Journal articles on the topic 'The Salafi movement'

Since the 1970s, the Salafi movement in Jordan has grown substantially. Today, Salafis are ubiquitous in every major city in the kingdom, and Salafi bookshops, lessons, and activities are common. The purpose of the movement is to institute religious behavior and practices that capture the purity of Islam, as understood by the salaf (early Companions of the Prophet). Salafis believe that because the salaf learned about Islam directly from the Prophet or those who knew him, they commanded a pure understanding of the religion. All decisions in life must therefore be based upon evidence from the Qur⊃an and sunna, as recorded in authentic sayings (had―iths) by the salaf. In instances where particular actions or behaviors were not sanctioned by the original sources of Islam, they are rejected as “not Muslim.” Those who strictly adhere to this religious understanding are considered Salafis.1

The importance of Salafism, both in the Muslim world and in Europe, has been quickly grasped by scholars and by governments, and some excellent studies of Salafism in individual countries have been published. Methodological and analytical problems, however, remain. One problem is defining the topic: what is and what is not Salafi? Classification is not assisted by internal divisions within the Salafi movement that result in disagreement among Salafis themselves as to who and what is and is not Salafi, nor by the way in which Salafis do not always describe themselves as Salafi, often preferring ahl al-sunna wa’l-jama’a, sometimes shortened to plain “Sunni,” terms which could, of course, describe almost any non-Shi’i Muslim. A related problem is that the term “Salafi” is sometimes applied by outsiders with little justification, often in the press, but also by authorities such as Hillel Fradkin, director of the Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World at the Hudson Institute, a “conservative” American think tank, who classified the Muslim Brotherhood as Salafi, on the basis that they were part of “the worldwide Islamic phenomenon and movement variously known as Islamism, Salafism, radical Islam, militant Islam, political Islam and the like.”

Abstract In this article, I trace the history of the label ‘Salafi’ in the UK to show that there has been a marked change in its desirability and use within some ‘Salafi’ circles. Drawing on interviews conducted with members of various streams of the Salafi movement as well as content analysis of the websites, social media pages and audio-visual content of ‘Salafi’ groups, I argue that while the oftentimes unqualified association between Salafism and terrorism in public discourse may have had a negative impact on the label’s desirability, intra-Salafi politics shed more light on why some ‘Salafis’ adopt the label while others do not.

This article explores the shifting trajectories of Salafi-inclined reforms in Ghana since the 1950s. I illustrate that Ghanaian expressions of Salafism emerged in the 1950s from local doctrinal debates between members of the Tījāniyya Sufi brotherhood and those who opposed Sufism. The opposition against the Tījāniyya evolved to become part of the worldwide Salafi reform movement. Tracing the movement’s development, I illustrate further that the Ghanaian expressions of Salafism was neither homogenous nor static in its strategies of proselytization or its doctrinal emphases. Rather, many local Salafi scholars continuously defined and sharpened their ideas and strategies to accommodate changing local and global realities. Moreover, while seeking intellectual and financial support of Salafi sponsors in the Arab world, Ghanaian Salafis remained focused on local needs. The history of Ghanaian Salafiyya will thus sharpen our knowledge of the dynamism of global Salafiyya, and the processes by which local doctrinal concerns find affinities with debates in other parts of the Muslim world.

The Salafi movement has recently spread so widely in Indonesia that it has reached rural communities. In that context, its contact with local beliefs and practices produces a dynamic and creative tension between them. This paper will explore the contact dynamics by photographing wrestle of Salafi’s theological movement and beliefs in the mainstream of theological beliefs of local Sasak society of Lombok. The authors found that local knowledge that expressed through practicing several ceremonies associated with the human life-cycle from moment of human birth to death events considered by the Salafi as unauthentic element of Islam called heretic to which the Salafi has to carry out purification. That potential conflict between the Sasak and Salafis, requiring mutual respect and tolerance among them.

This article describes the dynamics of da‘wah movement of Salafis and their response to its stigmatization as being heretical and radical. The phenomenon of radical movements with their terrorist actions shapes the stigma of being radical to the Salafis. The spread and acceleration of the Salafi movement have put the da‘wah of the traditionalists in trouble. The stigma of Salafis as being radical and heretical results in the resistance against the Salafis to stop their da‘wah in many places. The stigmatization of the Salafis as being radical and intolerant drives the Salafis to show their identity as unidentical with the stigmatization. A number of persecution towards the Salafis is the implication of this stigma. This article is resulted from interviews with Salafi figures and d?‘?s who felt annoyed with the stigmatization. The appearance of Salafis which resembles those stigmatized as radicals lead to the emergence of public opinion that the Salafis are radical, while on the contrary, this article finds that the Salafis in fact fight against radical thoughts that lead to radical and terrorist actions.

Salafi is one of Islamic movement which have spread around the world. This movement initiates to purify Islamicdoctrine from what it called bidah. It has been currently in South Kalimantan for several years. In fact, the movementhas several places that be the center of its teaching. Data showed that Ustadz Aiman and his brother introduce it atthe first in 2001. Since that time, Salafi has developed and has had many followers. In several big cities of SouthKalimantan district, such as Banjarmasin, Martapura, and Barabai, Salafi built some mosques and used it as itslearning and teaching center. This writing discussed about the development of Salafi movement in South Kalimantan.It will be reviewed about Salafis methods in introducing and teaching its doctrine to the people of South Kalimantan.

The study of Salafi is generally focused on the perspective of social movements with the political opportunity structure, resources theory, and collective action frames. The three approaches to social movement theory lead to the same estuary, which is an analysis of emerging factors and the development of a social movement. Unlike the previous studies, this article focuses on the acceptance of the Islamic community's acceptability patterns to the Salafi movement. The interesting phenomenon of this movement is the so massive infiltration occurring. The community is so rapidly accepting the style and the system of sustainability offered by various Salafi groups. This article uses a sociological approach to the basis of structural-functional and interactionist-symbolic theories of experience in both the individual and collective levels of the followers of Salafi. Methods of collecting data through interviews, observations, and documentation with the research subject of 30 members of the Salafi group are not grass-root. The results showed that structuralist-functionally, the phenomenon of public acceptability due to the currents of modernity, shifting the concept of the family, shifting the meaning of religious authorities, and ease of access to information technology. Symbolically-symbolic, the phenomenon is the result of individual interaction with the social environment and the search for alternative religious identity. Keywords: Salafi, Movemnt, and Islam

The article deals with the problem of Salafism politization. The process of politicization of traditional salafi ideas led to the emergence of conservative Islamism, which eventually moved away from medieval traditionalism and adapted to modern political conditions. The process of Salafism politicization was initiated by the Salafi reformists al-Afghani and M. Abdo in the early XX century. However, reformists Salafi ideas were modified into political ideology by the Mus-lim Brotherhood, which was strongly influenced by Salafism in its early stages. During the 50–60s of the XX century, the emerging conservative Salafi Islamism was on the defensive, as it faced the ideas of Arab nationalism. It is emphasized that the forced relocation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to Saudi Arabia, in parallel, marked the movement of Islamists ideas, which received significant devel-opment and organizational form due to the financial power of the Gulf monarchies. At the turn of the 70-80s of the XX century thanks to the efforts of the Saudi government throughout the Middle East region, Salafi movements were strengthened, which enjoyed diplomatic and finan-cial support from Saudi Arabia and were engaged in promoting Salafi-Wahhabi ideas. However, the further politicization of Salafi ideas and, as a result, the development of conservative Salafi Islamism slowed down the end of the XX century being connected with the invasion of Kuwait.

Abstract Salafism is a global religious movement whose male participants often distinguish themselves from their co-religionists by a particular style of facial hair. Historians have focused largely on this movement’s engagement with questions of theology and politics, while anthropologists have assumed that Salafi practice reflects a longer Islamic tradition. In this article, I move beyond both approaches by tracing the gradual formation of a distinctly Salafi beard in the 20th century Middle East. Drawing on Salafi scholarly compendia, leading journals, popular pamphlets, and daily newspapers produced primarily in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, I argue that Salafi elites revived a longer Islamic legal tradition in order to distinguish their flock from secular nationalist projects of communal identity and Islamic activists alike. In doing so, I cast light on Salafism’s interpretative approach, the dynamics that define its development as a social movement, and the broader significance of visual markers in modern projects of Islamic piety.

The infiltration of the Salafis into the Muhammadiyah organization became a continuing reality. This reality is driven by symptoms of the strengthening of the concept of salafism in the organization that founded by KH. Ahmad Dahlan. This study seeks to analyze the Salafi da’wah against the Charitable Business of Muhammadiyah in Taman, Sidoarjo, which is always resistant. This research uses a qualitative method with a naturalistic interpretive approach. The findings of this study reveal that Salafis offer "thinking" in every Muhammadiyah Business Charity institution in Sidoarjo. Salafis try to "dress" Muhammadiyah, but still have their mindset and ideology. With the thought movement, the Salafi propaganda model is carried out through infiltration, agitation, and propaganda within the Muhammadiyah Charitable Enterprises. This is not uncommon to cause resistance and even conflict between the two. The author recommends several efforts that must be made by the Muhammadiyah management: First, the power approach. The Muhammadiyah leadership must act firmly against Salafis through established rules. Second, the intellectual approach. This approach can be done by way of scientific dialogue in the public sphere, criticizing Salafis, as well as affirming the Muhammadiyah manhaj.

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

The Salafi movement in Tunisia in general and in the area of Sidi Ali Ben Aoun in particular, emerged as an antisocial movement that adopted the defense of a cultural identity based mainly on the rejection of democracy and the foundations of the modern state, seeking change in every way through a set of well-studied strategies that made young people deeply involved. In general, the Salafi movement is not separated from the social context in which it was born. It is also a reflection of the social actors who, by engaging in the Salafi movement, desire to achieve their objectives in negotiations. The Salafi movement is a social movement born out of the womb of society and its crises. It then adopted the same society, which has been muddling in the ignorance of religion and worldly dichotomies, as a target for change. This study attributes the growth in the number of Salafist youth to social exclusion. The social conditions of the youth in the Tunisian town of Sidi Ali Ben Aoun and of Tunisian youth in general make them look for alternatives that will provides them with what the state and its institutions failed to provide: an income and a small capital that will elevate their status in the social pyramid as belonging to the surviving group. The research will focus on the relationship between the social exclusion of Tunisian youth and the growing involvement of the Salafi movement. The following questions reflect the core issues behind this investigation: What are the representations of the youth of Sidi Ali Ben Aoun to the Salafi movement in their actions and interactions? How does social exclusion contribute to the growing involvement of Tunisian and Ben Aouni youth in the Salafi movement?

Salafism has developed into different interpretations and understandings. Every da’wah movement claims to follow Salafi way of its own interpretation. This study aims at portraying one of Salafi understandings and its Salafi da’wah. This research used literature review to reconstruct the model of first emerging da’wah according to Shaikh Muhammad Al-Ghazali, a 20th century da’wah thinker and practicioner. It used his works that are supposed to bear objective, original views, and understanding on Salafism and Salafi da’wah. The study shows that since the time of the prophet the core characteristics of Salafi da’wah are criticism, constructivism, and moderation. Salafisme telah berkembang menjadi beragam interpretasi dan pemahaman. Setiap gerakan dakwah mengklaim mengikuti cara Salafi dalam interpretasinya. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menggambarkan salah satu pemahaman Salafi dan dakwah Salafi. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis literatur untuk merekonstruksi model pertama kemunculan dakwah menurut Shaikh Muhammad Al-Ghazali, seorang pemikir dan praktisi dakwah abad ke-20. Ia menggunakan karya-karyanya yang seharusnya memiliki pandangan objektif, asli, dan pemahaman tentang Salafisme dan dakwah Salafi. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa sejak masa nabi, karakteristik inti dari dakwah Salafi adalah kritis, konstruktivisme, dan moderasi.

This article explores how the revival of the Tijaniyya and the Salafi movement shaped public discourse about Islam in Ghana. Examining the debates which characterised the religious sphere in the 1990s re-democratisation, the article highlights the power struggle which shaped the relations between the contending Muslim groups. It argues that the recognition of the Tijaniyya movement as a representative for all Muslims during Ghana’s re-democratisation in the 1990s emboldened its sympathisers to adopt repressive measures against the Salafi minority. While the local success of Salafism was often linked to locally specific forms of ethnic, political or generational self-assertion, the shared experience of political disadvantage during this period led to a consolidation of Salafi activities at the national level. Thus, as the Tijaniyya influence was politicised by Government, the ensuing conflicts between Sufi and Salafi groups also led to a politicisation of Salafism from below. Illustrating that intra-Muslim debates and disagreements cannot be divorced from their political context, this study demonstrates that learning to be Muslim in Ghana is deeply embedded in political, ethnic, and intergenerational dynamics.

This article intends to discuss the development of the Salafi-Wahabi movement in South Kalimantan in relation to conflict and integration. In South Kalimantan, the development of the Salafi-Wahabi movement was quite fast. Although less than two decades, this group's preaching has covered almost all regions in this province. The development of this group in recent years has become a topic of discussion among people in South Kalimantan, in both ways: pro and contra. This article employs a qualitative method that contains the study of literature and fieldwork. Fieldwork conducted in Banjar, South Kalimantan, to gather data related to the development of the Salafi-Wahabi movement and its implications to the changes community’s social order related to conflict and integration. The research shows that there are many issues of the Islamic purification movement that caused a strong response from the community that potentially prone to conflict. For example, are its teaching on Tawheed (monotheism) and accusation of many practices as bid’ah (heresy), which targeted respected local figures or groups like Guru Sekumpul in traditional circles. It becomes the main factor of the negative view of the Salaf-Wahabi group. However, there are some efforts made by Salafi-Wahabi to integrate their activities into the Banjar community.

The article is devoted to the analysis of Salafi Islamism. Conservative Salafi Islamism during the events of the Arab spring received a new development. In particular, the fall of authoritarian regimes and the beginning of the democratic process in the Middle East and North Africa led to the creation of Salafi political parties. The Salafi sts believed, that in a favorable political environment, they would be able to defend their legal status and gain some privileges through participating in parliamentary elections. However, the creation of parties has deepened internal divisions within the Salafi movements. In particular, there were supporters among the Salafi sts, who defended the combination of student and political activities against those who considered participation in the political struggle as a temporary tactical action. The result of the disagreement was the emergence of a reformist movement, that began to see participation in politics as a tool for strengthening the position of the Salafi st movement.

Salafis refer to their understanding of Islam as authentic. This claim has resonated well with a substantial number of young Muslims. The article sets out to identify this assertion’s main components and its appeal among Egyptian youth immediately before and after the 2011 popular revolt. In other words, what is specific in the Salafi approach to the issue of authenticity? By answering this question, I aim to offer a better understanding of why this religiously inspired movement has become so attractive. By examining the narratives of Egyptian Salafis, I suggest that the allure of strict religious life transcends a Muslim’s search for identity, for it is, in reality, driven by a deep-rooted desire for certainty, purpose, and a form of collective individualism. Salafism, broadly defined, offers a very modern form of socialized spirituality that hinges largely on a discourse of authenticity and prophetic originality, a discourse that resonates with many of today’s young Muslims.

<p>This article explores Salafism movement between ideology and violence. Categorically, salafi movement can be categorized in two forms. <em>First</em>, salafi. This group berorintasi the purification of faith to make improvements through individual, family, and community structure. <em>Second</em>, salafi jihadi. Although this group also aims to purification, but this group tends to be politically, do not even hesitate to commit violence. However, they both have the desire to realize a people as a form of community of believers. In the end, according to Bernard Haykel, Salafism least understood of the three basic constitution. <em>First</em>, theology embodied in the doctrine of monotheism. In matters of theology, all members of this movement looks unanimously agreed. <em>Second</em>, the law, which pivots on the issue of ijtihad. Although there are differences in attitude, but most of the salafi found ijtihad is a necessity, while <em>taql</em><em>î</em><em>d</em> should be avoided, even by Muslims who are not educated though. <em>Third</em>, the political, which is determined by the methodology of their choice to realize the desire involved in the international arena.</p>

This paper explores the role of Salafi formal schools in the increasing influence and proliferation of Salafism in Lombok, East Indonesia, alongside the impacts of this process on educational culture and broader social contexts. Despite intense resistance from, and even violence by, traditionalist mainstream groups, the Salafi movement has developed steadily. This paper argues that the growth of Salafism in Lombok is influenced by contextualizing of proliferation strategies by integrating into Indonesian national education system and selecting of the greater Islamic traditions, rather than ideological and financial support from the Middle East, as it has been highlighted in previous studies and literature. By establishing officially certified schools and formal recognitions from the Indonesian government, the Salafi schools have found a way to successfully recruit a new young generation of Muslims in Lombok and beyond.

Anyone who was not familiar with Michael Muhammad Knight’s oeuvreand picked up his Why I Am a Salafi based upon the title, thinking it wouldbe a straightforward explanation and defense of Salafism, would be quicklydisabused of that impression. Knight begins this memoir/theological exploration/postmodern deconstruction with an extended anecdote abouthis experience of praying at a Los Angeles mosque while coming downfrom a drug-induced hallucination brought on by his intentional consumptionof Amazonian ayahuasca tea, and the book gets stranger from there.This transgressive episode of praying while high becomes a touchstone forKnight in his rethinking of his own Muslimness, the origins of the Islamictradition, and his life-journey through a variety of controversial and eccentriccommunities on the fringes of the American Muslim community.In Knight’s previous body of work—from his 2004 novel The Taqwacores(Soft Skull Press) about punk-rocking, countercultural American Muslimsto his insider-white-man narrative of an esoteric offshoot movement of theNation of Islam in Why I Am a Five Percenter (Penguin, 2011)—he has longcast himself as an experimental Muslim writer challenging established traditionsand organized religion of all kinds. Like some of his other books,Why I Am a Salafi is difficult to categorize. Framed around Knight’s odysseywithin American Islam and the diffuse trends that contributed to thedevelopment of his distinct perspective, it is part religious autobiography,part analysis of the nebulous concept of Salafism, and part therapy session.Indeed, drawing upon his well-established tendency toward bucking trendsand upsetting orthodoxies, Knight quips that in the progressive Muslimcircles he tends to run in, labeling himself a Salafi could itself be a form ofrebellion. “Depending on whom you want to irritate, Salafis could look likethe new punk rock” (29) ...

The term Salafism refers to an interpretation of Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith and practice to the way they existed at the time of Prophet Muhammad and the early generations of his followers. Since this early period represented the golden age of Islam in its pure form, Salafis believe it should be the example followed by all Muslims today. Salafism as a trend and theological movement has been a point of interest to many researchers due to the current global political escalation. It has been a focal point of issues related to global terrorism, radicalism, post-Arab Spring politics, religious trends as well as theological debates. Salafism, more often known as Wahabism, has come to Malaysia at different times and with different motivations. The early brand of Salafism in pre-Malaysia Tanah Melayu, or Malaya, was the emergence of the early 20th century reformist Salafi movement, known as Kaum Muda, inspired by the Middle Eastern Abduh-Afghani Pan Islamism. Despite the differences between that and the current global Salafism they share the same roots. Additionally, according to numerous historical accounts, the current Salafi trend in Malaysia is closely related to the global Islamic revivalism of the 1970s and 1980s, and was also affected by the return of Malaysian students studying abroad during the 1990s and early 2000s. Evidence has shown that the emergence of Salafism in Malaysia has contributed directly and indirectly to the mainstream discourse of Islamic theology and Islamic worldview amongst Malaysian Muslims in general, and Islamic organizations in particular. This paper employs a historical approach in explaining the emergence of Salafism in Malaysia and offers a critical examination of certain historical events that led to the existence of the different trends and groupings of Salafism in Malaysia and its implications for Islamic discourse in the country.

In today's world Salafism, which has evolved from insignificant and apolitical to the very influential movement is the subject of active discussion. This article discusses and analyzes the historical background, the conditions of formation and propagation of Salafi movement in Egypt. In addition, the author disclosed the role and the place of this movement in modern political life of Egypt.

Over the past 30 years, the translocal Salafi movement has expanded rapidly across Indonesia. Propagating a strict ‘literal’ interpretation of Islam, Salafis place strong emphasis on separating themselves from un-Islamic (non-Salafi) society. However, the daily implementation of such rigid boundaries remains rife with tension, depending less on Islamic scripture and more upon how adherents interpret it in a given time and place. A reflexive approach to ethnography provides a unique tool to examine and make visible these anxieties, placing the ethnographer at a vantage point to observe the communal interactions through which religious ethics are given meaning. By reflecting upon my study of the al-Hasanah mosque in Yogyakarta, I describe the ways my informants and I negotiated each other’s presence and how this illuminated the struggles to create a Salafi selfhood and modern religious ethic.

As the Muslim world searches for the right formula for reform, scholarsand intellectuals are invited to study Islamic reform movements and theconditions that made their successes possible. In this context, Najd beforethe Salafi Reform Movement is a timely contribution to the literature onsocial conditions of reform in Muslim societies. The author correctly notesthat pre-Salafi Najd (central Arabia) was neither a center of religious learningnor the site of large urban communities, which might be expected toproduce a reform movement of a size and significance of the Salafi movement.Nevertheless, the Salafi movement managed to establish a strongstate that unified Arabia and imposed peace and order on its people for thefirst time since the period of the early caliphs (pp. 1-2).This book, originally a Ph.D. dissertation, seeks to solve this puzzle.A six-page bibliography and a thirteen-page index are suffixed, along withseveral maps and tables, and both the Hijri and the Gregorian calendars areused to mark the general time periods. This book is particularly useful forstudents of history, sociology, anthropology, or genealogy in an earlymoderncontext, such as that of Najd between the mid-ninth/fifteenth andmid-twelfth/eighteenth centuries. The author argues that nomadic migrationand settlement; the growth of a sedentary population, as well asmigration and resettlement; and the growth of religious learning combinedto create a new Najdi society that produced the Salafi reform movement(p. 2). Each of these factors is addressed in one chapter.The first chapter, “The Geographical and Ecological Background,”demonstrates how Najd’s geographical setting and climatic conditions(viz., a desert region with an unpredictable climate) dictated its people’shard lifestyle and activities. For example, a persistant drought could turn asettlement, a region, or even the entire emirate into a wasteland (pp. 36-37).The second chapter, “An Historical Background,” surveys Najd’s inhabitantsat the rise of Islam and follows its demographic and political developmentsthroughout the first 9 centuries of the Islamic era. On the eve ofIslam, Najd was populous and prosperous; however, by the third/ninth ...

Abstract: This study was aimed at explaining 1) the movement pattern of LaskarJihad Alumni in Mujur, Disctrict of Kroya, Cilacap Regency, 2) its development, and3) social respond in the district. This is a field research using a qualitative approach.Data were collected through observations and interviews. The findings of this researchare as follows. 1) The movement of Laskar Jihad alumni in Mujur, Disctrict of Kroya,Cilacap Regency converts itself from its nature as a Jihad-oriented movement (inconflict area of Ambon and Poso) to an education-oriented movement. 2) There aresome different social responds to this movement, i.e. [a] some people give neutralrespond to this movement and do not feel bothered with the existence of thismovement, but they do not give any support to it; [b] some people give positiverespond, do not feel bothered, and support the movement; [c] some people givenegative respond to it, feel bothered and feel disturbed by this movement. Thevariety of responds depends on whether the existence of this movement will giveadvantage, disadvantage, even threat to each group of society. 3) Local governmentof Kroya District gives a neutral respond to this movement and other religiousmovement existing in the district. The local government expects all religiousmovement to respect one another, including the previously existing religiousmovements such as NU and Muhammadiyah.Keywords: Salafi, Laskar Jihad alumnae, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah,government. Abstrak: Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa pertama gerakan salafi alumnilaskar jihad di Desa Mujur Kecamatan Kroya Kabupaten Cilacap mengalamipergeseran dari pola gerakan jihadi (gerakan “jihad” di wilayah konflik, Ambondan Poso) menjadi pola gerakan yang berorientasi pada pendidikan. Kedua,respons masyarakat terhadap gerakan salafi beragam, yaitu: [1] ada kelompokmasyarakat yang merespon dengan sikap netral, mereka tidak merasa terganggudengan keberadaan gerakan salafi, tetapi mereka juga tidak mendukung gerakantersebut, [2] ada kelompok masyarakat yang merespon dengan positif, merekamerasa tidak terganggu dan mendukung keberadaan gerakan salafi, [3] adakelompok masyarakat yang merespon dengan negatif, mereka merasa tergangguatau dirugikan dengan keberadaan gerakan salafi. Respon masyarakat yangberagam tersebut terkait dengan apakah keberadaan gerakan salafi mengancam, merugikan, atau menguntungkan bagi keberlangsungan kelompok masyarakattertentu. Ketiga, pemerintah Kecamatan Kroya pada posisi netral dalam meresponberbagai respon yang beragam terhadap keberadaan gerakan salafi alumni laskarjihad di Desa Mujur Kecamatan Kroya Kabupaten Cilacap. Yang terpenting bagipemerintah bahwa berbagai kegiatan yang diselenggarakan oleh fahamkeagamaan yang ada tidak melanggar peraturan perundang-undangan yang ada.Namun demikian, untuk menciptakan kehidupan beragama yang harmonis,pemerintah menghimbau kepada seluruh faham/ organisasi keagamaan yangada di wilayah Kroya agar saling menghormati satu sama lain, lebih khusus kepadafaham keagamaan yang baru (seperti salafi) agar lebih menghormati organisasikeagamaan yang telah lama ada di wilayah Kroya (seperti Nahdlatul Ulama danMuhammadiyah).Kata kunci: Salafi, alumni laskar jihad, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah,dan pemerintah.

One important aspect of the Salafi movement is their view of women's position. This purification movement attempts to restore the female khittah as the very symbolic early era of the Islamic Prophethood. Bringing women back into the house, wearing burkas and long robes, a very strict muhrim system, and full adherence to husbands and total sacrifice to the family. This paper attempts to show how the lives of Salafi women in South Kalimantan, especially with regards to their positions and roles in the family and social environment. In the early part, it will be shown how the women became acquainted with Salafism, and then involved, struggle to defend Salafi ideology that is puritanical, asocial and typical Arabism amid pessimism of South Kalimantan society, including how the conflict they encounter in the big family, dilemma in carrying out career and conflict at work. In the end, this article also showa how effort of Salafi women reconcile the conflicts while building social relationships with their surroundings. On the other hand, they keep trying to maintain the purified ideology they believe to be true, behind the burka and the cloak covering their bodies.Keywords: Salafi Women, Burka, Ideology, Banjarmasin Salah satu faham penting dalam gerakan Salafi adalah ideologi mereka tentang posisi perempuan. Gerakan purifikasi ini mencoba mengembalikan khittah perempuan seperti era awal kenabian yang sangat simbolik. Membawa para wanita kembali ke dalam rumah, mengenakan burka dan jubah, sistem muhrim yang sangat ketat, dan ketaatan penuh terhadap suami dan pengorbanan total terhadap keluarga. Tulisan ini mencoba menunjukkan, bagaimana kehidupan perempuan perempuan Salafi di Kalimantan Selatan, terutama berkaitan dengan posisi dan peran mereka dalam keluarga dan lingkungan sosial.Pada bagian awal, akan diperlihatkan bagaimana perempuan-perempuan tersebut berkenalan dengan Salafisme, lalu kemudian melibatkan diri, turut membangun dan ikut berjuang mempertahankan ideologi Salafi yang puritan, asosial dan khas Arabisme di tengah pesimisme masyarakat Kalimantan Selatan, ter­masuk didalamnya bagaimana konflik yang mereka temui dalam keluar­ga besar, dilema dalam menjalankan karir dan konflik dalam pekerjaan.Di bagian akhir, akan ditunjukkan pula bagaimana usaha para wanita Salafi da­lam merekonsiliasi konflik sekaligus membangun hubungan sosial dengan lingkungan sekitarnya, sementara di sisi lain tetap berusaha meme­lihara ideologi purifikasi yang mereka yakini benar, dibalik burka dan jubah yang meliputi mereka.Kata Kunci: Perempuan Wanita Salafi, Burka, Ideologi, Banjar­masin

Abstract The article uses insights from social movement theory (SMT) to comprehend how a local Salafi youth group in Britain promotes ideas, recruits new members and shares organisational features with other forms of collective action. A social movement perspective has not been employed systematically for the study of quietest Salafi activism, partially because of an urban, elite bias within SMT and fusion of SMT with terrorism studies. This omission within SMT is discussed, stressing that, although insights from SMT can be useful for understanding Salafi youth groups, its current application may further contribute to the stereotyping of Muslim minorities in Europe.

This paper is aimed at describing the advent and development of the radical Salafi movement in Indonesia. Historically speaking, such movement was originated in the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. In these countries movements like Hizbut Tahrir and Wahhabiya –to mention but few- were found and well-established. Movements such as these were actually banned subsequently in their countries of origin mainly for propagating the idea of Khilafah and for trying to topple the legitimate government. In Indonesia interestingly, the Salafi radical movements survived and even flourished amid the heavy criticism from their antagonists. Leading campuses in the country such as Bogor Institute for Agriculture (Institut Teknologi Bogor/IPB) became their safe-heavens, as it were. Leaders and followers of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as well as Islamic Justice Welfare Party (PKS) were graduates of this campus. Hence, it was on this campus that the seed of these Salafi movements was planted. The HTI and PKS must be considered the most important Salafi movements in modern Indonesia. They have played their important role in forming the history of this country. Views have been expressed concerning their nature and agendas. Some maintain that these movements are radical and fundamentalists and bear the political agenda to transform Indonesia into becoming the “Islamic State”. Others are of belief that these movements are moderate and progressive, or else revivalist and neo-fundamentalists. It is on this heated debate that this paper is interested in. It will explore the nature and agendas of these two Salafi movements by referring –first- to the views expressed by the experts, and –second- the views of the leadership of the Nahdhatul ‘Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, two largest Muslim organization in Indonesia.

The aftermath of the Arab Spring was leaving a great turnover for many countries as the regime changed, so does Egypt. As one of the most influential countries both in the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt's domestic politics is quite dynamics since immemorial time, from numerous kingdoms, West colonialism until republic under the authoritarian regime in this modern days. For once, the dynamics of politics itself comes from the grass-root level whichever reached the top such as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun or Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Movements which caught people’s attention, not only in Egypt but the entire world. Both basically have religious intentions as it is considered Islamic movements except for their differences in political experience, religious interpretation and manners overpower contestation. Although Egypt currently is controlled by a military coup regime that tends to perpetuate the power, the Brotherhood and Salafi Movements which likewise spread to many countries still lurking and it might be consolidating the power to turn back the democracy to Egyptian who suffer from authoritarian style regime ever since the establishment of the nation after independence from British colonialism. This paper is aimed to describe the policy of the Islamic movement in Egypt which is based on religious intention and the interaction with politics and democratic goal from the nature of establishment, during the Arab Spring and the prospect for Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Movements as the unrest recently occured.

AbstractTurkey has been absent from the growing literature on the phenomenon of transnational Salafism. A tendency among Middle East specialists to focus on Arab regions and in Turkey on the Islamist movement and its long struggle with the Kemalist establishment has perpetuated the notion of Turkey as a category apart. This article argues that, on the contrary, Salafism is a fringe strand of Turkish Islam that began to evolve in the context of the state's effort in the 1980s to recalibrate religion as a complement to nationalism. Salafism became a topic of discussion in media and scholarly writing in Turkish religious studies faculties, while self-styled Salafi preachers trained in Saudi Arabia found a niche through publishing houses. These publishers facilitated the translation into Turkish of Arabic texts by important Saudi religious scholars in an effort to change the discursive landscape of Islam in Turkey. I show that contra assumptions of a rich Sufi tradition acting as a block against modern Salafi ideas, Salafism managed to gain a foothold in Turkey, facilitated in part by the republic's experience of secular materialism.

Roel Meijer’s edited Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, oneof the first collected works to broadly analyze contemporary Salafism as aglobal religious movement for English-speaking audiences, presents thismovement as a string of methods for approaching Islam’s canonical sources.Its many methodological ambiguities and tactical classifications enable it toincorporate a variety of local and international religious groups: those that rejectpolitical participation (e.g., “Scholastic Salafis”), embrace their society’sestablished political rules (e.g., “Sahwah Movement”), and seek radical transformationoften through violent means (e.g., “al-Qaeda”). In part, Salafismsymbolizes a varied scholarly attempt to disentangle long-simmering questionsabout conservative forms of Muslim activism, most of which concernthe ethics of how Muslims are to conduct their lives, perceive their individualand group identities, and understand the pious order of political and socialarrangements.The volume has two primary goals: (1) to reveal the diversity among themovement’s various groups and streams and (2) to reclaim the study ofSalafism from the field of security studies, which has, since 2001, influencedmuch of our overall understanding of this rather new religious phenomenon.The contributors challenge the widespread notion of Salafism as an exclusivelyviolent and intransigent Islamic movement by addressing the tensionsbetween basic Salafi doctrines (e.g., scriptural literalism, a sharp distinctionbetween in- and outsiders, and an active program for individual and communalreform), its supposed attraction to growing numbers of Muslims, and its intrinsiclinks to politics as well as to violence. The contributors argue that thesetensions have produced a whole range of consequences for primarily Muslim ...

Da'wah is an activity that is needed by Muslims, it is a means of conveying Islamic teachings. During the current COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease) pandemic, da'wah activities have undergone a massive evolution in the public space. This condition is a challenge for da'I and mad'u. This implication is also experienced by followers of the salafi movement. The implementation of preaching, which was originally cultured face to face, changed to screen which massively demanded rapid adaptation. This study aims to explore the symptoms of the salafi da'wah phenomenon carried out online during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through a phenomenological approach, this study investigates pure symptoms that are independent of the intervention. Using qualitative methods, it is known that the salafi movement makes use of information technology in preaching activities. The salafi movement applies the concept of e-da'wah, namely using WhatsApp lectures, zoom, google meet, streaming youtube, podcast, clubhouse, Twitter, telegram, and others. Not only in the da'wah program, this activity is also carried out in the Al-Qur'an tahfidz program and joint charity.

The anti-bid'ah doctrine that has been brought up by Salafi groups in Indonesia is not easily accepted by other Islamic groups. Bid'ah is understood by the salafi movement as something new or made up in a religion that does not have the example of the Prophet Muhammad. Some Islamic groups that are not fully in line with this understanding are traditionalist Islamic groups, Sufis and jama'ah tabligh. Not a few religious practices that are usually carried out by them are categorized as heretical and even heretical by the Salafi Movement. Puritanical religious ideas and tend to be radical with the idea of returning to the Koran and al-Sunnah, pure monotheism, without madzhab and ijtihad sometimes in the realm of application creates friction in the community. Several opinions from the scholars expressed in this study, especially from the salafi group. This study found the inconsistency of the Salafi group towards their anti-bid'ah principles and their application. This can be traced from the principle of returning to the text by not functioning ijtihad, qiyas and takwil. This research also explores various literature related to differences in understanding of heresy between salafi groups and the factors that make them different in responding to new practices in religion, especially what is called bid'ah hasanah.

The rapid development of the salafi movement in Indonesia is inseparable from their main approach, namely, purification and education. In the realm of education, there is a phenomenon of the emergence of various salafi schools in various regions in Indonesia, including in the city of Metro, Lampung. Two topics related to the Islamic education system in salafi pesantren and the position of women in salafi pesantren were the questions this research was based on. This research was a qualitative-descriptive study. Data collection was done by direct observation, documentation, and in-depth interviews. The results of the study showed that in terms of the teaching method, the salafi pesantrens in Metro city were not too different from the learning systems in other Islamic boarding schools. Meanwhile, for salafi women, Islamic boarding schools provide a special program for women they call tarbiyah al-nisa'.

In Sufis, Salafis, and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism, Sadek Hamid provides a rich history of nearly four decades of Muslim organizing in Britain. Replete with careful typologies and periodizations, the work reflects the author’s intimate grounding in the world of British Islam, and provides a unique insight into the challenges and successes of four trends he describes as the “reformist Islamist Young Muslims UK (YM), the Salafi-oriented JIMAS (Jamiyyah Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah)...the radical pan-Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the neo-Sufi Traditional Islam Network”.

Salafi-jihadis, the foundation of many of today’s (most notorious) terrorist organizations, has achieved a significant impact on world affairs within less than three decades. It has given rise to many organizations such as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Yemen and North Africa. In this article, I argue that an important change is occurring within the Salafi-jihadi camp. Material published on jihad websites in the last few years reflects an imminent and noteworthy split within the Salafi-jihadi movement. Evidence suggests that the Salafi-jihadi community has split into two groups in Jordan (Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris), and that some of the views expressed by Neo-Takfiris coincide with those upheld by Takfiris in Egypt between the 1960s and the 1980s. A similar split may be occurring in other locations as well. I describe the emerging rift, examine its causes and assess its essence. At the root of the fragmentation observed to date, I argue, is a profound legal and ideological debate that has the potential to impact Salafi-jihadi organizations worldwide.

AbstractThe Islamic reformist movement known as Salafism is generally portrayed as a relentlessly literalist and rigid school of religious thought. This article pursues a more nuanced picture of a historical Salafism that is less a movement with a single, linear origin than a dynamic intellectual milieu continually shaped by local contexts. Using 1930s Aden as a case study, the article examines how a transregional reformist discourse could be vulnerable to local interpretation and begins to unpack the transformation of Salafi activism from a broad, doctrinaire, and, above all, foreign ideology to an integral part of local religious discourse. It situates reform within an evolving Islamic discursive tradition that in part developed as a result of its own theological logic but was equally shaped by local and historically contingent institutions, social practices, and power structures. It thus explores Salafism as a dynamic tradition that could be adapted by local intellectuals to engage the problems facing their own communities.

Technology has big impact for our interaction in social-cultural life. It also happens at Dakwah by woman Salafi which mediate by WhatsApp application. This paper attempts to explain deeply about mediatisasi by Woman Salafi in their activies. The aim of this paper is to break the stronger the dominance of media logic in religion. The concept of this research refer to mediatisasi concept develop by StigHjarvard at institution stages. This research use qualitative approach by using interview method focus in two informan who have chosen based on specific criteria. In this research, the writer use ethnography analysis to analyze the data and dialogic validity analysis to analyze the data validity. The result of the research shows that there is cultural changing in dakwah activity by Woman Salafi. Mediatisasi in dakwah activity by Woman Salafi shows that religion has movement in media. Media has become an integral part of Woman Salafi and also as a big structure in ManhajSalafi.

من اهم الموضوعات التي تهم المجال الاكاديميي بالنسبة للجامعات والمؤسسات الفكرية، هي (الفكر السلفي ومدي تأثيره على الدولة) حيث حازت على إهتمام الاكاديمين الغربين، وخاصة بعد هجمات الحادي عشر من سيبتمبر 2001، وقبل هذا التأريخ كانت هناك العديد من البحوث التي تمحورت حول الجماعات الاسلامية كالإخوان المسلمين في مصر، وحركة النهضة في تونس، أما فيما يخص الفكر السلفي فكانت البحوث في الجامعات الاوربية محدودة.

This article challenges the dominant organization-centered focus of the study of Islamic movements, and argues for a turn towards social practice. To do so, it traces the rise and spread of Egypt’s leading Salafi movement, Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya (e. 1926) and its role in popularizing a series of distinct practices between 1940 and 1990. Based on the full run of this movement’s magazine, al-Hadi al-Nabawi (the Prophetic Guide, 1936–66) and al-Tawhid (Monolatry, 1973–93), the article explores the conditions in which practices such as praying in shoes and bareheaded, gender segregation and the cultivation of a fist-length beard were both politically viable and strategically advantageous. In doing so, it not only casts light on the trajectory of this movement, but also shows how and why the articulation and performance of distinct social practices are central to how Islamic movements shape society.

In principle, the Salafi-Islam attempts to call for genuine Islamic teaching as practiced during the period of the Prophet. Salafi-Islam came to Indonesia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then spread to different places in the Archipelago. In Larangan, Pamekasan, the spread of Salafi-Islam is still in its nascent stage, from person-to-person, and appears as a small phenomenon in the midst of predominantly mainstream Islam. Salafi teachings spread through different forms of communication media (radios, televisions, magazines, and books) and religious practices of its proponents. The movement manifests itself in the pratices of rituals, not in politics. The implication of encounter between salafi-Islam and NU as the mainstream religious group in Pamekasan is as follows: (1) religous life in Pamekasan becomes more dynamic; (2) there emerges inward-looking attitude at their own religous practices as well as outward-looking attitude to the others. This phenomenon can be observed among more educated members of the society. Among the common people, however, there are two types of attitude: ignorance and negative reaction; and (3) an attempt to search for the common ground and dialogue among different religious communities is being conducted.

The Salafi (Wahabi) movement in Indonesia in recent decades is growing rapidly. Generally, the group is often considered as part of takfĩriy, radical or terrorist group considering its similarity in rejecting the heresy (bidah) practices and its view on democracy. This research attempts to explore how its religious teaching and strategies as well as its compatibility to deradicalization efforts. The research uses Hertbert Blumer's theory which classifies the development of a movement in four stages; social chaos, popular excitement, formalization and institutionalization. This research found that their Islamic teaching merely refers to the model of Islam practiced by three early generations. Meanwhile, the strategy undertaken is focused on teaching tauhid through education that has been purified (taşfiyah) and tarbiyah. Compatibility to deradicalization of this group lies on the evidence that Salafi is different with takfĩriy, radical or terrorist group. Moreover, they believe that Pancasila is not against Islam.

This article argues that the pragmatism displayed by Salafi politicians after the 2011 Arab uprisings might not apply to the larger networks of the movement. Such pragmatism contributed to organizational dysfunction in Kuwait's largest Salafi group, al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya. The ideological foundations of the group stood at odds with its extensive institutional structures, impeding it from functioning effectively. To explain this, the article draws on a comparison with the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, whose ideology and disciplinary practices facilitated the establishment of tight-knit, highly efficient organizations.

This article examines recent developments of Salafism in Côte d’Ivoire by exploring how the movement has evolved over the last 25 years through its main national associations and leaders. Although the situation with regard to terrorism has changed in this country since the attack in Grand-Bassam on 13 March 2016, the intent of this article is to move beyond a reductive focus on security and counterterrorism by painting a more-nuanced portrait of one local manifestation of a global movement often reduced to violence and conflict. Far from becoming radicalized and despite increasing levels of activism, the country’s Salafi elites and main national associations have demonstrated civic engagement and opposition to terrorism. They also increased their participation in the socioeconomic arena as well as their willingness to act as a key intermediary between the Muslim community and the country’s political leadership.