Academic literature on the topic 'Temporality and subjectivity'

Nosso objetivo é mostrar como o projeto heideggeriano de superação da metafísica ocidental enquanto um retorno à questão do ser enquanto ser, simultaneamente, implica em um projeto de superação da subjetividade. Utilizaremos a proposta de classificação elaborada pelos estudiosos do pensamento heideggeriano, para pontuarmos o tema da superação da subjetividade. Em seguida, indicaremos porque a temporalidade do Dasein (Ser e tempo) e a Temporalität do ser (Os problemas fundamentais de fenomenologia) constituem momentos distintos da superação da metafísica e da subjetividade, visto que ser não é mais concebido como substância, mas como temporalidade; e o homem não é mais entendido como sujeito, mas como Dasein. Assim, concluímos que o ser do homem não é mais determinado como subjetividade, mas como temporalidade.[Our aim is to show how the Heiddegerian Project of overcoming of Western Metaphysics through a return to the question of being as being, implies, at the same time, a project of overcoming of subjectivity. Based on the classification elaborated by Heideggerian scholars, we will start by locating the question of subjectivity in Heidegger’s work. Next, we will discuss why the temporality of Dasein (Being and Time) and the Temporalität of being (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology) are different moments of overcoming both Metaphysics and subjectivity, in the sense that being is no longer understood as substance, but as temporality; and mankind is no longer understood as subject but as Dasein. This reflexion enables us to conclude that for Heidegger it is not subjectivity but temporality that constitutes the being of mankind.]

The turn from mass consumption to the creation of new and unique works in the development of contemporary culture, education and science is more and more clearly outlined. It is important to change not only our attitude to cultural and scientific achievements, but also to the person who creates them. The problem of temporality in its counteraction to objectification of human existence is considered in the article. The reasons for objectification of human subjectivity are analyzed and its mechanisms are revealed. The essence of the dilemma of objective and subjective time is revealed. There is the result of identification of the attributive properties of temporality. The unity of all modes of temporality, its ecstatic and constitutional nature are among them. The authors conclude that the study of the problem of temporality is an important step towards changing the consumer attitude of a person to culture and to himself. He must comprehend his own temporal nature as a condition for creative activity, which is highly valued in the modern culture, oriented by innovations.

This study explores how Tomás Rivera’s . . . And the Earth Did Not Devour Him theorizes subjectivity as a space in which congruity and differentiation between self and other intersect and are in flux, outside of the restrictions of humanism and logocentrism, in order to propose that such a theory of the subject balances both the aesthetic and ethical demands of contemporary Chicana/o criticism. To articulate this theory of the subject as it is presented in Rivera’s novel, this essay employs the notion of nomadic subjectivity conceived by philosopher and feminist theorist Rosi Braidotti. The study also incorporates relevant contemporary Chicana/o criticism in order to contextualize the proposed theory of subjectivity within a broader conversation concerning alternative conceptions of how the self both operates and is constructed. It is through this framework that the central questions motivating this essay will be examined. Such questions relate to how figurations within And the Earth Did Not Devour Him encompass one’s substance and attributes laterally, via the intersections of individual and communal influence.

Perhaps one of the main attributes of the subjectivity is temporality in the metaphysical tradition. Subject cannot be found in space, it only exists in time, so the substantial concept of mind originates in the notion of time. On the other side the subject perceives time as such; as Saint Augustine writes in Confessions, “It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times”. Temporality and subjectivity were closely related notions before the transcendental turn. In his explicit argumentation Immanuel Kant considers the subject as a temporal principle; as he writes in The End of All Things, “thinking contains a reflecting, which can occur only in time”. However, Kant does not affirm that the apperception of “ego cogito” can lead to the substantial existence of subject or mind. He regards this deduction as a paralogism. The Kantian disaffirmation of substantial mind enabled the timeless concept of subjectivity in the Early German Idealism. The subjectivity notion of Kant and the transcendental philosophy has a special, ambiguous character: in their explicit theories they argue that the subject is mainly a temporal entity, but some special forms of the general subject (transcendental subject, self, Gemüt etc.) are placed out of time in several texts. In the paper I analyse the temporal aspects of the idealist subject concept. The main thesis of the paper is that the subject of the transcendental philosophy is characterised by atemporal temporality.

ABSTRACT : At the heart of Levinas’ work is an account of subjectivity that is premised on his account of temporality. In this regard, Levinas is like many other phenomenologists. However, in order to understand Levinas in this manner, we must first reconceive what Levinas means by ‘ethics’, so we can see the fundamental continuity in his accounts of subjectivity and temporality. By understanding the continuities, not just within but also between, Levinas’ ethical subject and his futural temporality, we are able to reconceive of the scope and method of phenomenology, so as to adequately assess Levinas’ influence in that discipline.

Geographies of Children, Youth and Families is flourishing, but its founding conceptions require critical reflection. This paper considers one key conceptual orthodoxy: the notion that children are competent social actors. In a field founded upon liberal notions of agency, we identify a conceptual elision between the benefits of studying agency and the beneficial nature of agency. Embracing post-structuralist feminist challenges, we propose a politically-progressive conceptual framework centred on embodied human agency which emerges within power. We contend this can be achieved though intensive/extensive analyses of space, and a focus on ‘biosocial beings and becomings' within dynamic notions of individual/intergenerational time.

My work explores subculture as a form of cultural resistance to the dominant ideology. I'm concerned with the ambiguous relationship we occupy as subjects to the material produced by popular culture, and how this is digested and understood by female viewers and cultural outsiders. The specific temporality of the queer subject is a key theme in my work.

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Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de examinar em Fenomenologia da Percepção a proposta de Merleau-Ponty1 de uma “reflexão radical” em busca do desvelamento da dimensão constitutiva da percepção considerando o sujeito encarnado. Adicionalmente, pretende-se investigar qual é a concepção de subjetividade no âmbito dessa filosofia que revela uma irredutível abertura do sujeito ao mundo.
This dissertation aims to examine in the Phenomenology of Perception the MerleauPonty‟s proposition of a “radical reflection” in order to unveil the constitutive dimension of perception considering the body's incarnation. It aims also to investigate which is the conception of subjectivity within this philosophy that reveals an irreducible opening of the subject to the world.

L’argument central de cette thèse est que le capitalisme financier en tant qu’économie fondée sur la dette produit une subjectivité mélancolique, en imposant à son sujet une structure particulière de temps. Je me suis appuyée sur la théorie deleuzienne du temps et sa thèse sur la formation du sujet. La synthèse du temps deleuzienne présente le temps comme constitutif du sujet plutôt que comme une forme subjective du temps, expliquant ainsi comment le sujet peut être passivement produit par le temps. Il procure également une thèse sur la formation du sujet à travers le capital, processus qu’il appelle « subjectivation ». En particulier, cette recherche consiste en trois tâches :(1) le rôle critique de la temporalité dans la formation du sujet, (2) la temporalité spécifique caractéristique du capitalisme financier contemporain, et (3) une pathologie du temps observée chez le sujet du capitalisme
This dissertation looks at time as a socially or psychologically imposed ‘structure’ that determines the ways in which past, present and future are weaved together in the subject. This inquiry presents (1) a critical role of temporality in the formation of the subject, (2) a specific temporality characteristic of contemporary financial capitalism, and (3) the pathologies of time found in the subjects of capitalism. The first two chapters provide an extensive analysis of Deleuze’s passive syntheses of time given in Difference and Repetition, which reveals the subject’s passive relation to time as a structure of ‘becoming.’ The following chapters examine how this ontological structure of time interacts with socio-economic temporalities in its production of the subject. I particularly focus on the temporal structure of debt, which has become a general condition of the subjects in the current economic system. I claim that the debt-based economy produces ‘melancholic subjectivity,’ characterized by a dominance of the past and the inhibition of becoming

L’objectif de notre présente étude est d’examiner un contexte philosophique dans lequel s’inscrit la recherche de la subjectivité liée à l’idée de l’extériorité à travers une étude des liens entre la philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig et celle d’Emmanuel Levinas. L’idée de socialité dans notre recherche se fonde sur la question de l’extériorité et sur celle de la subjectivité dans leurs philosophies. Ces deux philosophes soutiennent tous deux l’idée de la rupture de la totalité et défendent la subjectivité. Toutefois, leurs divergences sont profondescar la tentative de Levinas qui aboutit à la recherche d’une subjectivité consistant dans le dérangement de l’ordre ne renvoie pas au système rosenzweigien. Dès lors, quel est l’héritage de Rosenzweig dans la philosophie de Levinas ? Dans la première partie, nous déterminons la portée de la notion de système et celle de totalité dans leurs philosophies. Dans la seconde partie, nous observons la divergence entre leurs philosophies sur la conception du Soi et son rapport à l’extériorité. Dans la troisième partie, nous examinons la signification de la socialité fondée sur la question du temps. Selon nous, la question du langage qui fonde la relation entre le sujet et autrui se déploie à travers les analyses du temps, et ce sont des modalités du langage – le rapport entre le dialogue du « face-à-face » et l’intrusion de l’autre dans le sujet exprimé par Levinas comme « Dire sans Dit » - qui nous permettent de relier encore une fois la philosophie de Levinas à la philosophie de Rosenzweig. Levinas approfondit la question rosenzweigienne du dialogue sans dévaloriser sa signification et sans la systématiser, en partant de la pensée du système
The objective of our present study is to examine the philosophical context in which the research of a subjectivity which would be linked to the idea of the exteriority becomes possible. This objective will be achieved thanks to the study of the connection between Franz Rosenzweig’s philosophy and Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy. In our research the idea of sociality is founded upon the question of the exteriority and upon the question of the subjectivity. Both Rosenzweig and Levinas are determined to put the idea of the totality into question and to defend the subjectivity. However, their differences are great: Levinas’s endeavor to open the field for a new understanding of the subjectivity, which consists in the disturbance of the order, doesn’t appear in Rosenzweig’s system. If such is the case, what does Levinas’s philosophy owe to the heritage of Rosenzweig? In the first part, we try to determine the realm of the notion of system and that of totality in their philosophies. In the second part, we try to observe the difference between their philosophies about the conception of the Self and of its link to the exteriority. In the third part, we examine the meaning of a sociality founded upon the question of time. In our view, the question of language, which is the basis of the relationship between a subject and the other, is inseparable from a profound analysis of time. The modalities of language – the connection between the dialogue of the “face-to-face” and the intervention of the other into the subject expressed by Levinas as “ Saying without Said” - allow us to underline the relation between the philosophy of Levinas with that of Rosenzweig. Levinas has deeply studied Rosenzweig’s understanding of the dialogue without depreciating its signification

Si la déconstruction devait commencer quelque part, si son principe n'était pas d'emblée celui de lamultiplication originaire du principe, il faudrait alors dire que c'est comme déconstruction de l'autoaffectionpure qu'elle commence. En effet, l'interrogation du concept d'auto-affection pure estl'interrogation d'une dernière tentative pour penser encore la subjectivité en termes de principe (c'est-àdireen termes aussi de « subjectivité »). L'« auto-affection pure » est un concept qui renvoiecouramment au livre de 1929 de Heidegger sur Kant, Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. Or, dansce contexte, il renvoie déjà de manière essentielle à la répétition comme dispositif de sa production etcomme ce à partir de quoi sa déconstruction a concrètement lieu. La question de la répétition est en faitinséparable de la déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure. Si celle-ci est un autre nom de la temporalité,il faut alors démontrer en droit ce qui est un fait : c'est à partir de la répétition que la temporalité peutseulement être dévoilée. En ce sens, la répétition est déjà répétition de la question de l'être (Sein undZeit) mais aussi répétition de Kant (Kant et le problème de la métaphysique). Or, la détermination de latemporalité comme auto-affection pure, dans la répétition heideggerienne de Kant, n'est elle-mêmepossible que d'après la compréhension essentielle de la temporalité phénoménologique à partir duconcept de Husserl d'impression originaire. En ce sens, comme déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure,la répétition – en-deçà de toute identité constituée – doit aussi se trouver déjà à la racine de touteimpression originaire
If deconstruction begins somewhere, if its starting point is not already the original multiplication ofprinciple and origin, then it is necessary to say that it begins first as the deconstruction of pure selfaffection.The interrogation of the concept of pure self-affection is the interrogation of probably the lastattempt to think about subjectivity in the terms of a principle (which are of course the terms of“subjectivity”). The pure self-affection concept widely refers to the 1929 book by Heidegger on Kanttitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In this context, the concept of pure self-affection refersalready to repetition as the essential “device” for its production. The question of repetition is in factinseparable from pure self-affection deconstruction. If pure self-affection can work as another name fortemporality, then we have to show the reason for a well established fact : it is just through repetitionthat temporality can be disclosed. In this sense, repetition is already the repetition of the question onbeing (Sein und Zeit), but also the repetition of Kant (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Now, thedetermination of temporality as pure self-affection, through Heidegger's repetition of Kant, supposesthe essential understanding of phenomenological temporality on the basis of Husserl's concept oforiginary impression. In this sense, as leading pure self-affection deconstruction, repetition – before theconstitution of identity – is to be found on the grounds of the originary impression itself

Philosophy of mind has been concerned, one might even say dwell, with the mind – body problem since the ancient times. Although, present-day, we speak of the mind – brain problem, consciousness studies within philosophy are still mostly engaged within this debate. However, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness does not yield and remains to be hard. On the other hand, it still is the problem our attention should be focused on. How does one reconcile this imbalance? Perhaps with a slight shift in methodology. Put the discussion of the structure of the relation between phenomenological and physical in the background and focus on the structure of phenomenology itself. This dissertation is precisely an attempt at that – it concerns the structure of phenomenally intentional mental states. These are mental states that exhibit, primarily, the phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or ‘what it is like’ (Nagel, 1974) aspect of mental life. They also exhibit the intentional directedness; they are directed or “of” something. Until recently these two features were for the most part unreconciled. Paradigmatically intentional mental states, such as beliefs and thoughts, were not considered to be phenomenal. Vice versa – paradigmatically phenomenal mental states, such as feeling and sensations, were not considered to be intentional (although perception is possibly the one exception, being a mental state that is traditionally seen as phenomenal and intentional), were not considered to be intentional. I advocate a view according to which all intentional mental states are phenomenal, or at least, partly depend on phenomenology. There are, I believe, five marks of the mental (in no particular order): consciousness, intentionality, phenomenology, subjectivity, and temporality. I discuss each of them in this dissertation. As is evident by now and which I aim to further clarify, I do not take these terms necessarily to refer to the same underlying phenomena. My aim in this dissertation is to touch upon each of the five ‘marks of the mental’. The dissertation, formed as a collection of papers, starts by introducing a novel theory of modes or attitudes in ‘Intentional Primitivism of Modes’. Here I defend the idea that phenomenally intentional mental states, as defined above, are not individuated only by content, but also by mode. Both variables need to be fixed in order to fix the nature of a conscious mental state. My theory differs from other intentional primitivist theories of modes in that the modes are intrinsically differentiated, as opposed to relational (Crane, 2001; 2003) or simply qualitative (Block, 1978; 1994; 2007). That is to say, modes do not get their intentional character through relational properties to the intentional object, nor are they simply qualitatively defined as such mode as opposed to another. Rather modes are inherently intentional. I distinguish two ways of experiencing modes; a coarse-grained and a fine-grained, and put forward a new metaphysical model, the modifiers model, based on non-representational features of mental states that make a difference to how the occurrent mental state is given to us in experience. I explain the relation between mode and modifier as a genus – specie relation. For example, desperately desiring is composed of the property of desire, the mode, and an independent modifier of desperation. This, as a result, makes my theory adverbialist, however only at a single level, namely, at the level of modes or attitudes, and as such I avoid the main issues of adverbialism. Lastly, I give the metaphysical underpinning of modes in terms of trope theory of modes. However, this is not to say that all modes or attitudes are per se intentional. Hence, in the second paper ‘Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States’, I analyze the relationship between modes and contents. Here, there are two outstanding questions. The first one is, after examining the explanandum metaphysically and positing certain modes as primitive, the taxonomy of modes or attitudes, i.e., which are reducible to others. Furthermore, some modes are to be eliminated at modes and given a different classification. The second question is a more straightforward question of relation: once we individuate mode and content, how are they combined? Depending on the answer to the first question, I look more closely at possible metaphysical relations between modes and contents and give necessary conditions for the options, e.g. fusion, emergence, composition etc. The second part of the dissertation deals with differentiating conditions when is a mental state rightly said to be conscious, as opposed to unconscious and what are the consequences for intentionality and phenomenology. Here, I turn, in the third paper ‘Pure Content View of the Unconscious’, on the structure of unconsciousness itself. I defend Intentional Realism about unconscious or the thesis that unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional. Simply put, mental states that are paradigmatically considered intentional whilst conscious are intentional as well whilst unconscious. I defend this view by putting forward a two-dimensional intentional model of unconscious states. The structure of intentionality is usually conceived in a three-dimensional manner - that of subject, content and attitude. Most argue that conscious states are indeterminate with respect to content (Quine, 1960; Davidson 1973; Putnam 1975, 1980; Searle 1991). I agree with the indeterminacy thesis, however not with content indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by unpacking the indeterminacy argument for conscious content, applying it to conscious attitude while arguing it is an equally plausible alternative that the indeterminacy is in the attitudinal component, rather than the content one when it comes to unconscious mental states. This is a view of the unconscious that calls into question the standard model in analytic philosophy. On such a view, only desires are determinate, while other mental attitudes are not. This is essentially a Freudian view of the unconscious (2005, first published 1915). The fourth paper, ‘Against Unconscious Belief’ discusses propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, when unconscious. For example, I hold a belief ‘that J.J. Abrams is the worst thing that happened to Sci-Fi genre in the last 50 or so years’ unconsciously. Someone asks me, knowing I am a Sci-Fi fan, what do I think of contemporary genre. Without a second thought I express my unconscious belief of J.J. Abrams. We use the terminology of dispositional belief when it comes to the unconscious one and occurrent when it comes to conscious one. However, we have been taking for granted that beliefs are propositional attitudes, even while unconscious, while, at the same time, remaining committed to certain asymmetry between the conscious and the unconscious. As a result, unconscious beliefs are on par with conscious ones as propositional attitudes, which is in in tension to the presupposed asymmetry. The novelty of my account is that it vindicates the asymmetry thesis without positing a difference in intentional content, but rather saying that the difference is in intentional structure, as stated in the previous paper on the nature of the unconscious in general. My dissertation ends with an analysis of temporal and subjective dimension of experiences in ‘The Subject of Temporal Experience’. This paper is written in collaboration with Giuliano Torrengo and I thank him for his kindness in allowing me to include it in the dissertation. Most, if not every, mental state we undergo has a subjective structure of being to me or me-ness. We do not undergo experiences of a subject (at least not in the substantial term) of being to me, but rather the mental state as being to me. I argue that the same structure holds with respect to the temporal dimension, i.e. being present to one now or presentness. In other words, most, if not every, mental state we undergo is being present to me now. We experience these features as simply accompanying our experiences of content and attitudes towards those contents. Arguably, these are the only features of our experiences that are of this nature. I argue that this is not a simple correlation but rather there is a stronger metaphysical relation between them. Next, I analyze this relation. Contents nor attitudes we are experiencing do not give us the temporal or subjective dimension. Rather, my suggestion is that me-ness and presentness arise from the same structural characteristic of experience. There is much more to be said on the topic of the structure of phenomenally intentional states. This is another reason why I chose this research. Creatures are conscious in different manners. For example, me and my dog might share some features of experiences, e.g. we both have sensory-visual conscious experience; but differ in other, e.g. a belief that the sensory-visual conscious experience is of cats as opposed to undetached-cat-parts. Although our global conscious features differ, we do share some local similarities, e.g. we see the same shape. What differs is our subjective perspective on them and how we use such features to guide our action and cognition. Consequently, the question are there objective measurable structures of some elements of phenomenally intentional states is, in my opinion, a valuable direction of research in consciousness studies.

Se comprendre soi-même dans l'existence c'est comprendre concrètement l'abstrait, telle est chez Kierkegaard la tâche de celui qu'il nomme « le penseur subjectif ». Sortir de la plainte et accéder à la vérité de soi c'est se poser dans un rapport particulier à soi-même. Dans ce cadre, Kierkegaard indique différentes postures de vie qui sont autant de réponses fragmentaires que l'existant donne aux questions qui le pressent à son insu car, fondamentalement, ce n'est pas l'homme qui donne un sens à l'existence, mais il est bien lui-même l'interrogé. Ce qui effectue ce travail de questionnement chez le philosophe danois est sa pensée de la répétition dont la fécondité est grande puisqu'elle ouvre le champ de la pensée contemporaine sur ce point. Cette question de la répétition chez lui est paradoxale : elle est le lieu de l'attestation de soi du sujet qui ne devient lui-même que par le jeu d'infimes variations rendues possibles dans le mouvement religieux de la répétition-reprise de soi impliquant dans le creusement de l'être qui se fissure ouverture à l'Autre. Dans ce mouvement, il ne peut pas faire l'économie de l'épreuve de l'angoisse et du désespoir
Understanding oneself in the existence means understanding concretely the abstract : this is the task Kierkegaard appoints to the « subjective thinker ». Getting out of the complaint and reaching the truth about oneself implies setting one's being into a particular relationship with oneself. In this scope, Kierkegaard indicates various postures of live which are so many fragmentary answers the subject gives to these questions that urge him unknowingly, because it's not essentially the man who gives sens to existence but he is the one who is being questioned. What performs this questioning work in the Danish philosopher is this thought about repetition whose fertility is significant since it opens the field of contemporary philosophy in this point. This question of repetition in Kierkegaard's work is paradoxical : if is the place where the self gets certified and thus the subject becomes himself only thanks to the game of minute variations made possible by the religious movement of repetition-retake of oneself wich involves, in the depth of the being that fissures itself, the openness to the Other. In this motion, he cannot avoid the trial of anguish and despair

Consacrée à l’emploi de uže, la thèse vise à décrire le fonctionnement de cette unité polycatégorielle définie dans les ouvrages lexicographiques comme adverbe de temps et comme particule de renforcement. En tant qu’adverbe, uže assure le repérage du terme ou du contenu qu’il commente par rapport à un point sur l’axe spatio-temporel ; en tant que particule, il rend saillant le contenu de sa portée par rapport à une portée concurrente ou susceptible de l’être. Ces deux fonctions, celle de repérage et celle de focalisation sur un contenu, sont complémentaires et trouvent leurs origines dans l’étymologie. L’étude cherche à formaliser le mode opératoire de uže pour démontrer qu’indépendamment de son statut d’adverbe ou de particule, le fonctionnement de ce mot obéit aux principes de régularité qui déterminent la riche variation sémantique des contextes dans lesquels il est employé. L’analyse proposée s’appuie à la fois sur l’étude de données formelles (l’étymologie de uže, la position de uže dans la proposition, ainsi que la prosodie de celle-ci) et énonciatives (localisation et identité des instances énonciatives, leurs points de vue respectifs sur le contenu de la proposition, existence de valeurs préconstruites ou présupposées). La démarche adoptée permet de constater que uže intervient invariablement dans l’expression de l’avis subjectif du locuteur qui s’oppose à un autre avis concurrent porté sur la même situation. Quelle que soit la nature de l’altérité mise en place par uže (temporelle, existentielle ou bien appréciative), sa construction atteste de la vocation discursive de cette unité de langue qu’on propose d’envisager comme un marqueur discursif
Devoted to uže, the present thesis aims to describe the functioning of this poly-categorical unit, defined in dictionaries both as a time adverb and as an intensifying particle. As an adverb, uže locates the term or the content it comments on in relation to a point on the spatio-temporal axis; whereas, as a particle, it makes salient the content within its scope and opposes it to some other content perceived as competing or potentially so. These two functions – location and focalization – are complementary and find their origins in etymology. The study seeks to formalize the operating mode of uže, demonstrating that, regardless of its classification as an adverb or a particle, its functioning obeys regular principles that account for the wide semantic variation of the contexts in which it is employed. The analysis is based on both formal (etymology, the position of uže within a sentence, as well as the sentence prosody) and enunciative data (enunciative positions at play, corresponding viewpoints on propositional content, presence of preconstructed or presupposed information). This approach shows that uže invariably contributes to the expression of the speaker’s subjective opinion, contrasting it with another, competing, viewpoint in relation to the given situation. Whether the opposition expressed by uže is temporal, existential, or evaluative, its mere construction attests to the discursive nature of this linguistic unit, thereby supporting its classification as a discursive marker

Le présent travail vise à confronter les ontologies de l'imaginaire de Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Grimaldi. Empruntant la voie d'une critique du bergsonisme, chacune de ces philosophies s'élabore en accordant une valeur ontologique au négatif et en reconsidérant la signification de la temporalité. La réflexion sur le statut de l'image, et plus avant, sur les relations entre réel et imaginaire, présent et passé, conscient et inconscient, laisse émerger un sens original de la négativité. Merleau-Ponty et Grimaldi opposent ainsi à la dialectique de l'être et du néant l'idée d'une négativité qui pénètre l'être de part en part, le premier ouvrant la voie d'une alternative phénoménologique, le second lui préférant une alternative métaphysique. Ils prétendent par là, mieux que Sartre, rendre raison de la passivité de la subjectivité, de ses attaches dans l'être, source vive du mensonge à soi-même. Les limites de l'ontologie sartrienne trouvent leur origine dans une certaine idée de la conscience qui verrouille d'emblée les relations entre imagination et affectivité. C'est au contraire le libre jeu de cet axe qui rend possible le débordement de l'horizon de visibilité de la subjectivité en direction d'un certain invisible. La jonction concrète de l'imagination et de l'affectivité se déploie alors aux parages de la notion de désir, qui donne son sens rigoureux à la négativité dépistée initialement : à la différence de Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Grimaldi pensent le caractère médiatisant de l'être compris comme désir et théorisent un décentrement radical de la subjectivité qui culmine pour l'un dans une pensée de l'intercorporéité, pour l'autre dans une éthique du don de soi.

Process studies of organizations focus attention on how and why organizational actions and structures emerge, develop, grow or terminate over time. Time, timing, and temporality, are inherent to organizational process studies, yet time remains an under-theorized construct that has struggled to move beyond chronological conceptions of “clock” time. Missing from this linear view are ongoing debates about objectivity versus subjectivity in the experience of time, linear versus alternative structures of time, or an appreciation of collective or culturally determined inferences of temporality. This is critical because our understanding of time and temporality can shape how we view and relate to organizational phenomena—as unfolding processes or stable objects. History is an equally important but under-theorized concept in organization studies. Organizational theorists have struggled to move beyond two limited conceptualizations of historical processes: history as a constraint on organizations’ capacity for change, or history as a unique source of competitive advantage. Both approaches suffer from the restrictive view of history as an objective set of “brute facts” that are exterior to the individuals, organizations, and collectives that experience them. The historical turn in management has triggered an effort to re-theorize history in organizations in a more nuanced manner, and management theory is acquiring a “historical consciousness”—an awareness of time, history, and memory as critical elements in processes of organizing. This volume draws together emerging strands of interest in adopting a more nuanced orientation toward time and history to better understand the temporal aspects of organizational processes.

This introductory chapter traces the origins of Ralph Ellison’s philosophy of temporality, and illustrates how Ellison’s synthesis of the ideas of Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche precedes, and in many ways prefigures, the work of Gilles Deleuze. It also demonstrates how Ellison’s Bergsonian critique of spatialized time—a coercive form of temporality that subtends progressive history—anticipates contemporary post-Deleuzian elucidations of the reciprocal relationship between temporality and subjectivity. By attuning his readers to intensities implicit in the present, or the dynamism inherent in what Bergson called duration, Ellison affirms the open-endedness of the future while critiquing all forms of determinism. And by treating race as a matter of time, Ellison shows how the feedback loops by which a racist society chaotically reproduces itself can be destabilized by troubling the coercive temporality with which they are linked “on the lower frequencies” of our immanent existence.

This chapter argues that in the beginning is relation. Events, namely significant events, are encountered as I–You meetings, rather than as Its that one observes from without. Only at a later stage, language breaks up the ‘I–You’ relation and creates an ‘I–It’ experience. Language grows out of a more primitive stage of human development in which words are used to indicate phenomena that are relational in nature. Establishing an I–You relation in the context of care may generate a profound transformation of the basic structures of the life-world shared by the therapist and the patient, since the ‘I–You’ relation radically affects the structures of subjectivity of the two partners. A transformation of selfhood (directedness), agency (reciprocity), spatiality (in-betweenness), temporality (presentness), and language (sacredness/bonding) is involved.

Although Beauvoir’s notion of becoming a woman is frequently understood as a gradual and protracted process, Beauvoir also explicitly sees it as a brutal, immediate, and definitive transition. This alternative temporality becomes clear when we attend to Beauvoir’s repeated use of the reflexive verb se faire (to make oneself) throughout The Second Sex. In assuming the attitude of se faire objet (making oneself an object), a girl transforms the structure of her prereflective consciousness from a child’s consciousness where her body is at the center of her subjectivity to a double, divided consciousness that is both her own and the conduit for another’s desires. This opens a new ontology of sexual difference. Being a woman is not about taking on a construct, set of performances, or sexual style, but assuming a secondary perspectival configuration of prereflective consciousness that makes such styles and performances possible.

This book examines ‘queer style’ or forms of masculinity grounded in superficiality, inauthenticity, affectation, and the display of the extravagantly clothed body in early modern English city comedies. Queer style destabilizes distinctions between able-bodied and disabled, human and nonhuman, and the past and the present—distinctions that have structured normative ways of thinking about sexuality. Glimpsing the worldmaking potential of queer style, plays by Ben Jonson, George Chapman, Thomas Middleton, and Thomas Dekker imagine alternatives to the prevailing modes of subjectivity, sociability, and eroticism in early modern London. While the characters associated with queer style are situated in a hostile generic and historical context, this book draws on recent work on disability, materiality, and queer temporality to rethink their relationship to those contexts so as to access the utopian possibilities of early modern queer style. These theoretical frameworks also help bring into relief how the attachments and pleasures of early modern sartorial extravagance can estrange us from the epistemologies of sexuality that narrow current thinking about sexuality and its relationship to authenticity, pedagogy, interiority, and privacy.

The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory provides an overview of the analytical frameworks and theoretical concepts feminist theorists have developed to challenge established knowledge. Leading feminist theorists, from around the globe, provide in-depth explorations of a diverse array of subject areas, capturing a plurality of approaches. The Handbook raises new questions, brings new evidence, and poses significant challenges across the spectrum of academic disciplines, demonstrating the interdisciplinary nature of feminist theory. The chapters offer innovative analyses of the central topics in social and political science (e.g. civilization, development, divisions of labor, economies, institutions, markets, migration, militarization, prisons, policy, politics, representation, the state/nation, the transnational, violence); cultural studies and the humanities (e.g. affect, agency, experience, identity, intersectionality, jurisprudence, narrative, performativity, popular culture, posthumanism, religion, representation, standpoint, temporality, visual culture); and discourses in medicine and science (e.g. cyborgs, health, intersexuality, nature, pregnancy, reproduction, science studies, sex/gender, sexuality, transsexuality) and contemporary critical theory that have been transformed through feminist theorization (e.g. biopolitics, coloniality, diaspora, the microphysics of power, norms/normalization, postcoloniality, race/racialization, subjectivity/subjectivation). The Handbook identifies the limitations of key epistemic assumptions that inform traditional scholarship and shows how theorizing from women’s and men’s lives has profound effects on the conceptualization of central categories, whether the field of analysis is aesthetics, biology, cultural studies, development, economics, film studies, health, history, literature, politics, religion, science studies, sexualities, violence, or war.

Edmund Husserl, generally regarded as the founding figure of the philosophical movement of phenomenology—or, more precisely, transcendental phenomenology—exerted an enormous influence on the course of twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy. This influence was both positive and negative. The subsequent developments of existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstruction, and so on were defined in part by how they both assimilated and departed from Husserlian views. The course of what has come to be called “continental philosophy” cannot be described without reference to this assimilation and departure, and, among the many successor approaches, phenomenology remains a viable alternative. In addition, problems addressed by Husserl—most notably, intentionality, consciousness, the emotions, and ethics—are of central concern in so-called analytic philosophy. Husserl’s views remain central to many contemporary philosophical discussions. This volume collects and translates previously untranslated articles written by important German-speaking commentators on Husserl. These German perspectives not only detail Husserl’s phenomenology but point toward his confrontation with other significant German philosophers, both ancestors and heirs. The articles focus primarily on three problematics within phenomenology: the nature and method of phenomenology; intentionality—the “main theme of phenomenology”—along with its attendant problems of temporality and subjectivity; and intersubjectivity and culture. The commentators selected for inclusion in the volume range over a time span encompassing both Husserl’s contemporaries and our own.

The distinction between lived time as it is subjectively experienced by individuals and wider events that affect communities, collectives, and nations is a complex and significant aspect of time as it is presented in narrative. This chapter considers the tension between the time of individual experience and the time of collectively marked events in Doctor Faustus, Felix Krull, Mario and the Magician, as well as Günter Grass’s The Tin Drum, and Art Spiegelman’s graphic novel, Maus. The wide range of times and media afforded by these works allows an analysis of the ways in which references to historical events have a significant effect on the temporality of individual tales. In the case of the works discussed here, history presented through myth, metaphor, and magic realism further complicates the flow of time by thickening it into multiple layers of storytelling.

This chapter considers and rejects the Temporal Argument for Nihilism: (1)The meaningfulness of an activity, at a time, depends upon it making a permanent difference in the world. (2) Nothing we can do will make a permanent difference in the world. (C) Nothing we can do has meaning now. Thechapter rejects (1) and proposes a way of finding meaning in life by appealing to temporal neutrality. First the chapter considers cases from Scheffler and Shiffrin which motivate (1). Next, the chapter considers two strategies for blocking this result: subjectivism about meaning and heavenly optimism. Both strategies are found wanting. However, if we embrace temporal neutrality then events can have meaning through connections with events either in the future or in the past. The chapter concludes with a temporally neutral response to nihilism.

The essays collected in this volume examine manifestations of our sublime cosmos in ancient literature and its reception. Individual themes include religious mystery; calendrical and cyclical thinking as ordering principles of human experience; divine birth and the manifold nature of divinity (both awesome and terrifying); contemplation of the sky and meteorological (ir)regularity; fears associated with overpowering natural and anthropogenic events; and the aspirations and limitations of human expression. In texts ranging from Homer to Keats, the volume’s chapters apply diverse critical methods and approaches that engage with sublimity in various aesthetic, agential and metaphysical aspects. The ancient texts – epic, dramatic, historiographic and lyric – treated here are rooted in a remote world where, within a framework of (perceived) celestial order, literature, myth and science still communicated profoundly, a tradition that continued in literary receptions of these ancient works. This volume honours the intellectual legacy of Thomas D. Worthen, a scholar whose expertise and insights cut across multiple disciplines, and who influenced and inspired students and colleagues at the University of Arizona, USA, for over three decades. Beyond clarifying temporally and culturally distant contemplations of the human universe, these essays aim to inform the continuing sense of wonder and horror at the sublime heights and depths of our ever-changing cosmos. This volume honours Thomas D. Worthen, late Professor of Classics at the University of Arizona and author of The Myth of Replacement: Stars, Gods, and Order in the Universe. The individual chapters, focused on Greek and Roman literary texts and their post-classical receptions, are united in their engagement with ‘the sublime’, an ancient concept embraced here in its full breadth of aesthetic, agential, and metaphysical meanings. Across literary texts ranging from Homer to Keats, the contributors examine the many relationships of the cosmic and the sublime manifested in such themes as time’s subjectivity; ontological insecurity; divine birth and the nature of divinity; (im)mortality and regenerative rites; the play of reflection and distortion in our perception of the world; metatheatricality and the notion that humans are actors in a cosmic drama; the metaphysics of erōs; our confrontations with astronomical (ir)regularity and (dis)order; human fears of awesome technology; and the disruptive effects of epidemics. The ancient texts discussed in this volume, rooted as they are in a world where literature, myth, science, and metaphysics communicated profoundly, can offer contemporary readers distanced, palliative perspectives on our own technologically and economically knotted, and culturally siloed, moment in history.

In this chapter, I explore the normalization of my own vulnerability and immigrant otherness through a subjectivity of hope and aspiration. In particular, I embed my problematization of – and coping with – personal precarity (as a working-class Serbian academic in Belgium and the United States) in discourses of aspirational temporality and de-territorialized hope for happiness.

Stimuli that are spatially and/or temporally periodic, but too high in frequency to be subjectively resolvable, appear by definition uniform and steady. If processing is linear up to the stage at which resolution losses obliterate the stimulus modulation, this stimulus will match a uniform and steady stimulus of the same average luminance. The phenomena of difference-frequency gratings and contrast-modulation flicker are exceptions to this principle for unresolvable gratings in cone vision, and the direction of deviation from linearity suggests that a compressive or sensitivity-regulating nonlinearity precedes any neural spatial integration in the cone system. This nonlinearity is a dynamic one rather than an instantaneous compression. In the rod system, on the other hand, the spatially integrated signals are very nearly linear, even at saturating levels. In the short-wavelength cone system, compressive nonlinearity precedes both spatial and temporal integration, the latter being revealed in deviations from the Talbot-Plateau law under some conditions.

Event Has been extensively pored over in literature in recent years. Some noted thinkers of our time, including Heidegger, Deleuze, Badiou, Žižek, Foucault, Eagleton, etc. have made great contributions to the framework of events. This article revisits Russian literary theorist M. M. Bakhtin’s event thoughts in his philosophy and cultural poetics. In his Act Philosophy, Bakhtin proposes ‘Event of Being’ to interpret existence in terms of ontology, epistemology and value ethics. From this starting point, Bakhtin in his cultural poetics conceptualizes literature as an event. Firstly, literature as an event perceives itself as an act or event that is temporally and spatially constituted, rather than a solid object. And as irregular occurrences, events of literature are destined to undergo a process of changes and transformations and predict new emergence. Secondly, featuring in its inherent discourse characteristics, literature as an event is internally intertwined with other social and historical events while at the same time self – sufficiently develops. That is, instead of being perceived as reflective and a passive recorder to its historical society, literature is actually active with its own subjectivity to enter into dynamic dialogue with other events, and in some cases serves as a spiritual power in forging society and history. Therefore, literature as an event places itself between concrete entity and dynamic process, textual discourse and social history context, etc.. This reflects an ‘intero logical thinking', that is, literature exists in the relationship with others as something ‘between’. Clearly, Bakhtin's thoughts on literature as an event would shed light on our understanding towards world literature and literary history writing.