secure communication over the internet as of today. While certificates can be issued with long validity periods, there is always a risk of having them compromised during their lifetime. A good practice is therefore to use shorter validity periods. However, this limits the certificate lifetime and gives less flexibility in the timing of certificate replacements. In this thesis, we use publicly available network logs from Rapid7's Project Sonar to provide an overview of the current state of certificate usage behavior. Specifically, we look at the Let's Encrypt mass revocation event in March 2020, where millions of certificates were revoked with just five days notice. In general, we show how this kind of datasets can be used, and as a deeper exploration we analyze certificate validity, lifetime and use of certificates with overlapping validity periods, as well as discuss how our findings relate to industry standard and current security trends. Specifically, we isolate automated certificate services such as Let's Encrypt and cPanel to see how their certificates differ in characteristics from other certificates in general. Based on our findings, we propose a set of rules to help improve the trust in certificate usage and strengthen security online, introducing an Always secure policy aligning certificate validity with revocation time limits in order to replace revocation requirements and overcoming the fact that mobile devices today ignore this very important security feature. To round things off, we provide some ideas for further research based on our findings and what we see possible with datasets such as the one researched in this thesis.

The internet is one of the most widely used mediums for communication in modern society and it has become an everyday necessity for many. It is therefore of utmost importance that it remains as secure as possible. SSL and TLS are the backbones of internet security and an integral part of these technologies are the certificates used. Certificate authorities (CAs) can issue certificates that validate that domains are who they claim to be. If a user trusts a CA they can in turn also trust domains that have been validated by them. CAs can in turn trust other CAs and this, in turn, creates a chain of trust called a certificate chain. In this thesis, the structure of these certificate chains is analysed and a longitudinal dataset is created. The analysis looks at how the certificate chains have changed over time and puts extra focus on the domains of big tech companies. The dataset created can also be used for further analysis in the future and will be a useful tool in the examination of historical certificate chains. Our findings show that the certificate chains of the domains studied do change over time; both their structure and the lengths of them vary noticeably. Most of the observed domains show a decrease in average chain length between the years of 2013 and 2020 and the structure of the chains vary significantly over the years.

Companies analyse large amounts of sensitive data on clusters of machines, using a framework such as Apache Hadoop to handle inter-process communication, and big data analytic tools such as Apache Spark and Apache Flink to analyse the growing amounts of data. Big data analytic tools are mainly tested on performance and reliability. Security and authentication have not been enough considered and they lack behind. The goal of this research is to improve the authentication and security for data analytic tools.Currently, the aforementioned big data analytic tools are using Kerberos for authentication. Kerberos has difficulties in providing multi factor authentication. Attacks on Kerberos can abuse the authentication. To improve the authentication, an analysis of the authentication in Hadoop and the data analytic tools is performed. The research describes the characteristics to gain an overview of the security of Hadoop and the data analytic tools. One characteristic is that the usage of the transport layer security (TLS) for the security of data transportation. TLS usually establishes connections with certificates. Recently, certificates with a short time to live can be automatically handed out.This thesis develops new authentication mechanism using certificates for data analytic tools on clusters of machines, providing advantages over Kerberos. To evaluate the possibility to replace Kerberos, the mechanism is implemented in Spark. As a result, the new implementation provides several improvements. The certificates used for authentication are made valid with a short time to live and are thus less vulnerable to abuse. Further, the authentication mechanism solves new requirements coming from businesses, such as providing multi-factor authenticationand scalability.In this research a new authentication mechanism is developed, implemented and evaluated, giving better data protection by providing improved authentication.

Dans ce travail, nous analysons des certificats SSL/TLS X.509 (utilisant le chiffrement RSA et provenant de centaines de millions de matériels connectés) à la recherche d'anomalies et étendons notamment les travaux de Hastings, Fried et Heninger (2016). Notre étude a été réalisée sur trois bases de données provenant de l'EFF (2010-2011), de l'ANSSI (2011-2017) et de Rapid7 (2017-2021). Plusieurs vulnérabilités affectant des matériels de fabricants connus furent détectées : modules de petites tailles (strictement inférieures à 1024 bits), modules redondants (utilisés par plusieurs entités), certificats invalides mais toujours en usage, modules vulnérables à l'attaque ROCA ainsi que des modules dits «PGCD-vulnérables» (c'est-à-dire des modules ayant des facteurs communs). Pour la base de données de Rapid7, dénombrant près de 600 millions de certificats (et incluant ceux des matériels récents), nous avons identifié 1,550,382 certificats dont les modules sont PGCD-vulnérables, soit 0.27% du nombre total. Cela a permis de factoriser 14,765 modules de 2048 bits ce qui, à notre connaissance, n'a jamais été fait.En analysant certains modules PGCD-vulnérables, on a pu rétro-concevoir de façon partielle le générateur de modules (de 512 bits) utilisé par certaines familles de pare-feux, ce qui a permis la factorisation instantanée de 42 modules de 512 bits, correspondant aux certificats provenant de 8,817 adresses IPv4.Après avoir constaté que la plupart des modules factorisés avaient été générés par la bibliothèque OpenSSL, on a analysé les codes sources et les méthodes en charge du processus de génération de clefs RSA de plusieurs versions de cette bibliothèque (couvrant la période 2005 à 2021). À travers des expérimentations sur des plateformes à base de processeurs ARM, où l'on s'est mis quasiment dans les mêmes conditions que les matériels vulnérables identifiés, on a réussi à remonter aux causes de la PGCD-vulnérabilité
In this work, we analyze X.509 SSL/TLS certificates (using RSA encryption and from hundreds of millions of connected devices) looking for anomalies and notably extend the work of Hastings, Fried and Heninger (2016). Our study was carried out on three databases from EFF (2010-2011), ANSSI (2011-2017) and Rapid7 (2017-2021). Several vulnerabilities affecting devices from well-known manufacturers were detected: small moduli (strictly less than 1024 bits), redundant moduli (used by several entities), invalid certificates but still in use, moduli vulnerable to the ROCA attack as well as so-called “GCD-vulnerable” moduli (i.e. moduli having common factors). For the Rapid7 database, counting nearly 600 million certificates (and including those for recent devices), we have identified 1,550,382 certificates whose moduli are GCD-vulnerable, that is 0.27% of the total number. This made it possible to factor 14,765 moduli of 2048 bits which, to our knowledge, has never been done.By analyzing certain GCD-vulnerable moduli, we were able to partially reverse-engineer the modulus generator (of 512 bits) used by certain families of firewalls, which allowed the instantaneous factorization of 42 moduli of 512 bits, corresponding certificates from 8,817 IPv4 addresses.After noting that most of the factored moduli had been generated by the OpenSSL library, we analyzed the source codes and the methods in charge of the RSA key generation process of several versions of this library (covering the period 2005 to 2021). Through experiments on platforms based on ARM processors, where we put ourselves in almost the same conditions as the vulnerable devices identified, we managed to trace the causes of the PGCD-vulnerability

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a vital component to the security ecosystem and the most popular security protocol used on the Internet today. Despite the strengths of the protocol, numerous vulnerabilities result from its improper use in practice. Some of these vulnerabilities arise from weaknesses in authentication, from the rigidity of the trusted authority system to the complexities of client certificates. Others result from the misuse of TLS by developers, who misuse complicated TLS libraries, improperly validate server certificates, employ outdated cipher suites, or deploy other features insecurely. To make matters worse, system administrators and users are powerless to fix these issues, and lack the ability to properly control how their own machines communicate securely online. In this dissertation we argue that the problems described are the result of an improper placement of security responsibilities. We show that by placing TLS services in the operating system, both new and existing applications can be automatically secured, developers can easily use TLS without intimate knowledge of security, and security settings can be controlled by administrators. This is demonstrated through three explorations that provide TLS features through the operating system. First, we describe and assess TrustBase, a service that repairs and strengthens certificate-based authentication for TLS connections. TrustBase uses traffic interception and a policy engine to provide administrators fine-tuned control over the trust decisions made by all applications on their systems. Second, we introduce and evaluate the Secure Socket API (SSA), which provides TLS as an operating system service through the native POSIX socket API. The SSA enables developers to use modern TLS securely, with as little as one line of code, and also allows custom tailoring of security settings by administrators. Finally, we further explore a modern approach to TLS client authentication, leveraging the operating system to provide a generic platform for strong authentication that supports easy deployment of client authentication features and protects user privacy. We conclude with a discussion of the reasons for the success of our efforts, and note avenues for future work that leverage the principles exhibited in this work, both in and beyond TLS.

X.509 certificate revocation defends against man-in-the-middle attacks involving a compromised certificate. Certificate revocation strategies face scalability, effectiveness, and deployment challenges as HTTPS adoption rates have soared. We propose Certificate Revocation Table (CRT), a new revocation strategy that is competitive with or exceeds alternative state-of-the-art solutions in effectiveness, efficiency, certificate growth scalability, mass revocation event scalability, revocation timeliness, privacy, and deployment requirements. The CRT periodically checks the revocation status of X.509 certificates recently used by an organization, such as clients on a university's private network. By prechecking the revocation status of each certificate the client is likely to use, the client can avoid the security problems of on-demand certificate revocation checking. To validate both the effectiveness and efficiency of using a CRT, we used 60 days of TLS traffic logs from Brigham Young University to measure the effects of actively refreshing certificates for various certificate working set window lengths. Using a certificate working set window size of 45 days, an average of 99.86% of the TLS handshakes from BYU would have revocation information cached in advance using our approach. Revocation status information can be initially downloaded by clients with a 6.7 MB file and then subsequently updated using only 205.1 KB of bandwidth daily. Updates to this CRT that only include revoked certificates require just 215 bytes of bandwidth per day.

Certificate Transparency provides auditability to the widely used X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX) authentication in Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Transparency logs issue signed promises of inclusions to be used together with certificates for authentication of TLS servers. Google Chrome enforces the use of Certificate Transparency for validation of Extended Validation (EV) certificates. This thesis proposes a methodology for asserting correct operation and presents a survey of active Logs. An experimental Monitor has been implemented as part of the thesis. Varying Log usage patterns and metadata about Log operation are presented, and Logs are categorized based on characteristics and usage. A case of mis-issuance by Symantec is presented to show the effectiveness of Certificate Transparency.

Security on the Internet is essential to ensure the privacy of an individual. Today, Trans- port Layer Security (TLS) and certificates are used to ensure this. But certificates are not enough in order to maintain confidentiality and therefore a new concept, Certificate Trans- parency (CT), has been introduced. CT improves security by allowing the analysis of sus- picious certificates. Validation by CT uses public logs that can return Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT), which is a promise returned by the log indicating that the certificate will be added to the log. A server may then deliver the SCT to a client in three different ways: X.509v3 extension, Online Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP) stapling and TLS extension. For further analysis, we have created a tool to collect data during TLS handshakes and data transfer, including byte information, the certificates themselves, SCT delivery method and especially timing information. From our dataset we see that most websites do not use CT and the ones that use CT almost only use X.509 extension to send their SCTs.

This diploma thesis is focused on implementation of application for security monitoring of network communication of other applications in mobile device with Android platform. Provides users information about security risks that may harm his/her privacy or device. It uses a local VPN to tunnel all data sent to the wireless network. These can be linked to an application that has sent them because the Android kernel is derived from the Linux kernel and can be used to retrieve information about established network connections and the application identifier associated with the connection. This mapping allows to get more information about an app that is potentially dangerous for your mobile device.

With e-governance steadily growing, citizen-to-state communication via Web sites is as well, placing enormous trust in the protocols designed to handle this communication in a secure manner. Since breaching any of the protocols enabling Web site communication could yield benefits to a malicious attacker and bring harm to end-users, the battle between hackers and information security professionals is ongoing and never-ending. This phenomenon is the main reason why it is of importance to adhere to the latest best practices established by specialized independent organizations. Best practice compliance is important for any organization, but maybe most of all for our governing authorities, which we should hold to the highest standard possible due to the nature of their societal responsibility to protect the public. This report aims to, by conducting a quantitative survey, study the Web sites of the governments and government agencies of the member states of the European Union, as well as Web sites controlled by the European Union to assess to what degree their domains comply with the current best practices of DNSSEC, HSTS, HTTPS, SSL/TLS, and certificate validation types. The findings presented in this paper show that there are significant differences in compliance level between the different parameters measured, where HTTPS best practice deployment was the highest (96%) and HSTS best practice deployment was the lowest (3%). Further, when comparing the average best practice compliance by country, Denmark and the Netherlands performed the best, while Cyprus had the lowest average.

The aim of this thesis is to study and describe the theme of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Within the scope of minute PKI characterization there is a gradual depiction of particular structural elements, which are above all represented by cryptographic operations (asymetric and symetric cryptography, hash function and digital signature); then, there are also individual PKI subjects that are dealt with, like eg. certification authority, certificates, security protocols, secure heap etc. Last but not least there are a few complete Public Key Infrastructure implementation solutions described (OpenSSL, Microsft CA). The practical part of the thesis, a lab exercise, gives potential students the knowledge of installing OpenSSL system based certification authority. The next task educate students how to secure web server with certificate signed with own CA and also how to secure web server users‘ access control through certificates signed by the previously installed CA.

This master's thesis deals with design of security infrastructure for electronic archive. In theoretical part is disscus about technical resources which are based on security services and protocols and methods which are used for protection. On basics of theoretical part is designed model of security infrastructure and it is built in laboratory. Model of security infrastructure is based on Open Source Software and as safety storages for private user authentication data are used cryptographic USB tokens. This master's thesis includes design and construction of real infrastructure of secured electronic archive. In each part of master's thesis is put main emphases on security and clear explanation from the beginning of desing of model of security infrastructure for electronic archive to finish of construction.

This thesis deals with the introduction to the security mechanism.The procedure explains the basic concepts, principles of cryptography and security of modern protocols and basic principles that are used for information transmission network. The work also describes the most common types of attacks targeting the eavesdropping of communication. The result is a design of the eavesdropping and the implementation of an attack on the secure communication of the SSL protocol..The attacker uses a false certificate and attacks based on poisoning the ARP and DNS tables for this purpose. The thesis discusses the principles of the SSL protocol and methodology of attacks on the ARP and DNS tables.

The problem of SSL/TLS interception ("trusted proxy in SSL/TLS connection") has been known for years and many implementations exist. However, all of them share a single technical solution which is based solely on the PKI authentication mechanism and suffers from multiple serious disadvantages. Most importantly, it is not compatible with several aspects or future trends of SSL/TLS and PKI, there's almost no space for improvement and its real use may spawn legal issues. After we analyze technical background and the current solution, we will propose another one, based not only on PKI but SSL/TLS too. Both solutions will be compared and general superiority of the new one will be shown. Basic implementation and analysis will follow, along with deployment requirements and ideas for future development. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)