Books on the topic 'Three paradoxes of set theory'

The monograph reveals the basics of complexity theory and methods for assessing complexity. The concept of complexity consideration is based on the analysis of complexity as a common attribute in processes and systems. The monograph describes the main methods for assessing different types of complexity. The concept of considering complexity in this monograph is also based on the fact that complexity is a comparative characteristic. It is given on a relative scale of difficulty. Therefore, complexity must be defined on a relative scale of “simplicity-complexity.” This concept motivates the consideration and analysis of the concept of “simplicity” as a complement to the concept of “complexity”. These concepts set the scale of complexity. The monograph provides a comparative analysis of the related concepts of simplicity and complexity. Three methods for assessing complexity are described: expert assessment of complexity, assessment of complexity using mathematical metrics, comparative assessment of complexity based on the theory of comparative analysis. The monograph contains a taxonomy of the main types of complexity. The content of the main types of complexity is revealed in detail: descriptive complexity, system complexity, modeling complexity, computational complexity. algorithmic complexity, deterministic complexity. Specific cognitive difficulties are described in detail. For cognitive complexity, special assessment methods are used. An interpretation of the concept of cognitive filter is given. Complexity is associated with the concept of complex systems. In most monographs on complex systems, the complexity aspect has not been considered or is viewed in a simplified manner. This monograph examines complexity as a characteristic of complex systems and the basis for their classification. Emergence is described as a characteristic of the complexity of systems and complex processes. The monograph contains a taxonomy of complex systems with characteristics of the complexity of different systems. Complex data systems have been explored. An analysis of organizational complex systems is given. Various types of complex ergatic systems have been described. An analysis of complex technical systems is given. Self-developing complex systems are described. autopoiesis of a complex organizational and technical system has been studied as a principle of systems development. Cyber-physical systems are described as an example of the development of complex systems. The monograph is intended for specialists in the field of computer science, systems analysis, artificial intelligence and philosophy of information.

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.

Chapter 5 moves beyond the simple paradoxes discussed in Chapters 2-4. The chapter applies the singularity approach to the traditional paradoxes of definability (or denotation), associated with Berry, Richard, and König. The chapter goes on to argue that there are two settings for Russell’s paradox, one in terms of the mathematical notion of set, and the other in terms of the logico-semantic notion of extension. The chapter then applies the singularity approach to Russell’s paradox for extensions. The chapter moves on to the case of truth, and applies the singularity approach to various versions of the Liar paradox, paying particular attention to the so-called strengthened Liar.

Plural logic has become a well-established subject, especially in philosophical logic. This book explores its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its behalf correct? After introducing plural logic and its main applications, the book provides a systematic analysis of the relation between this logic and other theoretical frameworks such as set theory, mereology, higher-order logic, and modal logic. The applications of plural logic rely on two assumptions, namely that this logic is ontologically innocent and has great expressive power. These assumptions are shown to be problematic. The result is a more nuanced picture of plural logic’s applications than has been given so far. Questions about the correct logic of plurals play a central role in the last part of the book, where traditional plural logic is rejected in favor of a “critical” alternative. The most striking feature of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. This leads to a novel approach to the relation between the many and the one. In particular, critical plural logic paves the way for an account of sets capable of solving the set-theoretic paradoxes.

Chapter 2 surveys the various theories of time and explores their consequences for the possibility of time travel. Section 1 introduces the traditional debates over tense and distinguishes between three different views of temporal ontology: eternalism, presentism, and the growing block theory. Section 2 discusses eternalism and the double-occupancy paradox. Section 3 focuses on presentism and various versions of the “no destination” objection. Section 4 looks at the growing block theory and the worry that time travel would allow for future indeterminacy to creep back into the past. Finally, sections 5 and 6 look at the special and general theories of relativity and consider their implications for our understanding of time travel.

This book argues for both Metaphysical Infinitism—the view that there can be infinitely descending chains of ontological dependence and grounding, with no bottom level of fundamental things or facts—and Metaphysical Holism—the view that there can be circles of ontological dependence or grounding. It is argued that the orthodox view—Metaphysical Foundationalism, the view that everything in reality is ultimately accounted for by a base class of fundamental phenomena—is unmotivated. It is also argued that we should reject the orthodox view that relations like grounding and ontological dependence are explanatory relations. An alternative account of metaphysical explanation is defended that does not tie explanation to grounding, ontological dependence, or fundamentality. A number of cases are developed across a wide range of philosophical areas, to show the theoretical fruitfulness of allowing infinite regress and circularity, including: non-well-founded set theory, mathematical structuralism, the metaphysics of persons, the metaphysics of gender and sexuality, the semantic paradoxes, and others. In the course of the discussion, distinctive views are defended concerning when an infinite regress is vicious, the nature of truth, non-classical logic and dialetheism, social construction, and more.

This chapter turns the tables on the standard conception of the relation between the liar paradox and theories of truth. We should not look to the liar paradox as constraining the development of a materially adequate theory of truth; rather, we should see the development of a materially adequate theory of truth as sufficient to block the Liar. This evident reversal has important consequences for a number of issues that are widely discussed in the literature. The chapter advocates a substantivist theory of truth and conceives of such a theory as a cluster of interconnected principles of truth. In particular, according to the chapter, there is some material principle of truth, which is arrived at by investigating the nature of truth itself. This material principle, which the chapter calls ‘IMMANENCE’, has three subprinciples, ‘immanence’, ‘transcendence’, and ‘normativity’. Given the combination of the first two subprinciples, the chapter argues that the liar paradox does not arise.

The Law of Excluded Middle is not to be blamed for any of the logico-semantic paradoxes. We explain and defend our proof-theoretic criterion of paradoxicality, according to which the ‘proofs’ of inconsistency associated with the paradoxes are in principle distinct from those that establish genuine inconsistencies, in that they cannot be brought into normal form. Instead, the reduction sequences initiated by paradox-posing proofs ‘of ⊥’ do not terminate. This criterion is defended against some recent would-be counterexamples by stressing the need to use Core Logic’s parallelized forms of the elimination rules. We show how Russell’s famous paradox in set theory is not a genuine paradox; for it can be construed as a disproof, in the free logic of sets, of the assumption that the set of all non-self-membered sets exists. The Liar (by contrast) is still paradoxical, according to the proof-theoretic criterion of paradoxicality.

The principle that every statement is bivalent (i.e. either true or false) has been a bone of philosophical contention for centuries, for an apparently powerful argument for it (due to Aristotle) sits alongside apparently convincing counterexamples to it. This chapter analyzes Aristotle’s argument, then, in the light of this analysis, examines three sorts of problem case for bivalence. Future contingents, it is contended, are bivalent. Certain statements of higher set theory, by contrast, are not. Pace the intuitionists, though, this is not because excluded middle does not apply to such statements, but because they are not determinate. Vague statements too are not bivalent, in this case because the law of proof by cases does not apply. The chapter goes on to show how this opens the way to a solution to the ancient paradox of the heap (or Sorites) that draws on quantum logic.

According to a fairly widespread assumption, there is some definite collection of completely factual or fundamental propositions upon which all truths supervene and which are unaffected by vagueness. This assumption manifests itself in formal models of vagueness as well—for example, the supervaluationist who represents propositions as sets of world-precisification pairs may divide logical space into propositions that only depend on the world-coordinate. This chapter argues that this assumption leads to paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, and, ultimately, should be rejected in favour of a weaker notion of fundamentality or factuality. It suggests an alternative picture in which there is vagueness ‘all the way down’: logical-space can be divided into basic propositions that settle all precise matters, but it is vague where those divisions lie.

The concept of theory takes part in a conceptual network occupied by some of the most common subjects of European Enlightenment, such as “science” and “reason.” Generally speaking, a theory is a rational type of abstract or generalizing thinking, or the results of such thinking. Theories drive the exercise of finding facts rather than of reaching goals. To formulate a theory, or to “theorize,” is to assert something of a privileged epistemic status, manifested in the traditional scholarly hierarchy between theorists and those who merely labor among the empirical weeds. In so doing, a theory provides a fixed point upon which analysis can be founded and action can be performed. Scholar and author Kenneth W. Thompson describes a nexus of relations between and among three different senses of the word “theory:” normative theory, a “general theory of politics,” and the set of assumptions on the basis of which a given actor is acting. These three types of theory are somehow paralleled by Marysia Zalewski’s triad of theory as “tool,” theory as “critique,” and theory as “everyday practice.” While Thompson’s and Zalewski’s interpretations of theory are each inherently consistent, both signal a different philosophical ontology. Thompson’s viewpoint is dualist, presuming the existence of a mind-independent world to which knowledge refers; while Zalewski’s is more of a monist, rejecting the mind/world dichotomy in favor of a more complex interrelationship between observers and their objects of study.

The Introduction summarizes the aims and methods of the book, explains the title, taken from Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, addresses the paradox of the otherworldly aims of religion and the worldly means of book publication, lists the principal questions the book sets out to answer and the denominations and groups covered, and points out the varied meanings of the terms ‘Methodist’ and ‘evangelical’. Despite the theological and organizational differences between these denominations and groups, they agreed on the fundamental importance of disseminating books for inculcating Christian belief and practice. To illustrate the long-term influence of such publications there is a brief analysis of Collins’s nineteenth-century series, ‘Select Christian Authors, with Introductory Essays’.

Role theory is an approach to the study of foreign policy that developed in the interdisciplinary field of social psychology and can be appropriately applied at the individual, state, and system level analyses. Role theory, which first attracted attention in the foreign policy literature after the publication of K. J. Holsti’s 1970 study of national role conception, does not refer to a single theory, but rather a family of theories, an approach, or perspective that begins with the concept of role as central to social life. The major independent variables in the study of roles include role expectations, role demands, role location, and audience effects (including cues). In addition, role theory contains its own model of social identity based on three crucial dimensions: status, value, and involvement. The 1987 publication of Stephen G. Walker’s edited volume, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, set the stage for further advances in the use of role theory in both the fields of foreign policy and international relations. According to Walker, role theory has a rich language of descriptive concepts, the organizational potential to bridge levels of analyses, and numerous explanatory advantages. This makes role theory an extremely valuable approach to foreign policy analysis. Role theory also offers a way of bringing greater integration between foreign policy analysis and international relations, especially through constructivist meta-theory.

The previous chapter posed the primary research question and offered a new theory that encompassed two interrelated arguments. This chapter produces three hypotheses derived from the new theory offered in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 tests these arguments in a large-N study using multivariate statistical analysis. The first section discusses the operationalization of our main dependent and independent variables. It will also briefly outline a set of control variables and what the literature predicts regarding their effect on spending and inequality. These factors range from economic factors (globalization, inflation, female labor participation, economic development), political factors (partisanship, electoral systems, election cycle), and demographic factors. To correct for problems associated with the nature of panel data models, such as endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation, it uses the Arellano-Bond estimation, which uses the Generalized Method of Moments. The rest of the chapter presents the results and offers its interpretation and conclusion.

This book examines the practice of portraits as a way in to grasping the paradoxes of subjectivity. This book is written from the perspective that the portrait is suspended between likeness and strangeness, identity and distance, representation and presentation, exactitude and forcefulness. It can identify an individual, but it can also express the dynamics by means of which its subject advances and withdraws. The book consists of two extended essays written a decade apart but in close conversation, in which the author considers the range of aspirations articulated by the portrait. Heavily illustrated, it includes a newly written preface bringing the two essays together and a substantial Introduction, which places the author's work within the range of thinking of aesthetics and the subject, from religion, to aesthetics, to psychoanalysis. Though undergirded by a powerful grasp of the philosophical and psychoanalytic tradition that has rendered our sense of the subject so problematic, this book is at heart an unpretentious reading of three dozen portraits, from ancient drinking mugs to recent experimental or parodic pieces in which the artistic representation of a sitter is made from their blood, germ cultures, or DNA. The contemporary world of ubiquitous photos, the book argues, in no way makes the portrait a thing of the past. On the contrary, the forms of appearing that mark the portrait continue to challenge how we see the bodies and representations that dominate our world.

Recent developments in Constructivist theorizing add up to a qualitatively new approach: the New Constructivism. Central to the New Constructivism are novel theoretical perspectives and vocabularies, like practice theory, relationalism, and actor-network theory; new empirical interests, like affect and emotions; and methodological innovations like network analysis and multiple correspondence analysis. While many proponents of these approaches have downplayed their links to Constructivism, this book seeks to set the record straight—showing how they are principally developments within Constructivism, rather than outside it. The book presents a manifesto for this New Constructivism via a tour of the contemporary constructivist landscape. It demonstrates that identifying the New Constructivism is imperative for three related reasons: empirical pay-off, intellectual consistency, and the formation of groups of scholars who share a broad perspective on international politics. Surveying an array of exemplary works and drawing on the author’s own work on U.S. and U.K. national security policy, the book shows that the New Constructivism is a vibrant, powerful approach to world politics with eight key features. The New Constructivism is: (1) anti-foundationalist; (2) anti-essentialist; (3) methodologically omnivorous; (4) conceptually pluralist; (5) reflexive; (6) necessarily historical; (7) politically agnostic; and (8) attuned to emotions and affect in human action.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

This chapter considers the notion of an inconsistent concept. Previous chapters have argued that—despite its name—conceptual engineering has no use for concepts. However, a number of conceptual engineers give a central role to the idea that certain concepts are inconsistent. One might think that because it has no role for concepts the author’s theory will be unable to speak to the concerns of such conceptual engineers. The aim in this chapter is to respond to this line of thought, by explaining why such engineers (incorrectly) appeal to inconsistent concepts. In order to explain this notion, it appeals to three ideas: i) inconsistent beliefs or conceptions, ii) inconsistent introductory events, and iii) metasemantic messiness. It then compares this approach with that of philosophers who want to use conceptual engineering to solve paradoxes.

This chapter begins with a critique of David Lewis’s ontology of concrete possible worlds. One argument that has been given in support of such an ontology is that possible worlds are needed to uphold our best analysis of counterfactuals. In response to this argument it is objected that we do not need to postulate possible worlds as truthmakers for counterfactuals. It is further argued that Lewis’s ontology of concrete possible worlds leads to set-theoretic-like paradoxes, and that it fails to explain our motivation to eradicate evil in our world. Nelson Pike’s argument that if God exists our actions are fated is rejected, and Peter Geach’s argument that if time travel is possible we can change the past is refuted. These responses to Pike and Geach constitute a further defense of the pure manifold theory of time.

According to orthodoxy the study of vagueness belongs to the domain of the philosophy of language. On that view, to solve the paradoxes of vagueness we need to investigate the nature of words like ‘heap’ and ‘bald’. This book criticizes linguistic explanations of the state of ignorance we find ourselves in when confronted with borderline cases and develops, within the framework of classical logic, a theory of propositional vagueness in its stead. The view places the study of vagueness squarely in epistemological terms, situating it within a theory of rational propositional attitudes. Once one has accepted vague propositions, a number of questions about their role in thought become conspicuous. Can one’s total evidence be vague? What sort of support does vague evidence lend to precise matters and conversely? Can rational people agree about the precise whilst disagreeing about the vague? Is it rational to care intrinsically about vague matters? Can one’s attitudes towards vague propositions be relevant in decision making? The book develops a set of positions on these matters, and exploits them in expounding a novel theory of vagueness in which vagueness is defined in terms of its role in thought. The resulting view is applied to a number of problems in the philosophy of vagueness.

Abstract Entrepôt of Revolutions places the American, French, and Haitian revolutions in a single, connected, analytic frame. At the heart of this relationship was not just republican politics but also commerce between France and the United States, commerce that turned on the fate of Saint-Domingue/Haiti. The book centers imperial trade as a driving force, arguing that commercial factors preceded and conditioned political change across the revolutionary Atlantic. At the crux of these transformations was the “entrepôt,” the “Pearl of the Caribbean,” whose economy grew dramatically as a direct consequence of the American Revolution and the French-American alliance. Saint-Domingue was the single most profitable colony in the Americas in the second half of the eighteenth century, thanks to staggering production of sugar and coffee and the unpaid labor of hundreds of thousands of enslaved people. Through Saint-Domingue we see the Franco-American relationship for what it really was and resolve many of the paradoxes of the era. The colony was so focused on producing sugar and coffee that it needed to import food. Mainland North America was the Caribbean’s breadbasket, with exports of flour, livestock, salted meats, and timber to Saint-Domingue accounting for a huge portion of US exports. The book chronicles the rapidly changing set of relationships that emerged as the United States developed a trade regime independent of Great Britain and sheds light on the three-way struggle among France, the United States, and Haiti to assert, define, and maintain “commercial” sovereignty.

This article focuses on a particular theory of the emotions, somatic appraisal theory, which explain the range of emotions effectively. The somatic appraisal theory is designed to compensate for the flaw in James's formulation according to which emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. James's theory does not capture the idea that emotions are meaningful. Somatic appraisal theory mentions that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body and also carry information about circumstances that bear on well-being. The bodily changes that occur and the perception thereof have the function of carrying information about loss. They were set up as responses to loss. Somatic appraisal theory has much in common with Ekman's Darwinean modules. Ekman states that each emotion is associated with a physiological pattern. Ekman mentions that the patterns are evolved adaptations, and that is also true in somatic appraisal theory. He also says that emotions exploit automatic appraisals. Ekman mentions that appraisals are components of emotions, while somatic appraisal theory reports that they are causes, rather than components, but the difference is not especially important for present purposes. Somatic appraisal theory is compatible with three ways of acquiring new emotions. Emotions are individuated by their semantic content and their somatic profile (the pattern of bodily changes the perception of which constitutes the emotion). A change in semantic content could lead to the creation of a new emotion, and the introduction of new bodily patterns could as well.

Goal Focused Positive Psychotherapy presents the first comprehensive positive psychology psychotherapy model that optimizes well-being and thereby diminishes psychological distress. The theory of change is the Broaden-and-Build Theory of positive emotions. The therapeutic process promotes client strengths, hope, positive emotions, and goals. The book provides the foundational premises, empirical support, theory, therapeutic techniques and interventions, a training model, case examples, and future directions. A three-year study is presented that reveals that Goal Focused Positive Psychotherapy (GFPP) was as effective as cognitive-behavioral therapy and short-term psychodynamic therapies, which fits the meta-analyses of therapy outcome studies that no bona fide psychotherapy achieves superior outcome. However, GFPP was significantly more attractive to the clients. Descriptions are provided of the Broaden-and-Build Theory, therapy goals based upon clients’ values and personal meaning (i.e., approach goals and intrinsic goals), identification and use of clients’ personal strengths (including client culture), centrality of hope and hope theory, the implicit theory of personal change or the growth mindset, and finally Self-Determination Theory. The techniques and interventions of GFPP as well as the importance of the therapist’s intentions during therapy are presented. GFPP focuses upon the client and relationship while not viewing psychotherapy as a set of potent scripted treatments that acts upon the client. Goal Focused Positive Supervision is presented as a new model that supports the supervisee’s strength-based self-definition rather than a pathological one or deficit orientation. Training that includes the experiential learning of GFPP principles is underscored.

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's political philosophy, first by focusing on his claim that the ‘death of God’ inaugurates modern nihilism. It then explains Nietzsche's significance for political theory by situating him, on the one hand, against the Platonist and Christian traditions that dominate political philosophy and, on the other hand, with contemporary attempts to develop a new political theory of difference. The chapter also considers Nietzsche's genealogical method and proceeds by analysing the three essays of On the Genealogy of Morals, along with his views on good and bad, good and evil, slave morality, the ascetic ideal, and the nihilism of modern secularism. Finally, it reviews contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche's relation and relevance to political theory and how his philosophy has inspired a broader set of trends that has come to be known as ‘the ontological turn in political theory’.

This chapter describes the Preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations set forth by the International Law Commission, the main legal body which promotes the progressive development of international law and oversees its codification. It briefly describes three theories that form as the basis of the statements written at the Preamble —the ‘exterritoriality’ theory, the ‘representative character’ theory, and the ‘functional necessity’ theory. All of these theories heavily influence matters regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities. Ultimately, the Preamble to the Convention has two important legal functions—to state the view of the participating States on the theoretical basis of diplomatic privileges and immunities, and to make explicit the relationship between the Convention and customary international law.

In this Introduction the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume are set out. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, some central questions are discussed under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative judgements? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgements? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience?

This book presents a theory of enriched meanings for natural language interpretation. Certain expressions that exhibit complex effects at the semantics/pragmatics boundary live in an enriched meaning space while others live in a more basic meaning space. These basic meanings are mapped to enriched meanings just when required compositionally, which avoids generalizing meanings to the worst case. The theory is captured formally using monads, a concept from category theory. Monads are also prominent in functional programming and have been successfully used in the semantics of programming languages to characterize certain classes of computation. They are used here to model certain challenging linguistic computations at the semantics/pragmatics boundary. Part I presents some background on the semantics/pragmatics boundary, informally presents the theory of enriched meanings, reviews the linguistic phenomena of interest, and provides the necessary background on category theory and monads. Part II provides novel compositional analyses of the following phenomena: conventional implicature, substitution puzzles, and conjunction fallacies. Part III explores the prospects of combining monads, with particular reference to these three cases. The authors show that the compositional properties of monads model linguistic intuitions about these cases particularly well. The book is an interdisciplinary contribution to Cognitive Science: These phenomena cross not just the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, but also disciplinary boundaries between Linguistics, Philosophy and Psychology, three of the major branches of Cognitive Science, and are here analyzed with techniques that are prominent in Computer Science, a fourth major branch. A number of exercises are provided to aid understanding, as well as a set of computational tools (available at the book's website), which also allow readers to develop their own analyses of enriched meanings.

Moral theories can play both a theoretical and a practical role. As theories, they provide accounts of which features make actions right or wrong. In practice, they provide standards by which we guide our choices. Regrettably, limits on human knowledge often prevent people from using traditional moral theories to make decisions. Decision makers labor under false beliefs, or they are ignorant or uncertain about the circumstances and consequences of their possible actions. An agent so hampered cannot successfully use her chosen moral theory as a decision-guide. This book examines three major strategies for addressing this “epistemic problem” in morality. One strategy argues that the epistemic limitations of agents are defects in them but not in the moral theories, which are only required to play the theoretical role. A second strategy holds that the main or sole point of morality is to play the practical role, so that any theory incapable of guiding decisions must be rejected in favor of a more usable theory. The third strategy claims the correct theory can play both the theoretical and practical role through a two-tier structure. The top tier plays the theoretical role, while the lower tier provides a coordinated set of user-friendly decision-guides to provide practical guidance. Agents use the theoretical account indirectly to guide their choices by directly utilizing the supplementary decision-guides.Making Morality Work argues that the first two strategies should be rejected, and develops an innovative version of the third strategy.

Three simple forms of thought are fundamental to morality: treating others’ interests as important, respecting their equal status as agents, and being willing to join others as partners in a worthwhile cause. The aim of this book is to develop a substantive moral theory structured around this idea. To be successful, a theory of this kind must meet three constraints: it must be true, useful, and illuminating. The introduction specifies these constraints as a set of principles associated with Hume, Kant, Rousseau, Von Wright, Williams, Prichard, Aristotle, Hill, and Ross; and summarizes the structure of the book.

This chapter surveys the pluralist theory of morality set out in Parts I and II. It explains why the theory should be thought of as neither consequentialist nor deontological, how it makes morality into something worth caring about, and how it offers to meet the challenges set out at the start of the book. The main emphasis is on explaining how, by interacting with others in the three ways that are basic to morality, we participate in three valuable kinds of interpersonal relationship. By appealing to these relationships, we can justify claims about the foundations of morality, without attempting to derive them from a deeper foundation. We can also shed light on morality’s importance, its unity, and its complexity.

This article examines ways of expressing generality and epistemic configurations in which generality issues became intertwined with epistemological topics, such as rigor, or mathematical topics, such as point-set theory. In this regard, three very specific configurations are discussed: the first evolving from Niels Henrik Abel to Karl Weierstrass, the second in Joseph-Louis Lagrange’s treatises on analytic functions, and the third in Emile Borel. Using questions of generality, the article first compares two major treatises on function theory, one by Lagrange and one by Augustin Louis Cauchy. It then explores how some mathematicians adopted the sophisticated point-set theoretic tools provided for by the advocates of rigor to show that, in some way, Lagrange and Cauchy had been right all along. It also introduces the concept of embedded generality for capturing an approach to generality issues that is specific to mathematics.

Under what conditions will successful nonviolent revolutions lead to democratization? While the scholarly literature has shown that nonviolent resistance has a positive effect on a country’s level of democracy, little research to date has disaggregated this population to explain which cases of successful nonviolent resistance lead to democracy and which do not. This book presents a theory of democratization in transitions initiated by nonviolent resistance based on the successful resolution of two central strategic challenges: maintaining high transitional mobilization and avoiding institutionally destructive maximalism. I test the theory, first, on a data set of every transition from authoritarian rule in the post–World War II period and, second, with three in-depth case studies informed by interviews with key decision-makers in Nepal, Zambia, and Brazil. The testing supports the importance of high mobilization and low maximalism. Both have strong, consistent effects on democratization after nonviolent resistance.