Relevant bibliographies by topics / Takeovers

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Takeovers'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Takeovers"

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McDonald, Anthony D., Hananeh Alambeigi, Johan Engström, Gustav Markkula, Tobias Vogelpohl, Jarrett Dunne, and Norbert Yuma. "Toward Computational Simulations of Behavior During Automated Driving Takeovers: A Review of the Empirical and Modeling Literatures." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 4 (March 4, 2019): 642–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720819829572.

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Objective: This article provides a review of empirical studies of automated vehicle takeovers and driver modeling to identify influential factors and their impacts on takeover performance and suggest driver models that can capture them. Background: Significant safety issues remain in automated-to-manual transitions of vehicle control. Developing models and computer simulations of automated vehicle control transitions may help designers mitigate these issues, but only if accurate models are used. Selecting accurate models requires estimating the impact of factors that influence takeovers. Method: Articles describing automated vehicle takeovers or driver modeling research were identified through a systematic approach. Inclusion criteria were used to identify relevant studies and models of braking, steering, and the complete takeover process for further review. Results: The reviewed studies on automated vehicle takeovers identified several factors that significantly influence takeover time and post-takeover control. Drivers were found to respond similarly between manual emergencies and automated takeovers, albeit with a delay. The findings suggest that existing braking and steering models for manual driving may be applicable to modeling automated vehicle takeovers. Conclusion: Time budget, repeated exposure to takeovers, silent failures, and handheld secondary tasks significantly influence takeover time. These factors in addition to takeover request modality, driving environment, non-handheld secondary tasks, level of automation, trust, fatigue, and alcohol significantly impact post-takeover control. Models that capture these effects through evidence accumulation were identified as promising directions for future work. Application: Stakeholders interested in driver behavior during automated vehicle takeovers may use this article to identify starting points for their work.
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Enriques, Luca. "European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach." European Business Law Review 22, Issue 5 (October 1, 2011): 623–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2011031.

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This article argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante which kind they are. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers' and block-holders' incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies should be able to decide how contestable their control should be. After showing that the current EU legal framework for takeovers overall hinders takeover activity in the EU, the paper identifies three rationales for a takeover-neutral intervention of the EU in the area of takeover regulation (pre-emption of "takeover-hostile," protectionist national regulations, opt-out rules protecting shareholders vis-à-vis managers' and dominant shareholders' opportunism in takeover contexts, and menu rules helping individual companies define their degree of control contestability) and provides examples of rules that may respond to such rationales.
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Song, Guoxiang. "Large US bank takeovers in 2008: performance and implications." Journal of Capital Markets Studies 6, no. 1 (October 26, 2021): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcms-06-2021-0021.

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PurposeBecause systemically important banks' takeovers in the US were expected to contain the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) but were found to have imposed large cost on shareholders, this paper examines the effectiveness of these acquisitions during the GFC and investigates what went wrong with the market for corporate control of large banks.Design/methodology/approachThis paper presents a model of the disciplinary takeover based on the efficient market hypothesis which provides appropriate measures for it to examine the financial performance of acquiring banks after takeover.FindingsThe results indicate that the takeover market for large banks was ineffective in two aspects: the market did not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the crisis and acquirers performed worse after takeover. Such ineffectiveness reflects the fundamental deficiencies of large bank takeovers arising from some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.Research limitations/implicationsThe sample size of systemically important banks' takeovers is small so large-sample standard statistical inferences cannot be used.Practical implicationsThe deficiencies of large bank takeovers need to be rectified in order to aid in resolving future crises.Originality/valueThis paper provides rare and detailed insight based on case studies of large US bank takeovers during the GFC.
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Pandey, Ajay. "Takeover Announcements, Open Offers, and Shareholders' Returns in Target Firms." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 26, no. 3 (July 2001): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920010304.

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The empirical studies in the context of developed countries have consistently pointed out substantial valuation gains for target firms, particularly in case of successful takeovers. This effect has been "found to be higher for tender offers compared to mergers and proxy contests, the other forms of plays in the market for corporate control. Subsequent to enactment of takeover enabling regulations in 1997 in India, takeovers and substantial acquisition of shares necessitate making open offer to the investors. Based on the empirical investigation of 14 large (above Rs 10 crore) takeover related open offers using event study methodology, we document significant announcement effect (» 10%) associated with the takeovers in Indian capital market. We also find that the target firm valuations increase in the runup to announcement. However, unlike developed countries, substantial part of these gains are wiped out subsequently indicating that valuation gains associated with takeovers in large part reflect private value of control, expected to be high in the Indian context The fact that only one large open offer (out of 16 in all) was associated with an attempted unsuccessful hostile takeover bid suggests that given relatively large insiders' shareholdings, takeovers as governance mechanisms are not likely to be effective and private value of control may be the driver in the market for
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Costa, Eduardo, and Ana Marques. "Corporate governance and takeovers: Insights from past research and suggestions for future research." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 3 (2009): 211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c1p5.

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This paper reviews the literature on the association between corporate governance and takeovers. It approaches takeovers as an effective external corporate governance mechanism. The main conclusions to be drawn is that although the mere threat of an active market for corporate control may be positively correlated with good internal governance, takeovers will always take place independently of good internal corporate governance by targets and that managerial ownership is crucial for a favorable shareholder outcome in a takeover event. We believe future research on corporate boards, cross-national takeovers and managers of bidding firms would be of great interest
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Pasetha, Andre, Lisa Michelle Danish, Dyah Perwitasari-Farajallah, Muhammad Agil, and Antje Engelhardt. "Identification of Follower Status Based on Male Proximity Score in Crested Macaque." HAYATI Journal of Biosciences 27, no. 3 (July 1, 2020): 241. http://dx.doi.org/10.4308/hjb.27.3.241.

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Crested macaque live in multimale-multifemale social groups where temporary association (consortship) typically occurs. Current theory and these limited qualitative observations suggest the hypothesis that behavior functions as a means for males to gain access to fertile females. The aim of this study was to investigate follower status based on quantitative method. Males were classified as either “consort males,” “followers,” and “non-followers” based on proximity maintanance every 15 minute uses scan sampling. Tactics used by followers were classified into 1) individual challenge, 2) coalitionary challenge, 3) abandoned takeover, and 4) opportunistic takeover. The proportion of successful takeovers by followers was calculated by dividing the number of takeovers by followers by the total number of observed takeovers. The proportion of followers is higher than average on D-5 and earlier, D-4, and D-3. Only two of the four consort takeover tactics were used by followers. For abandoned which made up 40% and for individual tactic was made up to 11.5% of consort takeovers tactic used. This study contribute to our understanding of alternative mating strategy in primate and provide the first quantitative data demonstrating that following is an alternative mating strategy in crested macaque (Macaca nigra).
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Tidar, Maria Ulfah, and Kurnia Toha. "Public Listed Companies Takeovers Comparison Under Indonesian and Malaysian Law." YURISDIKSI : Jurnal Wacana Hukum dan Sains 18, no. 3 (December 30, 2022): 371–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.55173/yurisdiksi.v18i3.156.

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The current condition of business competion is getting tighter. This causes the company to compete to maintain its existence. One way to do that is by restructuring the company. Takeover is one type of corporate restructuring. Takeover is a legal action carried out by a legal entity or individual to take over company shares resulting in a transfer of control over the company. The purpose of this legal research is to increase knowledge in the field of public listed companies takeovers based on Indonesian and Malaysian Law which can be benefit to legal practitioners. This research is a normative legal research using statutory and comparative approach. The data used in this research is secondary data. The results of the study are a public listed company that undertakes a takeover in not only subject to the laws and regulations regarding limited liability companies, but also must comply with the provisions of the capital market laws and regulation. After the takeover process occurs, the expropriating party must carry out a mandatory tender offer process. There are differences in terms of public listed companies takeover process between Indonesian and Malaysian Law including the requirements to become a new controller, minority shareholder rights, and takeover’s impact regulation on business competition.
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Kini, Omesh, William Kracaw, and John J. McConnell. "Corporate Takeovers And Interest Rates." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 7, no. 3 (October 19, 2011): 62. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v7i3.6228.

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This study analyzes the effect of corporate takeover announcements on the volatility of interest rate changes and on the level of interest rates over the period 1962 through 1984. The findings suggest that intercorporate takeovers increase the volatility of interest rate changes over this period. Because the increase in volatility is concentrated around the announcement of cash takeovers, the results imply that it is the mode of financing, rather than takeovers, per se, that is important of credit markets.
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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak. "Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston." American Economic Review 106, no. 7 (July 1, 2016): 1878–920. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150479.

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Charter takeovers are traditional public schools restarted as charter schools. We develop a grandfathering instrument for takeover attendance that compares students at schools designated for takeover with a matched sample of students attending similar schools not yet taken over. Grandfathering estimates from New Orleans show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned charter seats in lotteries. A non-charter Boston turnaround intervention that had much in common with the takeover strategy generated gains as large as those seen for takeovers, while other more modest turnaround interventions yielded smaller effects. (JEL D44, H75, I21, I28)
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Hawk, Keith, and Kumar Chittipeddi. "Assessing The Long-Term Impact Of Hostile Takeovers." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 6, no. 2 (October 24, 2011): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v6i2.6308.

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This paper has attempted to review the hostile takeover phenomenon by casting the arguments for and against such takeovers in an objective framework. The paper also relies on empirical data on the long term impact of hostile takeovers gathered from firms that were taken over successfully. The authors have concluded that the hostile takeover phenomenon is minuscule in terms of the larger merger and acquisitions activity, and that it has beneficial consequences even though the loss of jobs is inevitably painful.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Takeovers"

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Cai, Wei, and 蔡伟. "The mandatory bid rule, hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2011. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46968398.

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Blease, John Robert. "The effect of the portfolio of takeover provisions on operating performance, takeovers, and takeover premiums /." view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3045084.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-118). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Bild, Magnus. "Valuation of takeovers." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 1998. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/471.htm.

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Berggren, Jennie, and Carina Engström. "Defensive Tactics : In hostile takeovers." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-469.

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Bugeja, Martin. "Independent Expert Reports and Takeovers." University of Sydney. School of Business, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/648.

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Target firms in Australian takeovers are required to obtain an independent assessment of the offer price in situations where the Corporations Law considers the bidder has a superior bargaining position. The intention of this requirement is to protect target shareholders from being offered a lower takeover premium. The only empirical study of expert reports, Eddey (1993), is consistent with expert reports achieving their purpose, as the results indicate no difference in target firm premiums in offers with and without an expert report. Eddey also reports that a revision in offer price is more likely where an expert indicates the bid is �not fair and reasonable.� Using all takeovers from 1990 to 2000, this thesis aims to re-examine and substantially extend the findings in Eddey. As the sample includes all bids, irrespective of the form of payment consideration, the thesis will assess whether the results in Eddey can be extrapolated from cash-based bids to all takeover bids. In addition, the analysis will extend Eddey�s results by investigating whether expert reports result in a higher probability of a revision in offer price relative to takeovers without an expert report. This study also investigates the impact of the expert report on bidder announcement abnormal returns and examines the returns to both bidders and targets when the expert report is released. This will add to the limited current knowledge on the impact of expert reports on the capital market. This thesis also tests the validity of public criticisms of expert independence. Firstly, experts have been publicly criticised on the basis that they are not independent from the target firm. It has been suggested that such experts will be more likely to provide an opinion that agrees with the recommendation of target directors. Secondly, it has been alleged that experts who are also the target auditor provide their reports at a lower fee by cross-subsidising the reports� preparation from other fees received from the client. The concern with this practice is that these reports may be of lower quality. This criticism is tested by developing an expert fee model. This fee model is then used to assess whether, similar to evidence in the auditing field, �quality� experts earn a fee premium. The results indicate that the need for an expert report does not affect bidder abnormal returns at either the announcement of the takeover or release of the expert report. On the other hand, target shareholders earn significantly lower abnormal returns at the announcement of a bid where an expert report is required. This result is inconsistent with Eddey (1993) and raises doubt over whether experts prevent bidders from using their superior bargaining position to offer target shareholders a lower premium. Consistent with Eddey, the probability of an alteration in offer price is greater where an adverse expert opinion is given. The results also show that the presence of an expert increases the likelihood of a bid revision relative to takeovers in general. Target abnormal returns on the release of an expert report are positive and significant, irrespective of the type of expert opinion. This result however, is sensitive to any association between the author of the report and the target. In the case that an expert discloses any prior or current business dealings with the target, abnormal returns are insignificant. The conclusion from this finding is that the market perceives expert reports prepared by an associate of the target as lacking credibility. In light of this lack of information content it is recommended corporate regulators review those experts permitted to prepare reports. Contrary to the published criticisms, experts who have business dealings with the target are just as likely as other experts to provide an opinion that agrees with the recommendation of directors. The tests of a fee reduction by experts associated to the target indicate significant lower fees where the expert is the target auditor. Further analysis shows this result is only significant where the auditor is also a non-Big 6/5 firm. These auditors are also found to provide reports that are significantly shorter than other experts, suggesting the cut in fee is achieved by reducing the amount of effort. The results also find that the top two experts, Grant Samuels and Associates and Price Waterhouse Coopers, earn a fee premium over other experts. The finding of a fee premium for a large accounting firm indicates that such firms may receive a premium for both auditing and non-audit services.
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Nuttall, Robin. "Essays on contracts and takeovers." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.286178.

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Slinger, Giles. "Essays on stakeholders and takeovers." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.621949.

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Kuvandikov, Azimjon. "Employment effects of corporate takeovers." Thesis, University of York, 2010. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/1467/.

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The influence of corporate governance on labour management is one of the key topics of the contemporary academic debate. In particular, there is a growing interest in better understanding the employment effects of takeovers. We investigate this issue in four empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter shows that acquired firms’ prior performance is the key variable in explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments: acquired firms’ poorer performance leads to greater workforce reductions post-merger. Industry relatedness also leads to higher levels of workforce adjustments. However, the results show that hostility does not lead to higher workforce reductions after controlling for other relevant variables. In contrast to prior research conclusions, the results show that high premiums do not induce workforce reductions. These results imply that workforce reductions are undertaken for efficiency improvement purposes. The second empirical chapter shows that acquiring firms’ performance decline may also induce workforce reductions post-merger. At the same time, the results show that workforce reductions are inversely associated with subsequent performance change. This implies that post-merger workforce reductions positively affect firm performance. The third empirical chapter shows that takeover announcement shareholder gains do not explain job losses and wage cuts, although there is some evidence of rent expropriation after hostile and cash-paid acquisitions. In contrast, there is a strong positive association between acquirers’ long-run abnormal returns and post-merger employee wealth concessions. This association suggests that post-takeover jobs and wage growth depends on value created by takeovers: if shareholders gain from takeovers, then employees also benefit from such transactions; if shareholders lose from takeovers, then employees also suffer from them. Finally, the fourth empirical chapter shows that mergers reduce demand for labour. A contribution of this chapter is that it confirms that decline in labour demand is larger after acquisitions that involve layoffs than after acquisitions that do not. This greater decrease in labour demand in layoff-involving acquisitions may justify workforce reductions post-merger. The general conclusion of the thesis is that mergers do not always negatively affect labour and that post-merger employee layoffs are usually undertaken for efficiency improvement purposes.
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Rossi, Luis Filipe. "Fusões e aquisições: hostis 'Takeovers'." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/34.

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Hussaini, Mussa <1985&gt. "Three essays on corporate takeovers." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/17795.

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Within the research area of corporate takeover, understanding the drivers of the choice of payment method is significantly important. This is accrued to the fact that the choice of payment method can affect various aspects of the transaction including shareholders’ value. The choice of payment method in takeovers is mainly a function of both the asymmetric information between the acquirer and the target and the acquirer’s financial capability. This dissertation aims at advancing our knowledge with respect to the effects that different sources of information can have on the choice of payment method in takeovers. More specifically, I first develop two related studies examining the extent to which two important sources of information, firms’ annual reports and firms’ corporate social responsibility performance (CSR) ratings, influence the choice of payment method in takeovers. The first study aims to capture the effect of a more general and publicly available information and the second study aims to shed light on how a more specific and difficult to comprehend set of information affects the choice of payment method in takeovers. Furthermore, motivated by the fact that the choice of payment method has a material impact on the performance of the takeovers and therefore shareholders’ value, I develop the third paper investigating the potential influence that the acquirer’s board of directors and institutional ownership as monitoring mechanisms can have on the choice of payment method in takeovers.
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Books on the topic "Takeovers"

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Fallon, Ivan. Takeovers. London: H. Hamilton, 1987.

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D, Cosh A., and Hughes, Alan, 1946 Aug. 1-, eds. Takeovers. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1998.

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Kelly, Edmund J. The takeover dialogues: A discussion of hostile takeovers. Arlington, Va. (1818 N. Veitch St., Arlington 22201): Washington Network Press, 1987.

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A, Black Michael. Hostile takeovers. New York: Leisure Books, 2009.

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Bild, Magnus. Valuation of takeovers. [Stockholm]: Stockholm School of Economics, EFI, Economic Research Institute, 1998.

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Bebchuk, Lucian A. Federalism and takeover law: The race to protect managers from takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.

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Levy, Rodd. Takeovers: Law and strategy. 2nd ed. Pyrmont, NSW: Lawbook Co., 2002.

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M, Mintz Jack, ed. Takeovers and tax policy. Kingston, Ont: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen'sUniversity, 1990.

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J, Kopp Thomas, and Siena College, eds. Perspectives on corporate takeovers. Lanham: University Press of America, 1990.

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Burkart, Mike. Economics of takeovers regulation. London: London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1997.

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Book chapters on the topic "Takeovers"

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Iannotta, Professor Giuliano. "Hostile Takeovers and Takeover Regulation." In Investment Banking, 155–73. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93765-4_9.

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Mäntysaari, Petri. "Takeovers: Introduction." In The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law, 391–403. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03058-1_11.

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Bebenroth, Ralf. "Unfriendly Takeovers." In International Business Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, 123–38. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54989-5_9.

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Falkenhayner, Nicole. "Transnational Takeovers." In Making the British Muslim, 23–35. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137374950_2.

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Stevens, P., and B. Kriefman. "Takeovers and Mergers." In Work Out Accounting A-Level, 58–70. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12640-8_7.

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Cramton, Peter. "Auctions and Takeovers." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 122–25. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_25.

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Stevens, P., and B. Kriefman. "Takeovers and Mergers." In Work Out Accounting A Level, 66–80. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13781-7_7.

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Stevens, P., and B. Kriefman. "Takeovers and Mergers." In Work Out Accounting ‘A’ Level, 58–70. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09807-1_7.

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Hudson, Alastair. "Mergers and takeovers." In Understanding Company Law, 228–36. Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315158099-14.

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Hawkins, David E. "Mergers and takeovers." In The Bending Moment, 40–46. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230510609_5.

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Conference papers on the topic "Takeovers"

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Yang, Shiyan, Angus McKerral, Megan Dawn Mulhall, Michael Graeme Lenné, Bryan Reimer, and Pnina Gershon. "Takeover Context Matters: Characterising Context of Takeovers in Naturalistic Driving using Super Cruise and Autopilot." In AutomotiveUI '23: 15th International Conference on Automotive User Interfaces and Interactive Vehicular Applications. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580585.3606459.

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Banik, Sandeep, and Shaunak D. Bopardikar. "FlipDyn: A game of resource takeovers in dynamical systems." In 2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc51059.2022.9992387.

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Cassidy, Aaren. "State Takeovers, Race, and the Little Rock School District Crisis." In 2021 AERA Annual Meeting. Washington DC: AERA, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/1686700.

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Gao, Huiyun, and Ying Huang. "Impacts of Public Listed Company Anti-Takeovers from Legal Perspective." In 2011 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2011.5998560.

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Zheng, Zhaobo, Kumar Akash, and Teruhisa Misu. "DualTake: Predicting Takeovers across Mobilities for Future Personalized Mobility Services." In HRI '24: ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3610978.3640610.

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Frömel, Pascal. "An Auction-Based Perspective on Takeovers of Real Estate Investment Trusts." In 26th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference. European Real Estate Society, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2019_217.

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Lambert, Solène, Sandrine Voros, Geoffroy Canlorbe, Jocelyne Troccaz, and Ignacio Avellino. "Understanding Takeovers and Telestration in Laparoscopic Surgery to Inform Telementoring System Design." In CHI '24: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3613904.3641978.

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Lindemann, Patrick, Niklas Muller, and Gerhard Rigolll. "Exploring the Use of Augmented Reality Interfaces for Driver Assistance in Short-Notice Takeovers." In 2019 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2019.8814237.

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May, Judy. "State Takeovers for the Public Good? The Struggle for Power in Failing Urban Schools." In 2020 AERA Annual Meeting. Washington DC: AERA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/1579477.

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Zheng, Zhaobo K., Kumar Akash, and Teruhisa Misu. "Detection of Perceived Discomfort in SAE L2 Automated Vehicles through Driver Takeovers and Physiological Spikes." In 2022 IEEE 25th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itsc55140.2022.9922161.

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Reports on the topic "Takeovers"

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Allen Ferrell. Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7232.

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Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, Holger Mueller, and Fausto Panunzi. Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17010.

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Shleifer, Andrei, and Lawrence Summers. Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2342.

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Lambrecht, Bart, and Stewart Myers. A Theory of Takeovers and Disinvestment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11082.

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Jovanovic, Boyan, and Serguey Braguinsky. Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9009.

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Gokhale, Jagadeesh, Erica Groshen, and David Neumark. Do Hostile Takeovers Reduce Extramarginal Wage Payments? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4346.

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Safieddine, Assem, and Sheridan Titman. Debt and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6068.

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Gorton, Gary, and Matthias Kahl. Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures, and Hostile Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7123.

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9078.

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Schwert, G. William. Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7085.

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