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Journal articles on the topic 'Takeovers'
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1
McDonald, Anthony D., Hananeh Alambeigi, Johan Engström, Gustav Markkula, Tobias Vogelpohl, Jarrett Dunne, and Norbert Yuma. "Toward Computational Simulations of Behavior During Automated Driving Takeovers: A Review of the Empirical and Modeling Literatures." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 4 (March 4, 2019): 642–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720819829572.
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Objective: This article provides a review of empirical studies of automated vehicle takeovers and driver modeling to identify influential factors and their impacts on takeover performance and suggest driver models that can capture them. Background: Significant safety issues remain in automated-to-manual transitions of vehicle control. Developing models and computer simulations of automated vehicle control transitions may help designers mitigate these issues, but only if accurate models are used. Selecting accurate models requires estimating the impact of factors that influence takeovers. Method: Articles describing automated vehicle takeovers or driver modeling research were identified through a systematic approach. Inclusion criteria were used to identify relevant studies and models of braking, steering, and the complete takeover process for further review. Results: The reviewed studies on automated vehicle takeovers identified several factors that significantly influence takeover time and post-takeover control. Drivers were found to respond similarly between manual emergencies and automated takeovers, albeit with a delay. The findings suggest that existing braking and steering models for manual driving may be applicable to modeling automated vehicle takeovers. Conclusion: Time budget, repeated exposure to takeovers, silent failures, and handheld secondary tasks significantly influence takeover time. These factors in addition to takeover request modality, driving environment, non-handheld secondary tasks, level of automation, trust, fatigue, and alcohol significantly impact post-takeover control. Models that capture these effects through evidence accumulation were identified as promising directions for future work. Application: Stakeholders interested in driver behavior during automated vehicle takeovers may use this article to identify starting points for their work.
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Enriques, Luca. "European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach." European Business Law Review 22, Issue 5 (October 1, 2011): 623–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2011031.
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This article argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante which kind they are. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers' and block-holders' incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies should be able to decide how contestable their control should be. After showing that the current EU legal framework for takeovers overall hinders takeover activity in the EU, the paper identifies three rationales for a takeover-neutral intervention of the EU in the area of takeover regulation (pre-emption of "takeover-hostile," protectionist national regulations, opt-out rules protecting shareholders vis-à-vis managers' and dominant shareholders' opportunism in takeover contexts, and menu rules helping individual companies define their degree of control contestability) and provides examples of rules that may respond to such rationales.
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Song, Guoxiang. "Large US bank takeovers in 2008: performance and implications." Journal of Capital Markets Studies 6, no. 1 (October 26, 2021): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcms-06-2021-0021.
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PurposeBecause systemically important banks' takeovers in the US were expected to contain the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) but were found to have imposed large cost on shareholders, this paper examines the effectiveness of these acquisitions during the GFC and investigates what went wrong with the market for corporate control of large banks.Design/methodology/approachThis paper presents a model of the disciplinary takeover based on the efficient market hypothesis which provides appropriate measures for it to examine the financial performance of acquiring banks after takeover.FindingsThe results indicate that the takeover market for large banks was ineffective in two aspects: the market did not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the crisis and acquirers performed worse after takeover. Such ineffectiveness reflects the fundamental deficiencies of large bank takeovers arising from some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.Research limitations/implicationsThe sample size of systemically important banks' takeovers is small so large-sample standard statistical inferences cannot be used.Practical implicationsThe deficiencies of large bank takeovers need to be rectified in order to aid in resolving future crises.Originality/valueThis paper provides rare and detailed insight based on case studies of large US bank takeovers during the GFC.
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Pandey, Ajay. "Takeover Announcements, Open Offers, and Shareholders' Returns in Target Firms." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 26, no. 3 (July 2001): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920010304.
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The empirical studies in the context of developed countries have consistently pointed out substantial valuation gains for target firms, particularly in case of successful takeovers. This effect has been "found to be higher for tender offers compared to mergers and proxy contests, the other forms of plays in the market for corporate control. Subsequent to enactment of takeover enabling regulations in 1997 in India, takeovers and substantial acquisition of shares necessitate making open offer to the investors. Based on the empirical investigation of 14 large (above Rs 10 crore) takeover related open offers using event study methodology, we document significant announcement effect (» 10%) associated with the takeovers in Indian capital market. We also find that the target firm valuations increase in the runup to announcement. However, unlike developed countries, substantial part of these gains are wiped out subsequently indicating that valuation gains associated with takeovers in large part reflect private value of control, expected to be high in the Indian context The fact that only one large open offer (out of 16 in all) was associated with an attempted unsuccessful hostile takeover bid suggests that given relatively large insiders' shareholdings, takeovers as governance mechanisms are not likely to be effective and private value of control may be the driver in the market for
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Costa, Eduardo, and Ana Marques. "Corporate governance and takeovers: Insights from past research and suggestions for future research." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 3 (2009): 211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c1p5.
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This paper reviews the literature on the association between corporate governance and takeovers. It approaches takeovers as an effective external corporate governance mechanism. The main conclusions to be drawn is that although the mere threat of an active market for corporate control may be positively correlated with good internal governance, takeovers will always take place independently of good internal corporate governance by targets and that managerial ownership is crucial for a favorable shareholder outcome in a takeover event. We believe future research on corporate boards, cross-national takeovers and managers of bidding firms would be of great interest
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Pasetha, Andre, Lisa Michelle Danish, Dyah Perwitasari-Farajallah, Muhammad Agil, and Antje Engelhardt. "Identification of Follower Status Based on Male Proximity Score in Crested Macaque." HAYATI Journal of Biosciences 27, no. 3 (July 1, 2020): 241. http://dx.doi.org/10.4308/hjb.27.3.241.
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Crested macaque live in multimale-multifemale social groups where temporary association (consortship) typically occurs. Current theory and these limited qualitative observations suggest the hypothesis that behavior functions as a means for males to gain access to fertile females. The aim of this study was to investigate follower status based on quantitative method. Males were classified as either “consort males,” “followers,” and “non-followers” based on proximity maintanance every 15 minute uses scan sampling. Tactics used by followers were classified into 1) individual challenge, 2) coalitionary challenge, 3) abandoned takeover, and 4) opportunistic takeover. The proportion of successful takeovers by followers was calculated by dividing the number of takeovers by followers by the total number of observed takeovers. The proportion of followers is higher than average on D-5 and earlier, D-4, and D-3. Only two of the four consort takeover tactics were used by followers. For abandoned which made up 40% and for individual tactic was made up to 11.5% of consort takeovers tactic used. This study contribute to our understanding of alternative mating strategy in primate and provide the first quantitative data demonstrating that following is an alternative mating strategy in crested macaque (Macaca nigra).
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Tidar, Maria Ulfah, and Kurnia Toha. "Public Listed Companies Takeovers Comparison Under Indonesian and Malaysian Law." YURISDIKSI : Jurnal Wacana Hukum dan Sains 18, no. 3 (December 30, 2022): 371–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.55173/yurisdiksi.v18i3.156.
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The current condition of business competion is getting tighter. This causes the company to compete to maintain its existence. One way to do that is by restructuring the company. Takeover is one type of corporate restructuring. Takeover is a legal action carried out by a legal entity or individual to take over company shares resulting in a transfer of control over the company. The purpose of this legal research is to increase knowledge in the field of public listed companies takeovers based on Indonesian and Malaysian Law which can be benefit to legal practitioners. This research is a normative legal research using statutory and comparative approach. The data used in this research is secondary data. The results of the study are a public listed company that undertakes a takeover in not only subject to the laws and regulations regarding limited liability companies, but also must comply with the provisions of the capital market laws and regulation. After the takeover process occurs, the expropriating party must carry out a mandatory tender offer process. There are differences in terms of public listed companies takeover process between Indonesian and Malaysian Law including the requirements to become a new controller, minority shareholder rights, and takeover’s impact regulation on business competition.
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Kini, Omesh, William Kracaw, and John J. McConnell. "Corporate Takeovers And Interest Rates." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 7, no. 3 (October 19, 2011): 62. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v7i3.6228.
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This study analyzes the effect of corporate takeover announcements on the volatility of interest rate changes and on the level of interest rates over the period 1962 through 1984. The findings suggest that intercorporate takeovers increase the volatility of interest rate changes over this period. Because the increase in volatility is concentrated around the announcement of cash takeovers, the results imply that it is the mode of financing, rather than takeovers, per se, that is important of credit markets.
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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak. "Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston." American Economic Review 106, no. 7 (July 1, 2016): 1878–920. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150479.
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Charter takeovers are traditional public schools restarted as charter schools. We develop a grandfathering instrument for takeover attendance that compares students at schools designated for takeover with a matched sample of students attending similar schools not yet taken over. Grandfathering estimates from New Orleans show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned charter seats in lotteries. A non-charter Boston turnaround intervention that had much in common with the takeover strategy generated gains as large as those seen for takeovers, while other more modest turnaround interventions yielded smaller effects. (JEL D44, H75, I21, I28)
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Hawk, Keith, and Kumar Chittipeddi. "Assessing The Long-Term Impact Of Hostile Takeovers." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 6, no. 2 (October 24, 2011): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v6i2.6308.
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This paper has attempted to review the hostile takeover phenomenon by casting the arguments for and against such takeovers in an objective framework. The paper also relies on empirical data on the long term impact of hostile takeovers gathered from firms that were taken over successfully. The authors have concluded that the hostile takeover phenomenon is minuscule in terms of the larger merger and acquisitions activity, and that it has beneficial consequences even though the loss of jobs is inevitably painful.
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Jovanovic, Boyan, and Serguey Braguinsky. "Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers." American Economic Review 94, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 46–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282804322970698.
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On news of a takeover, the sum of the stock market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.
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Dullard, Stuart, and Kim Hawtrey. "Disciplinary Corporate Takeovers: Evidence for Australia." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 15, no. 03 (September 2012): 1250018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021909151250018x.
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This paper tests the relationship between takeovers and poor management performance, known as the market discipline hypothesis. We create a proprietary new Australian dataset for this study by individually researching company reports for executive retention data. We assess takeover targets for pre-bid managerial inefficiency and find evidence that Australian target companies exhibit negative abnormal returns prior to takeover. In particular, we find that disciplinary targets underperform their non-disciplinary counterparts. Our tests take into account the difference between friendly and hostile takeovers, and the industry sector in which the target firm operates.
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Arzac, Martin G. "Takeovers and Equity Derivatives." American Economist 42, no. 1 (March 1998): 101–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/056943459804200112.
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This paper examines the use of equity derivatives in takeovers. The equilibrium model developed here shows that allowing the bidder to purchase equity derivatives on the target prior to the announcement of a takeover bid unequivocally increases the bid's probability, of success. The resulting propositions have major implications for takeover regulation, economic efficiency, and general social welfare, as the benefits of regulating the use of equity derivatives in acquisitions may not exceed the costs.
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Welsh, Richard O. "Recovery, Achievement, and Opportunity: A Comparative Analysis of State Takeover Districts in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia." Urban Education 54, no. 3 (September 26, 2018): 311–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042085918801884.
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Although state-run turnaround districts have grown in prominence as a school improvement strategy with significant equity implications for urban education, little is known about the similarities and differences across states. This article provides a comparative analysis of state-run takeover districts in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia. Although there are several similarities such as the centrality of test-based accountability and charter schools as an intervention strategy, no two state takeover districts are the same. The effectiveness of state takeovers is mixed and complicated by equity concerns as well as uncertainty about which aspect of state takeovers may be driving school improvement.
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Allen, D. E., and A. Soongswang. "Post-Takeover Effects on Thai Bidding Firms: Are Takeovers in the Bidder's Interests?" Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 09, no. 04 (December 2006): 509–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091506000847.
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This paper analyses takeover effects on the Thai stock market in terms of their impact on the bidding firms' shareholders. We apply a comprehensive analysis of shareholder wealth effects using multiple methods. Our results conform with prior studies: see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Agrawal and Jaffe (1999), Bruner (2002) and Campa and Hernando (2004). Thai takeovers result in significant negative abnormal returns over the sixteen months after the takeover. The abnormal returns, variously defined, vary from -4% to -6%, and -0.20% (monthly) for the bidding firm's shareholders. Thai takeovers do not appear to add to bidding firms' shareholder wealth.
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Dignam, Alan. "The globalisation of General Principle 7: transforming the market for corporate control in Australia and Europe?" Legal Studies 28, no. 1 (March 2008): 96–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2007.00076.x.
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The integration of national financial markets over the past 30 years has resulted in a globalised market for corporate control which has increased both the opportunities for companies to fund acquisitions and the possibility of being acquired. Takeovers and mergers have, as a result, become a matter of some concern for governments, as they try to encourage the development of financial markets but also deal with the consequences of a globalised market for corporate control, where even companies regarded as national champions are within the reach of a foreign takeover. In the course of the last decade General Principle No 7 of the UK Takeover Code, that shareholders should decide the outcome of a takeover bid, has been adopted in many jurisdictions around the world and has formed the heart of the EU Directive on Takeovers. The Principle is however a controversial one, as its adoption is often viewed in civil law jurisdictions as an attack on a core part of a social market system. This has been particularly evident in the debate on the EU Directive on Takeovers. A number of common law heritage countries have also based their takeover regime around General Principle No 7 and many of these common law heritage counties have similarities with social market systems, in that they have less significant stock exchanges than the UK, the make up of their shareholding base is more concentrated and employment protections are more extensive. A central jurisdiction in that overlap is Australia, with exactly this combination. The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical effect of introducing UK takeover principles into the Australian system, by creating an empirical data set of takeovers of Australian listed companies covering the period before and after those UK-based principles were introduced. In doing so the paper found that factors such as concentrated ownership, capital controls and protective labour law have significant effects on the market for corporate control. There was no transforming effect evident in adopting an anti-managerial pro-shareholder takeover regime. As such, the fear that the adoption of a standardised EU-wide takeover Directive, along the lines of the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers' shareholder-oriented General Principle 7, would have a negative transforming effect on social market systems appears, on the Australian evidence, to be overblown, while other key features of such systems, particularly concentrated ownership and protective labour laws, remain in place.
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Dugan, Robert. "Law, Economics and the Draft Takeovers Code." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 26, no. 1 (February 1, 1996): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v26i1.6178.
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In August 1995, the Government announced that it would defer a decision whether to adopt the draft Takeovers Code that had been formulated and recommended by the Takeovers Panel pursuant to s 19 of the Takeovers Act 1993. This announcement culminates, at least for the time being, almost a decade of intense and sometimes acrimonious controversy over the regulation of takeovers in New Zealand. Economics-based arguments figured in the run up to the legislation, within the legislation itself, in the formulation of the Code and in the debate about its merits. After a review of the background and the principal features of the draft Code, this article considers the main issues in the law and economics debate that preceded the Government's decision. The author argues that the Government's decision to defer action on the Draft Code can likely be attributed to the "law and economics" opposition to takeovers regulation and the Code itself. The article concludes that both law and economic components were flawed: the legal component (i.e. that there are already existing companies legislation and listing requirements) ignores the fact that takeover regimes fill a regulatory gap, and the economic component (i.e. that the cost of takeovers will increase) fail to consider the total effect of an arrangement.
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FELL, DAFYDD. "Merger and Takeover Attempts in Taiwanese Party Politics." Issues & Studies 53, no. 04 (December 2017): 1750010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1013251117500102.
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Taiwan has experienced a number of party splits and attempted mergers since democratization. These have played a critical role in the development of the country’s party system. While a number of studies have looked at the emergence of Taiwan’s splinter parties, party mergers have not received academic attention. This study aims to systematically examine the process of party mergers and takeovers. We examine four cases of attempted mergers and takeovers. In each case, we focus the analysis around three core questions: (1) How should we best classify the actual outcomes? (2) How we can best explain the variation in outcomes? (3) How can we assess the success of merger/takeover attempts? Unlike earlier studies, we examine a variety of merger outcomes rather than just successful cases. In addition to mergers, we propose the terms negotiated takeovers and hostile takeovers. Our classification scheme is based on relative party power and the inter-party relationship. To explain the variation in outcome, we applied a framework stressing the interplay of contextual, inter-party and inner-party factors. We found key contextual variables were electoral results, relative party sizes and the electoral system. The most important inter-party variables were ideological proximity and inter-party trust following successful cooperation. Lastly, the inner-party balance of power was also critical, particularly, the strength of leaders with favorable attitudes toward the merger project. We assess the success and failure of merger/takeover attempts with reference to election results, post-merger party unity and whether the post-takeover relationship was cooperative.
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Belayeva, I. Yu, O. V. Danilova, and K. V. Uskov. "Takeover as a Form of Corporate Conflict and the Process of Transfer of Stock Ownership’s Rights." SHS Web of Conferences 91 (2021): 01001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20219101001.
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The article considers the problem of corporate conflicts in the Russian practice of corporate relations in the joint-stock companies. Today, corporate relations are changing, the role of intangible resources is growing, and a 100% share in the company capital does not always guarantee control over the company. In this regard, the range of ways to acquire corporate control is expanding. The purpose of the article is to develop a classification of the methods of joint stock companies takeovers. The proposed classification differs from existing classifications by differentiating takeover methods according to the criterion “takeover tool used by the takeover initiator”. The use of this classification by companies in the development of protective mechanisms against takeovers will make it possible to choose the most appropriate and effective protective measures in a particular situation and thereby avoid some corporate conflicts.
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Lee, Joseph. "Striking a Fair Balance in UK Takeover Law: Market Interests, Power of Regulation, and Enforcement." European Business Law Review 28, Issue 6 (December 1, 2017): 829–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2017044.
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In this article, the author identifies the main characteristics of the UK takeover regulatory regime, which is unique compared to other models in advanced capital markets. The principal values of the Takeover Code, the functional constitution of the Takeover Panel, the expertise-based approach to enforcement, and the minimal intervention of the judiciary help strike a fair balance among various market interests. With this model, minority shareholder’s engagement, employee’s participation, and public interest in market integrity have been addressed within the principle-based investor primacy while not destabilising the UK market for corporate control because of incumbent shareholder litigation and other regulatory actions. Of many rules, the disclosure requirement is being used to target various areas prone to abuse such as stake-building, virtual bid, deal protection arrangement, and post-takeover behaviour. The UK market has faced many cross-border takeovers and is competing with other major financial markets for corporate listings, this model has so far proven to be a resilient best market standard for takeovers.
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Varian, Hal R. "Symposium on Takeovers." Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (February 1, 1988): 3–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.3.
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Of the hundred largest mergers and acquisitions on record up to 1984, 65 occurred between 1981 and 1983, and only 11 occurred prior to 1979. During the 1981-84 period, there were at least 45 transactions of over a billion dollars apiece; prior to this period there were only a dozen or so transactions of such magnitude. What is the meaning of this “merger mania?” Why did it occur so suddenly? Is the wave of takeovers merely a speculative bubble, or is it motivated by fundamental economic conditions? What can we expect in the future? What policy responses, if any, are appropriate in light of this explosion of takeover activity? The papers in this symposium offer four perspectives on takeover activities.
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Liu, Kai, and Heng Li. "Legal Supervision of Audit Practice in Corporate Takeovers." Jurnal Undang-undang dan Masyarakat 30 (May 1, 2022): 39–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17576/juum-2022-30-04.
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Auditing services are active throughout corporate takeover process. Audit issues not only affect the nature, efficiency and consequences of takeovers, but also matter the quality and social effects of corporate development after the successful reorganization. This paper aims to enhance the audit quality in the takeover process, and further improve the structure, productivity and social responsibility of takeover parties. Qualitative analysis method and case study are adopted in this paper to investigate the legal issues on audit involved in the takeover process, and explores their fundamental reasons and negative effects on the development of companies and society. This paper finds that since the acquiring companies need to master the comprehensive information of target companies, they incline to choose the audit firms associated with the target companies. Those firms have the opportunity to collude with the target companies and may damage the takeover performance by hiding decision-making power or even falsifying financial data1. In addition, in order to defeat other potential competitors, acquiring companies need to review the financial records and assess the key personnel of target companies within a limited time. They may miss out some technical issues of corporate governance at the stage of pre-takeover due diligence.2 Therefore, this paper suggests that takeover parties adopt shared audit. As the information intermediary, shared audit could effectively eliminate the illegal acts caused by the collusion among auditors and auditees, convey accurate information and promote higher-quality takeovers.
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Jack, Katharine, and Linda Marie Fedigan. "The Demographic and Reproductive Context of Male Replacements in Cebus Capucinus." Behaviour 141, no. 6 (2004): 755–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568539042245178.
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AbstractMale primates may immigrate into groups by peacefully joining the residents and taking up low-ranking positions in the hierarchy, or they may enter by force, challenging the resident males and attempting to drive them from high rank or from the group. Here we address the questions of how, when, and why immigrating male white-faced capuchins (C. capucinus) at Santa Rosa replace the former resident males of our groups, rather than simply joining them. We present data on 15 male replacements in 6 study groups tracked from 1984 through March 2004. During 11 aggressive takeovers, resident males were nearly always outnumbered by coalitions of invading males; lone resident males were particularly vulnerable. Both residents and invaders were wounded and infants often perished during or soon after takeovers. Male replacements also occur when resident males abandon their groups and males from neighboring groups 'waltz in' to become resident. Three such 'waltz in' replacements occurred during the study period. If we combine takeovers with 'waltz in' cases, replacements occur about every 4 years in our study groups, almost invariably during the dry season months of January to April, about 3-6 months before the annual peak in conceptions. In the years that groups are subject to takeovers, group composition includes significantly lower proportions of adult males than in no-takeover years. We conclude that: (1) the mechanism of male replacement is usually aggressive takeover, but sometimes abandonment of the group by prior resident males occurs; and (2) aggressive takeovers are more likely to happen when the group is vulnerable because it has a lower proportion of adult males, particularly when all co-resident males have emigrated, leaving only the alpha male in residence. Our long-term study shows that adult males need coalition partners not only to gain entry to a group but also to maintain their membership within it.
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Ali, Ruhani, and G. S. Gupta. "Motivation and Outcome of Malaysian Takeovers: An International Perspective." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 24, no. 3 (July 1999): 41–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090919990306.
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This paper examines the potential motives and effects of corporate takeovers that occurred in Malaysia during the period 1980 through 1993. The Mueller's methodology, which has been adopted for Australia, USA, UK, and five European countries, is employed in order to provide an analysis of the Malaysian takeovers on an international perspective. The findings indicate that the Malaysian takeovers were motivated by size, growth, and profit considerations, and supported by the desire of having a balanced leverage, thus favouring the eclectic theory of takeovers. In terms of the outcomes, the paper finds that the acquiring firms have achieved larger size at the expense of reduced profits both for themselves and the acquired firms. In contrast to other countries, the bidder firms in Malaysia, in general, have lower profitability, higher risk, and lower leverage vis-a-vis the control bidder firms. Also, in Malaysia, the target firms have significantly better pre-takeover growth and profit performance than the control target firms, which is quite the opposite in other countries.
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Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process." Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (February 1, 1988): 7–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.7.
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Like the rest of us, corporate managers have many personal goals and ambitions, only one of which is to get rich. The way they try to run their companies reflects these personal goals. Shareholders, in contrast, deprived of the pleasures of running the company, only care about getting rich from the stock they own. The takeover wave of the 1980s put the managershareholder conflict to a new test. Where other checks on management failed, hostile takeovers could now wrest control from managers who ignored the interests of their shareholders. More so than ever before, fear of such disciplinary takeovers has forced managers to listen to shareholder wishes. But even now, many acquisitions are not of this disciplinary variety. Ironically, making acquisitions is often just the quickest and easiest way for managers to expand the scope of their control by directing the firm's cash flows into new ventures. In this paper, we appraise the acquisition process from the managerial perspective. Has the pressure brought by hostile takeovers effectively restricted non-value-maximizing conduct by managers? Are acquisitions themselves driven by non-value-maximizing behavior on the part of acquiring managers? We conclude with some recommendations for improving the takeover process.
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Mallikarjunappa, T., and Panduranga Nayak. "A Study of Wealth Effects of Takeover Announcements in India on Target Company Shareholders." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 38, no. 3 (July 2013): 23–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920130303.
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The business strategy of inorganic growth is carried out by companies by resorting to actions which prominently include mergers, takeovers, and strategic alliances. There is a rapid growth of both mergers and takeovers in India subsequent to the economic liberalization. The companies consider takeover activity as the quickest means of corporate growth to enhance their size and face the domestic and global competition. In spite of several decades of vast research, researchers have not come to the final conclusion on the wealth effect of announcements of takeovers on the shareholders of participating companies. While some studies justify takeover as a socially productive activity which creates value for the shareholders, others provide contrary evidences to show that they destroy value for the shareholders. In India, only some studies have analysed the impact of M&A announcements on the stock return performance of companies involved and there is lack of evidences on wealth effects on shareholders. Therefore, this paper assesses the impact of takeover announcement on the stock price performance of target companies by taking a sample of 227 companies which received takeover bids during 1998–2007. The stock price reaction is examined for a period of 61 days surrounding the bid announcement day employing standard market model. BSE- 200 index is used as a proxy for the market. The regression co-efficient and the constant terms are estimated over a period of 250 days (-280 to -31) and the statistical significance of the results of the study is determined by non-standardized and standardized abnormal return methods. Both raw returns and log returns are examined. Results of the study show that target company shareholders experience substantial and statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of 27-37 percent — 37 percent when raw returns are employed and 27 percent when log returns are employed. The conclusions remain unchanged irrespective of the testing procedure used (i.e., non-standardized or standardized abnormal returns method) and even for several shorter event window periods within a broader event window of 61 days. The results for target companies are consistent with the evidence of extant research that major benefits from M&As accrue to target company shareholders. The practical implication of the study is that there is a large and significantly positive wealth effect on the target company shareholders in response to the announcement of takeovers. Takeovers offer an opportunity to shareholders of target companies and general investors to make profits both in the period before and after the announcement of the takeover bid.
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Nguyen, Duc Giang. "The endogeneity of poison pill adoption and unsolicited takeovers." International Journal of Managerial Finance 14, no. 1 (February 5, 2018): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-04-2017-0075.
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Purpose Poison pill adoption is often considered as the most effective tactic to fend off an unsolicited takeover bid. However, it is difficult to identify the deterrent effect because the adoption is naturally endogenous. The purpose of this paper is to use plausibly exogenous instruments to mitigate the endogeneity problem. Design/methodology/approach The author employs two econometric models: the linear probability model and the bivariate probit model to examine the effect of poison pills on the outcome of a takeover. Findings Using a sample of 655 unsolicited takeovers, the author finds that poison pills substantially reduce the likelihood that a takeover bid, once undesirably placed, is completed. This negative impact strongly supports the manager entrenchment hypothesis in that managers adopt poison pills to ensure the continuation of their private benefits. However, the author finds no strong evidence consistent with the shareholder interest hypothesis that poison pills enhance the management’s ability to negotiate higher premiums or reject inadequate offers. Research limitations/implications The demise of the market for unsolicited takeovers with the disappearance of poison pills can be explained by the fact that poison pills, if adopted, will have an absolute deterrent effect on the takeover likelihood of success, and targets always have the power to adopt them instantly. Practical implications There should be policies to limit the power of managers to adopt poison pills because it causes the entrenchment problem which will negatively affect the firm value. Originality/value The author tackles the problem of the endogeneity of poison pill adoptions. The author shows that poison pills have a strong negative effect on the takeover outcome and the result can explain the decreasing number of unsolicited takeovers.
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Li, Hongyi. "Current Status and Deficiencies of China's Anti-takeover Laws." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 13, no. 1 (September 13, 2023): 193–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/13/20230707.
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From reform and opening up to the current "One Belt, One Road" policy, more and more countries have started trading with China. Transactions between multinational and Chinese companies are becoming more frequent and complex, it is particularly important to control the business practices of large foreign companies in China and prevent hostile takeovers, given the coexistence of crises and interests. Anti-takeover measures and anti-takeover laws are now the main effective means of dealing with hostile takeovers worldwide. Currently, for China, which is in the process of telling development, it is very necessary to formulate anti-takeover laws and regulations in the context of frequent and complex eco-nomic activities. This article focuses on the existing domestic anti-takeover laws and regulations using the method of legal regulation analysis. It was found that the main rea-son for this is that China is at an early stage of development and has not given much attention to anti-takeover issues in the early stages. In light of this, China must add clear legal provisions to regulate anti-takeover, focus on the comprehensive combination of anti-takeover measures and anti-takeover laws, and establish relevant regulatory bodies to address the problems caused by existing legal loopholes.
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Wooldridge, Frank. "The Implementation of the Takeovers Directive in Germany." European Business Law Review 19, Issue 4 (August 1, 2008): 811–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2008040.
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An important law was enacted in Germany in 2006 implementing the requirement of the Takeovers Directive in Germany this should have been implemented by 20 May 2006, in accordance with Article 21 of the Directive, but full implementation in Germany did not take place until 1 January 2007. The new German provisions do not include the compulsory adoption of the breakthrough rule contained in Article 11 of the Takeovers Directive; the existing provisions of paragraph 33 of the German Takeovers Act of 2001 do not seem entirely in conformity with those contained in Article 9 of the Directive. Companies may adopt the new provisions of paragraph 33a (Europäisches Verhinderungs–verbot) and/or those of paragraph 33b (Europäische–Durchbrechungsregel) in their statutes, but are not bound to do so. Paragraph 33c, which like the aforementioned paragraph has been incorporated in the Takeovesr Act of 2001 by the amending statute of 2006, makes provision for the application of the reciprocity rule contained in Article 12(3) of the Takeovers Directive. The 2006 Act makes a number of alterations to the 2001 Act; a brief account of some of the more important of them is attempted below.
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Clarke, Blanaid. "Reinforcing the Market for Corporate Control." European Business Law Review 22, Issue 5 (October 1, 2011): 517–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2011028.
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The market for corporate control forms part of the basis of Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids. Article 20 of the Directive provides that the European Commission in 2011 must examine the Directive "in the light of the experience acquired in applying" it and, if necessary, propose its revision. The paper considers whether in revising the Directive, greater support should be given for the market for corporate control by counteracting the existing barriers to takeovers. In particular, the paper focuses on the barriers to takeovers which are introduced by the boards of the target companies ("offerees"), by shareholders and by derivative holders.
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Gomes, Armando. "Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage." Games 15, no. 1 (January 30, 2024): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g15010004.
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This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target’s shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show that trading allows for the entry of arbitrageurs with large blocks of shares who can hold out a freezeout—a threat that forces the bidder to offer a high preemptive bid. There is also a positive relationship between the takeover premium and arbitrageurs’ accumulation of shares before the takeover announcement, and the less liquid the target stock, the stronger this relationship is. Moreover, freezeouts eliminate the free-rider problem, but front-end loaded bids, such as two-tiered and partial offers, do not benefit bidders because arbitrageurs can undo any potential benefit and eliminate the coerciveness of these offers. Similarly, the takeover premium is also largely unrelated to the bidder’s ability to dilute the target’s shareholders after the acquisition, also due to potential arbitrage activity.
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King, Wendy J., and Dominique Allainé. "Social, maternal, and environmental influences on reproductive success in female Alpine marmots (Marmota marmota)." Canadian Journal of Zoology 80, no. 12 (December 1, 2002): 2137–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/z02-205.
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We examined the social, maternal, and environmental factors affecting the reproductive success of female Alpine marmots (Marmota marmota) during 8 years in the French Alps. Successful production of juveniles was almost entirely limited to dominant females. Production of juveniles increased with maternal body condition and experience. Female body condition was positively correlated with body mass and negatively correlated with dominant-male takeovers in spring, while experience increased with age. We found little evidence for a pregnancy block with takeover of dominant males because male replacement occurred mostly after mid-May, when juveniles were susceptible to infanticide. Production of yearlings depended on the number of juveniles produced, dominant-male takeovers in summer, and exposure of the site. We found no significant influence of group size or composition on production of yearlings. Climatic conditions varied little and had no measurable effect on reproduction. Social factors such as female dominance and dominant-male takeovers that could lead to infanticide have a strong effect on female reproductive success in Alpine marmots.
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Hollearn, Martina K., and James D. Miles. "Do People Mentally Represent Automated Tasks? Evidence from Task-Switching Costs Following Takeovers." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 63, no. 1 (November 2019): 1227–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1071181319631030.
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Partially automated vehicles, in which automation performs parts of the driving task, introduce new challenges of automation monitoring and human-automation teaming to the driving experience. We describe a new method for measuring whether operators mentally represent automated task performance using a version of the joint task-switching (JTS) task paradigm. In the JTS task, an operator and a teammate take turns performing two intermixed tasks. Following takeover from the teammate, task-switching costs (slower responses following a task switch vs repetition) indicate that the operator mentally represents the teammate’s performance. We measured performance following task switches and repetitions with and without a takeover from automation. Switch costs disappeared following takeovers, indicating a lack of representation of the prior automated task. We discuss how task switch costs following takeovers can serve as indirect measures of whether operators mentally represent automated task performance in mixed automation situations.
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Clark, Hallie, Anne Collins McLaughlin, and Jing Feng. "Situational Awareness and Time to Takeover: Exploring an Alternative Method to Measure Engagement with High-Level Automation." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 61, no. 1 (September 2017): 1452–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1541931213601848.
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Within human factors research of highly automated driving, in addition to examining the design of notifications of expected takeovers of vehicle control, understanding how drivers handle unexpected takeovers is of critical importance. Given a sufficient level of situational awareness has been shown as a premise for task performance in various domains, this study aims to establish a situational awareness measure in the context of highly automated driving using a simple platform for experimentation. In this study, we measured participants’ situational awareness when viewing a video of simulated automated system, and their time-to-takeover when vehicle automation failed unexpectedly (as indicated by an abnormal change of vehicle speed and lane position). The results verified the link between lower levels of situational awareness and longer time to respond to a takeover event, suggesting the potential use of the simple platform for experimentation and quick prototyping.
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Scherer, F. M. "Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments." Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (February 1, 1988): 69–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.69.
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In recent years, the tender offer takeover has been praised and damned with a ferocity suggesting that the survival of capitalism is at stake. The truth, as in most disputes with substantial metaphysical content, is more prosaic. Some takeovers enhance economic efficiency, some degrade it, and the balance of effects, though not fully known, is most likely a close one. In this essay I try to lay bare the debate's foundations and bring it back to earth with an injection of evidence.
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Bugeja, Martin. "Monitoring and the acquiring firm reaction to bad takeover bids." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 2 (2009): 208–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i2c1p4.
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This study investigates variables that explain why bidding firms raise their offer price following a negative capital market reaction to a takeover announcement. We find that whilst an increasing number of blockholders restrains the pursuit of unprofitable takeovers, greater institutional ownership and takeover hostility increases the likelihood a bidder will raise their offer price. Multiple bidders and board independence are unrelated to an increase in takeover price. Inconsistent with agency theory, management ownership and free cash flow do not explain bidder actions.
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Turk, Thomas A. "Takeover Resistance, Information Leakage, and Target Firm Value." Journal of Management 18, no. 3 (September 1992): 503–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639201800305.
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This study examines the effect of management responses to takeovers on the value of the targetfirm. Three categories of takeover responses are identified: auction-inducing resistance, competitionreducing resistance, and support. Auction-inducing resistance is shown to increase competition for control of the target firm. This increased competition leads to increased gains to the target firm during the takeover battle relative to gains obtained when the initial takeover offer is supported. Competition-reducing resistance is shown to have the opposite effect.
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Jurišić, M., I. Tomičić, and P. Grd. "User Behavior Analysis for Detecting Compromised User Accounts: A Review Paper." Cybernetics and Information Technologies 23, no. 3 (September 1, 2023): 102–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/cait-2023-0027.
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Abstract The rise of online transactions has led to a corresponding increase in online criminal activities. Account takeover attacks, in particular, are challenging to detect, and novel approaches utilize machine learning to identify compromised accounts. This paper aims to conduct a literature review on account takeover detection and user behavior analysis within the cybersecurity domain. By exploring these areas, the goal is to combat account takeovers and other fraudulent attempts effectively.
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Nyombi, Chrispas. "A critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule." International Journal of Law and Management 57, no. 4 (July 13, 2015): 235–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-12-2012-0042.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers.
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Nickels, Ashley E., Amanda D. Clark, and Zachary D. Wood. "How Municipal Takeovers Reshape Urban Democracy: Comparing the Experiences of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan." Urban Affairs Review 56, no. 3 (January 18, 2019): 790–822. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087418824670.
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Municipal takeovers are a state policy ostensibly designed to address urban fiscal crises by “temporarily” taking over local government, suspending local control, and implementing sweeping austerity measures. Although framed as “apolitical,” takeovers have the capacity to reshape local democracy. These changes radically rearrange how decisions are made, who has access to decision makers, and, ultimately, who is in power. Using a policy-centered approach, we compare the cases of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan, illustrating how variations in policy design and localized implementation reshaped the local political landscape in different ways. While the Camden takeover institutionalized the emergent “community development regime,” Flints’ grassroots activists and community-based organizations destabilized the emergent regime.
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Das, Varsha. "The New Takeover Code by the Securities and Exchange Board of India." Journal of Social and Development Sciences 4, no. 7 (July 30, 2013): 303–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v4i7.765.
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Merger & Acquisition in India have been governed by the age-old takeover rules. It seems that now, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has realized that these rules need to be revamped to keep them in line with the ever-changing global scenario. On September 2011, the SEBI amended the new set of takeover rules i.e.; the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011. The main purpose is to prevent hostile takeovers and at the same time, provide some more opportunities of exit to innocent shareholders who do not wish to be associated with a particular acquirer. With these rules coming into force, both promoter and public shareholders of a listed company would now get the same price for their shares being purchased by an acquirer. In another shareholder-friendly move, SEBI has scrapped the noncompete fee or control premium, which were being paid to only the promoters earlier and could have been as much as 25% of the public offer price. The SEBI has successfully done one part of the reform process by preparing the new takeover code, the other part requires it successful implementation.
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Arugaslan, Onur, Jim DeMello, and Devrim Yaman. "Share Structure And Wealth Effects Of Corporate Takeovers." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, no. 4 (June 27, 2012): 633. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i4.7046.
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this study we examine the stock price effects of corporate takeovers by dual class firms and unified firms. Our sample consists of 852 firms that were bidders in takeovers between 1993 and 2009. Our univariate and OLS regression results show that both dual class firms and unified firms obtain insignificant returns for various takeover announcement periods. The average and median returns for these two groups are similar to each other. We also identify several factors that the literature suggests should affect the bidder announcement returns in takeovers. Our results indicate that smaller firms in our sample and firms that pay for the acquisition in cash obtain higher abnormal returns when they announce the takeover. In addition, we find that the factors we identify have different influences on the announcement returns of dual class and unified firms. Specifically, unified firms that engage in tender offers and larger firms obtain more positive announcement returns compared to dual class firms whereas unified firms obtain more negative results when the target firm is a public firm. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>
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Johnston, Andrew. "TAKEOVER REGULATION: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CITY CODE." Cambridge Law Journal 66, no. 2 (July 2007): 422–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197307000591.
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The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers has generally been lauded as a system of self-regulation that offers the advantages of speed, flexibility and low cost administration by experts. Many of its provisions are uncontroversial and do indeed reflect a consensus view about the way in which takeovers should be carried out. However, the Code's prohibition on defensive measures by management in the event of a takeover is far more controversial. This article argues that the City Code – and the prohibition on defensive measures in particular - was introduced because the common law had demonstrated itself incapable of putting in place a system of takeover regulation that ensured the takeover remained a viable means of ensuring managerial accountability to shareholders. Its introduction in 1968 fundamentally transformed the UK's system of corporate governance. Through its prohibition on defensive measures once a takeover becomes imminent, the Code truncates the general management discretion that lies at the heart of company law and forces management to focus on the generation of short-term shareholder value. What is striking is that this fundamental reorientation of the way in which companies are controlled was brought about not by an Act of Parliament but by a self-regulatory measure put in place by financial institutions. Following the implementation of the Takeover Directive, which itself was heavily influenced by the City Code, the Companies Act 2006 now requires the Takeover Panel to maintain that prohibition.
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Margolin, A. M., and I. V. Vyakina. "Threats of hostile takeover in context of the business economic security." MIR (Modernization. Innovation. Research) 10, no. 2 (July 5, 2019): 196–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.18184/2079-4665.2019.10.2.196-212.
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Purpose: the article contains critical analysis and scientific review of research in the field of mergers and takeovers in the world academic literature and identifies the key factors causing the probability of losing a business in terms of business security in modern conditions of economic relations transformation. The following tasks have solved in the article to achieve this goal: scientific review and classification of academic studies on the problem of hostile takeovers in the interdisciplinary aspect of economic security have performed; key endogenous and exogenous factors that determine the threat of seizing business and the mechanisms for its protection against hostile takeovers have identified; possibilities of applying international experience in protecting against hostile takeovers under Russian conditions have analyzed.Methods: the article uses a set of scientific methods for analyzing literary sources and statistical data, among which are: methods of induction and deduction, logical abstraction, causal, functional, system, historical and comparative analysis, etc.Results: authors have identified endogenous and exogenous factors that increase the likelihood of hostile takeover, and have analyzed the impact of legislation and regulations on the activity of mergers and acquisitions in Russia and the world. The scientific review carried out by the authors is positioned in the existing set of studies and sets the directions for future research in the field of the economic security of business that are necessary for understanding this phenomenon.Conclusions and Relevance: Russian and foreign studies in the field of mergers and acquisitions differ in the methods and form used to substantiate the findings and results of research. The problems of business security and protection against hostile takeovers have interdisciplinary nature, while the threats of hostile takeovers can be both external and internal. Improving the legal framework along with economic mechanisms will allow creating conditions for protecting the interests of investors, enhancing business activity and business efficiency. The measures used in world practice for protection against hostile takeovers are of limited use in Russia due to the relative youth of the phenomenon itself and the domestic capital market, as well as due to the specifics of Russian legislation. In this regard, it is necessary to continue further research in this sphere.
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Konings, Jozef, Luca Marcolin, and Ilke van Beveren. "International rent sharing and takeovers." International Journal of Manpower 37, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 268–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijm-01-2015-0009.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of international rent sharing in multinational enterprises. It looks at changes in rent sharing before and after the acquisition of a company by a foreign entity, and assesses the role of target and acquirer profitability in the wage setting process for the target firm. It therefore contributes to the evaluation of the impact of a form of globalization (inward foreign direct investment (FDI)) onto wages. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use a unique firm level longitudinal dataset of M & As in Belgium between 1998 and 2010. The authors construct a micro-level dataset containing takeover and accounting information for target and acquiring firms. The empirical set up permits to net the estimates from selection effects in the choice of target firm, using propensity score matching and a difference-in-difference approach. Findings – The authors find evidence that the deal does not significantly affect the degree of domestic rent sharing, but it enables international rent sharing. The authors qualify the results in terms of the acquirer’s location, industry link with the target and controlling stake. Further robustness specifications include different profits and controls, and a comparison with a sample of domestic acquisitions. Research limitations/implications – The sample of matches for acquired firms is constructed using propensity scores, which may not perfectly capture the differences between targeted and non-targeted companies. Although estimates should be net of selection effects, other sources of endogeneity may still make the estimates inconsistent. Practical implications – Updating the discussion on the labor market consequences of globalization, and on foreign takeovers in particular. Social implications – The discussion on international takeover should take into account not only the extensive margin (i.e. labor adjustments) but also salaries. The authors argue that through a precise channel (rent sharing) international takeovers of domestic companies may benefit the domestic labor force. Originality/value – The dataset was constructed for the purposes of this analysis; rent sharing is tested in a takeover scenario for the first time, thus avoiding selection biases.
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Constantinou, Costas, Lenos Trigeorgis, and Nikos Vafeas. "Target board structure and takeover-induced abnormal returns in the UK." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 1 (2005): 101–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i1p9.
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We examine the link between board structure and bid-induced abnormal returns for a sample of 198 UK-based firms that became takeover targets between 1989 and 1998. As expected, takeover targets experience significant gains during the takeover announcement period. In line with a disciplinary explanation for takeovers, we find that target boards that are larger, with fewer independent directors, and a managing director chairman, experience more favorable announcement-period returns. Targets with more reputable directors and directors with greater ownership incentives, also experience more favorable announcement-period returns
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Ashraf, Rasha, Rajesh Chakrabarti, Richard Fu, and Narayanan Jayaraman. "Takeover Immunity, Takeovers, and the Market for Nonexecutive Directors." Financial Management 39, no. 1 (March 2010): 83–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2010.01067.x.
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Easterwood, Cintia M. "Takeovers And Incentives For Earnings Management: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 14, no. 1 (September 1, 2011): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v14i1.5726.
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This study tests the hypothesis that managers of firms that are targets of takeovers systematically increase reported earnings in the quarters immediately preceding and following initiation of the takeover attempt. Using both a modified version of the Jones method and the DeAngelo method, discretionary accounting accruals are examined for a sample of 100 firms that were targets of tender offers between 1985 and 1989, inclusive, and for a control group of nontargets. Results for the quarter ended prior to initiation support the hypothesis. Additional tests performed on the sub-samples of hostile and friendly takeover targets indicate that the results obtained for the sample as a whole are primarily due to the hostile takeover targets. No evidence of earnings management is found in the quarter ended subsequent to initiation.
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Roche, Fabienne, Anna Somieski, and Stefan Brandenburg. "Behavioral Changes to Repeated Takeovers in Highly Automated Driving: Effects of the Takeover-Request Design and the Nondriving-Related Task Modality." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 5 (December 5, 2018): 839–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720818814963.
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Objective: We investigated drivers’ behavior and subjective experience when repeatedly taking over their vehicles’ control depending on the design of the takeover request (TOR) and the modality of the nondriving-related task (NDRT). Background: Previous research has shown that taking over vehicle control after highly automated driving provides several problems for drivers. There is evidence that the TOR design and the NDRT modality may influence takeover behavior and that driver behavior changes with more experience. Method: Forty participants were requested to resume control of their simulated vehicle six times. The TOR design (auditory or visual-auditory) and the NDRT modality (auditory or visual) were varied. Drivers’ takeover behavior, gaze patterns, and subjective workload were recorded and analyzed. Results: Results suggest that drivers change their behavior to the repeated experience of takeover situations. An auditory TOR leads to safer takeover behavior than a visual-auditory TOR. And with an auditory TOR, the takeover behavior improves with experience. Engaging in the visually demanding NDRT leads to fewer gazes on the road than the auditory NDRT. Participants’ fixation duration on the road decreased over the three takeovers with the visually demanding NDRT. Conclusions: The results imply that (a) drivers change their behavior to repeated takeovers, (b) auditory TOR designs might be preferable over visual-auditory TOR designs, and (c) auditory demanding NDRTs allow drivers to focus more on the driving scene. Application: The results of the present study can be used to design TORs and determine allowed NDRTs in highly automated driving.
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Ali, Hasani Mohd. "Hostile takeovers as corporate governance: a legal analysis of tender offer and proxy contest in China and Malaysia." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 4 (2014): 558–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i4c6p6.
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This paper will specifically analyse from a legal perspective the applicability of tender offer and proxy contest as the most frequently used techniques in hostile takeovers in China and Malaysia. The purpose is to evaluate the adequacy of the related regulation and governance in place for companies in both jurisdictions. This paper unfortunately found that both China and Malaysia have not particularly adopted tender offer technique since in practice most hostile takeover cases were completed through mandatory offers triggered by negotiated purchases. Likewise, the existing Chinese and Malaysian laws are not supportive enough to supervise proxy contest exercises. As a result, they are losing the advantages that both techniques may offer to enhance corporate governance and promote fair competition. Both jurisdictions should consider putting on adequate laws and practices to better regulate hostile takeovers