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Published: 26 July 2024

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1

Pincus, Jonathan. "International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. By Michael J Hiscox. Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp xiv, 209. $49.50, cloth; $18.95, paper." Journal of Economic History 63, no. 1 (March 2003): 306–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050703621807.

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This short book has a novel thesis, which is that the degree of factor mobility at the national level influenced the politics of foreign-trade policies. When factor mobility was high, tariff legislation was class legislation. When mobility was low, tariffs were decided by interest-group competition. Michael Hiscox brings data on mobility to bear on the history of foreign trade policies of the six countries—the United States, Britain, France, Sweden, Canada, and Australia—over the last one or two hundred years or so, devoting a chapter to each. He then tests his ideas quantitatively on U.S. congressional voting between 1924 and 1994, finding that, when the indicators of factor mobility were low, an “interest group theory” better explains U.S. tariff politics than does a “class legislation theory” (and the reverse when mobility was high).

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2

Beaulieu, Eugene, and J. C. Herbert Emery. "PORK PACKERS, RECIPROCITY, AND LAURIER'S DEFEAT IN THE 1911 CANADIAN GENERAL ELECTION." Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (December 2001): 1083–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050701042097.

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The 1911 Canada–United States Reciprocity Agreement had a central role in the campaigns of the Liberal and Conservative parties in the 1911 Canadian General Election. Consequently, Laurier's defeat in 1911 has been interpreted as Canada's rejection of reciprocity and her commitment to tariff protection. This analysis shows that reciprocity bolstered support for Laurier in 1911. In the absence of opposition from pork packers, particularly in Quebec, Laurier would have retained his majority mandate. Thus, Canada was not committing to a path of protectionism after 1911.

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3

Rulli, Daniel. "Campaigning In 1928." Teaching History: A Journal of Methods 31, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 42–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/th.31.1.42-46.

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While the military and political accomplishments of World War I were clearly limited, the war, nonetheless, established a foundation for unparalleled economic growth in the United States during the 1920s. A significant consumer economy grew as many Americans worked fewer hours, earned higher salaries, invested in the stock market, and bought everything from washing machines to Model T Fords. This culture of consumerism in the 1920s changed the politics of American society and set the tone for American attitudes about economic political issues for decades to come. In the early 1920s, President Warren G. Harding's policies were generally conservative, especially regarding taxes, tariffs, immigration restriction, labor rights, and business regulation. Continuing Republican policies, President Calvin Coolidge included federal tax cuts and high tariffs. The expansive economy of the 1920s was fueled by the use of factory machine manufacturing and standardized mass production. The economic boom also resulted from the effects of World War I on technology, scientific management, the rapid increase in worker productivity, the psychology of mass consumption (with installment credit) behind the purchase of radios, motion picture tickets, electric appliances, and automobiles. Certainly, federal policies that supported big business with high tariffs, cutbacks in the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to regulate unfair trade practices, and the reduction of corporate and personal income taxes contributed to the boom as well. It was with this backdrop that Herbert Hoover and Al Smith squared off in the election of 1928. Hoover was born in Iowa and orphaned as a child. He began a career as a mining engineer soon after graduating from Stanford University in 1895. Within twenty years he had used his engineering knowledge and business skills to make a fortune as an independent mining consultant. In 1914, Hoover administered the American Relief Committee and during World War I he headed the Commission for Relief in Belgium and the U.S. Food Administration and was chairman of the Interallied Food Council. After the war he directed the American Relief Administration. Then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt said of Hoover in 1920, "He is certainly a wonder and I wish we could make him President of the United States. There could be no better one." In 1919 Hoover founded the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University. As Secretary of Commerce in the Harding and Coolidge administrations from 1921 to 1929, Hoover was widely celebrated for his leadership. The man who had fed Belgium, had run the U.S. Food Administration, revolutionized the Department of Commerce, and ministered to victims of the 1927 Mississippi flood appeared the ideal candidate in 1928. Hoover seemed more practical than Woodrow Wilson, glowed with respectability compared to the Harding administration, was easily more inspired than Coolidge, and was generally considered more "purely American" than his Democratic opponent, New York Governor Alfred E. Smith.

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4

SEYER, SEAN. "An Industry Worth Protecting? The Manufacturers Aircraft Association’s Struggle against the British Surplus, 1919–1922." Journal of Policy History 34, no. 3 (June 6, 2022): 403–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030622000112.

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AbstractThe American aircraft industry’s important role in the economic, military, and cultural expansion of the United States over the past one hundred years has been well documented by historians. But America’s twentieth century aerial dominance was not preordained. After World War I, the nascent American aircraft industry faced a concerted British effort to dump thousands of war surplus machines on the U.S. market. With aircraft outside of the nation’s tariff regime, members of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association turned to Congress for emergency protections in the face of what they considered an existential threat. Despite efforts to equate a strong industrial base for aviation with the national defense, aircraft antidumping legislation became mired in partisan debates over tariff policy and accusations of wartime corruption. In the absence of relief from Congress, the Wright patent served as a barrier against the importation of foreign surplus machines.

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5

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Gulotty. "America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform." International Organization 68, no. 2 (2014): 263–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818313000490.

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AbstractAmong scholars, delegation of power to the US president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years. According to conventional wisdom, delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. This article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurred. Through a close study of the US tariff schedule between 1928 and 1964, focusing on highly protected products, we examine which products were subject to liberalization and at what time. After 1934, delegation led to a change in trade policy, not because Congress gave up their constitutional prerogative in this domain but because presidents were able to target the potential economic dislocation that derives from import competition to avoid the creation of a congressional majority willing to halt the trade agreements program.

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6

POTTER, SIMON J. "THE IMPERIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CANADIAN–AMERICAN RECIPROCITY PROPOSALS OF 1911." Historical Journal 47, no. 1 (March 2004): 81–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x03003522.

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This article builds on the recent willingness among British, Canadian, and imperial historians to question older national histories, and to re-examine how the divergent societies, economies, and polities of the empire once interacted in a wider ‘British world’. It argues that the press acted as a key mechanism for the transmission of political ideas through the permeable internal boundaries of empire. This is demonstrated through analysis of contemporary debate over the Canadian–American reciprocity proposals of 1911. This controversy provided an opportunity for political groups in Britain and Canada to use the press to forge alliances with each other and work together on a specific issue. Two key forces made this possible. In Britain, constructive imperialists had since 1903 sought to rally Dominion support for tariff reform, initially with limited success. In Canada, neither western farmers nor eastern manufacturers seemed interested in imperial preference. It was the reciprocity proposals that changed the situation, providing the second driving force. Canadian manufacturing interests, seeking to prevent the lowering of tariff barriers against United States rivals, began to court British constructive imperialists. As a result political conflict was reshaped both in colony and metropole.

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7

Joshi, Vivek. "Preferential Tariff Formation The Case of the United States." Journal of World Trade 47, Issue 4 (August 1, 2013): 835–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2013028.

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In this article, we address the impact of multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) on the preferential tariffs granted by the United States, which is one of the largest traders and one of the biggest contributors to MTL. We empirically address two important questions. First, if the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff for a product is higher, does it lead to a higher or lower preferential tariff? Second, the US being a large trading partner in such agreements, does reciprocity matter for giving meaningful preferential access? For a given MFN tariff, we model the preferential tariff with a simple linear functional form. We take the US MTL as known to the world by the end of Uruguay Round in 1994 and estimate the impact of MTL on preferential tariff negotiations of the US during 1995 to 2007. Here use a three-dimensional panel data, which takes into account the partner, product and time variation of the data-set. To complete our data-set, we codify eight Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) legal agreements. We draw three important conclusions. First, the products that are highly protected do not get high preferential access even at the regional level. Second, reciprocity plays only a limited role in granting better preferential access. Third, irrespective of development level of the partner, the non-reciprocal Generalized System of Preference (GSP) preferences always matter.

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8

Guifen, Pei, and Wang Xinying. "A Comparative Study of China and Japan’s Response to Section 301 Investigations of the United States." Management and Economics Research Journal 5 (2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.18639/merj.2019.902800.

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Japan is the country with the most Section 301 investigations initiated by the United States. Meanwhile, the ongoing Section 301 investigation case against China is the most complicated and tough case until now. The different responses of Japan and China will be the core theme of this paper. Originally, Japan, little by little, accepted all the demands of the United States under American pressure in the semiconductor conflict and then began to resist its unreasonable demands; eventually, Japan forced the United States to withdraw its excessive requirement in auto parts conflict. In the case of China, previous Section 301 investigations were resolved by bilateral or multilateral agreements although it was difficult. In this time, the Chinese government has taken a countermeasure against the United States’ bullying, evident from the very beginning. The situation is that China and the United States conducted bilateral negotiations on the stretch. Meanwhile, the United States continued to extend the scope of tariff goods and escalate the tariff rate against China, and the Chinese government immediately published the same amount and tariff rate for imported products from the United States. China and other countries are jointly suffering the sanction from the United States and are trying to restrain the trade hegemony of the United States.

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9

Song, Jingyu. "Why Tariff and Trade War?" Finance and Market 5, no. 4 (December 22, 2020): 272. http://dx.doi.org/10.18686/fm.v5i4.2693.

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<p>By see the tariffs and trade wars in different time periods, each countries’ aim to start the trade war and tariff are protecting themselves. Analyzing and comparing the tariff acts in the colonial and antebellum period, the trade conflicts between the United States and Japan in the 1980s, and 2019’s China-United States trade war, we can see how tariffs work the same but also different in different time periods. </p>

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10

Spreen, Thomas H., Charlene Brewster, and Mark G. Brown. "The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Market for Processed Orange Products." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 35, no. 1 (April 2003): 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800005976.

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The proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas would join the world's two largest processed orange producing regions: Brazil and the United States. Because the United States currently imposes a sizeable tariff on imported processed orange products, there is concern by U.S. orange growers over possible adverse effects resulting from tariff elimination. A model of the world processed orange market is developed as a spatial equilibrium model with implicit supply functions based on the dynamic behavior of orange production. The model is used to estimate the impact of U.S. tariff elimination on U.S. production, grower and processor prices, and imports. The results suggest a sizeable price impact on U.S. producers if the tariff is eliminated.

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11

Veroneau, John K., and Catherine H. Gibson. "Presidential Tariff Authority." American Journal of International Law 111, no. 4 (October 2017): 957–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.69.

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As part of the “America First” agenda discussed in his inaugural address, President Donald J. Trump promised that “[e]very decision” on trade, among other areas, would be “made to benefit American workers and American families.” During its first months, the Trump Administration made a number of trade moves apparently in connection with this “America First” trade agenda, including initiating national security investigations into steel and aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and preparing an “omnibus” report on trade deficits. The Trump Administration also took steps to alter U.S. treaty relationships, by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, announcing the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and requesting a special session of a joint committee created under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In August 2017, President Trump continued this course—and indicated a willingness to take unilateral action against U.S. trading partners—by signing a presidential memorandum directing the United States Trade Representative to determine whether China's treatment of U.S. intellectual property warranted investigation under Section 301 et seq. of the Trade Act of 1974.

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12

Haggard, Stephan. "The institutional foundations of hegemony: explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934." International Organization 42, no. 1 (1988): 91–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300007141.

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In 1930, Congress approved the highly restrictive Smoot–Hawley tariff, the textbook case of pressure group politics run amok. Four years later, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), surrendering much of its tariff-making authority to a policy process in which internationalists had increasing influence. While the United States had used reciprocity to expand exports before, the stick of discriminatory treatment took precedence over the carrot of liberalizing concessions. With the transfer of tariff-making authority to the executive, the United States could make credible commitments and thus exploit its market power to liberalize international trade. Despite later modifications, the RTAA set the fundamental institutional framework for trade politics.

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13

Gardner, Grant W., and Kent P. Kimbrough. "Tax smoothing and tariff behavior in the United States." Journal of Macroeconomics 14, no. 4 (September 1992): 711–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(92)90007-u.

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14

de Melo, Jaime, and Céline Carrère. "The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets." Journal of World Trade 44, Issue 1 (February 1, 2010): 251–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2010008.

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Least developed countries (LDCs) hoped that the DOHA round would bring them greater market access in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries than for non-LDCs. Using HS-6 tariff level data for the United States and the EU for 2004, this paper estimates that, once the erosion from preferential access into the EU to non-LDCs is taken into account, LDCs have about a 3% preferential margin in the EU market. In the US market, in spite of preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA), on a trade-weighted basis, LDCs are discriminated against. Under various ‘Swiss formulas’ for tariff cuts, effective market access for LDCs in the EU will be negligible and still negative in the United States. If the United States were to apply a 97% rule (i.e, duty-free quota-free access for all but 3% of the tariff lines), LDCs could increase exports by 10% or about USD 1 billion annually. Effective market access is further reduced by complicated Rules of Origin (RoO) applied by the EU and the United States. Furthermore, generally, the most restrictive RoO fall on products in which LDCs have the greatest preferential market access.

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15

Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Pinelopi Goldberg, Patrick Kennedy, Amit Khandelwal, and Daria Taglioni. "The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations." American Economic Review: Insights 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2024): 295–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230094.

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The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many “bystander” countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding the United States and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-Chinese tariffs identify whether a country’s exports complement or substitute the United States or China and its supply curve’s slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) the United States and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war. (JEL F13, F14, O19, P33)

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16

Remy, Steven P., and Michael Behnen. "Die USA und Italien, 1921-1933 (The United States and Italy, 1921-1933)." Journal of American History 87, no. 3 (December 2000): 1074. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2675375.

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17

Luan, Bowen. "Macroeconomic Effect of The U.S. Tariff on Steel and Aluminum." BCP Business & Management 23 (August 4, 2022): 890–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v23i.1469.

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In the context of deglobalization, the United States proposed a trade policy of imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum in March 2018. This paper first discusses the possible motivations behind the tariff levitation by the United States. It also analyzes the impact of US tariffs on its trading partners and itself under the unilateral tariff model and the bilateral tariff model. The conclusion of the analysis is that the impact of this US trade policy on the economy of steel and aluminum importing countries, especially in the long run, is not as pessimistic as imagined. And considering the impact of the tariffs, as well as the EU and China’s trade countermeasures on the U.S. economy, the U.S. should perhaps reassess what this policy has brought to the U.S.

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18

LUCKSTEAD, JEFF, STEPHEN DEVADOSS, and MAHALINGAM DHAMODHARAN. "STRATEGIC TRADE ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND CHINESE APPLE JUICE MARKET." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 47, no. 2 (April 10, 2015): 175–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aae.2015.4.

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AbstractBecause of high competition from Chinese apple juice processors, the United States imposed an antidumping duty on apple juice imports from China to protect the domestic processors. This trade policy benefited U.S. processors but negatively impacted Chinese processors as well as consumers in the United States. Because of the economic reforms, foreign direct investment, and technological spillover, Chinese apple processors have increased their productivity. Under oligopolistic competition with endogenous firm entry and exit, this article analyzes how the changes in U.S. tariff policy and Chinese productivity impact the market structure in the United States and China, as well as prices, quantities, and U.S. and Chinese welfare. Trade liberalization and an increase in Chinese productivity help U.S. consumers and Chinese processors. However, U.S. tariff removal adversely affects U.S. apple juice processors.

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19

Abbott, Kenneth W. "United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930." American Journal of International Law 84, no. 1 (January 1990): 274–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2203030.

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20

Clark, Don P. "Non-tariff measure use in Japan and the United States." Japan and the World Economy 6, no. 1 (January 1994): 53–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0922-1425(94)90037-x.

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21

Kidd, Laura K., and Jane Farrell-Beck. "Menstrual Products Patented in the United States, 1854–1921." Dress 24, no. 1 (January 1997): 27–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/036121197805298017.

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22

Schropp, Simon, Olim Latipov, Christian Lau, and Kornel Mahlstein. "Quantifying the Impact of the Latest US Tariff Sanctions on Russia: A Sectoral Analysis." Journal of World Trade 57, Issue 1 (February 1, 2023): 55–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2023003.

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In addition to the existing import ban on energy products (oil, gas, coal), the United States recently announced a new sanction package that imposes significantly higher import tariffs on 570 product groups from Russia. These tariff increases affect more than USD 2 billion in US imports from Russia. Using a sector-specific partial-equilibrium (PE) model, we quantify the impact of these US tariff increases. We find that the new tariffs affect 8.7% of total US imports from Russia and may decrease Russian welfare by USD 181 million per year, while imposing annual costs of USD 90 million on US consumers. Our sectoral analysis shows that the US’ choice of target sectors produces mixed results. On one hand, the sanctions cover dozens of sectors whose inclusion produce particularly large welfare losses to Russia and/or high welfare gains to the US Yet, for several target sectors higher tariffs result in zero harm to Russia, and/or greater harm to the US than to Russia. For example, higher tariffs for several selected sectors result in zero harm to Russia, and/or greater harm to the United States than to Russia. These and other insights may provide guidance for the design of future tariff sanctions by the European Union (EU) and other Allies. International trade, war in Ukraine, economic sanctions, import tariffs, economic impact, partial equilibrium, sectoral analysis, welfare analysis, pass-through, tariff revenue, Russia, United States, European Union

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23

Peterson, John M. "Totes-Isotoner v. United States: Tariffs and Civil Rights Intersect, Uncomfortably." Global Trade and Customs Journal 5, Issue 5 (May 1, 2010): 177–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2010020.

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Taxes that discriminate based on gender and age have come under Constitutional attack in recent decades and today are relatively rare. Defying this trend, however, the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS) still contains dozens of provisions that discriminate in the taxation of imported merchandise based on the gender or age of the intended user. In Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States and more than 150 pending lawsuits, importers have challenged these discriminatory rates, contending that no sufficient justification exists for Congress? disparate treatment of similar goods. To date, the Federal courts have struggled with the question of what type of allegations importers must plead in order to state a prima facie challenge to these discriminatory rates. Is the discrimination evident on the face of the statute, which ordinarily shifts to the government the burden of justification? Or, because modern tariff schedules are based on internationally agreed nomenclatures and duty rates reflect concessions made in multilateral agreements, are tariff laws a “breed apart” to which a special standard should be applied? The Totes-Isotoner case shows that the Federal courts are confused and somewhat divided on this basic issue and that the United States Supreme Court may need to identify the standards of pleading applicable to Totes and similar lawsuits.

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24

Hutchinson, William K. "Import Substitution, Structural Change, and Regional Economic Growth in the United States: The Northeast, 1870–1910." Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (June 1985): 319–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002205070003401x.

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This article uses data on regional output and imports to examine the relationship between imports and regional growth in the Northeast. The tariff rates, both nominal and effective, are considered as evidence of national policy that may have benefited this particular region. The findings are that particular industries do benefit from tariff protection, but their location is due to regional resource advantages.

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25

Becerril Torres, Osvaldo, Gabriela Munguía Vázquez, and Justyna Wieloch. "The effects of US import tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico." JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 15, no. 4 (December 2022): 165–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2022/15-4/10.

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To this end, mathematical and statistical methods are used to model the effect of tariffs, ex-ante and ex-post, after implementing this trade policy, on exports of aluminum and steel from Mexico to the United States, versus US imports of these metals from the ROW. The results show that the protectionist tariff policy had a structural effect on US imports; likewise, the tariff shock implemented by the United States in June 2018 adversely affected its imports of these goods, both in terms of volume and value. This suggests that bilateral trade may be affected, but the effect is differentiated. The United States may be achieving its objective of protecting its domestic industry or it may impact upwards on the domestic prices of these metals, which could influence the prices paid by the final consumer. For Mexico, trade may be diverted or its export capacity reduced, adversely affecting its trade balance of these metals.

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26

Wade, Larry L., and John B. Gates. "A new tariff map of the United States (House of Representatives)." Political Geography Quarterly 9, no. 3 (July 1990): 284–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0260-9827(90)90028-9.

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27

Clark, Don P., and Simonetta Zarrilli. "Non‐tariff measures and United States' imports of CBERA‐eligible products." Journal of Development Studies 31, no. 1 (October 1994): 214–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220389408422355.

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28

Wade, Rex A., and Norman E. Saul. "War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1917-1921." Journal of Military History 66, no. 1 (January 2002): 222. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2677375.

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29

Rosenberg, Victor. "War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914–1921." History: Reviews of New Books 29, no. 4 (January 2001): 167–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2001.10527845.

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30

McFadden, David W., and Norman E. Saul. "War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921." Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 671. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3092260.

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31

Gabriella, Andrea Gladys, Shanti Darmastuti, and Wiwiek Rukmi Dwi Astuti. "U.S. Economic Diplomacy towards Japan in Resolving Beef Tariff Barriers." Insignia: Journal of International Relations 10, no. 1 (April 19, 2023): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.20884/1.ins.2023.10.1.6852.

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The United States (US) is one of beef exporting countries in Japan. The high level of demand for beef in Japan was followed by a decrease in the volume of US beef from Japan during 2017-2020 period caused by import barriers in the form of tariffs faced by US beef. These tariff barriers arise because the US does not have a trade agreement with Japan. This study aims to discuss the efforts made by the US through negotiating tariff barriers with Japan regarding beef exports. This study uses the concepts of economic diplomacy and trade theory as the basis for research analysis. The research method used in this research is descriptive qualitative with data collection through documentation study. The results of this study indicate that the US effort in negotiating tariff barriers with Japan is to form a bilateral trade agreement, namely the US-Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA) which uses the stages of decision-making in economic diplomacy in its formation. Through this effort, the US successfully lowered its beef import tariffs in Japan and leveled its beef competitive level with the CPTPP member countries. In the formation of the USJTA, various actors are involved, both state and non-state actors. Efforts to negotiate tariff barriers on beef exports by the US and Japan succeeded in increasing US beef exports after the establishment of the USJTA began to be implemented on January 1, 2020. Keywords: economic diplomacy, export, tariff barriers, United States

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32

McDonald, Judith A., Anthony Patrick O'Brien, and Colleen M. Callahan. "Trade Wars: Canada's Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff." Journal of Economic History 57, no. 4 (December 1997): 802–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700019549.

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Strange as it seems, the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff might have had an expansionary effect on the U.S. economy. Basic macroeconomic principles indicate that the direct effect of a tariff increase is expansionary. This expansionary effect might be offset by retaliatory increases in foreign tariffs. Barry Eichengreen has recently questioned whether significant retaliation to Smoot-Hawley occurred. This article demonstrates that the tariff increases enacted during 1930 in Canada—the largest trading partner of the United States—were in direct response to Smoot-Hawley. The conventional wisdom that Smoot-Hawley hurt the U.S. economy may be right after all.

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33

Barus, Adhi Pradana, Suhaidi, Sutiarnoto, and Jelly Leviza. "Sengketa Penerapan Tariff Impor Dan Hambatan Dagang Antara Amerika Serikat Dan Negara China Dalam Perspektif Kerangka WTO." Locus: Jurnal Konsep Ilmu Hukum 2, no. 1 (March 17, 2022): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.56128/jkih.v2i1.21.

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Hubungan dagang antara Amerika Serikat dan China menjadi perhatian dunia terutama karena sengketa dagang yang terjadi antara kedua negara.Amerika Serikat membuat kebijakan untuk menaikkan tariff bea masuk yang tinggi untuk barang impor dari negara China. Kebijakan ini bertentangan dengan GATT khususnya Pasal I dan Pasal II yang menyatakan tidak boleh ada diskriminasi antara negara anggota WTO. Sengketa ini diawali dengan adanya kebijakan tariff bea masuk impor yang hanya ditujukan kepada Negara China, Amerika mengaku ini dilakukan demi melindungi pekerja domestik dan produk domestik, dan ini semua bagian dari kampanye Donald Trump, kemudian pada akhirnya Negara China melayangkan gugatan ke Amerika Serikat melalui DSB. Dalam penemuan yang dilakukan oleh Panel, bahwa Amerika Serikat dalam sengketa dagang ini telah terbukti melanggar ketentuan GATT/WTO yaitu Pasal I dan Pasal II GATT yang dengan sepihak menaikkan komitmen tariff tanpa ada perundingan terlebih dahulu, setelah sengketa ini dibawa ke Dispute Settlement Body dimana Panel menyatakan Amerika Serikat telah bersalah dan tidak memiliki bukti yang cukup jelas dalam pembelaanya dalam hal pencegahan lebih lanjut maka WTO dapat menggunakan ketentuan Pasal I, Pasal II, dan Pasal III GATT/WTO untuk dapat mengendalikan tariff bea masuk impor, dan juga masalah perdagangan internasional kedepannya untuk menyelesaikan masalah secara baik. Kata kunci: Hambatan perdagangan, Sengketa Dagang, Tariff, WTO. Abstract The relationship between the United States and China has attracted worldwide attention, especially because of the trade dispute between the two countries. The United States made a policy to raise high import duty rates for goods imported from China. This policy contradicts the GATT, especially Article I and Article II which state that there should be no discrimination between WTO member countries. This dispute began with the existence of import tariffs that were only aimed at the State of China, America claimed this was done to protect domestic workers and domestic products, and this was all part of Donald Trump's campaign, then in the end China filed a lawsuit against the United States through the DSB. In the findings made by the Panel, that the United States in this trade dispute has violated the provisions of the GATT/WTO, namely Article I and Article II of the GATT which unilaterally raised tariffs without prior agreement, after this dispute was brought to the Settlement Body where the Panel stated that the United States has been guilty and does not have clear enough evidence in his defense in further prevention, the WTO can use the provisions of Article I, Article II, and Article III of the GATT/WTO to control import duty tariffs, as well as international trade issues in the future to resolve the problem properly. Keywords: tariffs, trade barriers, trade disputes, WTO.

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Lee, Hongshik, and Backhoon Song. "Quantitative Estimates of the Economic Impacts of a Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement." Asian Economic Papers 7, no. 2 (June 2008): 52–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/asep.2008.7.2.52.

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This paper investigates the bilateral trade pattern between South Korea and the United States and examines the economic impact of a Korea–United States (KORUS) free trade agreement (FTA). Three related general equilibrium approaches were used to investigate the effects of a KORUS FTA. The static general equilibrium model estimates the efficiency gains from resource allocation. The capital accumulation general equilibrium model includes the growth bonus from the increased incentives for savings and investment created by the static efficiency gains. The productivity enhancement general equilibrium model augments the capital accumulation model by taking into consideration the dynamic efficiency improvements from competitive effects in the economies over time. The last welfare gain turns out to be the biggest gain from the KORUS FTA, dwarfing the static efficiency gains. The results indicate that Korea could gain an estimated 0.32 to 5.97 percent in GDP from a KORUS FTA. Much of the gains that would accrue to Korea from the FTA with the United States would be productivity gains from increased competition between U.S. producers and domestic Korean producers. Another important area of gain for Korea would be increased efficiency from lower non-tariff barriers. This provides a strong argument for ensuring that an FTA between Korea and the United States is comprehensive and facilitates regulatory cooperation and the reduction of non-tariff barriers.

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Spearot, Alan. "Unpacking the Long-Run Effects of Tariff Shocks: New Structural Implications from Firm Heterogeneity Models." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 2 (May 1, 2016): 128–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140015.

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I derive a novel solution for the general equilibrium effects of tariffs that is robust to heterogeneity across industries and countries, and is a function of only aggregate trade data and country-by-industry Pareto shape parameters. Using the model to evaluate tariff shocks, I show that while most countries lose by removing observed tariffs unilaterally, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States gain by doing so, which suggests inefficient tariff discrimination. In evaluating multilateral shocks, observed tariff cuts over 1994 –2000 benefit 69 percent of countries, with these benefits skewed toward developing nations. In contrast, removing all post-2000 tariffs benefit the developed. (JEL F12, F13, F14)

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Chudinova, K. O. "The Influence of D. Trump’s Policy on International Trade." International Trade and Trade Policy, no. 3 (October 8, 2019): 65–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.21686/2410-7395-2019-3-65-82.

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The increasing level of tension in the trade relations between the United States and other countries, especially China; the potential escalation of trade wars, when countries take more and more explicit retaliatory protectionist measures, becomes a sustainability risk to development of international trade. The US actions taken in 2018–2019 to protect the internal market turned into into a full-fledged trade war, directed primarily against China - the country the United States has the largest trade deficit with. The introduction of the US tariff restrictions on imports from China and several other countries has caused retaliatory measures, as a result the uncertainty of the prospects for international trade increases. Non-tariff measures, such as phytosanitary requirements and technical barriers to trade, have also seen an increase in restrictions.An important source of controversy is the different positions of countries regarding the permissible degree of state support for enterprises. Developed countries, especially the United States, Japan, and the countries of the European Union, have fairly rigidly regulated rules regarding free competition. A cause for great concern is not only the US trade war with China and its consequences for other countries, but also the problems of international trade regulation.

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Luckstead, Jeff, Stephen Devadoss, and Ron C. Mittelhammer. "Apple Export Competition between the United States and China in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 46, no. 4 (November 2014): 635–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s107407080002914x.

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We developed a trade model under imperfect competition to analyze the market power of U.S. and Chinese apple producers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) market and their domestic markets and the elimination of ASEAN tariffs on U.S. and Chinese apples. We also formulated welfare functions for the United States, China, and ASEAN. Comparative static results are derived to analyze the effect of tariff changes on exports, domestic sales, and welfare. Based on the theoretical model, we derived an econometric specification and used the new empirical industrial organization literature to estimate the market power of U.S. and Chinese apple producers. The econometric model is simulated to quantify the effect of tariff removal on exports and domestic sales.

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Thibault, Johanna. "Implementing an Effective Renewable Energy Policy in the United States: Can Feed-In Tariff Policies Be Successful for Advancing Renewable Energy Development?" European Energy and Environmental Law Review 23, Issue 6 (December 1, 2014): 233–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eelr2014021.

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This article explores the nuances of Feed-in Tariff policies as they are used to accelerate the development of renewable energy sources. Specifically, this article considers whether the United States (US) could successfully implement Feed-in Tariffs to advance renewable energy resource development. Although both popular and successfully used worldwide for this purpose, the US has been slow to adopt such policies. The success of a Feed-in Tariff program is dependent on the goals set forth by each jurisdiction; however, the two most important factors are setting the tariff at a premium rate, and keeping the design and implementation of the tariff administratively simple. Both of these factors are critical to encourage investors in renewable energy, and they are missing from most Feed-in Tariffs adopted in US state and local jurisdictions due primarily to the complex regulatory structure in the US energy market. The legal hurdles the US faces to adopt Feed-in Tariffs are explored using a comparative analysis with Germany, which was the first country to successfully implement Feed-in Tariff policies that have now been imitated worldwide. This article also reviews other policy approaches utilized in the US to achieve renewable energy goals including net-metering and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs). The key objective of this article is to support the conclusion that, although popular, the US might not have a suitable legal regime or energy market structure for Feed-in Tariff policies to be an effective strategy for acceleration of renewable energy development.

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Rees, Anne. "‘Treated like Chinamen’: United States immigration restriction and white British subjects." Journal of Global History 14, no. 2 (July 2019): 239–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1740022819000056.

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AbstractIn 1921, the United States introduced national immigration quotas. Although designed to curb the arrival of ‘undesirables’ from south-east Europe, this quota system also applied to Britain and its white Dominions. By 1929, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa were each allocated 100 quota places per annum. The British quota was far greater, but still struggled to meet demand. Through a focus on the Australian example, this article investigates how an immigration regime intended to bolster America’s ‘Anglo-Saxon’ identity also exposed the limits of Anglospheric kinship by closing the gates to white Britons. Although the quotas had a comparatively minor impact on Britons, their exclusion held great significance in the context of Anglo-American relations, where the rhetoric of transnational white solidarity produced expectations of unqualified welcome in the United States. After 1921, as such welcome disappeared and then failed to rematerialize, the global community of white men’s countries was shaken and remade.

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Clarke, Andrew J., Jeffery A. Jenkins, and Kenneth S. Lowande. "Tariff politics and congressional elections: exploring the Cannon Thesis." Journal of Theoretical Politics 29, no. 3 (May 18, 2016): 382–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629816647801.

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While a number of studies have examined the politics of tariff decision-making in the United States, little work has examined the subsequent political effects of tariff policy. We help fill this gap in the literature by analyzing—both theoretically and empirically—the electoral implications of tariff revision. Specifically, we investigate the veracity of the Cannon Thesis—the proposition advanced by Speaker Joe Cannon in 1910 that the majority party in the U.S. House was punished when it made major revisions to the tariff. We find that from 1877 to 1934 major tariff revisions were, on average, associated with a significant loss of votes for majority-party members—both regionally and nationally—that translated into a loss of House seats. We find support for the notion that major tariff revisions generated inordinate uncertainty among various business interests, which the opposition party could then use (by leveraging fear and market instability) to mobilize its base and gain ground in the following election. Our results provide a new explanation for the delegation of tariff policymaking to the executive branch.

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Irwin, Douglas A. "Tariff Incidence in America's Gilded Age." Journal of Economic History 67, no. 3 (September 2007): 582–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050707000241.

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In the late nineteenth century, the United States imposed high tariffs to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition. This article examines the magnitude of protection given to import-competing producers and the costs imposed on export-oriented producers by focusing on changes in the domestic prices of traded goods relative to nontraded goods. The results suggest that the 30 percent average import tariff gave about a 17 percent implicit subsidy to import-competing producers and effectively taxed exporters at about 10 percent. Tariffs redistributed large amounts of income (about 8 percent of GDP), but the effect on consumers was roughly neutral.

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Niu, Junde. "US-China Trade War Effects on The Economy of The United States." BCP Business & Management 38 (March 2, 2023): 21–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v38i.3665.

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Several significant imports, including solar panels, washing machines, steel, and aluminum, saw tariff increases in the United States at the beginning of 2018.It soon became clear that China was the target of US trade restrictions, despite the fact that these tariffs did not discriminate based on origin. The United States then increased tariffs on tens of thousands of Chinese goods in 2018 and 2019, concentrating on imports worth approximately $350 billion. China targeted US shipments worth approximately $100 billion as a response to numerous tax waves. The two sides agreed to stop increasing tariffs in January 2020; however, as of 2021, the existing tariffs were still in effect. The trade war stands out as one of the broadest and most significant shifts in US trade policy, despite the fact that the United States has historically been at the forefront of efforts to promote global tariff reductions. As the trade war progressed, economists attempted to assess its economic effects. A timeline of the major events and a summary of the reasons for the trade war from experts and analysts are included in this article. The effects of the trade war on the US economy are also discussed in this article. The conclusion suggests that the conflict has already had different effects on the US economy.

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ZHANG, Mei. "Interpretation of WTO's Panel Report on United States — Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China and Its Enlightenment to China." Theory and Practice of Social Science 3, no. 3 (August 31, 2021): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.6914/tpss.202108_3(3).0001.

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The United States imposed a high tariff on importing goods from China which valued USD 34 billion and USD 200 billion respectively in 2018 and 2019. This measurement not only violated the most favored nation treatment principle, but also violated the tariff concession commitment which the US offered to China. With respect to the United States’ defence under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, the Panel adopted a holistic approach to determining whether the measures at issue were “necessary to protect public morals” and found that there were no relationship. The ruling has the following enlightenments: the enterprises should value the proof in WTO litigation and make use of the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes. Finally, the enterprises should pay more emphasis on the market of One Belt One Road to expand more trade benefits and enjoy the double win.

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MacPhee, Craig R., and David I. Rosenbaum. "The Asymmetric Effects of Reversible Tariff Changes under the United States GSP." Southern Economic Journal 56, no. 1 (July 1989): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1059060.

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45

Grossman, Gene M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. "US – Lead and Bismuth II: United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies." World Trade Review 2, S1 (2003): 170–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745603001113.

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In 1993, the US Department of Commerce began to levy countervailing duties on imports of certain leaded bars from the United Kingdom. The United States applied tariffs to goods imported from British Steel Engineering Steels, a subsidiary of British Steel plc. Following investigations by the US Department of Commerce and the United States International Trade Commission, the US authorities held that the imposition of duties was both required by Section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended) and not in violation of any of the country’s obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization.

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Engerman, D. C. "Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921-1941." Journal of American History 93, no. 3 (December 1, 2006): 918. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4486521.

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Maddox, Robert James. "Friends or Foes?: The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921—1941." History: Reviews of New Books 34, no. 4 (July 2006): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2006.10526919.

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Ott, Julia. "Tax Preference As White Privilege in the United States, 1921–1965." Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics 1, no. 1 (2019): 92–165. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cap.2019.0007.

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49

Gallarotti, Giulio M. "Toward a business-cycle model of tariffs." International Organization 39, no. 1 (1985): 155–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300004896.

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A modified interest-group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations. This model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations: the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Empirical analysis lends strong support to the model's central thesis, that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle. Tariff changes occurring in the three nations, with the exception of British tariff increases, generally conform to the expectations of the model. Furthermore, business-cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives, those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability.

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Cull, N. J. "Review: Twisting the Lion's Tail: Anglophobia in the United States 1921-48 * John E. Moser: Twisting the Lion's Tail: Anglophobia in the United States 1921-48." Twentieth Century British History 13, no. 3 (March 1, 2002): 316–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/13.3.316.

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