Journal articles on the topic 'The Stoics'
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1
Glucker, John. "Stoics, para-stoics and anti-stoics: Methods and sensibilities." Philosophia 31, no. 1-2 (October 2003): 221–324. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380935.
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Flamigni, Gabriele. "O QUE DEVEM AS MULHERES FAZER?" Ethics, Politics & Society 4 (August 6, 2021): 100–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.192.
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The aim of this paper is to enquire if the Stoics consider certain social activities appropriate only for men or women, a much-debated question in the scholarship. Here it is argued that the Stoics are not committed to gendered divisions of tasks. This claim is pled through an analysis of the various testimonies and of the Stoic notion of appropriate activity (καθῆκον). This result leads to reconsider the Stoics’ stand within their cultural environment and will hopefully contribute to the debate on their thinking on womanhood. This study is thus structured: firstly, the notion of καθῆκον is presented; next, the evidence of the Stoic use of gender as a parameter in determining καθήκοντα is discussed; then, a reconstruction of the social role the early Stoics assigned to women in their planned constitutions is attempted; finally, the reflection of later Stoics on the role of women in actual societies is addressed.
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Meyer, Susan Sauvé. "Passion, Impulse, and Action in Stoicism." Rhizomata 6, no. 1 (August 2, 2018): 109–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0006.
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Abstract A familiar interpretation of the Stoic doctrine of the πάθη runs as follows: The Stoics claim the πάθη are impulses (ὁρμαί). The Stoics take impulses to be causes of action. So, the Stoics think the πάθη are causes of action Premise (1) is uncontroversial, but the evidence for (2) needs to be reconsidered. I argue that the Stoics have two distinct but related conceptions of ὁρμή – a psychological construal and a behavioural construal. On the psychological construal (2) is true, but there is strong evidence that (1) is true only on the behavioural construal. That is, when the Stoics classify πάθη as impulses they are thinking of them not as impulses to act, but as cases of action in their own right.
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Blythe, William. "Stoics." Missouri Review 9, no. 3 (1986): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mis.1986.0001.
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Damski, Michał. "Kilka uwag na temat polemiki Plutarcha ze stoikami." Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2017): 223–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.24917/20841043.7.2.2.
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Some comments on the polemics of Plutarch with Stoics The purpose of this article is to briefly discuss several key anti-stoic arguments presented in Plutarch’s polemical texts — De stoicorum repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis adversus stoicos. The paper argues that the polemic against Stoicism is rather ill-disposed and that the presented arguments, despite their rhetorical power and elegancy in language, show an insufficient understanding of the criticised doctrine.
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Brouwer, René. "On the Ancient Background of Grotius's Notion of Natural Law." Grotiana 29, no. 1 (2008): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187607508x384661.
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AbstractGrotius's notion of natural law is, as he himself makes clear, founded upon two demands of nature, which are to be connected with what is now known as the Stoic doctrine of appropriation. However, Grotius's understanding of the notion of natural law as a set of rules is not Stoic, but rather goes back to an interpretation that can be ascribed to Antiochus of Ascalon. By moving away from the Stoics Grotius could not only easily accommodate the Aristotelian doctrine of equity, otherwise rejected by the Stoics, but he could also formulate a minimalistic interpretation of human dispositions or 'rights', in contrast to the Stoics' maximalistic understanding of these dispositions as virtues.
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Sanzhenakov, Alexander. "EPISTEMOLOGY AND THEORY OF ACTION OF THE STOICS." Respublica literaria, no. 1 (December 25, 2020): 119–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.47850/s.2020.1.33.
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The article is devoted to the epistemological foundations of the theory of action of the Stoics. According to the Stoics, the ideal moral subject acts correctly because she possesses knowledge. This knowledge can be understood in two ways: either it is awareness in the divine plan, or it is a correct axiological assessment. In linguistic terms, knowledge is expressed by subject-predicate judgments, to which the moral agent give an agreement, which leads to the appearance of an impulse, which prompts action. Skeptics turned their criticism to the Stoic criterion of truth – the comprehending representation and its result (comprehension), believing that by doing so they destroyed the ethics and Stoic’s theory of action, since these parts of the teaching depend on the theory of knowledge. However, the knowledge, thanks to which the moral subject receives his perfection, is much broader than a simple accurate comprehension of individual objects of external reality.
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Ju, Anna Eunyoung. "The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits." Phronesis 54, no. 4-5 (2009): 371–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/003188609x12486562883219.
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AbstractScholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both as a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological taxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their discussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, tending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, as a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, this disagreement held among the historical Stoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This apparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers in detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the evidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on this topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained between the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so disagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were actually positions that might be called "standard" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In attempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain features of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late Stoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the school's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, and, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the school's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last notion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be traced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy.
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Plecas, Tamara. "The stoic notion of friendship." Theoria, Beograd 62, no. 4 (2019): 73–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1904073p.
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The aim of this paper is to examine the Stoic notion of friendship. First, we will examine everyday and common understanding of friendship, and afterwards we will examine philosophical understanding of ideal friendship that influenced Stoics thought. Plato?s and Aristotle?s notion of friendship is of great importance to the Stoics. The Stoics, faced with a number of challenges, such as the problem of self-sufficiency outlined in Plato?s Lysis, developed a normative ideal of friendship. That ideal, as we will demonstrate, could also be developed under the influence of everyday political friendships.
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Alessandrelli, Michele. "La sintassi del cosmo: osservazioni su un volume recente." Elenchos 42, no. 2 (November 29, 2021): 375–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0019.
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Abstract This note does examine a recent volume by Ada Bronowski on the Stoic doctrine of the lekta (The Stoics on Lekta. All There Is to Say, OUP, 2019). The first part summarizes its content, while the second discusses some critical and controversial points, in particular the Platonic tenor of the interpretation of the Stoic lekta offered by the Author. This interpretation gives an extra-linguistic and realistic function to items that the Stoics cautiously left under-determined from the ontological point of view.
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Plecas, Tamara, and Ivan Nisavic. "Roman stoics Seneca and Epictetus on epicurean hedonism and the social roles of philosophers." Theoria, Beograd 65, no. 3 (2022): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2203005p.
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Epicureans and Roman Stoics interpreted pleasure (?????) differently from each other: for the Epicureans, pleasure was the ultimate good, while most Stoics perceived pleasure as something indifferent. This difference in understanding of pleasure is the crucial point of a disagreement between these two Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in particular if we consider their ethics. This paper examines this difference and highlights the significant similarities between the Roman Stoic and the Epicurean positions. Further, it briefly explores the Epicurean and the Roman Stoic understanding of social relations and philosophers? role in politics and society.
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Plecas, Tamara. "Voluntary death as an affirmation of dignified life: Death and suicide in Roman late Stoa." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 2 (2014): 107–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1402107p.
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This paper will examine the relation that Roman Stoics had towards death and suicide (voluntaria mors). After brief analysis of the historical and social context of the Roman society in which Stoics formed their opinion, it could be claimed that the Stoic defense of suicide is based on their defense of fulfilled and dignified life. According to their ethical thought, Stoics did not consider death as something terrifying, but the opposite; they valued and praised rationally chosen death. Rational death, in their opinion, is not a testimony of useless life, but a confirmation of the idea that the only life worth living is a life according to virtue.
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Sellars, John. "Stoics Against Stoics In Cudworth'sA Treatise of Freewill." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 5 (September 2012): 935–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2012.718870.
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Vogt, Katja Maria. "Vagueness and Kataleptic Impressions." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96, no. 1 (May 31, 2022): 165–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akac005.
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Abstract The Stoics’ theory of kataleptic impressions looks different once we attend to their analysis of the Sorites paradox. In defending this view, I reject the long-standing assumption that the Stoics develop their theory by focusing on sensory impressions. The Stoic approach to vagueness shows, for example, that non-sensory impressions can be seemingly indistinguishable by belonging to a series. It also draws attention to an understudied dimension of Stoic theory: in aiming to assent only to kataleptic impressions, one aims to avoid not only assent to false impressions but also assent to those that are neither true nor false.
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Ierodiakonou, Katerina. "The Stoic Provenance of the Notion of Prosochê ." Rhizomata 9, no. 2 (November 30, 2021): 202–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2021-0012.
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Abstract Late Stoics and, in particular, Epictetus made ample use of the notion of attention (prosochê), which they understood as the soul’s vigilant focus on sense impressions and on the Stoic principles. Attention, in their view, was meant to assist our self-examination and lead to ethical progress. It was thus regarded as a Stoic good and a constitutive part of eudaimonia. Early Stoics did not seem to have invoked such a notion, whereas the Neoplatonists appropriated it into their psychology by postulating the soul’s attentive part, which they introduced to explain both perceptual and intellectual attention as well as self-awareness.
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Hene, Bernd. "Aristotelian and Stoic Syllogistic in the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus." History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 24, no. 1 (September 7, 2021): 44–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10048.
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Abstract The present paper investigates the question as to how and for what purposes the Middle Platonic author of the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus uses Aristotelian and Stoic syllogistic in his interpretation of the Platonic text. This investigation shows that the commentator employs Aristotelian categorical syllogistic as an exegetical tool for reconstructing arguments in the Platonic text, enabling him not only to uncover doctrinal statements that are in his view hidden in the Platonic text, but also to dissociate Plato from unwelcome propositions. By contrast, the commentator uses Stoic hypothetical syllogistic as a polemical tool for constructing ad hominem arguments against the Stoics. More precisely, the author exploits the Stoic type of deductive reasoning to draw anti-Stoic conclusions from premises that are accepted by the Stoics, and in doing so, he manages not only to refute Stoic doctrines, but also to corroborate the corresponding Platonic theories.
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Elton, María. "Self-love in Adam Smith and the Stoic Oikeiosis." POLIS, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 32, no. 1 (May 5, 2015): 191–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340043.
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Some interpreters associate Smith with the Stoics. My aim in this paper is to discuss this position in relation with one principal aspect of this view, adopted by most of these authors, according to which the Smith’s concept of self-love is narrowly linked to the Stoic notion of oikeiosis. I intend here to demonstrate that Smithian self-love, as seen through the lens of the Stoics themselves, is instead supportive of an Epicurean interpretation of Smith, taken from Mandeville, in spite of his Stoic narrative and his apparent rejection of the system of the author of the Fable of Bees. So it is possible to classify Smith as a ‘voluntarist’ in contrast to the ‘realism’ predominant in his time.
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Stephens, William O. "The Roman Stoics." Ancient Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2006): 438–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil200626223.
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Sellars, John. "Stoics and Cynics." Classical Review 55, no. 1 (March 2005): 69–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni041.
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POPOV, DANIL S. "LEO TOLSTOY'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY AND THE STOIC TRADITION." Study of Religion, no. 4 (2021): 144–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.22250/2072-8662.2021.4.144-151.
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The article investigates a contribution of the Stoic ideas to Leo Tolstoy's religious philosophy. The problem is considered in the context of the alleged “break” in the creative development of Leo Tolstoy in the late 1870s. Although Tolstoy had been familiar with the texts and ideas of the Stoics before this time and, probably, made some allusions to the Stoics in “War and Peace”, it is possible to say that in that time the Stoic ideas as such were not of significance for him. The thinker might have realized the deeper meaning of the Stoic tradition against the background of the teachings of Christ. Applying the methods of textual analysis, the author shows that after the conversion Tolstoy sought to use some aspects of the Stoic religious narrative (men's mind as a part of the divine one, the unity of the universe) as a support for his own pantheistic (panentheistic) views, in which both his ethical and social values were rooted.
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Sanzhenakov, Alexander. "Stoic Theory of Action and Sceptical Objections Against It." Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics VI, no. 2 (March 31, 2022): 209–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2022-2-209-237.
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The article considers the Stoic theory of action and its critique by Sceptics. The Stoics believed that the agent is autonomous due to his ability to give the assent to a representation. The theory of action is interwoven with the theory of knowledge in the assent-giving since the assent can be given to both value-neutral and value-loaded statements. It is thus appropriate to ask whether an adequate theoretical comprehension is required for performing a morally correct action, or is a correct practical comprehension sufficient? Sceptics actively criticized all parts of Stoic philosophy and often turned to the concept of “comprehensible representation”, dialectically arguing that such a thing does not exist. Revealing the deficiencies of Stoic views (which can be applied to other dogmatic theories), sceptics pointed out epistemic and moral flaws of the seemingly immaculate Stoic sage. A possible answer of the Stoics would be to distinguish between the practical and theoretical aspects of the comprehensible representation. Using the example of the assent given to a false representation, it is suggested that an error in the theoretical assent does not necessarily imply an error in the practical assent. In reaction to the Stoics' critique, Sceptics developed not only a non-dogmatic way of argumentation but also their model of action. Moreover, Sceptics should defend themselves from the apraxia charge. The charge, in general, argues that the Sceptic cannot be active because s/he would not give the assent to any representation. However, it is argued that having the ataraxia state does not imply a plant or animal-like life or the total quietism since it leaves room open for an undogmatic action, the action which avoids truth-valued statements or the assent to a representation. The discussion had the consequence that the Stoics loosened the connection between epistemology and ethics. In contrast, Sceptics had to develop a model of sceptical action, according to which one can act and live without adherence to beliefs.
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Bennett, Michael James. "Cicero's De Fato in Deleuze's Logic of Sense." Deleuze Studies 9, no. 1 (February 2015): 25–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dls.2015.0173.
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The arguments of the Stoic Chrysippus recorded in Cicero's De Fato are of great importance to Deleuze's conception of events in The Logic of Sense. The purpose of this paper is to explicate these arguments, to which Deleuze's allusions are extremely terse, and to situate them in the context of Deleuze's broader project in that book. Drawing on contemporary scholarship on the Stoics, I show the extent to which Chrysippus' views on compatibilism, hypothetical inference and astrology support Deleuze's claim that the Stoics developed a theory of compatibilities and incompatibilities of events independent of corporeal states of affairs.
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Sanzhenakov, Alexander A. "The Problem of Moral Progress and Stoic Cosmopolitanism." Ethical Thought 21, no. 1 (2021): 59–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-1-59-70.
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The article is devoted to showing the connection between the moral progress and the cosmopolitanism of the Stoic. Since the early Stoics considered the right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) as one of the basic conditions for the unification of gods and humankind into a single community (κοσμόπολις), anyone who intends to join to this community must develop his or her reason to the highest level. It means that the cosmopolitan must be morally perfect, which implies that he or she has successfully completed the process of moral progress. However, the concept of moral progress in Stoicism (especially in the early one) is problematic because the Stoics denied a qualitative difference between vicious people and believed that all bad deeds are equal. The author of the article tries to remove this contradiction by introducing a two-level structure of moral progress, in which the gradation of moral development and qualitative changes in the moral character of the subject are spaced. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and their ideas about moral progress are united not only by the concept of «right reason», but also by their doctrine of «oikeiôsis», which implies the development of natural inclinations to the highest principles of morality. Finally, the interdependence of moral progress and the cosmopolitanism is demonstrated by their evolution with the development of the Stoic school. This evolution is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, the Stoics perfected the tools for moral development, which paved a clearer path to the cosmopolis, and on the other hand, they reduced the requirements for the citizens of the cosmopolis, which also led to the growth of the community of gods and people.
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Nolan, Daniel. "Stoic Gunk." Phronesis 51, no. 2 (2006): 162–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852806777006796.
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AbstractThe surviving sources on the Stoic theory of division reveal that the Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, believed that bodies, places and times were such that all of their parts themselves had proper parts. That is, bodies, places and times were composed of gunk. This realisation helps solve some long-standing puzzles about the Stoic theory of mixture and the Stoic attitude to the present.
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Maurer, Christian. "Hutcheson's Relation to Stoicism in the Light of his Moral Psychology." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 33–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1479665109000499.
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Without questioning Hutcheson's general affinities with the Stoics, this article focuses on two important differences in moral psychology that show the limits of the appropriation of Stoicism in Hutcheson's ethics of benevolence. First, Hutcheson's distinction between calm affections and violent passions does not fully match with the Stoic distinction between constantiæ and perturbationes, since the emotion of sorrow remains in Hutcheson's table of the calm affections. As far as sorrow as a public affection is concerned, this first point is tied to a second point, which Hutcheson highlights himself: His conception of virtue as benevolence and the general importance of the public affections seem to be in conflict with a Stoic conception of virtue as an internal good, since the happiness of others, which is the object of both Hutchesonian benevolence and the public sense, is external for the Stoics.
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Bobzien, Susanne. "How to give someone Horns." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 15, no. 1 (April 5, 2012): 159–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01501007.
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This paper discusses ancient versions of paradoxes today classified as paradoxes of presupposition and how their ancient solutions compare with contemporary ones. Sections 1–4 air ancient evidence for the Fallacy of Complex Question and suggested solutions, introduce the Horn Paradox, consider its authorship and contemporary solutions. Section 5 reconstructs the Stoic solution, suggesting the Stoics produced a Russellian-type solution based on a hidden scope ambiguity of negation. The difference to Russell’s explanation of definite descriptions is that in the Horn Paradox the Stoics uncovered a hidden conjunction rather than existential sentence. Sections 6 and 7 investigate hidden ambiguities in “to have” and “to lose” and ambiguities of quantification based on substitution of indefinite plural expressions for indefinite or anaphoric pronouns, and Stoic awareness of these. Section 8 considers metaphorical readings and allusions that add further spice to the paradox.
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Marmodoro, Anna. "Stoic Blends." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 32, no. 1 (July 25, 2017): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00321p02.
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The Stoics’ guiding principle in ontology is the Eleatic principle. Their existents are bodies that have the power to act and be acted upon. They account both for the constitution of material objects and the causal interactions among them in terms of such dynamic bodies. Blending is the physical mechanism that explains both constitution and causation; and is facilitated by the fact that for the Stoics all bodies exist as unlimited divided. In this paper I offer a novel analysis of this Stoic stance, and of the role it plays in their metaphysics. I argue that when blended, the substances involved become sharing subjects of qualities and structural features.
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Castagnoli, Luca. "Philosophy." Greece and Rome 62, no. 2 (September 10, 2015): 244–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017383515000182.
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I start this review, which focuses for the most part on publications on Hellenistic philosophy, with a survey of some recent studies on Stoicism. René Brouwer's The Stoic Sage introduces itself as ‘an attempt to bring the early Stoic notions of the sage and wisdom to the fore again’ (1). ‘Again’ alludes to the fact that those notions, which attracted considerable philosophical and scholarly interest at various stages since antiquity, have not received sufficient attention in recent times (specialists in the area will judge the merits of this assessment). The book is divided into four chapters, dealing respectively with the Stoic definitions of wisdom; the ancient puzzles surrounding the nature and very possibility of the change from ‘folly’ to ‘wisdom’; the controversial question of whether the Stoics themselves believed they had achieved the ideal of perfect wisdom; and the intellectual, Socratic background against which the Stoics developed their notion of wisdom. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain, in expanded and revised form, material published by Brouwer in self-contained essays between 2002 and 2008. Chapter 1, with its analysis of the Stoic definitions of wisdom as ‘knowledge of human and divine matters’ and ‘fitting expertise’, is fundamental to set the stage for the more focused inquiries of the rest of the book. From this point of view, it succeeds only partially. It helpfully covers a reasonable amount of ground, but because of Brouwer's choice to focus exclusively on the Stoic definitions of wisdom (sophia) at this stage, and not, say, on the descriptions of the Stoic wise man (sophos: Brouwer's preferred translation ‘sage’ hides the etymological connection), it also problematically leaves some fundamental aspects untouched. I was especially surprised not to see the key notion of infallibility discussed at all in this context, despite the fact that Brouwer correctly clarifies that Stoic wisdom is not to be interpreted as a form of omniscience (33–4). This ultimately springs from an insufficiently detailed analysis of the Stoics’ notions of katalēpsis (which Brouwer translates as ‘cognition’, without ever explaining its distinctive status), and then, in turn, of epistēmē and technē, and their Stoic definitions (see also the puzzling reference to ‘weak cognitions’ on p. 62). (I only note here that Paolo Togni's 2010 monograph Conoscenza e virtù nella dialettica stoica examines much more extensively and systematically the psychological and epistemological ground which needs to be covered by a discussion of Stoic sophia.) The attempt to map exhaustively the three key terms of the first definition – knowledge, human and divine – into the three parts of Stoic philosophy, respectively logic, ethics, and physics, is ingenious but too crude and ultimately unconvincing, since logic had for the Stoics its own separate subject matter (not to be identified with ‘human and divine matters’, and not even with knowledge itself, pace Brouwer), and ethics and physics can themselves be described as forms of knowledge. The interconnected nature of Stoic philosophy, which is helpfully emphasized throughout the book, need not be mirrored in the very definition of wisdom. From a broader methodological point of view, the attempt to reconstruct an early Stoic theory of wisdom constantly clashes with the nature of our evidence, and although in several cases Brouwer does carefully justify why a certain late source can be taken to bear witness to such an early theory, in other cases the reader is left to wonder whether such a justification could be given (for example, in the case of some passages from Seneca). There is still much worth pondering in Brouwer's insightful analyses in Chapters 2–4, although one is left to wonder how much added value has been generated by integrating this previously published material into a single monograph.
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Popov, Danil S. "The Stoic tradition in Russian and Western existentialism: Lev Shestov and Karl Jaspers." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies 38, no. 3 (2022): 364–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2022.308.
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The article investigates the Stoic tradition in Russian and Western existentialism, drawing on the example of the philosophy of L. Shestov and K.Jaspers. Applying the methods of textual analysis, the study focuses on their accounts of what the Stoics did and preached (or would have done and preached), instead of revealing alleged conceptual affinities between Stoic philosophy and existentialism. The author shows that both thinkers used these accounts as crucial points of reference, developing and upholding their own key doctrines: refutation of rationalism (L. Shestov), the experience of boundary situations and existential communication (K.Jaspers). Yet, they expressed serious criticism of Stoic ideas and emphasised that people would not achieve the highest aim of philosophising if they pursued the strategies of the Stoics. The study highlights the fact that L. Shestov and K.Jaspers were neither historians of philosophy nor proponents of Stoicism and examined not Stoic doctrines but a set of certain Stoic values. The form and content of their arguments make it possible to consider them as coherent Stoic narratives. Thus, the article suggests that accounts of Stoic attitudes and values offered in Russian and Western existentialism give an essential guide as to how one ought or ought not to exist, act and think.
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Brouwer, René. "The Normativity of Law in Nature Revisited: Natural Law in Late Hellenistic Thought." Ancient Philosophy Today 4, Supplement (December 2022): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/anph.2022.0080.
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In this paper I revisit nature as a source of normativity for law in the later Hellenistic period, that is beyond the opposition of law and nature in the early classical period, Plato’s and Aristotle’s naturalism, or the early Stoics’ conception of the common law. I will focus on the first century BCE, when the expression ‘natural law’ gained prominence, reconstructing its origins in the interaction between Hellenistic philosophers and the Roman elite, including jurists. I argue that for the jurists the Stoic doctrine of law in nature offered a theoretical underpinning for their unique practice of dispute resolution, whereas for the Stoics this Roman practice offered an unexpected opportunity to instrumentalise their conception of law.
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Sanzhenakov, Alexander. "STOIC ETHICS THROUGH THE EYES OF SKEPTICS." Respublica literaria, RL. 2021. vol. 2. no. 3 (September 15, 2021): 52–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.47850/rl.2021.2.3.52-60.
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The article evaluates the skeptical criticism of Stoic ethics. The author of the article notes some weak points of the Skeptics’ argumentation. Thus, skeptics have questioned that the Thus, Skeptics argued that the Stoics misidentified the good in itself. As evidence, Skeptics pointed to disagreement among dogmatists on this issue. The author of the article argues that such an argument is not decisive and cannot discredit the position of the Stoics. Skeptics could strengthen their criticism by proposing a procedure for verifying the good in itself, but in that case, they themselves would become dogmatists. Another line of skeptical criticism is connected with the thesis about the highest good, as such an object of choice, which should be chosen for its own sake. Skeptics argue that if such an object of choice exists, then it contains a contradiction in itself. Since we choose the good for its own sake, insofar as we are not interested in the subject, but in the choice itself, therefore, we must avoid the good, because after receiving it we will be deprived of the opportunity to choose it. This contradiction is eradicated by the Aristotelian concept of energeia, which was inherited and developed by the Stoics in its own way. The contradiction between the Stoics and Skeptics is most clearly manifested in their discussion of the theory of action, from which it can be concluded that disagreements between these schools exist not only at the theoretical, but also at the worldview level.
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Bronowski, Ada. "Rational Empiricism: The Stoics on Reason, Experience and Katalepsis." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 19, no. 1 (April 5, 2016): 167–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01901011.
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In this paper, Stoic epistemology is analysed in terms of how to achieve a stable grasping of reality through katalepsis. The paper argues that for the Stoics, this is a state accessible to any rational being because it is the upshot of a mental capacity we are necessarily bound to put into operation, namely that of experiencing and mentally ordering objects from the sensible world. The paper puts forward an original interpretation relying on a reconsidered notion of Stoic empeiria or experience. It connects the Stoic theory of the development of reason and formation of conceptions with a more fluid oscillation between belief and knowledge so as to establish a peculiar relation between reason and the Stoic notion of experience, articulating a form of rational empiricism.
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Arnold, Bradley. "αὐτάρκης in Stoicism and Phil 4:11." Novum Testamentum 59, no. 1 (January 5, 2017): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685365-12341553.
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This article contends that many nt scholars have read the Stoics and their view of αὐτάρκης through a post-Enlightenment (specifically Kantian) ethical framework, which assumes notions like individualism and detachment are fundamental to the ethical subject. When Stoicism is not distorted with these modernist assumptions about the ethical subject, a fairer comparison can be made between the Stoics and Paul. This article demonstrates this by providing an outline of Stoicism in such a manner, emphasizing how their ethical theory is grounded in a teleological and communitarian framework and maintains a psychologically holistic view of the self, which then sets up an exploration of the Stoic understanding of αὐτάρκης not clouded by individualist strands of thinking. This provides material for a more equitable comparison with Paul’s use of this term in Phil 4:11, where it can be seen that the scope, sources, and basis of Stoic and Pauline contentment are similar.
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Inwood, Brad, and F. H. Sandbach. "Aristotle and the Stoics." Philosophical Review 95, no. 3 (July 1986): 470. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185481.
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Blank, David, and Catherine Atherton. "The Stoics on Ambiguity." Philosophical Review 104, no. 2 (April 1995): 267. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185982.
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Todd, Richard B. "Aristotle and the Stoics." Ancient Philosophy 8, no. 2 (1988): 304–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil19888213.
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Long, A. A. "The Stoics on Ambiguity." Ancient Philosophy 17, no. 2 (1997): 484–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil199717254.
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Rabel, Robert J. "Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics." Ancient Philosophy 18, no. 1 (1998): 199–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil199818118.
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한경자. "The Stoics On Mixture." CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas ll, no. 50 (November 2013): 73–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss..50.201311.003.
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Shade, Patrick. "Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics." Teaching Philosophy 22, no. 1 (1999): 80–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil19992219.
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Boys-Stones, George. "PLUTARCH AGAINST THE STOICS." Classical Review 54, no. 2 (October 2004): 338–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cr/54.2.338.
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Reynolds, John Mark N. "Paul and the Stoics." Philosophia Christi 5, no. 1 (2003): 275–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20035121.
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Vernezze, Peter. "The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates." Ancient Philosophy 35, no. 2 (2015): 477–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil201535239.
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López-Astorga, Miguel. "Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 20, no. 3 (April 9, 2017): 417. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p417.
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http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p417The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problematic issues that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the conditionals can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already studied by the Stoics, and that they even gave their solutions to those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.
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Dyson, Henry. "What Kind of Cosmopolitans Were the Stoics? the Cosmic City in the Early Stoa." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 25, no. 2 (2008): 181–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000131.
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The Stoics are often cited as predecessors of Kantian theories of cosmopolitan justice. After setting out the various types of contemporary cosmopolitanism, I argue that the Stoic doctrine does not match any of these categories. The core of the Cosmic City doctrine in the early Stoa is cosmological and theological, not moral or political. It concerns the Zeus’ governance of the physical universe and the proper relation of our individual natures to the nature of the whole. Although the Stoics do appeal to this doctrine in moral contexts, the underlying concepts of law, autonomy, and citizenship are quite different from their contemporary counterparts. As part of my argument I attempt to explain how this theological doctrine came to be expressed in a de-politicized political vocabulary.
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Celkyte, Aiste. "THE STOIC DEFINITION OF BEAUTY ASSUMMETRIA." Classical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (March 16, 2017): 88–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838817000386.
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The Stoa might be not the first philosophical school that comes to mind when considering the most important ancient contributions to aesthetics, yet multiple extant fragments show that the Stoics had a non-marginal theoretical interest in aesthetic properties. Probably the most important piece of evidence for the Stoic attempts to theorize beauty is the definition of beauty assummetriaof parts with each other and with the whole. In the first half of this article, I present and analyse the main evidence for this definition. Then I discuss Plotinus' critique of the definition and argue that it contains some pertinent remarks that, with support of additional evidence, lead to the conclusion that the Stoics conceptualized aesthetic properties as supervening on functional composition.
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Gartner, Corinne. "Colloquium 5 Commentary on Levin." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 36, no. 1 (November 19, 2021): 159–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00361p14.
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Abstract In her rich and provocative paper, Susan Levin seeks to defend the value of anger against the views of Stoics and transhumanists, both of whom regard anger as irrational and to be eliminated. In her defense, Levin draws on Aristotle, relating his position to contemporary appraisal theorists as well as anti-racism activists and scholars, for Aristotle holds, in contrast with the Stoics, that some cases of anger are justified. The virtuous Aristotelian agent will become angry in response to injustice. I explore the extent to which Levin endorses Aristotle’s account of anger, complicating some of the associations she aims to establish. In particular, while the Stoics and Aristotle disagree about the rationality, morality, and prudential value of anger, they share a very similar conception of the emotion, according to which a desire for revenge partly constitutes anger. By contrast, Levin defends a forward-looking conception of anger, focusing on rectifying current injustice and preventing future injustice. It turns out, then, that Levin’s justified forward-looking anger may have more in common with the spirit of the Stoic response to injustice than with Aristotle’s retributive view.
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Gellera, Giovanni. "Pride Aside: James Dundas as a Stoic Christian." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17, no. 2 (June 2019): 157–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2019.0234.
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In the manuscript Idea philosophiae moralis (1679), James Dundas (c.1620−1679), first Lord Arniston, a Presbyterian, a judge and a philosopher, makes extensive use of Stoic themes and authors. About one third of the manuscript is a close reading of Seneca. Dundas judges Stoicism from the perspective of Calvinism: the decisive complaint is that the Stoics are ‘prideful’ when they consider happiness to be within the grasp of fallen human reason. However, pride aside, Dundas is willing to recover some Stoic insights for his Calvinist faith. In what ways? The promise of the practical rewards of Stoicism (control of the passions, tranquillity of the mind, strength of character) drives Dundas's interest in arguing that Stoicism can play a crucial psychological and moral contribution to a Christian's life. The investigation of Stoicism in the Idea philosophiae moralis sheds new light on the backdrop of the Scottish Enlightenment's relationship with Stoicism, commonly characterised as ‘Christian Stoicism’, as well as on the variety of the early modern Christian-Stoic syntheses, such as the Religio Stoici (1663) by George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, a friend of Dundas's.
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Seregin, Andrei V. "Intentionalism and Deontology in the Early Stoic Ethics." Philologia Classica 14, no. 1 (2022): 32–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu20.2022.103.
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In this paper, I demonstrate that the early Stoics adhered to a normative theory that may be called intentionalist: the moral significance of any action is not determined by its material content, but by the virtuous or vicious disposition of the agent’s soul and the intentions arising from this disposition. Since according to Stoics all people are divided into virtuous sages and vicious non-sages, all the actions of the former are morally right (κατορθώματα), whereas those of the latter are morally wrong (ἁμαρτήματα), even if they are materially identical. On the other hand, some statements in the Stoic fragments can rather be characterized as deontological: in this case, certain materially defined types of action (stealing, lying, adultery, etc.) seem to be presented as morally wrong in themselves. The paper’s central thesis is that such statements do not contradict the basic Stoic intentionalism but can be interpreted as consistent with it. Such an interpretation becomes possible under two conditions: firstly, if one takes into account how exactly the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα relate to the Stoic notions of appropriate and inappropriate action (καθῆκον and παρὰ τὸκαθῆκον), and, secondly, if one examines the Stoic position on the moral status of lying, which is very revealing in this respect.
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TOGNI, PAOLO. "PLATO'S SOUL-BOOK SIMILE AND STOIC EPISTEMOLOGY." Méthexis 26, no. 1 (March 30, 2013): 163–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000619.
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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to shed some light on the early Stoics' practice of managing platonic suggestions to construct their epistemology. Instances of such a practice, which scholars have recently focussed on, are the Stoic reassessment of the account of phantasia Plato offers in the Sophist and the image of the wax block as discussed in the Theaetetus. In this work I put forward a comparison between the simile of the soul-book, as presented by Socrates in the Philebus (39a1-c2), and the Stoic image of the soul as a sheet in which conceptions are inscribed. I try to show that a far-reaching investigation of the relationship between Plato and early Stoic epistemology should take such a comparison into due account. In section one, I go into the details of the comparison and argue that Plato's perceptual judgment (this is how I translate the term doxa as it is used in the relevant section of the Philebus) is compatible with Stoic phantasia. In section two, I try to show that the theorisation of assent enable the Stoics to reply to an objection Aristotle made to Plato's definition of phantasia as a mixture of perception and judgment.