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Journal articles on the topic 'Theory of truth'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Romero, Gustavo E. "Truth and Relevancy." Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.48160/18532330me7.150.

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There are several types of truths. In this paper I focus on semantic truths, and within these on factual truths. These truths are attributed to statements. I review the theory of the truth proposed by Bunge and discuss some problems that it presents. I suggest that a theory of truth of factual statements should be complemented by a theory of relevance, and propose the basic tenets of it. Finally, I briefly discuss the nature of propositions and the problem of scientific truth in the light of the presented semantic theory.

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2

DiChristina, Mariette. "Theory and Truth." Scientific American 315, no. 5 (October 18, 2016): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1116-4.

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3

Ameri, Amer. "On Truth, In Theory." American Journal of Semiotics 10, no. 1 (1993): 155–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ajs1993101/221.

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4

Sayward, C. "Prior's theory of truth." Analysis 47, no. 2 (March 1, 1987): 83–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/47.2.83.

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5

Tanesini, Alessandra. "Nietzsche's theory of truth." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 4 (December 1995): 548–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409512346891.

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6

Levine, Timothy R. "Truth-Default Theory (TDT)." Journal of Language and Social Psychology 33, no. 4 (May 23, 2014): 378–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x14535916.

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7

Kvernbekk, Tone. "Truth matters – The correspondence theory of truth meets an educational theory." Nordic Studies in Education 27, no. 03 (November 6, 2007): 210–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.18261/issn1891-5949-2007-03-02.

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8

Rifai, Afga Sidiq. "KEBENARAN DAN KERAGUAN DALAM STUDI KEISLAMAN (TELAAH PEMIKIRAN CHARLES SANDER PEIRCE DALAM BUKU CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSHOPHY)." Jurnal Penelitian Agama 20, no. 1 (August 1, 2019): 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.24090/jpa.v20i1.2019.pp95-109.

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Theory of belief and doubt Charles Sander Peirce gives fresh air to the problems faced by Muslims who are trapped in madzhabiyah and class fanaticism. Charles S. Peirce with the theory of Pragmatism tries to pioneer new philosophical thinking, where good theory must lead to the discovery of new facts and the consequences of theoretical thinking in practice does not stop at doctrine and truth claims (truth claim). Arguments that want to be proposed are beliefs about the truth if a test can be carried out to find truths about their beliefs that will give meaning. In religious studies the approach of Charles S. Peirce's theory is important to find the meaning of a truth that is believed. Keywords: Belief, doubt, Islamic study, Charles Sander Peirce

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9

Gready, Paul. "NOVEL TRUTHS: LITERATURE AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS." Comparative Literature Studies 46, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25659704.

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10

Gready, Paul. "Novel Truths: Literature And Truth Commissions." Comparative Literature Studies 46, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/complitstudies.46.1.0156.

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11

Paul Gready. "Novel Truths: Literature and Truth Commissions." Comparative Literature Studies 46, no. 1 (2008): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cls.0.0067.

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12

Tandyanto, Yulius. "Membaca 'Kebenaran' Nietzsche." MELINTAS 31, no. 2 (November 23, 2015): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/mel.v31i2.1622.130-153.

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<p>Nietzsche’s early work that gives wide exploration of the idea of truth is his unpublished essay entitled <em>Wahrheit und Lüge in Ausermoralischen Sinne </em>(1872). His controversial statement in this essay was “Truths are illusions”, opening many interpretations among scholars in understanding his position on truth. Sarah Kofman argues that it is useless to speak about truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy, for values are neither true nor false. Referring values to truth means forgetting to place oneself “beyond good and evil.” Unlike Kofman, Maudemarie Clark separates sharply Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and his denial of truth. Clark argues that Nietzsche rejects metaphysics and eventually overcomes it in his own work, but also that he ultimately affirms the existence of truths and therefore does not undermine his own theory when he claims truth for his own position. Clark’s strategy in defending her theses tries to explain that there is a turning (<em>Kehre</em>) in Nietzsche’s position. This article wants to offer an interpretation that Nietzsche does not make a new theory of truth in <em>WL</em>, but rather examines and constates truths that hold true. With his subtile and metaphoric style, Nietzsche might want to vivify the symbolic and figurative elements in language before the truth or reality that already escapes languages.</p>

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13

Wider, Kathleen. "Truth and existence:The idealism in Sartre's theory of truth." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3, no. 1 (March 1995): 91–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559508570805.

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14

Koch, T. M. "An Attributalistic Theory of Truth." Communications of the Blyth Institute 1, no. 2 (June 2, 2019): 71–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.33014/issn.2640-5652.1.2.koch.1.

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The Attributalistic Theory of Truth defines truth as being absolute, arithmetic, and axiomatic. Truth is consistent universally as it is tied to existence itself. This existence provides a system of reasoning through three innate principles: the Law of Commonality, the Concept of Infinity, which together allow for the Function of Comparability. Truth is metaphysically founded in the attribute of being. This truth is the absolute truth that meets the criteria of being the independent, prevalent element of reality.

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15

WELCH, P. D. "ULTIMATE TRUTH VIS-À-VIS STABLE TRUTH." Review of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 1 (June 2008): 126–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020308080118.

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We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: \Delta _3^1-CA0 (second-order number theory with a \Delta _3^1-comprehension axiom scheme) is insufficient. We briefly consider his claim to have produced a ‘revenge-immune’ solution to the semantic paradoxes by introducing this conditional. We remark that the notion of a ‘determinately true’ operator can be introduced in other settings.

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16

deRosset, Louis. "Hollow Truth." Philosophical Review 130, no. 4 (October 1, 2021): 533–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-9263952.

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A raft of new philosophical problems concerning truth have recently been discovered by several theorists. These problems concern the question of how ascriptions of truth are to be grounded. Most previous commentators have taken the problems to shed light on the theory of ground. In this paper, I argue that they also shed light on the theory of truth. In particular, I argue that the notion of ground can be deployed to clearly articulate one strand of deflationary thinking about truth, according to which truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” I offer a ground-theoretic explication of the (entirely bearable) lightness of truth and show how it yields a novel solution to the problems concerning how truth is grounded. So, the theory of truth and the theory of ground interact fruitfully: we can apply the notion of ground to offer a clear explication of the deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight” that both captures the motivations for that claim and solves the problems.

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17

Clavier, Paul. "God as Ultimate Truthmaker." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 1 (March 11, 2018): 67–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1908.

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Theories of truthmaking have been introduced quite recently in epistemology. Having little to do with truth serums, or truths drugs, their concern is to define truth in terms of a certain relation between truthbearers and truthmakers. Those theories make an attempt to remedy what is supposed to be lacking in classical theories of truth, especially in Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory.

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18

MAROSAN, BENCE PETER. "HUSSERL’S CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF TRUTH." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 9, no. 1 (2020): 162–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-1-162-183.

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19

Chisholm, Roderick M. "William James’s Theory of Truth." Monist 75, no. 4 (1992): 569–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist199275431.

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20

Swift, Peter. "Theory-practice gap: the truth?" Paediatric Nursing 20, no. 6 (July 24, 2008): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/paed.20.6.8.s14.

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21

Grover, Dorothy. "The Correspondence Theory of Truth." International Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 3 (2004): 438–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200444328.

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22

Halbach, Volker, and Leon Horsten. "Axiomatizing Kripke's theory of truth." Journal of Symbolic Logic 71, no. 2 (June 2006): 677–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1146620166.

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AbstractWe investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF and conjectured that the detour through classical logic in KF is dispensable. We refute Reinhardt's Conjecture, and provide a direct axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We argue that any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic has the same proof-theoretic strength as PKF. namely the strength of the system ramified analysis or a system of Tarskian ramified truth up to ωω. Thus any such axiomatization is much weaker than Feferman's axiomatization KF in classical logic, which is equivalent to the system of ramified analysis up to ε0.

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23

MIYAZAKI, Izumi. "Atisa's Two Truth Theory Reconsidered." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu) 58, no. 1 (2009): 433–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.4259/ibk.58.1_433.

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24

Maio, Tianyi. "A Contextual Theory of Truth." Questions: Philosophy for Young People 18 (2018): 19–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/questions20181811.

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25

Haecker, Dorothy. "A Theory of Historical Truth." Philosophical Topics 13, no. 2 (1985): 267–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198513240.

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26

McGee, Vann. "Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth." Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 10 (1989): 530–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil1989861024.

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27

McGee, Vann, Anil Gupta, and Nuel Belnap. "The Revision Theory of Truth." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, no. 3 (September 1996): 727. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108400.

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28

Gravelle, Sarah Stever. "A New Theory of Truth." Journal of the History of Ideas 50, no. 2 (April 1989): 333. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2709739.

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29

Stephanou, Yannis. "A Propositional Theory of Truth." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59, no. 4 (2018): 503–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2018-0013.

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30

Hay, M. "An Identity Theory of Truth." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 2 (June 2002): 242–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/724051017.

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31

BALDWIN, THOMAS. "The Identity Theory of Truth." Mind C, no. 397 (1991): 35–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/c.397.35.

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32

David, Marian. "A Substitutional Theory of Truth?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no. 1 (January 2006): 182–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00497.x.

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33

Harris, H. S. "Hegel's Correspondence Theory of Truth." Hegel Bulletin 15, no. 01 (1994): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002913.

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“The world”, said Wittgenstein, “is the totality of facts, not of things”. According to the “correspondence theory”, therefore, “the truth” will be the totality of assertions that state “the facts”. In Hegel's mature theory of “truth”, this is not “philosophical truth” at all, but the ideal limit of “correct statement”. “Philosophical truth” however – like Wittgenstein's Tractatus – is a rather special subset of “the truly assertible facts”. It is the set that contains all of the true assertions about the logical structure of human cognitive experience. Thus, it is a set of “logical facts”; and if we are to know scientifically, what “human knowledge” is, we must be able to state these “facts” correctly. Hence Hegel's theory of “truth” is not independent of his theory of “correctness”. He has a “correspondence theory” of “truth”; but “Truth” is a property of assertions about “knowledge”, not of assertions about “the world”. For this reason, the theory of “truth” becomes a complex and interesting topic in Hegel's view, and not the boringly simple matter already disposed of in the formal definition of “correctness”. What is called “the correspondence theory” does not deserve the honorific name of “theory” at all. It is a formal logical truth that can be stated in a single sentence. Only in Hegel's theory of “experience” does “correspondence” become, for the first time, interesting.

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34

Guha, Nirmalya. "The Story Theory of Truth." Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 32, no. 3 (August 31, 2015): 301–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0031-9.

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35

Milne, Peter. "Tarski, Truth and Model Theory." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, no. 2 (January 1999): 141–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.00052.

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36

Arthur, Alex. "A Utility Theory of `Truth'." Organization 10, no. 2 (May 2003): 205–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350508403010002002.

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37

Resnik, David B. "The fittingness theory of truth." Philosophical Studies 68, no. 1 (October 1992): 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00354472.

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38

Armour-Garb, Bradley. "A Minimalist Theory of Truth." Metaphilosophy 44, no. 1-2 (January 2013): 53–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12004.

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39

Restall, Greg. "Truth Values and Proof Theory." Studia Logica 92, no. 2 (June 30, 2009): 241–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y.

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40

Stebbins, Sarah. "A minimal theory of truth." Philosophical Studies 66, no. 2 (May 1992): 109–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00646268.

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41

Mancini, Vasco, and Wyllis Bandler. "A database theory of truth." Fuzzy Sets and Systems 25, no. 3 (March 1988): 369–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-0114(88)90021-8.

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42

Asay, Jamin. "The role of truth in psychological science." Theory & Psychology 28, no. 3 (January 23, 2018): 382–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354317752875.

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In their 2012 article, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, make equally good sense of scientific practice as the correspondence theory, but at a lesser theoretical cost. I also argue that the considerations Haig and Borsboom draw on are better thought of as issues relevant to realism, and thus separate from the theory of truth. I conclude that while they are correct to engage questions about what makes true the various claims that arise in psychological research, they may do so without saddling themselves with a correspondence theory.

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43

Glanzberg, Michael. "Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression On McGinn's Theory of Truth." Philosophical Studies 118, no. 3 (April 2004): 413–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:phil.0000026467.56343.66.

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44

davis halifax, nancy viva, David Fancy, Jen Rinaldi, Kate Rossiter, and Alex Tigchelaar. "Recounting Huronia Faithfully: Attenuating Our Methodology to the “Fabulation” of Truths-Telling." Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 18, no. 3 (December 25, 2017): 216–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532708617746421.

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If telling the truth is considered vital to research methodology, what happens in methodological spaces where “telling the truth” is futile? In this article, we examine the limitations, possibility, and even desirability of normative forms of empirically verifiable truth-telling and the potentialities for storied or fabulated truths with regard to knowledges that have historically been dismissed by their audiences as unreliable and even deceptive. To do so, we draw from critical theory, and Deleuzian theory in particular, to offer a detailed theoretical framework for understanding the notion of fabulated truth. We then turn to our own research to describe a project that embraced the potential of fabulation as a deeply generative methodological practice in regard to better understanding experiences of trauma. This project, which involved working alongside people with intellectual disabilities who have survived institutional incarceration, used fluid arts-based methods to help engage the affective force of trauma to story multiple truths about an otherwise unspeakable history.

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45

BARRIO, EDUARDO, and LAVINIA PICOLLO. "NOTES ONω-INCONSISTENT THEORIES OF TRUTH IN SECOND-ORDER LANGUAGES." Review of Symbolic Logic 6, no. 4 (October 28, 2013): 733–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020313000269.

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It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, butω-consistency is less frequently required. This paper argues thatω-consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adoptingω-inconsistent truth theories for arithmetic is unsatisfiability. In order to bring out this point, well knownω-inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truthT#and the classical theory of symmetric truthFS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems withω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories.

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46

Wang, Sijia, and Huanhuan He. "Paramārtha’s Ultimate Truth and the Development of Chinese Buddhism’s Ultimate Truth." Religions 13, no. 1 (December 24, 2021): 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13010017.

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This paper discusses the development of ideas of the ultimate in the thought of Chinese Buddhism in the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The concept of ultimate truth is, along with that of conventional truth, a core concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism. During the Sui Dynasty, Chinese Buddhism developed the unique perspective of the Three Truths, the foundation for which was formed during the Southern and Northern Dynasties. This begins with Jie jie Jing 解節經 (in full, Foshuo Jiejie Jing 佛說解節經) by Paramārtha (499–569), which is a partial translation of Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and presents the theory of ultimate truth (paramārtha) to Chinese Buddhists. Through a comparison of Jiejie Jing with other Chinese and Tibetan translations of Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, we establish Paramārtha’s thoughts on the ultimate. The relationship between Paramārtha’s thought on the ultimate and the development of the Three Truths is evaluated in a comparison of Paramārtha’s thoughts on ultimate truth with the thinking of nearly contemporary Chinese monks.

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47

Nadjarian, Nora. "Truth." World Literature Today 86, no. 5 (2012): 58–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wlt.2012.0201.

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48

Healy, Paul. "Is Habermas’s Consensus Theory A Theory of Truth?" Irish Philosophical Journal 4, no. 1 (1987): 145–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/irishphil198741/27.

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49

Ingthorsson, R. D. "There’s no truth-theory like the correspondence theory." Discusiones Filosóficas 20, no. 34 (January 1, 2019): 15–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/difil.2019.20.34.2.

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I challenge the assumption that pragmatist, coherence, identity, and deflationary theories of truth are essentially rival views to the correspondence theory, but I do not endorse pluralism. Except for some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only seem to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are combined with a rejection of an objective reality or when it is assumed that to offer a ‘theory of truth’ is to offer a theory of the function of the truthpredicate. I argue that the correspondence theory should not be understood as a theory about the function of the truthpredicate, and that the core ideas of the alternative views, once separated from any anti-realist convictions, are best understood as complementary views about different aspects of a fairly complex phenomenon, notably of how our beliefs relate to their subject matter and how we reason and talk about that relation.

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50

Genin, Konstantin, and Kevin T. Kelly. "Theory Choice, Theory Change, and Inductive Truth-Conduciveness." Studia Logica 107, no. 5 (August 4, 2018): 949–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9809-5.

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