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Journal articles on the topic 'Tariff protection and poltics'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Jones, Ronald W. "Protection and the Optimal Tariff." Journal of Economic Integration 4, no. 1 (March 15, 1989): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.1989.4.1.1.

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2

Bohlin, Jan. "Tariff protection in Sweden, 1885–1914." Scandinavian Economic History Review 53, no. 2 (May 2005): 7–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03585522.2005.10414244.

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3

Magee, Christopher. "Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection." Review of International Economics 10, no. 4 (November 2002): 749–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00362.

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4

Conybeare, John A. C. "Voting for protection: an electoral model of tariff policy." International Organization 45, no. 1 (1991): 57–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300001399.

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The political economy of trade policy has largely neglected popular elections. When legislatures determine protection, politicians supply tariffs that are demanded by their constituents. A model of this political market is specified and tested with data related to the McKinley Tariff of 1890. An index of the extent to which tariff protection accrued to individual congressional districts is applied, along with demand and supply variables, to three questions: Did representatives supply tariffs to their districts as the model predicts? Did they vote in accordance with the district tariff interest in the roll-call vote on the McKinley Tariff? Did electors reward representatives for the district tariff protection in a manner consistent with a political market model? Empirical estimations based on the model provide answers that are generally affirmative and appear to be inconsistent with the traditional view that the Republican defeat in 1890 was a result of the McKinley Tariff.
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5

Miravete, Eugenio J. "Infant-industry tariff protection with pressure groups." International Journal of Industrial Organization 16, no. 6 (November 1998): 749–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00046-5.

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6

Lloyd, Peter. "100 YEARS OF TARIFF PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA." Australian Economic History Review 48, no. 2 (July 2008): 99–145. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8446.2008.00233.x.

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7

Greenaway, David. "EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 50, no. 3 (May 1, 2009): 313–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.1988.mp50003006.x.

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8

Hatzipanayotou, Panos, and Dennis Heffley. "TARIFF PROTECTION IN AN OPEN SPATIAL ECONOMY*." Journal of Regional Science 31, no. 1 (February 1991): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.1991.tb00127.x.

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9

Edwards, Terence Huw. "Tariffs, Horizontal Regulatory Standards and Protection against Foreign Competitors." Global Economy Journal 9, no. 2 (March 2009): 1850164. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1456.

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This paper focuses on a regulator's choice between setting a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) or a tariff in a linear, Cournot duopoly, where a foreign firm competes with a local rival. Where a country is free to impose a tariff, it will not impose a HTBT. Only under a limited set of circumstances will the profit-shifting effect be sufficient to lead to total exclusion of the foreign firm: in other conditions, the country will set a tariff yielding some revenue. By contrast, if tariffs are constrained by international agreement, then the importing country will set an HTBT to exclude the foreign firm if and only if tariffs are reduced below a threshold level. Trade liberalisation agreements which only cover tariffs can reduce, rather than increase global welfare.
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10

Kemal, A. R. "Effective Protection Rates - A Guide to Tariff Making." Pakistan Development Review 26, no. 4 (December 1, 1987): 775–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v26i4pp.775-785.

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Important restrictions, both tariff and non-tariff, have been the main policy instrument in implementing the import substitution industrial strategy which has been pursued by almost all the developing countries. The strategy was visualised as a means of realising higher growth of output and foreign exchange earnings, conservation of foreign exchange and stability of the economy. Efficiency in resource use and income distribution considerations did not assume much significance in the development strategy. The industrial sector of Pakistan, protected from imports through severe quantitative restrictions and even bans, suffered from inefficiencies and rigidities. However, this was realized only by the mid-Sixties when Soligo and Stern (1985), on the basis of effective protection rates reached a very startling, though not entirely correct, conclusion that in most of the industries in Pakistan, value added at world market prices was negative! . The study aroused interest in the examination of efficiency levels, both inside and outside Pakistan, through the computation of effective protection rates. These studies include among others, Balassa (1971); Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) and the NBER series on the import regime in many countries. Studies relating to effective protection in Pakistan include Soligo and Stern (1985); Lewis and GUisinger (1968); Kemal (1978); Khan (1978) and Naqvi, Kemal and Heston (1983).
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11

Walkenhorst, Peter, and Nora Dihel. "Tariff Bindings, Unused Protection and Agricultural Trade Liberalisation." OECD Economic Studies 2003, no. 1 (December 10, 2003): 231–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-v2003-art6-en.

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12

Milner, Chris. "PROTECTION BY TARIFF BARRIERS AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTION COSTS." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 52, no. 1 (February 2005): 105–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0036-9292.2005.00337.x.

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13

Carter, C. A., and W. Mooney. "Japanese Tariff Protection of Rapeseed and Soybean Processing." Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie 35, no. 2 (July 1987): 305–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7976.1987.tb02231.x.

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14

LIN, HWAN C. "TARGETED TARIFF PROTECTION, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND DEMAND INTERDEPENDENCE." International Economic Journal 10, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 25–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10168739600080010.

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15

Conlon, R. M. "An Overview of Protection of Australian Manufacturing: Past, Present and Future." Economic and Labour Relations Review 5, no. 1 (June 1994): 137–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530469400500112.

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Australia, and before Federation, the colonies, have long histories of tariff protection. However, by the end of this century tariffs for imports of most commodities will have been lowered to negligible levels. This paper briefly examines the history of the tariff and the changing structure of assistance to manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s. As the tariff has been dismantled, a variety of alternative measures have been implemented. Thus, while the ‘old’ protectionism of tariffs on imports has been discredited, a ‘new’ form of protectionism — much to do with providing assistance for exports — has arisen to at least partially take its place. The protective effects of many of these measures is far less apparent and possibly more deleterious than the tariffs they replace.
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16

Gashi, MSc Burim. "Policy of Tariff Protection in the Light of WTO Accession." ILIRIA International Review 4, no. 1 (June 30, 2014): 185. http://dx.doi.org/10.21113/iir.v4i1.60.

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Tariff rates are crucial instrument of trade policy. This paper covers several important issues related to the reforms of this area. First part of the paper explains the key features of tariffs as protection instrument: different policy takers and opposite economic interests; benefits and adverse effects; alternative measures of protection; dependence of tariff policy on the development priorities and the welfare effects, etc.This document explains main World Trade Organization requirements concerning protection policy such as primary role of tariffs, restricted set of non-tariff instruments, limited scope of safeguard measures, comparison on the legal development in the field until now, and an indication of further legislation changes necessary in the period of adjustment. It also gives main elements of the customs-reform strategy: choice and concentration of goals and priorities; criteria for preparation of the alternative scenarios; solving convergence problems; defining conditionality for alternative solutions and interdependence of relevant externalities. The goal of the paper is to give recommendation for trade policy reform in our country necessarily to become member of World Trade Organization.
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17

Choi, Kangsik, and Seonyoung Lim. "Tariff protection and port privatization: An import-competing approach." Maritime Economics & Logistics 20, no. 2 (July 15, 2016): 228–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41278-016-0004-1.

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18

Grant, Jason H., Thomas W. Hertel, and Thomas F. Rutherford. "Tariff line analysis of U.S. and international dairy protection." Agricultural Economics 37 (December 19, 2007): 271–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00251.x.

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19

Smith, Michael S. "The Méline Tariff as Social Protection: Rhetoric or Reality?" International Review of Social History 37, no. 2 (August 1992): 230–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020859000111149.

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20

FOURIE, F. C. v. N., and A. SMITH. "Concentration, Tariff Protection and Industrial Performance in South Africa." South African Journal of Economics 61, no. 3 (September 1993): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1813-6982.1993.tb01215.x.

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21

Stanley, Tony. "‘Our tariff will rise’: Risk, probabilities and child protection." Health, Risk & Society 15, no. 1 (February 2013): 67–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698575.2012.753416.

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22

Kinzius, Luisa, Alexander Sandkamp, and Erdal Yalcin. "Trade protection and the role of non-tariff barriers." Review of World Economics 155, no. 4 (January 29, 2019): 603–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10290-019-00341-6.

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23

Yang, Quanfa, and Liyun Cheng. "Import tariff, intellectual property right protection and foreign merger." Economic Modelling 25, no. 6 (November 2008): 1225–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2008.04.002.

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24

Kuenzel, David J. "WTO tariff commitments and temporary protection: Complements or substitutes?" European Economic Review 121 (January 2020): 103344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103344.

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25

Switzer, Stephanie. "ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: A LEGAL AND APPROPRIATE LINKAGE?" International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57, no. 1 (January 2008): 113–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589308000055.

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AbstractThis article will question the legality of measures of environmental ‘conditionality’ in the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] of the European Community [EC].1 The GSP is a GATT/WTO2 authorized scheme which permits developed nations to grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences in favour of developing countries.3 The objectives of the GSP are primarily development-oriented in that it aims to increase the export earnings of developing countries, promote their industrialization and accelerate rates of economic growth.4 A recent case taken in the WTO examined the legal contours of the grant of tariff preferences and it is in the light of this that this article will examine the so-called ‘special incentive arrangements’ of the reformed EC GSP which offers additional tariff preferences to developing countries on the ‘condition’ that they adhere to specified standards of environmental protection.
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26

Heo, Yoon, and Tran N. Kien. "The Political Economy of Tariff Formation in Vietnam." International Studies Review 12, no. 1 (October 15, 2011): 33–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01201002.

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Using a simultaneous equation model of tariffs and impurts, this paper empirically investigates the determinants of tariff rates applied in Vietnam using two-digit ISIC data over the 2001-2006 period. This paper extends the findings of previous studies in Several ways. First, there has been no study thus far conducted that has attempted to apply the endogenous theory of tariffs to explain tariff formation in developing countries, including Vietnam. Second, imports and trade protection are simultaneously modeled using the two-stage least square estimator. Third, this study employed an up-to-date panel dataset that was recently made available in Vietnam, which allowed us to measure the dynamic interactions among trade flows. industry characteristics, and trade protection. The results of this paper showed that tariffs are frequently high in industries with a small number of firms, large employment size, low import penetration, low industry growth rate, and less capital stock. Therefore, the findings of our study on Vietnam provide further evidence favoring the theory of endogenous protection.
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27

Edmonds, Eric V., Nina Pavcnik, and Petia Topalova. "Trade Adjustment and Human Capital Investments: Evidence from Indian Tariff Reform." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 42–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.2.4.42.

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Does trade policy influence schooling and child labor in low-income countries? We examine this question in the context of India's 1991 tariff reforms. While schooling increased and child labor declined in rural India in the 1990s, these trends are attenuated in districts with employment concentrated in industries losing tariff protection. As the loss of protection causes a relative rise in poverty in affected districts, families reduce schooling to save schooling costs. Girls disproportionately bear the burden of helping their families cope with poverty. (JEL F13, F16, I21, J13, J82, O15, O19)
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28

Bond, Eric W., and Stephen E. Guisinger. "Investment Incentives as Tariff Substitutes: A Comprehensive Measure of Protection." Review of Economics and Statistics 67, no. 1 (February 1985): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1928438.

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29

Weber, William V., Jannett K. Highfill, and Deanne Short. "Tariff protection and workforce gender: Evidence from U.S. manufacturing industries." Atlantic Economic Journal 24, no. 2 (June 1996): 155–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02299005.

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30

THOMPSON, ANDREW S. "TARIFF REFORM: AN IMPERIAL STRATEGY, 1903–1913." Historical Journal 40, no. 4 (December 1997): 1033–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x97007565.

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Historians of the Edwardian tariff reform movement have disagreed about its aims. This article examines the motivations of the leadership of the Tariff Reform League, which was by far the most influential organization in the tariff lobby. It argues that the League's leaders were more empire-minded than often allowed, and that it was the preferential tariff which they were most determined to promulgate and defend. Indeed, attempts by the Balfourite wing of the Unionist party to twist tariff reform away from its imperial origins were strongly resisted by the League, and the forces of protection within the organization were also carefully controlled. When the Tariff Reform League finally gave way on the issue of imperial preference in January 1913, it was not because it had suddenly ceased to be concerned about the unity of the empire. Rather, the widespread public hostility to the imposition of food duties showed no sign of diminishing, thus making it difficult to persuade a critical mass within the Unionist party that tariff reform was a politically viable strategy of imperial federation.
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31

Hutchinson, William K. "Import Substitution, Structural Change, and Regional Economic Growth in the United States: The Northeast, 1870–1910." Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (June 1985): 319–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002205070003401x.

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This article uses data on regional output and imports to examine the relationship between imports and regional growth in the Northeast. The tariff rates, both nominal and effective, are considered as evidence of national policy that may have benefited this particular region. The findings are that particular industries do benefit from tariff protection, but their location is due to regional resource advantages.
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32

Irwin, Douglas A. "Tariff Incidence in America's Gilded Age." Journal of Economic History 67, no. 3 (September 2007): 582–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050707000241.

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In the late nineteenth century, the United States imposed high tariffs to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition. This article examines the magnitude of protection given to import-competing producers and the costs imposed on export-oriented producers by focusing on changes in the domestic prices of traded goods relative to nontraded goods. The results suggest that the 30 percent average import tariff gave about a 17 percent implicit subsidy to import-competing producers and effectively taxed exporters at about 10 percent. Tariffs redistributed large amounts of income (about 8 percent of GDP), but the effect on consumers was roughly neutral.
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33

PERES-CAJÍAS, JOSÉ ALEJANDRO. "Bolivian Tariff Policy during the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: High Average Tariff and Unbalanced Regional Protection." Journal of Latin American Studies 49, no. 3 (October 24, 2016): 433–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x16001796.

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AbstractThis article demonstrates that Bolivian tariff policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not as passive as previously assumed and that the average tariff ratio remained high. However, high average tariffs coexisted for a long time with free-entry rights for different products which represented the main economic activity of certain Bolivian regions. Furthermore, the competitiveness of products was sometimes mostly determined by the geographic fragmentation of the country and the uneven pattern of railway construction rather by than tariffs. Therefore, beyond its high average level, the protectionist effect of tariffs was sometimes constrained by institutional and geographical restrictions.
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34

Lloyd, Peter. "The Evolution of Tariff Protection and Wage Protection in the Late Colonies and Early Federation." Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy 36, no. 4 (July 20, 2017): 459–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1759-3441.12183.

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35

Bopage, Lionel, and Kishor Sharma. "Trade Liberalization and Productivity Performance: Evidence from the Australian Passenger Motor Vehicle Industry." Global Economy Journal 14, no. 03n04 (September 25, 2014): 467–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/gej-2014-0001.

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This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the effects of trade liberalization on productivity performance of the Australian passenger motor vehicle industry, which has experienced significant liberalization over the years. Our analysis indicates that trade liberalization had a negative impact on productivity growth, at least in the immediate post-liberalization period. Empirical results suggest that economies of scale and tariff protection improve productivity, while industry assistance (such as the local content and duty drawback schemes and production subsidies) retards productivity. Policy implications of these findings are that there are dividends in terms of improved productivity by encouraging economies of scale, providing tariff protection and lowering industry assistance.
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36

Terrill, Thomas E., and Joseph F. Kenkel. "Progressives and Protection: The Search for a Tariff Policy, 1866-1936." American Historical Review 90, no. 5 (December 1985): 1278. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1859833.

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37

Kabiraj, Tarun, and Sugata Marjit. "Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer." European Economic Review 47, no. 1 (February 2003): 113–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00208-8.

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38

Acharyya, Joysri. "On the Equivalence of Content Protection Scheme and X-equivalent Tariff." Foreign Trade Review 51, no. 1 (February 2016): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0015732515614435.

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39

Marino, Andrea U. "Growth and Welfare Implications of Tariff Protection―Location Versus Allocation Effects." Journal of Economic Integration 35, no. 4 (December 15, 2020): 609–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2020.35.4.609.

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40

Niu, Zhaohui, Chang Liu, Saileshsingh Gunessee, and Chris Milner. "Non-tariff and overall protection: evidence across countries and over time." Review of World Economics 154, no. 4 (May 9, 2018): 675–703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10290-018-0317-5.

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41

Joson, S. S. "Substitutability of “buy local” policy for tariff protection in small economies." Journal of Policy Modeling 8, no. 2 (June 1986): 223–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0161-8938(86)90026-8.

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42

Kawahara, Shinya. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Environmental Protection with Unilateral Tariff Reduction." Environmental and Resource Economics 57, no. 1 (April 23, 2013): 41–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9658-7.

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43

Crivelli, Pramila. "Regionalism and falling external protection in high and low tariff members." Journal of International Economics 102 (September 2016): 70–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.06.001.

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44

Johan, Eva. "NEW CHALLENGES IN ASEAN REGIONAL MARKET: INTERNATIONAL TRADE FRAMEWORK ON HALAL STANDARD." Jurnal Dinamika Hukum 18, no. 1 (January 31, 2018): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.20884/1.jdh.2018.18.1.809.

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The use of non-tariff protection increased during 1980s. One of Non-tariff measures which have been deployed by countries is safety and health standards/technical specifications. In many Muslim countries, Halal standard has essential part in protecting consumer rights. National labeling laws must seek a balance between labeling requirements and certification to minimize barriers to the free trade. The problem is every nation has own Halal Standard. This could result trade dispute among parties since import product cannot enter local market based on different Halal Standard. This situation remains as non-tariff barriers to free trade. By capturing the differences of Halal Standard in some ASEAN countries, the result shows some challenges rise for ASEAN to create one unified Halal Standard framework in order to gain strong ASEAN single market in the future. Keywords: non-tariff barriers, halal, standard, international trade.
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45

Belko, William S. "“A TAX ON THE MANY, TO ENRICH A FEW”: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY VS. THE PROTECTIVE TARIFF." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 37, no. 2 (June 2015): 277–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837215000097.

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The core concepts underlying Jacksonian Democracy—equal protection of the laws; an aversion to a moneyed aristocracy, exclusive privileges, and monopolies, and a predilection for the common man; majority rule; and the welfare of the community over the individual—have long been defined almost exclusively by the Bank War, which commenced in earnest with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. Yet, this same rhetoric proved far more pervasive and consistent when one considers the ardent opposition to the protective system. Opponents of the protective tariff, commencing with the Tariff of 1816 and continuing unabated to the Walker Tariff of 1846, thus contributed directly to the development of Jacksonian Democracy, and, by introducing and continually employing this language, gave to the tariff debates in the United States a unique angle that differed from the debates in Europe.
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46

Pond, Amy. "Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection." Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 5 (August 6, 2015): 1073–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002715596777.

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How do the distributional consequences of economic sanctions impact future trade policy? Regardless of whether sanctions are effective in achieving concessions, sanctions restrict international trade flows, creating rents for import-competing producers, who are protected from international competition. These rents can then be used to pressure the government to implement protectionist policies. Thus, while the lifting of sanctions directly facilitates some international transactions, sanctions also have an indirect effect. They create powerful domestic interest groups in the sanctioned country who seek market protection. I use multiple estimators to evaluate the effect of trade sanctions on tariff rates. The evidence is consistent with the argument that sanctions increase market protection in both the short and long run.
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47

Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. "The Structure of Tariff Protection: Effects of Foreign Tariffs and Existing NTBs." Review of Economics and Statistics 67, no. 4 (November 1985): 539. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1924797.

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48

Choi, Jung-Sup, and Daniel A. Sumner. "Opening Markets while Maintaining Protection: Tariff Rate Quotas in Korea and Japan." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 29, no. 1 (April 2000): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500001477.

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As the result of Uruguay Round negotiations, Korea and Japan established tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for agricultural imports. Both countries allocate the TRQs with various methods that show different fill rates and welfare implications. The state trading enterprises play important roles in TRQ administration in both countries. The TRQs contributed to increased imports. However, the transparency and commercial consideration in administering the TRQs remain a concern and the access for some commodities seems to be less open than would be the case if quota amounts were made available on a purely commercial basis.
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49

Juarez, Telleria, and Boubaker Dhehibi. "The Moroccan wheat sector: What if there is no more tariff protection?" Asian Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development 7, no. 4 (April 2017): 65–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.18488/journal.1005/2017.7.4/1005.4.65.85.

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50

Gaasland, Ivar, and Erling Vardal. "Tariff or quota protection-a case study of the Norwegian apple market." Applied Economics 30, no. 7 (July 1998): 951–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/000368498325381.

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