Academic literature on the topic 'Timing fiscale'

We relate the informativeness of earnings and dividend announcements to their timing relative to the fiscal quarter end to which the earnings pertain. Evidence is provided that the information content of earnings decreases as the timing of its announcement relative to the fiscal quarter end increases, and that such information erosion is more pronounced for smaller firms. Evidence is also provided that the information content of dividend announcements increases as its timing relative to the fiscal quarter end increases, and that such information enhancement is relatively more pronounced for larger firms. The results suggest that preannouncement information precision and announced information precision have offsetting effects on the informativeness of financial information, and that the nature of the offset depends on the type of information and firm size. More specifically, the predisclosure information effect is more pronounced for earnings and small firms, whereas the announced (new) information effect is more pronounced for dividends and large firms.

In some industries, firms schedule their disclosure at about the same time, usually around the end of the business season, whereas in others such disclosures are more dispersed over time. This paper examines firms' choice of fiscal year-ends (and hence of disclosure timing) relative to the business cycle and to the timing chosen by other firms in the industry. We model a stochastic setting in which the periodic closing of books yields information that is relevant for subsequent managerial decisions. The results show that although it is business seasonality that is the primary determinant of reporting period choice, competitive forces in the form of information transfer effects and proprietary disclosure costs have the ability to make firms' fiscal years deviate from the business season. Such deviations are more likely in industries in which costs exhibit low serial correlation across seasons, where cross-sectional correlation between firms' costs is high, or where within-season variations in business conditions are moderate. Furthermore, if incumbent firms are already reporting at the end of the business season, newer firms may have a greater inclination to make a different choice. The results also offer a novel rationale for what makes the end of the business cycle an attractive fiscal year-end. In our setting it is the desire to acquire managerially relevant information at an opportune time, rather than the ease of collecting information or the desire to optimize disclosure timing, that makes the end of a business cycle a preferred fiscal year-end.

We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that (1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and (2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy.

Abstract. In this paper we examine the length of political tenure in Canadian federally elected parliamentary governments since 1867. Using annual data on tenure length, we categorize the distribution of governing tenures in terms of a hazard function: the probability that an election will arise in each year, given that an election has not yet been called. Structuring the election call as an optimal stopping rule, we test whether that distribution responds predictably to characteristics of the political and/or economic environment. The results of using the continuous Cox and Gompertz models together with the discrete semi-parametric proportional hazard model suggest that governing parties in Canada do engage in election timing and that the only economic policy measure that is used consistently in conjunction with election timing is fiscal expenditure.Résumé. Dans cet ouvrage, nous examinons la durée d'un régime parlementaire canadien depuis la Confédération de 1867. Nous utilisons des données annuelles et nous représentons la distribution de durée de vie d'un gouvernement par une fonction de hazard, c'est-a-dire, la probabilité qu'une élection soit déclenchée durant une année spécifique étant donné qu'elle ne l'a pas encore été jusqu'à présent. Nous modélisons un déclenchement d'élection par une règle d'arrêt optimal el nous testons si la distribution dépend des caractéristiques de l'environnement politique et économique tel que prédit selon la théorie. Nous résultats basés les modèles de hazard proportionnel continu de type Cox et Gompertz et discret semi-paramétrique révèlent que les partis fédéraux au pouvoir au Canada choisissent le moment opportun pour déclencher une élection. De plus, les dépenses fiscales sont la seule variable de politique économique qui y soit systématiquement relié.

AbstractThis paper examines the capacity of governments to implement fiscal reforms in times of austerity. Unlike existing studies, which mostly focus on gradual policy changes like government spending, this analysis distinguishes between consolidation events and consolidation size to examine fiscal reforms. This strategy clarifies contradictory results in previous research and yields new insights into the underlying mechanism of fiscal reform. Based on an action-based data set that includes information about discretionary changes in taxation and government spending policies from 1978 until 2009 for 16 advanced (OECD) countries, the study shows that left and right governments are equally likely to implement cuts. Strategic considerations play a major role for the timing of fiscal consolidation, as the probability of fiscal cuts is highest at the beginning of the legislative term. When governments reform, the left cut as much as necessary, whereas right governments take the opportunity to reduce spending more.

EMU countries have engaged in fiscal consolidation since 2011. This strategy has proven to be costly in terms of GDP. This cost has been amplified by the fact that fiscal multipliers are high in time of crisis, as recently stressed by the literature. Within this context, we wonder whether there is an alternative strategy aiming at bringing back the debt ratio to 60% of GDP in 2032, meanwhile lowering output losses. To this end, we report simulations realized from a simple model describing the Eurozone and the timing for consolidation. Based on a pragmatic view of the fiscal compact, we find an alternative path for consolidation which achieves a 60% threshold for public debt over the next 20 years in most euro area countries.

2009 - 2010
Questo lavoro si propone un duplice scopo. La prima parte è tesa ad evidenziare come l’uso di metodologie alternative all’identificazione di Cholesky sono in grado di arginare i problemi che si incontrano nell’applicazione dei Vettori Autoregressivi (VAR) nell’analisi degli effetti della politica monetaria, connessi sia alla loro inefficiente parametrizzazione che al noto problema del price puzzle. Al fine di superare i limiti dell’approccio VAR si è fatto uso sia della Teoria dei Grafi, che basandosi sulle correlazioni parziali tra i valori correnti e ritardati delle variabili nel modello, rappresenta una valida soluzione al problema di imporre restrizioni per identificare un modello VAR, che delle tecniche sviluppatesi di recente nell’ambito dell’analisi fattoriale in ambito multivariato che combinano l’analisi VAR con l’analisi fattoriale: Vettore Autoregressivo Aumentato dei Fattori (FAVAR). Quest’approccio utilizza regole di estrazione dei fattori da un vasto insieme di serie storiche al fine di ottenere un insieme relativamente piccolo di sequenze, in grado di sintetizzare un gran quantitativo d’informazioni. Le informazioni che tale metodologia utilizza garantiscono con maggior precisione la corretta identificazione del meccanismo di trasmissione monetaria. E’ stata effettuata una comparazione internazionale considerando l’Unione Monetaria Europea (EMU), Giappone e gli Stati Uniti. Dai risultati è emerso che l’information set delle autorità monetarie, la cui definizione è essenziale al fine di identificare gli shock di politica monetaria, sembra essere costituito da dati ad alta frequenza. Inoltre, non è ancora stato stabilito in letteratura se l’EMU può essere considerata un’economia chiusa o aperta. I nostri risultati indicano che il tasso ufficiale EMU sembra dipendere dal Federal Funds rate degli Stati Uniti che pertanto, i policy maker europei adottano misure di politica monetarie tenendo conto della politica monetaria statunitense. L’ultima parte pone l’accetto sull’importanza del timing dell’azione fiscale da cui deriva il titolo della dissertazione. Il pepar di riferimento è stato quello di Valery Ramey (2011). La macroeconometrica Ramey ritiene fondamentale considerare gli effetti dell’anticipazione dell’azione fiscale sostenendo e mostrando anche attraverso la simulazione di modelli teorici che i risultati ottenuti attraverso i VAR strutturali, sono stati differenti in quanto mancava il “timing” dell’azione fiscale. Questo lavoro si è proposto, anche attraverso l’utilizzo di un modello maggiormente ricco d’informazioni, di verificare se i risultati di Ramey fossero robusti ad una diversa specificazione del modello base, che nel nostro caso si è tenuto conto in maniera diretta della dinamica del debito distillando in pochi fattori le informazioni derivanti da un gran numero di variabili avvalendoci dell’approccio FAVAR. Inoltre, è stato utilizzato un sample differente rispetto a quello di Ramey. I risultati ottenuti sono di stampo keynesiano, in quanto mostrano che sia il consumo che il salario reale aumentano come risposta ad una politica fiscale espansiva e che dunque, anche se tiene conto del timing dell’azione fiscale, sembra sia possibile giungere a conclusioni differenti da Ramey la quale invece, perviene a risultati di stampo neoclassico. Risultati contraddittori potrebbero essere imputati a break strutturali, che possono riguardare aspetti istituzionali, di policy e al comportamento degli agenti privati, che gioca un ruolo di non poco conto, implicando moltiplicatori della spesa e reazioni dei consumatori che possono essere differenti nel tempo. Questa rappresenta probabilmente la direzione da intraprendere, volta a modellare una reazione agli shock che possa cambiare nel tempo, e attraverso l’uso di modelli più strutturali, liberi dalla critica di Lucas, quali i Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE), di verificare come cambia il meccanismo di trasmissione economica al fine di poter implementare nuove azioni fiscali che siano Pareto Ottimali.[a cura dell'autore]
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This chapter investigates the link between the government debt-to-GDP ratio and real per capita income growth in Italy over 1861-2007. By estimation of a standard production function, we find support for the hypotheses of a negative relation between the two variables which appears to work mainly through reduced investment. A descriptive analysis of fiscal policy in 1880-1914 (when the negative correlation between the two variables is particularly strong) and 1985-2007 (when the correlation appears to break down when debt starts declining) suggests that differences in the timing of fiscal consolidation, as well as in the size and composition of the budget, are additional significant explanatory factors.

This chapter describes the long 2010–15 fiscal squeeze under the first Conservative–Liberal coalition since the early 1920s, in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and with debt and deficit at levels not seen for four decades or more. It included sharp political debate over timing, depth, and tax/spending balance of fiscal squeeze, with most of the coalition squeeze based on its Labour predecessor’s plans, and the deficit reduction outcome roughly the same as those Labour plans, principally because of shortfall on the revenue side. This episode was marked by a repeat of ‘bear trap’ tactics by the incumbents, and the post-squeeze 2015 election rewarded one party in the coalition, while the other party was heavily punished and so was the Labour Opposition. How far the victory of ‘Vote Leave’ (Brexit) in the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU can be attributed to fiscal squeeze is debatable.

From 1978 through the turn of the century China was transformed from a state-owned economy into a predominantly private economy. This fundamental change took place under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is ideologically mandated and politically predisposed to suppress private ownership. Dancing with the Devil explains how and why such an ironic and puzzling reality came about. The central thesis is that private ownership became a necessary evil for the CCP because the public sector was increasingly unable to address two essential concerns for regime survival: employment and revenue. Focusing on political actors as a major group of change agents, the book examines how their self-interested behavior led to the decline of public ownership. Demographics and the state’s fiscal system provide the analytical coordinates for revealing the changing incentives and constraints faced by political actors and for investigating their responses and strategies. These factors help explain CCP leaders’ initial decision to allow limited private economic activities at the outset of reform. They also shed light on the subsequent growth of opportunism in the behavior of lower-level officials, which undermined the vitality of public enterprises. Furthermore, they hold a key to understanding the timing of the massive privatization in the late 1990s, as well as its tempo and spread thereafter. The book illustrates how the driving forces developed and played out in these intertwined episodes of the story. In so doing, it offers new insights into the mechanisms of China’s economic transformation and enriches theories of institutional change.

This chapters shows how to construct a New Keynesian by changing the timing of monetary injections and imposing an information friction. We show the model implies an expectational Phillips Curve. We then discuss how to simulate our model on the computer.

This chapter examines the politics of fiscal squeeze during the Argentine Great Depression (1999–2002) and subsequent economic recovery (2003–07). Argentina’s dramatic transition from poster child to basket case has received much attention, but little systematic research has been conducted on the logic, determinants and implications of the key budget decisions taken before, during and after the financial collapse of 2001. This chapter fills the gap in two ways. First, it assesses fiscal policymaking during both the recession and economic crisis period and the subsequent recovery, focusing on the timing, size and composition of deficit-cutting measures (spending cuts and tax increases). Secondly, it analyses the politics of fiscal adjustment, including the strategies adopted by governments to legitimise the fiscal squeeze. The Argentine case provides insights into the political effort going into budget consolidation in really hard times and offers a counterpoint to received views about the possibilities and limits of austerity.

Abstract The Indian economy was seen fast settling to a ‘New Normal’ with Unlock 2.0 effective 1 July 2020, relaxing the night curfew timings, provision of additional domestic flights and trains and more activities being permitted in a calibrated manner outside of containment zones. With the pandemic having negatively impacted countries globally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its revised projections of June 2020, had predicted that the Indian economy would contract by 4.5% in FY21 as against the optimistic forecast announced of 1.9% growth in April 2020. The chapter discusses in detail the fiscal measures that had been adopted by the Indian government to mitigate the adverse economic of the virus.

Social media has recently emerged as a key tool to manage customer relations in industry. This chapter aims to contribute a step-by-step Twitter Analytic framework for analysing the tweets in a fiscal crisis. The proposed framework includes three major sections – demographic analytic, content analytic and integrated method analytic. This chapter provides useful insights to develop this framework through the lens of the recent Volkswagen emission scandal. A sizable dataset of #volkswagescandal tweets (8,274) was extracted as the research sample. Research findings based upon this sample include the following: Consumer sentiments are overall negative toward the scandal; some clustered groups are identified; male users expressed more interest on social media in the topic than female users; the popularity of tweets was closely related with the timing of news coverage, which indicates the traditional media is still playing a critical role in public opinion formation. The limitations and practical contribution of the current study are also discussed.

Social media has recently emerged as a key tool to manage customer relations in industry. This chapter aims to contribute a step-by-step Twitter Analytic framework for analysing the tweets in a fiscal crisis. The proposed framework includes three major sections – demographic analytic, content analytic and integrated method analytic. This chapter provides useful insights to develop this framework through the lens of the recent Volkswagen emission scandal. A sizable dataset of #volkswagescandal tweets (8,274) was extracted as the research sample. Research findings based upon this sample include the following: Consumer sentiments are overall negative toward the scandal; some clustered groups are identified; male users expressed more interest on social media in the topic than female users; the popularity of tweets was closely related with the timing of news coverage, which indicates the traditional media is still playing a critical role in public opinion formation. The limitations and practical contribution of the current study are also discussed.

Abstract Chapter 2 situates Timon of Athens in the context of a Scottish gold boom to argue that the monarchy’s superficial control over the subterranean world and its minerals perpetuated dubious views of the natural world as a gift economy. Entranced by the glittering promises of mining entrepreneurs like Bevis Bulmer, the king’s faith in chimerical reserves of gold and silver encouraged a fiscal recklessness mirrored in Shakespeare and Middleton’s tragic satire. Timon bears a notable resemblance to Jacobean England’s biggest coal baron, Bulmer, who hosted lavish feasts and engaged in acts of aggressive generosity until he was forced to flee into the wilds of Ireland after his credit collapsed. Assaying the Folio’s rhetorical capitalization of Gold, the chapter argues that Shakespeare imbues the metal with a vitalist power or mettle far more absolute than that of the insolvent king.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.