Academic literature on the topic 'TEPCO nuclear disaster'
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Journal articles on the topic "TEPCO nuclear disaster"
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Saito, Kenji. "TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster and Social Media: A Chronological Overview." International Review of Information Ethics 18 (December 1, 2012): 30–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/irie301.
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This article is a chronological overview and discussion of the public's use of social media in Japan in response to the TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster that occurred on 11 March 2011. Reactions have included defiance aimed at protecting children and protests against the government's nuclear policies. A mass media decline is apparent during the course of the events. However, there seem to be multiple levels of divides that have been preventing people from progressing beyond criticism to achieve effective activism.
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Aureli, Selena, Renato Medei, Enrico Supino, and Claudio Travaglini. "Sustainability Disclosure after a Crisis." International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development 7, no. 1 (January 2016): 35–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsesd.2016010102.
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This research investigates what happens to sustainability disclosure in the light of an industrial disaster. Drawing from legitimacy theory, the disaster is treated as a moment of crisis, in which the relationship of trust between the company and its stakeholders suffers and has to be reconstructed to legitimise the company's operations once more. While past studies revealed an increase in corporate disclosure after a disaster, the authors' results highlight a different behaviour. The analysis focuses on six companies involved in industrial disasters with a global media coverage, before and after the event. The sample includes, among others, Tepco for the leakage of nuclear material from the Fukushima power plant and Carnival Cruise Corporation in relation to the sinking of the Costa Concordia. Findings obtained using text mining techniques suggest that there is a tendency to reduce the quantity of information provided in the year of the disaster, which represents a precise managerial strategy aiming to avoid further drops in corporate legitimacy.
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Sarjiati, Upik. "RISIKO NUKLIR DAN RESPON PUBLIK TERHADAP BENCANA NUKLIR FUKUSHIMA DI JEPANG." Jurnal Kajian Wilayah 9, no. 1 (June 28, 2018): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.14203/jkw.v9i1.785.
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In the post-Fukushima nuclear disaster, the use of nuclear as safe, cheap and reliable energy resources is contested. Some actors are considered that nuclear energy is danger for human and environment for long term period. On the other hand, other actors are believed that nuclear is still important energy resources for Japan’s economic development. Risk arises as consequences of science and technology development. Some studies explained Fukushima nuclear disaster focusing on disaster management, energy politics, and technical aspect. Different to previous studies, this article aimsto analyze contestation of knowledge in risk nuclear construction in the post-Fukushima nuclear disaster. Risk is not only real, but also constructed by various institution and actors such as government, academicians, bureaucrats, scientists, and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) as nuclear reactor operator. Contestation of knowledge in nuclear risk construction comprises spreading and impact of nuclear radiation, the food safety standard, and a victim categorization that determine the parties entitled compensation. Contestation of knowledge and construction of nuclear risk urge new uncertainty in modern society. Thus, public take strategies cope with the new uncertainty by carrying out anti-nuclear movement and citizen science. Keywords:risk society, nuclear, Fukushima, JapanAbstrakPasca bencana nuklir Fukushima, pemanfaatan nuklir sebagai sumber energi yang aman, murah dan dapat diandalkan kembali diperdebatkan. Berbagai pihak menilai energi nuklir dapat membahayakan kehidupan manusia dan lingkungan dalam jangka panjang. Di sisi lain, beberapa pihak berpendapat bahwa nuklir masih menjadi sumber energi yang penting bagi pembangunan ekonomi Jepang. Risiko nuklir merupakan salah satu bentuk risiko yang timbul sebagai konsekuensi kemajuan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi. Beberapa penelitian telah membahas bencana nuklir dari sudut pandang manajemen bencana, politik energi, dan teknik. Berbeda dengan penelitian sebelumnya, artikel ini menggunakan pendekatan risk society untuk mengkaji kontestasi pengetahuan dalam konstruksi risiko nuklir pasca bencana nuklir Fukushimayang melibatkan pemerintah, akademisi, media, birokrat, ilmuwan, dan Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) sebagai operator reaktor nuklir. Kontestasi pengetahuan dalam konstruksi resiko nuklir mencakup penyebaran dan dampak radiasi nuklir, standar keamanan pangan, dan kategorisasi korban bencana nuklir untuk menenentukan pihak yang berhak mendapatkan kompensasi. Kontestasi pengetahuan dan konstruksi resiko nuklir menyebabkan suatu ketidakpastian baru dalam masyarakat modern. Oleh karena itu, publik melakukan strategi untuk menghadapi risiko nuklir dan ketidakpastian dengan melakukan gerakan anti-nuklir dan citizen science.Kata kunci: masyarakat beresiko, nuklir, Fukushima, Jepang
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Iimoto, Takeshi, Ryuta Takashima, Hiroshi Kimura, Kazuhisa Kawakami, Hironori Endo, Hiroshi Yasuda, Natsuki Nagata, Noriaki Sakai, Yumiko Kawasaki, and Makoto Funakoshi. "RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS (2006–17) ABOUT NUCLEAR AND RADIATION APPLICATIONS." Radiation Protection Dosimetry 184, no. 3-4 (June 7, 2019): 523–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rpd/ncz127.
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Abstract Public opinion on the application of nuclear technology and radiation could change when a nuclear related event occurs. Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization has tracked its variation through a nationwide opinion survey in Japan by almost the same way every year since FY 2006. We can identify a continuous long-term fluctuation of Japanese opinion before and after the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster using the data. In this study we focused on the trends of public opinion for nuclear energy, impressions and knowledge on radiation, and zero-risk request. For example, radiation can be recognised that it is dangerous and complicated matter by Japanese public regardless of that accident. However, a big change of opinions on radiation was shown on the impression for the word of ‘Useful’ between before and after the accident.
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Takagi, Akira. "Evacuation and Community Issues Caused by Nuclear Disaster in Fukushima Japan." Journal of Asian Development 3, no. 1 (February 27, 2017): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jad.v3i1.10578.
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The aim of this study is to clarify the evacuation behaviors of the local residents in a small rural community called “T” district in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture at the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) on March 11th, 2011 and how their personal relationship changed subsequently. This district suffered more impact from the nuclear disaster caused by Tokyo Electrical Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (TEPCO-1F NPS) accident than from the earthquake itself: a split in the community arising from the residents’ various evacuation behaviors and disagreement in their attitudes toward radioactivity. For example, a serious conflict occurred between those who returned from out-of–district evacuation (“escapees”) and those who consistently stayed within the district (“non-escapees”). However, on the other hand, as a way to maintain their community functions, there was an attempt made by the returnees inside the community in order to temper the conflict and another attempt provided from outside of the community such as the re-start of university student experience program which had been carried out by the local residents before the GEJE. Now that nearly 6 years have passed since the occurrence of the GEJE, the community conflict is becoming less obvious but not yet completely solved.
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Tamari, Yuki, Yujiro Kuroda, Ryu Miyagawa, Kanabu Nawa, Akira Sakumi, Naoko Sakata, Nozomi Mizushima, et al. "A report that Fukushima residents are concerned about radiation from Land, Food and Radon." Journal of Radiation Research 57, no. 4 (July 1, 2016): 418–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrr/rrw017.
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Abstract The Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster occurred on 11 March 2011, which caused the leakage of radioactive materials into the environment. In this study, we report public concerns about radiation in Fukushima and Tokyo almost one year after the nuclear disaster. We examined the public concerns by analyzing the data from 1022 participants, 555 in Fukushima and 467 in Tokyo. They were asked whether they were concerned about radiation from some of six different types of sources, which could be answered in a binary way, ‘yes’ or ‘no’. We found not only similarities, but also significant differences in the degrees of concerns between Fukushima residents and Tokyo ones. Fukushima residents more concerned about radiation from land, food and radon in larger rate than that of Tokyo ones, while Tokyo residents were concerned about radiation from medical care. Residents in neither location were concerned about radiation from space. Our results suggested that careful risk communication should be undertaken, adaptively organized depending on location and other factors, e.g. comprehension about radiation, presence of the experience of evacuation, and also age and gender of the people.
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Nakanishi, Hiromi, Houdo Tanaka, Kouki Takeda, Keitaro Tanoi, Atsushi Hirose, Seiji Nagasaka, Takashi Yamakawa, and Satoshi Mori. "Radioactive cesium distribution in bamboo [Phyllostachys reticulata(Rupr) K. Koch] shoots after the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster." Soil Science and Plant Nutrition 60, no. 6 (August 5, 2014): 801–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00380768.2014.939936.
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Takahashi, Tomoyuki, and Nobuo Shuto. "Special Issue on the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami." Journal of Disaster Research 8, no. 4 (August 1, 2013): 547–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jdr.2013.p0547.
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An unprecedented M9.0 earthquake occurring at 14:46 local time on March 11, 2011, off of northeast Japan’s Pacific Ocean generated a huge tsunami which had a run-up of over 40 m at the highest point and nearly 20,000 lives were lost. The tsunami demonstrated the need to drastically readdress current tsunami countermeasures. “Guidebook for Tsunami Preparedness in Local Hazard Mitigation Planning” published prior to the March 11 tsunami had already estimated, as one of the cases of tsunami assumptions, that the tsunami could be generated by the largest earthquake near off the Sanriku Coast predicted by the recent seismology. The seismotectonics had predicted that off the Sanriku Coast consisted of three independent blocks, which could conceivably cause an M8.6 earthquake at the largest. However, three blocks were not independent and they moved continuously to yield an earthquake of M9.0. The Guidebook had recommended a combination of three approaches for handling such a tsunami; Construction of defense structures, Tsunami-resilient town development, and Disaster prevention systems – defense structures were not expected to completely prevent every tsunami but only reduce its effect. Caissons forming part of Kamaishi Port’s tsunami breakwaters and registered in Guinness World Records, were overturned but reduced the tsunami height from 14 m outside the port to 8 m inside. Many coastal dikes were also destroyed, even though three surfaces – fore slope, top slope, and rear slope – had been protected using concrete and other means. Such phenomena pinpoint the importance of toe protection against erosion. Since 2004, tsunami inundation hazard maps have been distributed to communities in Japan as an aid to public education and as part of the country’s nationwide disaster prevention system. Unexpectedly, these maps had a negative effect in many places where residents living outside inundation areas mentioned on the hazard maps believed they were safe under all condition. Many did not in fact keep track of the actual tsunami rising in front of their very eyes and not evacuate, thus losing their lives. The tsunami hitting the coast of the Fukushima Prefecture had a run-up height almost double that designed in defense plans. The Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plants of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) located on ground 4.8 m above sea level were immerged and a concurrent electric system failure led to total plant shutdown. The Fukushima nuclear disaster itself has become well known worldwide. The effects of the tsunami, however, are less so, despite damage such as fires, railroad destruction and drifting ships caused by the tsunami. With the nuclear incident overshadowing such effects, we are concerned that these results might be overlooked. To better prepare against potential future tsunami disasters, we must understand clearly what sort and how such diverse damage has been generated by the 2011 tsunami. This special issue focuses on the various types of tsunami-induced damages, emphasizing the valuable data and modeling obtained from field investigations in the tsunami-devastated areas. It will be more than worth publication if this special issue contributes in whatever way to furthering tsunami disaster research. Finally, we extend our sincere thanks to all of the contributors and reviewers involved with these articles. (written by Nobuo Shuto and Tomoyuki Takahashi)
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Hasegawa, Shin, Teppei Suzuki, Ayako Yagahara, Reiko Kanda, Tatsuo Aono, Kazuaki Yajima, and Katsuhiko Ogasawara. "Changing Emotions About Fukushima Related to the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station Accident—How Rumors Determined People’s Attitudes: Social Media Sentiment Analysis." Journal of Medical Internet Research 22, no. 9 (September 2, 2020): e18662. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/18662.
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Background Public interest in radiation rose after the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident was caused by an earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tohoku on March 11, 2011. Various reports on the accident and radiation were spread by the mass media, and people displayed their emotional reactions, which were thought to be related to information about the Fukushima accident, on Twitter, Facebook, and other social networking sites. Fears about radiation were spread as well, leading to harmful rumors about Fukushima and the refusal to test children for radiation. It is believed that identifying the process by which people emotionally responded to this information, and hence became gripped by an increased aversion to Fukushima, might be useful in risk communication when similar disasters and accidents occur in the future. There are few studies surveying how people feel about radiation in Fukushima and other regions in an unbiased form. Objective The purpose of this study is to identify how the feelings of local residents toward radiation changed according to Twitter. Methods We used approximately 19 million tweets in Japanese containing the words “radiation” (放射線), “radioactivity” (放射能), and “radioactive substances” (放射性物質) that were posted to Twitter over a 1-year period following the Fukushima nuclear accident. We used regional identifiers contained in tweets (ie, nouns, proper nouns, place names, postal codes, and telephone numbers) to categorize them according to their prefecture, and then analyzed the feelings toward those prefectures from the semantic orientation of the words contained in individual tweets (ie, positive impressions or negative impressions). Results Tweets about radiation increased soon after the earthquake and then decreased, and feelings about radiation trended positively. We determined that, on average, tweets associating Fukushima Prefecture with radiation show more positive feelings than those about other prefectures, but have trended negatively over time. We also found that as other tweets have trended positively, only bots and retweets about Fukushima Prefecture have trended negatively. Conclusions The number of tweets about radiation has decreased overall, and feelings about radiation have trended positively. However, the fact that tweets about Fukushima Prefecture trended negatively, despite decreasing in percentage, suggests that negative feelings toward Fukushima Prefecture have become more extreme. We found that while the bots and retweets that were not about Fukushima Prefecture gradually trended toward positive feelings, the bots and retweets about Fukushima Prefecture trended toward negative feelings.
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Campbell, Rose G. "A content analysis case study of media and public trust in Japan: After the quake." Observatorio (OBS*) 13, no. 4 (December 5, 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.15847/obsobs13420191473.
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On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 (Mw) earthquake off the Pacific coast of Honshu, Japan, caused a devastating tsunami, killing thousands of people. The 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake also created a partial meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, operated by TEPCO. TEPCO’s and Japan’s government response during this tragedy is the focus of this study. How institutions handle crises impacts public trust in institutions, which is a central theme. Using Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) as a framework, a content analysis of a U.S. national newspaper and a Japan-based English language newspaper was conducted covering a period of three months following the disaster. The primary objectives were to determine the nature of TEPCO’s communication and the extent to which unethical crisis communication patterns were revealed in the news sources. Key findings included a) TEPCO maintaining the role of victim throughout the early stages of the crisis, thus accepting no responsibility for the radiation problems; and b) TEPCO minimizing the risk of radiation in the early weeks of the crisis, while it had more concrete data suggesting otherwise. Other findings including differences in content as a function of newspaper source and crisis stage are also reported.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "TEPCO nuclear disaster"
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Stanford, Kristina B. "The Impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster on Electricity Consumption: An Examination of TEPCO's Daily Load Curve." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/73.
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This paper analyzes the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster on Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) electricity load using alternative event study methodology. The data set includes TEPCO’s published hourly loads from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2011. Four time series regressions are used to analyze the disaster’s effect on TEPCO’s load curve at an hourly and aggregate level. By examining the hourly impacts of the disaster, this paper provides commentary on the effects of the disaster on the daily load curve, finding transition periods to be the time of day that is most targeted for decreases in electricity consumption. The models control for temperature, population, time of day, week, month, and year, holidays, and trends. The results indicate a significant, negative relationship between the disaster and TEPCO’s electricity load. In addition to examining the effects of the disaster on the daily load curve, four event windows are analyzed, ranging from a week after the March 11, 2011 disaster to the end of the data set (December 31, 2011). These event windows are used to capture the short, medium, and long-term effects of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster on electricity load. These event window results combined with an analysis of the annual and disaster trend variables allow for commentary on the timeline for which TEPCO’s loads will reach pre-disaster levels. Additionally, the results provide insight into both the economic and political implications of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster both in Japan and worldwide.
Books on the topic "TEPCO nuclear disaster"
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Kan, Naoto. My Nuclear Nightmare. Edited by Jeffrey S. Irish. Cornell University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501705816.001.0001.
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On March 11, 2011, a massive undersea earthquake off Japan's coast triggered devastating tsunami waves that in turn caused meltdowns at three reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Ranked with Chernobyl as the worst nuclear disaster in history, Fukushima will have lasting consequences for generations. Until 3.11, Japan's Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, had supported the use of nuclear power. His position would undergo a radical change, however, as Kan watched the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 Power Plant unfold and came to understand the potential for the physical, economic, and political destruction of Japan. This book offers a fascinating day-by-day account of the Prime Minister's actions in the harrowing week after the earthquake struck. He records the anguished decisions he had to make as the scale of destruction became clear and the threat of nuclear catastrophe loomed ever larger—decisions made on the basis of information that was often unreliable. For example, frustrated by the lack of clarity from the executives at Tepco, the company that owned the power plant, Kan decided to visit Fukushima himself, despite the risks, so he could talk to the plant's manager and find out what was really happening on the ground. As the text details, a combination of extremely good fortune and hard work just barely prevented a total meltdown of all of Fukushima's reactor units, which would have necessitated the evacuation of the thirty million residents of the greater Tokyo metropolitan area.
Book chapters on the topic "TEPCO nuclear disaster"
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Iimoto, Takeshi, Hirofumi Fujii, Seiichi Someya, Sadao Iiizumi, Takao Ebisawa, Seiichi Hirose, Etsuko Furuta, et al. "Environmental Radiation Status In and Around Tokyo Immediately After the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Disaster." In Radiation Monitoring and Dose Estimation of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 49–57. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54583-5_5.
Full textConference papers on the topic "TEPCO nuclear disaster"
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Suganuma, Naotaka, Takuya Uehara, Kenji Matsuzaki, Makoto Ochiai, Fujio Terai, Akira Tsuyuki, and Itaru Chida. "A Remote Operated Quadruped Robot System for Investigation of Reactor Building." In 2014 22nd International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone22-30304.
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A remote operated quadruped robot has been developed for disaster site which can move on stairs, slopes, and uneven floor under the radiation-polluted environment, such as TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants [1][2]. In particular, the control method for stable walking and the remote operation system have been developed to move on stairs in the reactor building. We applied this robot to investigation of suspicious water leakage points in reactor building at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants unit2[3]. In this investigation, a small vehicle equipped with camera and a manipulator which is connected the vehicle with cable were mounted on the robot and were carried to near the target by the quadruped robot and the investigation was carried out with the small vehicle.
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Iino, Kenji, Ritsuo Yoshioka, Masao Fuchigami, and Masayuki Nakao. "What Could Have Saved Fukushima From Its Severe Accident." In ASME 2016 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2016-65069.
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The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 triggered huge tsunami waves that devastated the northeast region of Japan along the Pacific coastline. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) owned Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima-1) survived the earthquake, however, not the tsunami that followed. Four of the 6 reactor units underwent Station Blackout. Unit 5 lost all its own AC power, however, it shared AC power with Unit 6. Units 1, 3, and 4 had hydrogen explosions that destroyed their reactor buildings, and even worse, 1, 2, and 3 had core meltdowns to release a large amount of radioactive material to their surroundings. The accident was rated Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the worst level defined by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Reports and papers have been published by a number of entities including the Japanese Diet, Government, TEPCO, IAEA, and more. They give detail explanation of how the accident developed into a nuclear disaster explaining the direct and background causes and faults made after the accident broke out. Finding the accident process, i.e., how it happened, and its causes of why it happened, are the most important first steps in accident analysis. Figuring out how to prevent similar events in the future, or even if it is possible to do so, however, is equally important for our future. We started our study in 2014 to find what actions TEPCO could have taken before the accident for preventing it from growing into a catastrophe. Then in February 2015, we set the goal of our study group to find answers to the following two questions: A. Was the huge tsunami, induced by a huge earthquake, predictable at Fukushima-1? B. If it was predictable, what preparations at Fukushima-1 could have reduced the severity of the accident? In response to our invitation to experts in the nuclear field, active and retired people gathered from academia, manufacturers, utility companies, and even regulators. After a series of tense discussions, we reached the conclusions that: Aa. Tsunami of the level that hit Fukushima-1 in 2011 was well predictable, and, Ba. The accident would have been much less severe if the plant had prepared a set of equipment, and most of all, had exercised actions against such tsunami. Preparation at the plant to prevent the severe accident consisted of the following items 1 through 7, and drills in 8: 1. A number of 125Vdc and 250Vdc batteries, 2. Portable underwater pumps, 3. Portable AC generators with sufficient gasoline supply to run the pumps, and 4. High voltage AC power truck This set applied only to this specific accident. For preparing against many other situations that could have taken place at Fukushima-1, we recommend having, in addition, the following equipment and modifications. 5. Portable compressor to drive air-operated valves for venting, 6. Watertight modification to RCIC and HPCI control and instrumentation, 7. Fire engines for alternate low pressure water injection after vent (Fukushima-1 had three). Just making these preparations would not have been sufficient. Activating valves with DC batteries, for example, takes disengaging the regular power supply lines and hooking up the batteries. 8. Drills against extended loss of all electric power and seawater pump This item 8, on and off-site drills was the most important preparation that should had been made. All other necessary preparations to save the plant in such cases would have followed logically.