Journal articles: 'Taiwan – Foreign public opinion, American'

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Erskine, Kristopher C. "“American Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics: The Genesis of the China Lobby in the United States, and how Missionaries Shifted American Foreign Policy between 1938 and 1941”." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 25, no. 1 (March 15, 2018): 33–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02501003.

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The China Lobby in the United States attracted much scholarly attention after 1945, yet it found its footing in the late 1930s and played a critical role in re-shaping American public opinion prior to World War ii. Historians have devoted relatively little time to investigating this earlier period. The overwhelming majority of China’s lobbyists during these early years were American missionaries who the Chinese government often funded and managed. This article examines the role of two of those missionaries—Frank and Harry Price—and their American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. It relies on research in Taiwan, China, and in archives across the United States. The author also has interviewed members of the Price family, as well as former associates of Frank Price in the United States, Taiwan, and China. The evidence this article presents demonstrates that while difficult to quantify, the Price brothers played a crucial role in helping to re-shape American public opinion about China between 1938 and 1941.

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Wu, Chung-li, and Alex Min-Wei Lin. "The Certainty of Uncertainty: Taiwanese Public Opinion on U.S.–Taiwan Relations in the Early Trump Presidency." World Affairs 182, no. 4 (November 11, 2019): 350–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0043820019885103.

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The election of Donald Trump has injected new uncertainties into the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs in Asia. For Taiwan, regional security is challenging because it must simultaneously deal with an increasingly belligerent China and an America led by the unconventional Trump. Based on public opinion data, this study analyzes how the Taiwanese public perceives the state of U.S.–Taiwan relations, and how certain they are about America’s overall commitment to Taiwan in this era. Results indicate that people in their 20s, pan-Green partisans, and those favoring Taiwan independence perceive U.S.–Taiwan relations to be better under President Trump. Moreover, supporters of the pan-Green coalition and of Taiwan independence, together with the more “ambivalent” respondents, likewise feel more certain about America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security. On the contrary, pan-Blue partisans and Taiwanese citizens with mainland Chinese ethnicity are generally more pessimistic and skeptical about U.S.–Taiwan ties and partnership with Trump in the White House.

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PANG, YANG HUEI. "Helpful Allies, Interfering Neighbours: World opinion and China in the 1950s." Modern Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (September 17, 2014): 204–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x13000395.

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AbstractIn the aftermath of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China was effectively an international pariah. Accounts of this period in Chinese textbooks emphasize how the Chinese turned this around, either during the Geneva Conference or the Bandung Conference, through deft planning and enterprise. Yet few pay any attention to how such manipulation of world opinion became increasingly difficult for Beijing after that initial success. One outcome of China's public relations campaign meant friendly Afro-Asia leaders voiced their opinions, in alarming numbers, to their Chinese counterparts regarding issues such as Asian security, mainland China's economic development, and the Taiwan problem. Indeed, recently declassified Chinese Foreign Affairs archive documents demonstrate that China tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinions to its advantage during the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1955). Chinese efforts were successful in that there was no lack of volunteers to air dissent with American foreign policy. But these new allies also wished to mediate between the United States and the Republic of China, on the one side, and mainland China on the other. Moreover, such efforts were often at variance with China's domestic and strategic outlook in the region. China thus had to embark upon an active ‘management’ of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavour. Although China tried to provide a sanitized ‘script’ for its new friends, most had their own ideas. By the time of the second Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the volume of third party interference had grown. Overwhelmed by such international attention, China responded by openly rejecting unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded outright condemnation of the United States. Thus, ironically, with its growing prominence on the international stage, China found itself unbearably weighted down by the burden of world opinion, a position previously occupied by the United States.

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Lien, Pei-Te. "Transnational Homeland Concerns and Participation in US Politics: A Comparison among Immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong." Journal of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 1 (2006): 56–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/179325406788639075.

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AbstractThis study addresses the scholarly debate between assimilation and transnationalism through analyses of public opinion data collected mainly in California and from residents of Chinese descent whose families originated from the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere in Asia. It explores the empirical relationship between Chinese Americans' concern about the political condition of the ethnic homelands in Asia and their patterns of political participation in the United States. Not all transnational concerns are equal. This study distinguishes between the democratic-oriented and nationalist-oriented transnational political behavior. It also separates voting registration from other types of political participation. A main argument of this study is that the relationship between political assimilation and transnational linkages depends both on the nature of the transnational political concern and on the type of political participation. Transnational political concerns are found to influence the degree of participation in regime-influence (e.g. making campaign contributions) but not system-support (e.g. voting registration) acts. Also, only those homeland concerns that are consistent with US foreign policy interests such as regarding the democratic future of Hong Kong after the 1997 transition are found to have a positive impact on participation.

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Powlick, Philip J., and Andrew Z. Katz. "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus." Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 1 (May 1998): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/254443.

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Grose, Peter, and John E. Rielly. "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987." Foreign Affairs 65, no. 5 (1987): 1105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043230.

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TOMZ, MICHAEL, and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (April 14, 2020): 856–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000064.

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Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.

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Smith, Gaaddis, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. "Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 70, no. 3 (1991): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20044851.

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Russett, Bruce, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. "Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy." Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 3 (1991): 511. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2151745.

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10

HU, Shaohua. "American Public Opinion and Cross-strait Relations." East Asian Policy 11, no. 04 (October 2019): 88–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000394.

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Amid the improved official relationship between Washington and Taipei, this article investigates the relationship between American public opinion and cross-strait relations. It introduces different types of surveys and polls related to the issue; examines the causes for the American public’s lack of attention to cross-strait relations; and discusses the interplay between public opinion and foreign policy, especially in the event of an armed conflict along the strait.

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Lee, Hak-Seon. "Inequality and U.S. Public Opinion on Foreign Aid." World Affairs 182, no. 3 (August 8, 2019): 273–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0043820019862268.

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I investigate how the level of inequality affects American public opinion on foreign aid. As the level of inequality increases across the United States, the majority of the public will be more likely to demand the government implement policies that should ameliorate severe inequality in society. Assuming that government resources are limited, a greater level of inequality in American society may weaken public support for foreign aid because the public may prioritize providing social safety nets and welfare programs in domestic milieu over granting foreign aid to developing countries. In addition, as inequality widens, the public may perceive economic globalization as one of the main causes of inequality; thus, their overall support for globalization will decline. As a result, American support for global engagement will be negatively affected, and public support for foreign aid may decrease. An empirical test using public opinion data in 50 U.S. states since the 1980s confirms my theory: widening inequality both across states and within a given state does weaken public support for U.S. foreign aid.

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TURES, JOHN. "The Democracy-Promotion Gap in American Public Opinion." Journal of American Studies 41, no. 3 (October 24, 2007): 557–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875807003994.

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United States foreign-policymakers have enthusiastically backed policies of promoting democracy abroad. But do the American people support these plans? Evidence from polls reveals that while people generally like the idea of exporting freedom, they do not view it as a top priority. Other concepts such as political and economic security are valued more by the American public. Backing for democracy promotion also seems to be waning in recent years. I examine these issues and offer possible reasons for this “gap” in response to democracy promotion among American people. I also explain the implications of these findings for America's foreign policy, including the types of government the US appears to support in the wake of military operations. I conclude with an examination of why the policy of democracy promotion has not been more popular with the American people, evaluating competing arguments that the policy is flawed, as opposed to simply a case of poor public relations.

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Benson, Brett V., and Emerson M. S. Niou. "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait." Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April 2005): 274–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410500232933.

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Lee, Hak-Seon. "Inward Foreign Direct Investment and U.S. Public Opinion on Immigration." World Affairs 181, no. 2 (June 2018): 181–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0043820018791645.

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I investigate how the direct investment of foreign firms in the United States affects public opinion on immigration. On one hand, when foreign firms invest in the United States, local residents may have job opportunities and a better understanding of foreign cultures following social and work-related interactions with foreign employees at multinationals. As a result, American workers may have a positive attitude toward immigration. On the other hand, when local residents see foreign investment as a foreign acquisition of American assets, or if they experience any unpleasant interactions with foreign nationals at multinationals, foreign investment may result in a negative impact on public perception on immigration. My empirical test of inward investment’s impact on public opinion demonstrates the aforementioned contrasting impacts: While more local employees working at foreign multinationals lead to positive sentiments on immigration, the existence of more local affiliates of foreign firms has a negative impact on public opinion of immigration.

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15

Powlick, Philip J. "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials." International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 427. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600801.

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LEVERING, RALPH B. "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s." Diplomatic History 13, no. 3 (July 1989): 383–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1989.tb00062.x.

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17

Schier, Stephen E., and Andrew Kaufman. "American Foreign Policy Opinion in 2004: Exploring Underlying Beliefs." American Review of Politics 27 (January 1, 2007): 295–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2007.27.0.295-317.

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This analysis identifies some underlying foreign policy beliefs of Americans in 2004 and explores the impact of those beliefs upon attitudes about specific foreign policies. We find, following Wittkopf (1986, 1987, 1990), that there remains a coherence to American mass foreign policy opinion. Americans can be described as clustering into four belief sets about foreign policy— accommodationists, internationalists, isolationists and hardliners. Further, these beliefs explain variation in public responses regarding specific foreign policies, such as the proper U.S. role in world affairs, the choice of multilateral or unilateral approaches, and support of increased defense spending.

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Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad." World Politics 47, no. 4 (July 1995): 534–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100015203.

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This article argues that the problems identified in the literature on public choice should critically affect our research on public opinion and our understanding of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. While a robust literature has emerged around social choice issues in political science, there has been remarkably little appreciation for these problems in the literature on public opinion in general and on public opinion and foreign policy in particular. The potential importance of social choice problems for understanding the nature and role of public opinion in foreign policy making is demonstrated through an examination of American public attitudes about military intervention abroad. In particular, drawing on several common descriptions of the underlying dimensionality of public attitudes on major foreign policy issues, it is shown that there may be important intransitivities in the ordering of public preferences at the aggregate level on policy choices such as those considered by American decision makers in the period leading up to the Gulf War. Without new approaches to public-opinion polling that take these problems into consideration, it will be difficult to make credible claims about the role of public opinion in theforeignpolicy process.

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Graber, Doris A. "Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.Eugene R. Wittkopf." Journal of Politics 54, no. 1 (February 1992): 317–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2131675.

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20

Clinton, David. "The Distinction between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 3-4 (March 21, 2011): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187119111x583950.

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Throughout his writings, Harold Nicolson advocates a distinction between ‘policy’ (to be subject to democratic control) and ‘negotiation’ (to remain the province of professional diplomatists), preferring to separate these two quite different activities, rather than lumping them together under the general term ‘diplomacy’ (an intermingling that he found conceptually muddled and politically impossible to sustain once general public opinion becomes politically mobilized). Nicholas Murray Butler and George Kennan, who may be taken as representing idealist and realist American opinion in the twentieth century, found themselves at one in rejecting Nicolson’s distinction. Butler believed that the progressive enlightenment of public opinion, resulting in the attainment of the ‘international mind’, would improve both the formulation of policy and the conduct of negotiations; Kennan deprecated public opinion, at least in the United States, as irredeemably clumsy and ill-informed, and was convinced that this domestic political force would not be satisfied with directing policy, but would insist on interfering with negotiation as well. Across the board, American opinion seems to be hostile to Nicolson’s differentiation. This rejection of Nicolson’s view illustrates a more general influence of distinctively American thinking about international relations on American attitudes towards, and expectations of, diplomacy.

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Cavari, A. "Religious Beliefs, Elite Polarization, and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Partisan Gap in American Public Opinion Toward Israel." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 25, no. 1 (January 27, 2012): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edr053.

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Gravelle, Timothy B. "Love Thy Neighbo(u)r? Political Attitudes, Proximity and the Mutual Perceptions of the Canadian and American Publics." Canadian Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1 (March 2014): 135–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423914000171.

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AbstractThere has been renewed interest in recent years in both the foreign perceptions of the United States as well as the foreign policy attitudes of the American public. In this light, it is interesting to observe that there is a substantial body of research on Canadian public opinion toward the United States but relatively little on American public opinion toward Canada. Further, most literature neglects the effect of spatial proximity to the other country on perceptions. This article addresses both shortcomings in the literature. It investigates the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American publics drawing on public opinion data from both Canada and the US. The explanation of attitudes toward the other country has three main foci: the roles of political party identification and political ideology; the role of spatial proximity to the Canada–US border; and the interactive relationship between political attitudes and border proximity.

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Powlick, Philip J. "The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American Foreign Policy Officials." Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 611–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002791035004003.

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Sagan, Scott D., and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Weighing Lives in War: How National Identity Influences American Public Opinion about Foreign Civilian and Compatriot Fatalities." Journal of Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (December 4, 2019): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz047.

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Abstract This article explores how the American public weighs tradeoffs between foreign and compatriot fatalities during war. This focus provides an important window into the meaning and significance of citizenship and national identity and, in turn, the most fateful consequences of inclusion and exclusion in the international context. To examine these attitudes, we conducted an original survey experiment asking subjects to consider a fictional US military operation in Afghanistan. We find that: (1) Americans are significantly more willing to accept the collateral deaths of foreign civilians as compared to American civilians in operations aiming to destroy important military targets; (2) Americans are less willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to minimize collateral harm to foreign civilians as compared to American civilians; (3) Americans who express relatively more favorable views of the United States compared to other nations are more willing to accept foreign collateral deaths in US military operations; and (4) Americans are more willing to accept Afghan civilian collateral deaths than those of citizens from a neutral state, such as India. Many Americans recognize that placing a much higher value on compatriot lives over foreign lives is morally problematic, but choose to do so anyway.

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SHIRK, SUSAN L. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (March 14, 2007): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002472.

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China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.

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Taylor, Samantha A. "Reciprocal Influence: Public Opinion and Presidential Elections on American Foreign Policy—and Vice Versa." Presidential Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (July 2019): 736–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psq.12582.

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Tarzi, Shah M. "The Trump Divide and Partisan Attitudes Regarding US Foreign Policy: Select Theoretical and Empirical Observations." International Studies 56, no. 1 (January 2019): 46–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881718824488.

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This article presents select data, recent trends and empirical analysis concerning American voters’ attitudes on American foreign policy in the Trump era. Accordingly, it addresses several vital questions: (a) whether and to what extent Trump Republicans hold views that are distinct from non-Trump Republicans and from average US voters?; (b) how widespread is support for President Trump’s foreign policy?; and (c) whether partisanship has intensified? Importantly, the study deduces preliminary theoretical observations and highlights select new pathways for future research. The key findings of the article are: (a) Trump supporters hold distinct views from the general public; (b) President Trump’s positions are not popular; (c) partisanship has intensified under Trump; (d) on the broad contours of American foreign policy, the American public, including the non-Trump Republicans, express noteworthy continuity, stability and support in spite of a deeply polarizing American president. The article offers select theoretical insights, including recognition of the role of core value in ordering belief systems, thereby offering a modicum of internal coherence, stability and structure to foreign policy views of American mass public, thus transcending the traditional Almond–Lippmann theoretical consensus regarding the content of American public opinion.

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Heffington, Colton, Brandon Beomseob Park, and Laron K. Williams. "The “Most Important Problem” Dataset (MIPD): a new dataset on American issue importance." Conflict Management and Peace Science 36, no. 3 (March 31, 2017): 312–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894217691463.

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This article introduces the Most Important Problem Dataset (MIPD). The MIPD provides individual-level responses by Americans to “most important problem” questions from 1939 to 2015 coded into 58 different problem categories. The MIPD also contains individual-level information on demographics, economic evaluations, partisan preferences, approval and party competencies. This dataset can help answer questions about how the public prioritizes all problems, domestic and foreign, and we demonstrate how these data can shed light on how circumstances influence foreign policy attentiveness. Our exploratory analysis of foreign policy issue attention reveals some notable patterns about foreign policy public opinion. First, foreign policy issues rarely eclipse economic issues on the public’s problem agenda, so efforts to shift attention from poor economic performance to foreign policy via diversionary maneuvers are unlikely to be successful in the long term. Second, we find no evidence that partisan preferences—whether characterized as partisan identification or ideology—motivate partisans to prioritize different problems owing to perceptions of issue ownership. Instead, Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, respond in similar fashions to shifting domestic and international conditions.

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CUMINGS, BRUCE. "Still the American Century." Review of International Studies 25, no. 5 (December 1999): 271–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599002715.

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At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?

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Hogan, J. Michael. "Public opinion and American foreign policy: The case of illusory support for the Panama Canal treaties." Quarterly Journal of Speech 71, no. 3 (August 1985): 302–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00335638509383738.

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PARMARA, INDERJEET. "Engineering consent: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the mobilization of American public opinion, 1939–1945." Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500000358.

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The role of private organizations and think tanks in the United States have been well documented. The Council on Foreign Relations in particular has been much discussed—less so, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article seeks to fill that gap by exploring its influence on American public opinion during World War II. Based upon archival research, the essay examines the background of the key members of the Endowment, their outlook and the impact their work had in shaping US attitudes. Using Gramsci's notion of an ‘historic bloc’ wedded to the insights of the ‘corporatist’ school of American foreign relations, the conclusion reached is that the organization—along with other key bodies situated at the interface between the private and public spheres—played a not inconsiderable part in educating Americans for internationalism before the end of the war and the onset of the Cold War two years later.

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Allani, Samira. "Confrontational Argumentative Strategies in the Discourse of Foreign Policy Experts." Research in Language 17, no. 1 (March 30, 2019): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/rela-2019-0004.

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The aim of this study is to explore the discursive practices of foreign policy experts. While policy decisions involving war and peace keep people alarmed all over the globe, most of these decisions are shaped by policy experts who work on influencing public opinion through the media (Manheim, 2011). This study adopts a critical discursive stance and uses argumentation analysis to examine the ideological backdrop to the discourse of thirty opinion articles authored by American foreign policy experts in print media. Drawing on the Pragma-dialectical method of augmentation analysis (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004), and more particularly on its notion of strategic maneuvering, the analysis examines the confrontational strategies used by this group of experts and attempts to determine the rhetorical goals pursued by these strategic maneuvers.

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Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy." International Organization 65, no. 1 (January 2011): 37–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818310000317.

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AbstractIn this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand U.S. foreign policy, in particular foreign trade and aid. Using votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979–2004, we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy. We assess the impact of domestic factors, namely political economy and ideological preferences, versus foreign policy pressures. Our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas. First, aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences. Second, trade preferences, but not economic aid ones, are shaped by the president's foreign policy concerns; for economic aid, domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones. Third, aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones, but ideology plays a different substantive role in each. Different constituencies support aid and trade. This finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability, “the internationalist coalition” in U.S. foreign policy, “statist” theories of foreign policy, and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting.

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Lewis, Jeff. "Propagating Terror: 9/11 and the Mediation of War." Media International Australia 104, no. 1 (August 2002): 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0210400110.

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Academic and public analysis of the media's performance during the 9/11 and Afghanistan wars are critically influenced by the specific ideological perspective of the analyst. Those commentators who support the reprisal attacks against bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban tend to commend the media, identifying a substantial confluence between state interests, public opinion and media reporting. Alternatively, commentators such as Noam Chomsky who are highly critical of American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, see the media as representing a pernicious conduit which allows state and military hegemonies to oppress and manipulate public opinion. The role of the media in reporting war and terrorism needs to be considered in terms of processes of cultural construction and representation. As we approach the anniversary of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, we need to understand that government foreign policy, public opinion and military action are all shaped through specific kinds of mediated discourse. Our role as media analysts is to expose these discourses in terms of those complex historical and cultural conditions which have served to generate a violence of this proportion.

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Tomz, Michael, and Jessica L. P. Weeks. "Military Alliances and Public Support for War." International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 3 (February 25, 2021): 811–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab015.

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Abstract How do military alliances affect public support for war to defend victims of aggression? We offer the first experimental evidence on this fundamental question. Our experiments revealed that alliance commitments greatly increased the American public's willingness to intervene abroad. Alliances shaped public opinion by increasing public fears about the reputational costs of nonintervention and by heightening the perceived moral obligation to intervene out of concerns for fairness and loyalty. Finally, although alliances swayed public opinion across a wide range of circumstances, they made the biggest difference when the costs of intervention were high, the stakes of intervention were low, and the country needing aid was not a democracy. Thus, alliances can create pressure for war even when honoring the commitment would be extremely inconvenient, which could help explain why democratic allies tend to be so reliable. These findings shed new light on the consequences of alliances and other international legal commitments, the role of morality in foreign policy, and ongoing debates about domestic audience costs.

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Scotto, Thomas J., Jason Reifler, David Hudson, and Jennifer vanHeerde-Hudson. "We Spend How Much? Misperceptions, Innumeracy, and Support for the Foreign Aid in the United States and Great Britain." Journal of Experimental Political Science 4, no. 2 (2017): 119–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/xps.2017.6.

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AbstractMajorities of citizens in high-income countries often oppose foreign aid spending. One popular explanation is that the public overestimates the percentage and amount of taxpayer funds that goes toward overseas aid. Does expressing aid flows in dollar and/or percentage terms shift public opinion toward aid? We report the results of an experiment examining differences in support for aid spending as a function of the information American and British respondents receive about foreign aid spending. In both nations, providing respondents with information about foreign aid spending as a percentage of the national budget significantly reduces support for cuts. The findings suggest that support for aid can be increased, but significant opposition to aid spending remains.

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Marson, Ana Carolina. "The press and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Brazil’s participation at the 1962 Punta del Este Conference." Brazilian Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (September 7, 2020): 348–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2237-7743.2020.v9n2.p348-373.

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This paper seeks to comprehend how a portion of the Brazilian public opinion, specifically the press, understood Brazil’s participation in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 – the Punta del Este Conference. This was a decisive meeting since it culminated in the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS), because of the pressure exerted by the United States. Brazil distinguished itself for leading a group of countries against Cuba’s expulsion, based on the principle of self-determination and non-intervention. Although some authors believe the Punta del Este Conference to be the first event to massively mobilize the Brazilian public opinion around a foreign policy issue, they are not clear about what they understand as the concept of public opinion or how it positioned itself about Brazil’s participation in the Conference. Thus, this paper focuses on the coverage of three newspapers of national circulation (Jornal do Brasil, O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora) between November 1961 and March 1962 to understand, through a content analysis method, how the press evaluated Brazil’s participation in the Punta del Este Conference. The results point to a bigger support of the Brazilian position and the Independent Foreign Policy. Recebido em: Agosto/2019. Aprovado em: julho/2020.

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Artamonova, U. "History Rhymes Itself: U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Tool for “Political Warfare”." World Economy and International Relations 66, no. 11 (2022): 41–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-11-41-49.

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In 2022, the tension between Russia and the U.S. has reached a new high. This trend has been especially noticeable in the information space: influencing public opinion of each other’s populations as well as of global community. Focusing on the concept of “political warfare” (POLWAR), the author analyzes the circumstances of its last notable emergence in the discourse among the American expert community and political elites – the start of the Cold War. The article discovers that American approach to the POLWAR in the first decades of confrontation with the USSR was reactive and even defensive, since the USSR did already have a successful experience of projecting influence on the global public opinion, effectively winning hearts and minds of foreign populations and thus presenting a threat to the newly constructed liberal world order. Hence, the U.S. governments proceeded to a gradual establishment of what later will be called the American “public diplomacy” (PD), including the development of relative legislation, institutes, etc. Thus, the article concludes that PD as a political practice may be considered a product of the Cold War in general and POLWAR in particular, which explains why the American PD has been in systemic crisis since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, studying the latest changes in the U.S. legislation and institutes related to public diplomacy, the author suggests that those events were once again the reaction of the U.S. to the Russian policies which were considered a challenge to the “rule-based world order”. Those steps, however, have been too inconsequent to bring the American PD into the most effective mode. That is why in the POLWAR that started in 2022, the American side fluctuates towards reactive and defensive tactic, mostly focusing on stopping Russian information campaigns influencing the population of the U.S., whereas control over the global public opinion remains second priority and public opinion of Russians is not being considered at all within the framework of this new approach of the U. S. Aside from that the creation of Disinformation Board and introduction of the concept of “domestic PD” likely indicate the desire to boost the public diplomacy resources that are not currently adequate for POLWAR offensive via discovering new talents and ideas among motivated Americans.

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Nadtochey, Yuriy. "The Impact of the Korean and Vietnam Wars on US Foreign and Domestic Politicy." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 2 (2022): 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640014886-2.

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The article compares the two most significant military conflicts of the Cold War era, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in terms of their impact on US domestic and foreign policy. To this end, they are analysed on eight key parameters (objectives of the war, changes in foreign policy concepts, economic consequences of the war, public opinion, etc.). Unlike numerous studies on the impact of the US on Asian regions and nations, the main thrust of this study is to focus on the reverse impact of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, namely on the ways these conflicts affected the domestic affairs of the US and altered its foreign policy behaviour. The empirical base for the study encompasses declassified White House and Pentagon papers, memoirs of American presidents, public opinion polls, as well as extensive research literature. The authors conclude that, although the war on the Korean Peninsula was one of the hottest points of the Cold War and had a serious impact on the social and political life of the country, it has in fact turned out to be a “forgotten” event in American history. By contrast, the Vietnam War, although it had a significant impact on the public consciousness of Americans, was on the whole largely a local conflict, failed to substantially change the international situation, and could not impede the policy of détente in international relations, which was essential for both the USA and the USSR.

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Munayyer, Yousef. "Crisis Moments." Journal of Palestine Studies 44, no. 1 (2014): 97–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.44.1.97.

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Discourse and public opinion on the question of Palestine—and every other issue for that matter—are largely shaped by the mainstream media. Palestine remains remote for the average American consumer of information who is generally less concerned with foreign affairs than with the domestic issues that directly impact daily life. In moments of crisis, however, media coverage of Palestine increases significantly, sometimes to the point of saturation. Such “crisis moments,” despite being few and far between, can have a significant and lasting impact on shaping public opinion, rendering it critically important to understand and analyze the coverage of Israel's latest assault on Gaza—as well as the discourse surrounding the issue.

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Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. "Too Pacifist in Peace, Too Bellicose in War: Political Information and Foreign Policy Opinion." Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 10 (March 29, 2020): 1828–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002720912818.

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Scholars of public opinion and foreign policy recognize that the general public is poorly informed about international affairs, but they disagree about whether and how this fact affects the policies that it will support. Some argue that the lack of information has little effect, at least in the aggregate, while others hold that political information mediates attention to elite cues. We investigate a third line of argument in which political information has a direct effect on the policy options individuals support. Low levels of political information give rise to a pattern of complacency toward likely international threats in times of relative peace and a contrasting tendency to support violent and aggressive policy options during war or acute crises. We test this argument using survey data from two relevant historical settings: the American entry into World War II and the response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

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Feinstein, Yuval. "The Rise and Decline of “Gender Gaps” in Support for Military Action: United States, 1986–2011." Politics & Gender 13, no. 04 (November 2, 2017): 618–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x17000228.

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In the past several decades, many scholars of public opinion in the United States have argued that American women are less likely than American men to endorse military action as a means to deal with international problems. Evidence for this “gender gap” has been found in studies of public opinion during major international conflicts (Bendyna et al. 1996; Wilcox, Ferrara, and Allsop 1993), as well as studies of longitudinal trends that examined pooled data sets from multiple conflict periods (Berinsky 2009; Burris 2008; Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Researchers sometimes view men's generally greater rates of support for military actions as part of a more general “gender gap” phenomenon in U.S. politics, but the cumulative evidence has suggested that foreign policy issues and questions of peace/war generate the widest and most consistent gender gaps (see Holsti 2004, 209–10 for a review).

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Buranok, Sergey Olegovich. "«Red Threat» in the estimates of the USA press in 1939." Samara Journal of Science 8, no. 3 (August 5, 2019): 223–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/snv201983219.

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The following paper deals with the research of the place and value of Russias foreign policy and its reflection in the USA public opinion. The study of information campaign around USSRs foreign policy has its specifics and value: first, it gives a chance to establish new, unknown facts; secondly, to determine the level of knowledge of another (in this case, American) society about the Soviet foreign policy; thirdly, to understand what place information about Soviet foreign policy took in the USA in the system of the USSR image creation, the image of the Soviet revolution. This paper uses materials of the USA press about USSRs foreign policy in 1939. Besides, the author analyzes the image of the Soviet foreign policy in the American society. The information campaign around USSRs foreign policy could report to the world about the Soviet foreign policy achievements as well as promote preparation (in the information plan) to the following large project - the image of the Soviet ally. Articles, reports, notes on USSRs foreign policy of 1939 helped to change the attitude towards Russia / the USSR in the USA and helped to correct the image of the USSR in the world.

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Miles, William F. S. "Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa." African Studies Review 55, no. 3 (December 2012): 27–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002020600007198.

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Abstract:Since September 11, 2001, the aid component of American foreign policy toward Africa has undergone a significant evolution: U.S. security has come to rival development as an increasingly explicit rationale. Development programming and project implementation now contain a security dimension that is underpinned by Pentagon strategists working through AFRICOM as much as by USAID officers partnering with the State Department. This article argues that given the potential of terrorism for undermining development in Africa itself, soft counterterrorism should be envisioned as a strategic developmental defense activity. Making use of unpublished country risk assessments and the author's participant observation during USAID field mission consultancies in the Sahel, as well as the scholarly literature and relevant policy documents of the Bush and Obama administrations, this article explores the new agenda and grassroots dynamics of development projects as tools for terrorism prevention. It contends that policy and institutional responses to 9/11 have resulted in a greater convergence of operational goals among U.S. government agencies that in the past, at least according to publicly stated goals, had pursued distinctly different missions in Africa. Normative implications of this change are mixed. Because of differing expectations with respect to separation of powers, African public opinion, paradoxically, may be more sympathetic to U.S. military engagement with civilians for developmental purposes than American public opinion is.

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Goldstein, Benjamin S. "‘A legend somewhat larger than life’: Karl H. von Wiegand and the trajectory of Hearstian sensationalist journalism." Historical Research 94, no. 265 (July 5, 2021): 629–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hisres/htab019.

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Abstract This article re-evaluates the trajectory of sensationalism within twentieth-century American journalism and foreign correspondence by examining William Randolph Hearst’s chief foreign correspondent, Karl H. von Wiegand (1874–1961). By following von Wiegand’s activities as a journalist, celebrity, propagandist and diplomatic go-between through both world wars, it argues that post-World War I concerns over propaganda and commercial mass media’s reliability impacted the typically sensational methods of foreign correspondents particularly strongly. In von Wiegand’s case, his exceptionally sensational style, which became entangled in fascist propaganda throughout the 1930s and fell under an increasingly systematic ethical critique, caused his own reputation and ability to impact public opinion to weaken drastically.

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Hughes, Patrick, Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. "Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century." Contemporary Sociology 30, no. 5 (September 2001): 516. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3089360.

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Patterson, Thomas E. "Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Ageby Matthew A. Baum." Political Science Quarterly 120, no. 1 (March 2005): 160–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2005.tb01342.x.

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Pandya, Sonal S. "Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment." International Organization 64, no. 3 (July 2010): 389–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818310000160.

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AbstractExisting research on foreign direct investment (FDI) focuses on how politics influences the supply of FDI inflows. In this article I shift focus to the demand for FDI inflows within recipient countries by examining individual preferences for FDI. I argue that FDI preferences are largely a function of FDI's effects on income. FDI raises wages, especially those of skilled labor because foreign firms require more highly skilled labor than their local counterparts. Accordingly, support for FDI should increase with respondents' skills. Using three years of extensive public opinion data from eighteen Latin American countries, I provide robust evidence that preferences are consistent with FDI's effects on income. There is relatively little support for alternate explanations including concerns about job security, opposition to privatization, and the socializing effects of higher education on economic policy preferences.

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Rukavisnjikov, Vladimir. "The Russians and the American 'war on terrorism': Lessons learned after September 11." Medjunarodni problemi 54, no. 4 (2002): 379–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp0204379r.

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Paper deals with the Russian perception of the American 'war against terrorism' started after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon. It shows how the Russian attitudes towards the American foreign policy have changed during the first year of this war - from September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2002. The American 'global war on terrorism' is reviving and crystallizing deep-seated cultural and ideological differences between the United States and Russia and becoming a factor jeopardizing global stability. The analysis is based on data of opinion surveys, official documents and messages conveyed to the public by the national electronic and printed media.

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BIBERMAN, YELENA. "How We Know What We Know about Pakistan: New York Times news production, 1954–71." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 5 (September 2017): 1598–625. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000901.

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AbstractThis article explores public knowledge creation by examining how the New York Times produced Pakistan news between 1954 and 1971, the formative period of United States of America (USA)–Pakistan relations. These years encapsulate not only the heyday of cooperation between the two governments, but also the American public's first major introduction to the South Asian country by the increasingly intrepid news media. A leader in shaping that introduction was the New York Times. While most studies of the American media focus on measuring the effect of news exposure and content on public opinion, this article focuses on the theoretically underexplored aspect of news production: foreign news gathering. With a lens on South Asia, it shows that foreign news gathering involves the straddling of on-the-ground political and logistical constraints that generate an atmosphere of high uncertainty. By exploring the limitations on news gathering faced by America's leading newspaper's foreign correspondents in Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, this article identifies an important historical source of the ambiguity characterizing USA–Pakistan relations. The findings are based on recently released archival material that offers rare insight into the news-production process.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Taiwan – Foreign public opinion, American'

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