Academic literature on the topic 'Terrorism Indonesia Bali'

This research aimed to make description on alternative way to press terrorism in Indonesia. Some approaches are adopted, especially by the government, to eliminate the terrorists, namely: a firm approach by attacking the terrorists, legal remedy by bringing them before the court and giving punishment. However, such efforts still not able to maximally pressing the terrorism. Terror in Jalan Thamrin Jakarta in the early 2016 showed that terrorism still cannot be pressed. This research aimed to give additional approaches in combating terrorism by using local wisdom. Bali as one of tourist destination in Indonesia, had twice experiences of terrorist attack with many casualties. Bali has a lot of local wisdoms which meanings can be explored. Some of it are menyama braya, mesegeh ritual, okokan arts performance and Tat Twam Asi. Therefore, there are several methods and steps which can be used to press the terrorism by exploring the meanings contained in such local wisdoms. All of that local wisdoms contains the meanings of cooperation, alertness and togetherness. The terrorists are expected to stop their terrorism attack by implementing such local wisdoms.

Changes in the international humanitarian legal system in a global context have shifted, as the first war identified with an inter-state ceasefire. Today, the war party is not only a state but also the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy marked by non-state war actors, a terrorist attack. In Indonesia, the issue of terrorism becomes a serious concern after the first Bali Bombing, the second Bali Bombing, and other terrorist tragedies. Lately, the discourse of TNI involvement in the eradication of terrorism in Indonesia through the formation of the Anti-Terrorism Act. According to the issue, the research problems are (1) TNI's authority elements to combat terrorism in the Indonesian legal system; (2) the International humanitarian law system regulates the involvement of the military on combating terrorism. The results of the study are (1) after the fall of New Order regime in 1998, the dual function of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces during Suharto's era) had dissolved, and this implied the limited authority of TNI to maintain the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) sovereignty at the border. The authority of the TNI on combating terrorism, following Act No.34, 2004 section 7 articles (3) about TNI, mentions that the fight against terrorism deals with criminal methods. Except for war aggression, related to terrorism that threatens the State sovereignty and not against terrorism that occurs in the community on the Anti-Terrorism Act. If TNI wants to be involved in combating terrorism, it must be following the 1945 constitution, of which terrorism is part of non-international armed conflict, in which the power of command is in the hands of the President.

In the aftermath of Bali Bombing 2002, which is considered the biggest terrorist attack in Indonesia, the Indonesian government launched the so-called ‘war against terrorism’. Subsequently, the government established and applied laws on terrorism and formed a special counter-terrorism police squad: The Detachment 88. A state body that coordinates counter-terrorism measures is quickly established, the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT –Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme). Therefore, terrorism in Indonesia has been considered a ‘big and serious business’ since 2002. It also raises a serious question in defining and judging terror crime. Indeed, Indonesia has the law of terrorism since 2002, yet the definition is not very clear. Even in international forum, there is no single and approved definition of terrorism. For instance, an armed group who attacked civilians in Central Sulawesi was named terrorists by the state. On the other hand, a group of militias who attacked and held hostages in Timika, Papua was labelled as an armed criminal group. In Jakarta, there were some bomb threats during 2015 and 2017. Nevertheless, the law enforcement agencies have never named them as ‘terrorists’, although their actions deserve to be called as ‘lone-wolf terrorism’. This paper aims to identify the social construction of terrorism. Terrorism is a term that is used regularly by news media and politicians. Whether its application is impartial or biased is fundamental to a debate. In a society where, international terrorism monopolizes news media and political discussion, there is no greater need than to analyze the boundaries of the term ‘terrorism’ construction within social processes. One of the serious problems involving terrorism in Indonesia is to define an offense as terrorism. The laws of terrorism are existed. The judgment and conviction to terrorism suspects also have been made in various jurisdictions. Yet, the types of offenses constituted as terrorism are still unclear. Ordinary people, media, opinion makers, and law enforcement officers have socially constructed terrorism and have their own perceptions of terrorism. This condition leads to law uncertainty and, to some extent, it leads to victimization and stigmatization of innocent people because their appearances and social environments have been associated to terrorism. This study employed two approaches: Social construction and guilt by association theories.

In the aftermath of Bali Bombing 2002, which is considered the biggest terrorist attack in Indonesia, the Indonesian government launched the so-called ‘war against terrorism’. Subsequently, the government established and applied laws on terrorism and formed a special counter-terrorism police squad: The Detachment 88. A state body that coordinates counter-terrorism measures is quickly established, the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT –Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme). Therefore, terrorism in Indonesia has been considered a ‘big and serious business’ since 2002. It also raises a serious question in defining and judging terror crime. Indeed, Indonesia has the law of terrorism since 2002, yet the definition is not very clear. Even in international forum, there is no single and approved definition of terrorism. For instance, an armed group who attacked civilians in Central Sulawesi was named terrorists by the state. On the other hand, a group of militias who attacked and held hostages in Timika, Papua was labelled as an armed criminal group. In Jakarta, there were some bomb threats during 2015 and 2017. Nevertheless, the law enforcement agencies have never named them as ‘terrorists’, although their actions deserve to be called as ‘lone-wolf terrorism’. This paper aims to identify the social construction of terrorism. Terrorism is a term that is used regularly by news media and politicians. Whether its application is impartial or biased is fundamental to a debate. In a society where, international terrorism monopolizes news media and political discussion, there is no greater need than to analyze the boundaries of the term ‘terrorism’ construction within social processes. One of the serious problems involving terrorism in Indonesia is to define an offense as terrorism. The laws of terrorism are existed. The judgment and conviction to terrorism suspects also have been made in various jurisdictions. Yet, the types of offenses constituted as terrorism are still unclear. Ordinary people, media, opinion makers, and law enforcement officers have socially constructed terrorism and have their own perceptions of terrorism. This condition leads to law uncertainty and, to some extent, it leads to victimization and stigmatization of innocent people because their appearances and social environments have been associated to terrorism. This study employed two approaches: Social construction and guilt by association theories.

Terrorism is a form of extraordinary crime that not only leads to lives and material losses, but also creates a continuing fear in society. Backed by the many cases of terrorism with suicide bombing mode, especially in the case of Bali Bombing 1 and 2, then born special datachment 88 (Densus 88) which has the obligation to combat terrorism. Unfortunately, in cracking down on the perpetrators of terror, even those still suspected as terrorist suspects, Densus 88 often uses violence and even shoots off on the spot. The late Siyono was one of the victims of repressive measures carried out by Densus 88. In other cases, Densus 88 is also often proven to mis-arrest after the suspect has lost his life. This condition is certainly contrary to the spirit of democracy and efforts to guarantee human rights protection in Indonesia. This paper discusses: (1) the Standard Operational Procedure of terrorist suspected arrest process by Densus 88 and its comparison with anti terrorism agency in other country; and (2) Guarantees and legal protection in the fulfillment of the rights of suspected terrorists.

Terrorism is a significant issue in national and global security. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, USA, the fight against terrorism has continued to this day. Resistance to terrorists has also changed the stereotype of Muslims, which affects Indonesia's reputation as the largest Muslim country in the world. The Bali I bombing attacks in 2002 by Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) terrorism group reconstructed its identity as Islam Moderate and Indonesia's foreign policy. The method used is the literature study method. Literature study is all efforts made by researchers to collect various information relevant to the topic or problem that will be studied. Through the identity, Indonesia can convince the western countries that Indonesia is worth reflecting true Islam and space to involve in the international political stage. As a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement and track record in the region, Indonesia trusted to be a role model for the Islamic world, especially the Middle East, that Islam and democracy are compatible. Through this, Indonesia seed as a strategic country to build international cooperation against radicalism and terrorism, which still becomes a global challenge presently.

Bali Bomb on 2002 becomes the first and the entry point of terrorism issues in Indonesia. It has devastated more than 200 people lives and damage the overall image of Bali as the paradise site in the world and Indonesia as a secure state. Since then, the local government try to protect the potential of terrorist attack. With its indigenous, the local government not only optimizing its agencies but also build a cooperation with the local structure of governance which has built before Indonesia exist. This paper seeks to analysis the collaboration works of these actors to maintain the stability and secure condition in Bali, especially from the terrorism issue. The research conducted through qualitative method, using interview keys person as the main references and official documents, journals, articles, databases as the supporting resources. By using the concept of the role of concentric circle of society in preventing terrorism, this research found that there is systematic communication and coordination between the government agencies and local communities in preventing the terrorism action. And by having a periodic, continuous communications, coordination, and build a controlling mechanism, amongst local government agencies such as Kesbangpol, FKPT, Babinsa, RT/RW staffs, and local actors such as Village Structure of Pakraman, Pecalang, and FKUB, they can create almost a comprehensive ecosystem to protect Bali island from the threat so far. Since 2005 there is no terrorism activity detected in this Island. Another interesting finding from this ecosystem is that this local wisdom system so far does not bring any resistance from the society and trust building among them are getting stronger.

The war against terrorism is being carried out not only in Afghanistan where it was first declared but also in the media around the world. Southeast Asia became a focus of international attention after the U.S. administration identified the region as the second front in the fight against terrorism following the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The perception that the region is a cradle for terrorism was reinforced by the Bali bombing in October 2002. The event was the first major terrorist attack after 11 September, and the worst act of violence against foreigners in Indonesia, a country that has been under continuous international pressure to be decisive in the fight against terrorism. Although the media can function as the source of people's information, it can provide interpretations of the social construction of ideas and images. Like the media in all parts of the world, the media in Southeast Asia function within some form of governmental, societal, and economic constraints. Journalists are encouraged to support their governments' efforts to develop the nation and instil a sense of national identity. In such a setting journalists, consciously or not, end up not only reflecting but also spreading the dominant view of the society's elite. This transnational comparative study involving three mainstream English-language newspapers from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore examines the reportage of the Bali bombing.

This article articulates that the terrorists in Indonesia are basically a group of normal people who have sound minds and a long-term goal to establish an Islamic government system based on the teachings of the Quran and Hadith. This study employed qualitative approach by acquiring the data through interviews, document analysis and media information covering terrorists and terrorism. A former terrorist involved in Bali bombing I served as the research informant. Data from in-depth interviews and document analysis were analyzed by utilizing social identity and social cognition theory about ideology of jihad. The article concludes that the changing process from the ordinary people into the terrorist strongly relates to jihad ideology and search for identity.

AbstractIndonesia has had its share of natural and manmade disasters. From 1997 to 2002, Indonesia has experienced 90 incidents of terrorist bomb attacks. In 13 (14.4%) of the terrorist attacks, the bombs did not explode. A total of 224 persons have been killed, and 340 persons have been injured. Most of those killed or injured were the result of the bombings in Jakarta and Bali. Besides bombings, there have been riots, especially in Jakarta. The Indonesian Surgeons Association established the 1–1–8 Emergency Ambulance Service Foundation to develop the Prehospital Emergency Medical Services in Indonesia. Despite difficulties, this service has been implemented in 18 cities. The occurrence of disasters, riots, ethnic conflicts, terrorist attacks, and the introduction of the Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) course in 1995, have helped to convince the people and the government that it was important to develop this 1–1–8 Emergency Ambulance Services system, and agreed to accept a Safe Community Program. With the Safe Community Program, Jakarta with its Integrated 1–1–8 Emergency Ambulance Service managed to provide proper emergency medical care to the casualties caused by terrorist bombings, riots, and in the three weeks of floods during which 75% of Jakarta was submerged.

This research discusses the tourism crisis management approach used in handling the recovery of Bali as a tourism destination after the first Bali bombings in 2002 and second Bali bombings in 2005. It acknowledges the importance of a crisis management especially in a situation where the crisis repeatedly occurs in the same place and targeted the similar target. This research examines the crisis management approach through the tourism public policy formulated and implemented by the government of Indonesia. An external perspective from the industry private sector is also investigated as many scholars note that other observations and opinion from senior executives following every episode are necessary because they have different perceptions of the crises. Finally, an investigation of any existence of organisational learning the first and second Bali bombings is also presented. This research concludes in three new findings. First, the Indonesian government did not present any crisis management framework after the first and second Bali Bombings; rather they established a National Recovery Program that lacks few main aspects of crisis management. Second, although the Indonesian government initiated the recovery program after the first Bali Bombings it was the private sector (Bali Tourism Board) who initially instigated the recovery program after the second Bali Bombings. Third, the absence of an organisational learning was also discovered after the first and second Bali Bombings incidents

Introduction. In the past decade terrorist attacks and suicide bombings have killed, injured and intimidated thousands of people in many countries. In the aftermath of an attack a significant proportion of the population present with symptoms of depression, post traumatic stress disorder, and physical health problems (Boscarino & Adams, 2009, Norris et al., 2002, Bride, 2007 ). The present study examined the impact of the Bali bombings in 2002 when two bombs were deliberately exploded in the Sari night club and Paddy’s bar, in the popular tourist area of Kuta, in Bali, Indonesia.Aim of the study. The overarching aim of the study were to examine the multilayered effects and forms of support received by directly affected victims and their indirectly affected family members in both Indonesia and Australia. The perceptions of members of the Indonesian and Australian emergency response teams, community volunteers and key informants were also examined.Methods. A qualitative case study approach was used in this study, as it was important that participants told their story in their own words and according to their own unique experiences. In total 50 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted in Bali and Perth, with first and secondary level victims, professional and volunteer responders, and key informants. An in-depth analysis of available literature was also undertaken with a focus on the multilayered effects of terrorist attacks and the forms of post attack support that is offered to victims and their families. Other qualitative methods such as home visits, observations and documentary data collection facilitated triangulation of the data. In addition a personal reflective diary recorded the observations of the researcher during a two month field trip in Bali in early 2008.The conceptual framework for this study was based around the work of the Psychosocial Working Group (2003). Within this framework three dimensions relating to resources that help people cope in the aftermath of a disaster are explored. They are: human capacity (encompassing the skills and knowledge of the people); social ecology (encompassing familial, religious and cultural resources) and finally culture and values (encompassing cultural values, beliefs and practices). The framework was modified in this study to enhance the examination of the participant responses using the concepts of disrupted and reinforced resources.Results. In both Bali and Perth victims of all levels reported many symptoms of distress in the initial aftermath of the bombing. Most of the effects reported could be termed normal distress reactions to a very abnormal event. The poor economic situation in Bali appeared to compound and exacerbate the effects for many of the Balinese victims. As a result many of the injured and their families were left almost destitute. A number of victims described symptoms such as depression, suicidal ideations and fear during thunderstorms and the many cultural celebrations on the island.In Bali and Perth, first level victims described the importance of practical, economic, emotional and spiritual support from their families and the community. The narratives of mateship, families and communities responding to help are innumerable and are an invaluable and unique insight into this disaster. In addition, the study highlighted that many of the volunteer and professional responders also reported effects such as emotional numbing and derealisation. For most it was a temporary and understandable reaction to the difficult tasks they had to undertake.Recommendations for policy, practice and a modified framework are proposed that may be used by professionals and non-professionals in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, particularly when needing to choose appropriate and culturally relevant interventions, or by organisations who may be involved in strategically planning a response in the event of an attack.Conclusion. Although the focus of this study was a terrorist attack, the recommendations and framework proposed in chapter 9 of this study can be generalised to other forms of natural and man-made disasters. They are intended for use by professionals, nonprofessionals and agencies who are involved in a response in the aftermath of complex emergencies. The recommendations are derived and drawn from the indepth analysis of the participant interviews, and the literature. The Bali disaster showed the strength of human spirit, the resilience of victims at multiple levels and the willingness of people and countries to help each other in times of extreme distress. This framework is intended to promote a psychosocial response to any disaster situation based on the knowledge that communities have pre-existing inherent resources which can be utilised in a terrorist attack.

This chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric of the War on Terror, Indonesia’s counterterrorism policies are neither specific responses to transnational terror networks, nor are they simply a byproduct of the post-9/11 era. We argue, instead, that counterterrorism policies in Indonesia cannot be disentangled from historical state reactions to internal security challenges—ranging from social violence to terrorism and secessionism—since the country’s independence in 1945. While these different conflicts had diverse political, ideological, religious and territorial characteristics, they are united as disputes over the basic institutions and boundaries of the state. In light of this history, the Indonesian state’s response to contemporary political violence—such as the 2002 Bali bombings and the threat of transnational terrorism, allegedly centered on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group—should be reexamined as part of these broader, historical trends in state responses to internal violence. We further argue that while the state, in seeking to maintain its territorial integrity and defend its institutions, has responded in a variety of ways to these conflicts, the particular domestic tools of coercion and repression used in President Suharto’s authoritarian New Order—from arbitrary imprisonment to forced disappearances and an all-out military campaign—have contributed to the rise of JI and its splinter groups and left a legacy of mixed responses to terror. Our examination of the evolution of internal political violence and state counterterrorism demonstrates that terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia are rooted within this context of the disputed postcolonial state. As such, state responses to terrorism and political violence in Indonesia have taken both a different form and function when compared to the reactions of the United States and United Kingdom. While the latter states committed their militaries abroad in an effort to exterminate foreign militants, our analysis demonstrates that the state has crafted responses to various sources of domestic violence—including different secessionist movements and JI—on an ad hoc basis and, in doing so, has utilized different security institutions, from the military to the police.