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Journal articles on the topic 'Theism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 August 2024

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1

Lougheed, Kirk. "Anti-Theism, Pro-Theism, and Gratuitous Evil." Philosophia Christi 21, no. 2 (2019): 355–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc201921232.

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Ebrahim Azadegan recently argues that personal anti-theism, the view that it’s rational for a particular individual to prefer that God not exist, is a form of gratuitous evil. He justifies this evil by arguing that the anti-theist is uniquely positioned to bargain, implore, and plea to God. I argue that Azadegan faces a paradox. Once the anti-theist recognizes that God plus anti-theism makes the world better, she should convert to pro-theism. But then there can be no reflective anti-theists who could add value to the world. Ignorance is a requirement of the anti-theist who can offer these unique goods.

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2

RHODA, ALAN R. "Generic open theism and some varieties thereof." Religious Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2, 2008): 225–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412508009438.

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AbstractThe goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. The significance of this approach is that it helps avoid conflating arguments bearing on specific versions of open theism with arguments pertaining to open theism simpliciter.

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3

Dumsday, Travis. "Is Palamism a Form of Classical Theism, Theistic Personalism, Panentheism, or What? Some Conceptual Clarification for Analytic Philosophers." Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Researches 5, no. 2 (2021): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2587-683x-2021-5-2-27-40.

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The precise understanding of “classical theism” varies somewhat within analytic philosophy of religion. Sometimes it is understood as something like a synonym for generic Christian theism (in contrast to deism or pantheism or the theisms of other world religions). Alternatively, the label is often understood by reference to a specific understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity (namely that promulgated by such figures as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas) and the larger conception of God which flows from it. The latter usage of the label is quite common within the recent literature, such that classical theism in this sense is viewed as competing with other prominent ways of conceptualizing Christian theism, notably panentheism, theistic personalism, and open theism. Where does the Palamite understanding of God (normative within Eastern Orthodox theology) fall within a contemporary taxonomy of Christian theisms? I seek to answer this question. By way of a literature review consulting representative contemporary sources on the various alternative theisms plus Palamism, I clarify the distinctive commitments of each position and draw out their assorted conceptual relationships and interconnections. I then go on to suggest that Palamism is uniquely well-situated to function as a bridge-builder and corrective force within the current literature, capable of dialoguing productively with the aforementioned range of Christian theisms.

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LEECH, DAVID, and AKU VISALA. "The cognitive science of religion: a modified theist response." Religious Studies 47, no. 3 (July 12, 2010): 301–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000302.

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AbstractCritics of religion have recently claimed that the natural explanation of religious-belief formation offered by the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is incompatible with theism. Defenders of theism have in turn responded to these claims by arguing for the compatibility of the CSR account with theism. In this paper we propose a modified defence of the compatibility of the CSR account with theism which supplements extant theistic arguments by drawing out the implications of certain points about the nature of CSR explanation which have so far been left relatively unexploited. In developing this defence, we argue that extant atheistic and theistic readings of the CSR can be understood as accepting certain presuppositions, especially about the relative centrality of the CSR account in explaining religious belief, which, we argue, would be detrimental to the theist case were they actually intended, and which should be clearly rejected. We suggest that the theist should argue explicitly from the nature of CSR explanation to its compatibility with theism.

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5

Law, Stephen. "Skeptical theism and Skepticism About the External World and Past." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (October 2017): 55–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246117000285.

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AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.

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6

Mullins, R. T. "The Problem of Arbitrary Creation for Impassibility." Open Theology 6, no. 1 (July 18, 2020): 392–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opth-2020-0110.

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AbstractThere is a particular question that has plagued classical Christian theism over the centuries. What reason could God have for creating a universe? In this article, I shall articulate the unique claims of classical theism that other rival models of God lack. I shall argue that classical theism’s unique commitments entail that God cannot create the universe for a reason. Thus, any nonclassical model of God can claim to have the advantage over classical theism because they can affirm that God creates the universe for a reason. In Section 1, I shall articulate classical theism. In Section 2, I shall lay the groundwork for the debate by explaining what a reason is and what a creation is. In Section 3, I shall argue that a classical theist cannot affirm that God creates the universe for a reason, thus conflicting with God’s perfect rationality.

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7

McNabb, Tyler Dalton, and Michael DeVito. "Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism: A Synthesis." Religions 13, no. 1 (December 28, 2021): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13010024.

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Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation.

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8

DePoe, John M. "Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Moral Skepticism." Philosophia Christi 24, no. 2 (2022): 257–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202224222.

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One objection to skeptical theism is that it implies radical moral skepticism. Humans cannot make any moral judgments on this view because of their ignorance of the inaccessible divine knowledge that is called upon to explain the existence of apparently gratuitous evil. In answering this objection, I propose two important moves for skeptical theists. First, skeptical theists should be positive skeptical theists (the existence of God positively implies the appearance of gratuitous evil), rather than negative skeptical theists (the appearance of gratuitous evil is probabilistically inscrutable given theism). Second, the skeptical theist can affirm a model of divine transcendence whereby the unknown divine moral knowledge is continuous with human moral knowledge. These two moves, I contend, assist in saving skeptical theism from accusations of radical moral skepticism.

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9

Dombrowski, Daniel A. "Neoclassical Theism as Inherently Dialogical." Religions 13, no. 6 (June 8, 2022): 529. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13060529.

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The position usually called “process theism” is seldom called this by one of its most important defenders, Charles Hartshorne. The label he typically uses is “neoclassical theism”. It is important to notice that these two designations are not equivalent. To speak of process theism is to accentuate the differences between this metaphysical view and an opposing metaphysical stance, that of traditional or substantialist theism. By way of contrast, to speak of neoclassical theism is not to accentuate differences but rather the inclusion of one metaphysical tradition within another. That is, the neoclassical theism of Hartshorne (along with that of A.N. Whitehead, John Cobb, and David Ray Griffin, et al.) is both “neo” and “classical”. The compatibility between the best insights of classical theism and the best in neoclassical theism is evidenced in Hartshorne’s startling claim that he learned almost as much from St. Thomas Aquinas as he did from Whitehead! Although Hartshorne spent a good deal of his career pointing out that classical theism was shipwrecked on certain rocks of contradiction (neo), Thomas, more than anyone else, has provided us with an admirable chart showing the location of the rocks (classical). Three different topics will be emphasized in my defense of the thesis that “process theism” tends to be a polemical designation, in contrast to the more irenic “neoclassical theism”. The first of these is the contrast between monopolar and dipolar metaphysics. In the divine case, the neoclassical theist emphasizes the claim that, in partial contrast to the classical theistic God who does not in any way change, God always changes, and both of these words are important. The second topic is the commonplace in “process” thought that one of the most important passages in the history of metaphysical writing is in Plato’s Sophist (247e), where it is suggested that being is power or dynamis, specifically the power, however slight, both to affect other beings and to be affected by them. The third topic is Whiteheadian prehension, wherein a metaphysical thinker in the present can literally grasp and include the best insights from previous metaphysical traditions and partially transform them by bringing them into a larger whole.

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Kozlova, Tatyana Aleksandrovna. "Psychological intention in European theism of the XIX century." Философская мысль, no. 4 (April 2020): 14–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2020.4.32437.

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The subject of this research is the psychological intention in the European theism of the XIX century in the context of anthropological turn. The author examines such trends of European theism of the XIX century as German post-Hegelian theism, French and Italian spiritualism, Russian spiritual-academic theism. It is demonstrated the European theism of the XIX century as a philosophy of that time of anthropological pivot mats psychologism as a transition towards individual-substantial (psychological) Self with dialogical intention, and establishment of philosophy on the psychological foundation. Particular attention is given to the essence of anthropological turn and psychologism in its context. Anthropological turn is interpreted as a transition of metaphysical into anthropology in the vein of Heidegger’s philosophy. This transition means that philosophy is structured upon the basis of natural sciences and psychology, human Self and its reflection lose the ontological character, but it becomes individually-substantial and obtains dialogical intention. The philosophy of European theism of the XIX century is viewed in this context; however, special attention is dedicated to the establishment of philosophy on psychological foundation, transition from the individually-substantial Self and problem of its reflection. The novelty consists in examination of psychological intention of European theism of the XIX century within the framework of anthropological turn, as well as substantiation of presence of the psychologically oriented trend in terms of this philosophy. To the representatives of psychological oriented direction of European theism of the XIX century can be attributed such French spiritualists as Maine de Biran, Cousin, Jouffroy, Ravaisson-Mollien, whose works resemble the psychological method of the similar to their views Italian spiritualist Galupppi, French neo-spiritualist Bergson, German post-Hegelian theist Fechner, whose doctrine was structures on psychophysical foundation.

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11

Ezri, Grigorii Konstantinovich. "Psychological intention in European theism of the XIX century." Философская мысль, no. 4 (April 2020): 36–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2020.4.32455.

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The subject of this research is the psychological intention in the European theism of the XIX century in the context of anthropological turn. The author examines such trends of European theism of the XIX century as German post-Hegelian theism, French and Italian spiritualism, Russian spiritual-academic theism. It is demonstrated the European theism of the XIX century as a philosophy of that time of anthropological pivot mats psychologism as a transition towards individual-substantial (psychological) Self with dialogical intention, and establishment of philosophy on the psychological foundation. Particular attention is given to the essence of anthropological turn and psychologism in its context. Anthropological turn is interpreted as a transition of metaphysical into anthropology in the vein of Heidegger’s philosophy. This transition means that philosophy is structured upon the basis of natural sciences and psychology, human Self and its reflection lose the ontological character, but it becomes individually-substantial and obtains dialogical intention. The philosophy of European theism of the XIX century is viewed in this context; however, special attention is dedicated to the establishment of philosophy on psychological foundation, transition from the individually-substantial Self and problem of its reflection. The novelty consists in examination of psychological intention of European theism of the XIX century within the framework of anthropological turn, as well as substantiation of presence of the psychologically oriented trend in terms of this philosophy. To the representatives of psychological oriented direction of European theism of the XIX century can be attributed such French spiritualists as Maine de Biran, Cousin, Jouffroy, Ravaisson-Mollien, whose works resemble the psychological method of the similar to their views Italian spiritualist Galupppi, French neo-spiritualist Bergson, German post-Hegelian theist Fechner, whose doctrine was structures on psychophysical foundation.

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12

COLLINS, JOHN M. "The evil-god challenge: extended and defended." Religious Studies 55, no. 1 (March 19, 2018): 85–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000070.

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AbstractStephen Law developed a challenge to theism, known as the evil-god challenge (Law (2010) ). The evil-god challenge to theism is to explain why the theist's responses to the problem of evil are any better than the diabolist's – who believes in a supremely evil god – rejoinders to the problem of good, when all the theist's ploys (theodicy, sceptical theism, etc.) can be parodied by the diabolist.In the first part of this article, I extend the evil-god challenge by showing that additional theist replies to the problem of evil (more theodicies, the privation view of evil, and others) also may be appropriated, with just as much plausibility, in support of the diabolist position. In the second part of the article, I defend the evil-god challenge against several objections.

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13

Glas, Gerrit. "Heeft Het Theïsme Eigen Gronden? Alvin Plantinga Over de ‘Proper Basicality’ van Religieus Geloof." Philosophia Reformata 65, no. 2 (December 17, 2000): 170–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000197.

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The title of this article is ambiguous in the sense that it may direct the attention to either (a) theism as a system of beliefs of persons who are referring to particular facts that serve as external grounds for the foundation of theist beliefs (the foundationalist approach) or (b) to theism as a system of beliefs of persons who are convinced of theism’s truth on grounds that are intrinsic to their belief (the Pascalian approach). Traces of both conceptions of theism can be found in Alvin Plantinga’s thesis of the ‛proper basicality’ of religious belief, for instance in the distinction between evidence of the ‛on the basis of …’- type and evidence of the ‛inclination’- type. However, these two types of evidence do only lead to doxastic experience. In order to be warranted with respect to a particular knowledge claim, beliefs must be produced by noetic capacities that function properly, i.e. according to their design plan and in contexts that are appropriate to these capacities. This externalist epistemology exerts its greatest power in the criticism of the ‛evidentialist objection to belief in God’. However, it raises a number of objections with respect to its positive account of theism. When every community of thinkers creates its own relevant set of examples in order to establish criteria of proper basicality, does this not lead to skepticism? And, can doxastic experience not be honoured as a proper response to being called by divine discourse and, correspondingly, be seen as the relational foundation of theist belief?

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14

Gillespie, Ryan. "Cosmic Meaning, Awe, and Absurdity in the Secular Age: A Critique of Religious Non-Theism." Harvard Theological Review 111, no. 4 (October 2018): 461–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017816018000238.

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AbstractThe notion of a meaningful life in secular modernism is often caught between two worlds: a deep human yearning for cosmic meaning, on the one hand, and a seemingly random, impersonal, contingent universe on the other hand. This is often referred to as absurdity. One response to absurdity is classical theism, and another is scientific reductionism. A third response, and the subject of this article, is religious non-theism. This article: (a) explicates the primary tensions of absurdity, in relation to both human expectations and discussions of beauty in contemporary physics and cosmology; (b) analyzes the arguments and motivations of religious non-theists and the attitude of awe toward the cosmos as a rapprochement between—or at least alternative to—classical theism and scientific reductionism, as a sort of post-secular response to absurdity; and (c) begins a critique of the religious non-theist perspective, explicating four worries, expressed as the Commitment Problem, the Standards Problem, the Moral Problem, and the Awe Problem.

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15

SILVER, DAVID. "Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil." Religious Studies 38, no. 3 (September 2002): 339–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412502006133.

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This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

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16

Aguti, Andrea. "Logical Argument from Evil and Theism." Religions 13, no. 11 (October 22, 2022): 1007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111007.

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The article argues that the logical argument from evil is dead, and the new version presented by James Sterba cannot resurrect it. In the first part, I say that the logical argument from evil is dead either because, in the version given by Mackie, it was successfully refuted by Plantinga and other theists or because, by inviting a reformulation of theistic doctrines, it was nevertheless superseded by contemporary versions of theism, such as open theism. In the second part, I argue that the two significant moves made by Sterba to resurrect the logical argument from evil fail in their intent either because the premise they start does not necessarily give rise to an atheistic conclusion or because the premise is unacceptable for the theist.

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17

Law, Stephen. "MISS THE TARGET: HOW SOME ‘SOPHISTICATED’ THEISTS DODGE ATHEIST CRITICISM." Think 17, no. 50 (2018): 5–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175618000167.

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This short article looks at a move made by some theists in defence of theism: the suggestion is that because the atheist (e.g. Richard Dawkins) has failed fully to grasp what the theist means by ‘God’ etc. so the atheist's criticisms must miss their target.

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18

MacBeath, Murray, and Clement Dore. "Theism." Philosophical Quarterly 39, no. 154 (January 1989): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220361.

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19

Rowe, William L. "Theism." Faith and Philosophy 3, no. 2 (1986): 202–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil19863217.

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20

Matthews, Gareth B., and Clement Dore. "Theism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47, no. 4 (June 1987): 678. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107240.

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21

McClellan, John. "Not Skeptical Theism, but Trusting Theism." Southwest Philosophy Review 32, no. 1 (2016): 233–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201632124.

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22

Basinger, David. "Process Theism Versus Free-Will Theism." Process Studies 20, no. 4 (1991): 204–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process199120438.

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23

Legenhausen, Gary. "Is God a Person?" Religious Studies 22, no. 3-4 (September 1986): 307–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018345.

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The most striking difference between Christian and Muslim theologies is that while, for Christians, God is a person, Muslims worship an impersonal deity. Despite the importance of this difference for a host of theological issues, it is a difference which has gone largely unnoticed by Christians and Muslims alike. Yet Christians everywhere will affirm that God is a person, while the average Muslim will readily deny this. Theism is often defined by philosophers of religion who work in the Christian tradition in such a manner as to require the belief that God is a person. Thus The Encyclopedia of Philosophy has it that, ‘THEISM signifies belief in one God (theos) who is (a) personal, (b) worthy of adoration, and (c) separate from the world but (d) continuously active in it”. John H. Hick admits that, ‘Theism…is strictly belief in a deity, but is generally used to mean belief in a personal deity”. Richard Swinburne states that a theist is one who believes that there is a God who is a ‘person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe”, and J. L. Mackie, while arguing the case of atheism, endorses Swinburne's definition of theism.

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24

Seigal, Joshua. "Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception." Forum Philosophicum 15, no. 2 (December 20, 2010): 251–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2010.1502.19.

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Skeptical theism—a strategy for dealing with so-called “evidential arguments from evil”—is often held to lead to moral skepticism. In this paper I look at some of the responses open to the skeptical theist to the contention that her position leads to moral skepticism, and argue that they are ultimately unsuccessful, since they leave the skeptical theist with no grounds for ruling out the possibility of maximal divine deception. I then go on to argue that the situation is particularly bleak for the skeptical theist, since the most prominent ways of dealing with this pervasive type of skepticism are not available to her. Furthermore, since this pervasive type of skepticism entails moral skepticism, it follows that moral skepticism will after all have found a way in “through the back door.” In order to solidify my case, I go on to outline and deal with three potential objections.

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25

Perszyk, Ken. "Motivating the Search for Alternatives to Personal OmniGod Theism: The Case from Classical Theism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 4 (December 13, 2018): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i4.2622.

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Analytic philosophers of religion typically take God to be ‘the personal omniGod’ – a (supernatural, immaterial) person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, and who creates and sustains all else that exists. Analytic philosophers also tend to assume that the personal omniGod is the God of ‘classical’ theism. Arguably, this is a mistake. To be consistent, a classical theist or her supporter must deny that God is literally a person. They need not, however, deny the aptness of using personal language, or of thinking of God as a person or personal at the level of religious psychology.

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SILVER, DAVID. "Defending the independence constraint: a reply to Snider." Religious Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2, 2008): 203–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507009316.

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AbstractIn an earlier paper I argued that Alvin Plantinga's defence of pure experiential theism (a theism epistemically based on religious experience) against the evidential problem of evil is inappropriately circular. Eric Snider rejects my argument claiming first that I do not get Plantinga's thought right. Second, he rejects a key principle my argument relies on, viz. the ‘independence constraint on neutralizers’. Finally, he offers an alternative to the independence constraint which allows the pure experiential theist to deal successfully with the evidential problem of evil. In this paper I argue that: (a) I have correctly characterized Plantinga's argument; and (b) that Snider's proposed counter-example to the independence constraint fails. Finally, I argue (c) that Snider's proposed alternative to the independence constraint is not a plausible epistemic principle.

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Łukasiewicz, Darek. "Epistemic Deism and Probabilistic Theism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 1 (March 11, 2018): 129–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1872.

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The aim of my paper is to clarify the conceptions of epistemic deism and probabilistic theism and to demonstrate that the two doctrines do not finally collapse into one. I would like also to point some reasons for the acceptance of a certain version of probabilistic theism which I will call in the last part of the article “open probabilistic theism”. Open probabilistic theism is not a version of the view called “open theism”. The reasons for the openness of open probabilistic theism are quite different from the reasons supporting open theism.

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Madden, James D. "The Evolution of Suffering, Epiphenomenalism, and the Phenomena of Life: Evidential Problems for Naturalists." Religions 12, no. 9 (August 26, 2021): 687. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12090687.

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Paul Draper argues that the central issue in the debate over the problem of suffering is not whether the theist can offer a probable explanation of suffering, but whether theism or naturalism can give a better explanation for the facts regarding the distribution of pain as we find them. He likewise maintains a comparison of relative probabilities considering the facts of suffering; atheological naturalism is to be preferred. This essay proceeds in two phases: (a) It will be argued that mainstream positions in naturalistic philosophy of mind make it difficult to take pain as anything but epiphenomenal and therefore not subject to evolutionary explanation. While the distribution of suffering is a difficulty for the theist, the naturalist has equal difficulty explaining the fact that there is any suffering at all in the first place. Thus, the facts of suffering offer no advantage to the atheist. (b) Phenomenologists suggest that there is an intrinsic connection between animal life, pain, and normativity (including a summum bonum). The mere occurrence of life and normativity are, at least prima facie, more likely on the assumption of theism than atheism, so the theist may have a probabilistic advantage relative to the atheist. Phases (a) and (b) together support the overall conclusion that the facts of pain as we find them in the world (including that there is any pain at all) are at least as great, if not greater, a challenge for the atheist as they are the theist.

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McBrayer, Justin. "The Problem of Evil & Sceptical Theism." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (October 2017): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246117000248.

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AbstractThe problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of a perfect God with the existence of horrible things in the world. Many take this problem as a convincing reason to be an atheist. But others think that the problem can be solved. One prominent solution is called ‘sceptical theism’. A sceptical theist is someone who believes in God but thinks that the problem of evil is not a real problem since humans are unable to see whether the horrible things in our world are truly pointless or else serve some greater purpose.

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Nemes, Steven. "God Is Not Chastened." Philosophia Christi 23, no. 1 (2021): 27–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20212314.

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Oliver Crisp proposes “chastened theism” as a theologically realist alternative to classical theism and theistic personalism. I critique his chastened theism and propose the alternative of Christian Pure Act theism, a “chastened” version of theological nonrealism.

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31

Law, Stephen. "Skeptical theism." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 72 (2016): 71–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20167237.

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32

Dombrowski, Daniel. "Developmental Theism." Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 3 (2009): 353–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil200926321.

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33

Dombrowski, Daniel. "Developmental Theism." Faith and Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2010): 228–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201027224.

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Rockwell, Teed. "Naturalistic Theism." Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 25, no. 2 (October 6, 2017): 209–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/eph.34830.

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McBrayer, Justin P. "Skeptical Theism." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 7 (June 27, 2010): 611–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00306.x.

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Nagasawa, Yujin. "Anselmian Theism." Philosophy Compass 6, no. 8 (August 2011): 564–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00415.x.

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Sorensen, Roy. "Fictional Theism." Analysis 75, no. 4 (October 2015): 539–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv075.

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Foley, Richard, and Richard Fumerton. "Davidson's theism?" Philosophical Studies 48, no. 1 (July 1985): 83–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00372409.

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Lataster, Raphael. "The Problem of Alternative Monotheisms: Another Serious Challenge to Theism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 1 (March 11, 2018): 31–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1801.

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Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence – especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world – many of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the – arguably infinite – number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists.[1] I take ‘theism’ to mean ‘classical theism’, which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence.

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Launonen, Lari, and R. T. Mullins. "Why Open Theism Is Natural and Classical Theism Is Not." Religions 12, no. 11 (November 2, 2021): 956. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12110956.

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The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but the classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.

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Kartaiev, Volodymyr. "Open Theism: A Critical Analysis." Theological Reflections: Eastern European Journal of Theology 19, no. 1 (May 27, 2021): 265–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.29357/2521-179x.2021.v19.1.21.

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Kartaiev, Volodymyr. “Open Theism: A Critical Analysis.” The dissertation for the degree of candidate of philosophical sciences– 09.00.14 (041 – Theology). This dissertation provides a critical analysis of the methodological, philosophical, andhermeneutic aspects of open theism as a conceptual model of providence. Open theism is a revision of the classical model of God’s providence. It has been proven that despite significant modification, open theism can be called part of the theological family of Arminianism. At the same time, fundamental disagreements prevent the identification of open theism with process theology. It is shown that open theism is in essence a God-centered model. Divine life is social life. Open theism tries to correct, and if necessary, eliminate all elements of the providence model that contradicts love. It was discovered that of the three versions of open theism, only one falls within the confines of Christian orthodoxy. This is a version that denies the existence of the truth about future events (alethic openness) on the basis of causal, providential, and ontic openness of the future.

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Collier, Matthew James. "Repairing the Contingency Argument against Divine Simplicity." Journal of Analytic Theology 9 (September 22, 2021): 126–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.12978/jat.2021-9.120009021417.

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According to classical theism, God is simple. However, contemporary objections to divine simplicity abound. One of those objections has received a lot of attention recently: the contingency objection. The objection is taken to pose a threat to God's freedom. Tomaszewski argues that the argument that supports the contingency objection, however, is invalid. Herein, I supply two valid versions of the argument; thus, the classical theist is required to defuse the argument.

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Frances, Bryan. "THE ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT FROM OUTRAGEOUSNESS." Think 17, no. 48 (2018): 107–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175617000379.

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When pressed, many atheists offer three reasons why they reject theism: there is strong evidence against theism, there is no strong evidence for theism, and theism is so outrageous that it needs a great deal of support in order for us to believe it in a reasonable manner. I examine the third reason, arguing that it fails.

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Hendricks, Perry. "The Nature of Skeptical Theism." Philosophia Christi 21, no. 1 (2019): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc201921112.

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Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Recently, Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs have argued that the theses that ground skeptical theism are either false or limited in scope. In this article, I show that their objections rest on dubious assumptions about the nature of skeptical theism. Along the way, I develop and clarify the ambiguous parts of skeptical theism. The upshot of this is that—once the nature of skeptical theism is made clearer—it is far more difficult to resist.

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PHILIPSE, HERMAN. "Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism evaluated." Religious Studies 53, no. 3 (August 10, 2017): 307–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412517000245.

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AbstractIn this article, I classify Richard Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism, and raise eight structural problems with regard to his Bayesian approach. For example, is theism really a meaningful theory? Does it have any predictive power? If so, isn't theism a degenerating research programme? Furthermore, is it legitimate to immunize theism against empirical refutations? Is Swinburne's tactic of doing so successful?

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Hendricks, Perry. "Causal Connections, Logical Connections, and Skeptical Theism: There Is No Logical Problem of Evil." Religions 13, no. 7 (July 21, 2022): 668. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13070668.

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In this paper, I consider Sterba’s recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba’s criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due to his focus on causal connections and his neglect of logical connections. Because of this, his argument remains vulnerable to skeptical theism.

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Peckel, Ariel. "Hume beyond Theism and Atheism." Hume Studies 49, no. 1 (April 2024): 9–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2024.a924228.

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Abstract: This paper defends a rigorous reading of Hume’s critiques of arguments for the existence of God and of the belief in God against interpretations that endorse Humean theism, deism, and fideism. The latter include Donald Livingston’s theist reading, J. C. A. Gaskin’s “attenuated deism” reading, and Edward Kanterian’s “humble fideism” reading. I also examine whether Hume’s rejections of a positive theology commit him to agnosticism or atheism. My innovative challenge to such conclusions maintains that, while elements of both agnosticism and atheism are found in Hume, these denote, respectively, a methodology and an incidental implication of his philosophy. But neither sufficiently captures his constructive vision for a society, individual psychology, and system of knowledge guided by naturalist principles and aims. For this, an alternate conception is needed that describes Hume’s philosophy of religion beyond mere atheism.

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HENDRICKS, PERRY. "Skeptical Theism Proved." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 2 (2020): 264–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.45.

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AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many hold that it undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However, the case for skeptical theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered an explicit argument for the truth of skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous argument for the truth of skeptical theism.

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Ladstaetter, Klaus. "On John McClellan’s “Not Skeptical Theism, but Trusting Theism”." Southwest Philosophy Review 32, no. 2 (2016): 87–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201632243.

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Ezri, Grigorii Konstantinovich. "Personalistic intention in European theism of the XIX century." Философская мысль, no. 5 (May 2020): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2020.5.32717.

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The subject of this research is the personalistic intention in European theism of the XIX century in the context of anthropological turn. The article examines such trends of European theism of the XIX century as German post-Hegelian theism, French spiritualism, Spanish theism introduced by Unamuno, Russian spiritual-academic theism. It is demonstrated that the European theism of the XIX century as a philosophy of the period of anthropological turn is characterized with personalism: interpretation of personality as an individual substance in the context of its dialogical and value aspects; a more existential interpretation of personality was possible. Special attention is paid to the essence of anthropological turn and personalism in its context. Anthropological turn is viewed in light of Heidegger’s philosophy as structuring philosophy on the basis of natural sciences and psychology. It means that the human Self becomes individually substantial, and acquires psychological, dialogical and value dimensions. The philosophy of European theism of the XIX century is examines in this context, however, emphasis is made on explanation of personalism as a reflection of personality as an individual substance through researching the conditions of being and conditions for-self-being, and meaning of any being for other creatures. The scientific novelty consists in viewing personalistic intention on European theism of the XIX century in the context of anthropological turn, as well as in substantiation of the existence of personalistically oriented trend in European theism of the XIX century, which was represented by Lotze, Teichmüller, and Russian spiritual-academic theists. Maine de Biran and Bergson, who dedicated major attention to psychological method, did not substantiate personalism.

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