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Journal articles on the topic 'Supervenience'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 9 March 2023

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1

Binhi, Vladimir. "D. Chalmers’ argument from logical supervenience in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness." Философская мысль, no. 4 (April 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2021.4.35459.

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The subject of this research is D. Chalmers’ argument in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness –sentience or qualia – explanation on the basis of dualism of the low-level physical and high-level mental propertoes of the brain. The dualism of properties in the philosophy of consciousness means that consciousness is a high-level property, supervenient on the physical properties of the brain. Chalmers introduces the concept of logical supervenience and explains the phenomenal consciousness by the fact that psychical properties are supervenient on physical properties naturally, rather than logically. This comprises the essence of Chalmers' concept of naturalistic dualism. The article reviews the concept of supervenience in most commonly used form, and the definition of logical and natural supervenience. Supervenience becomes logical and/or natural due to the fact that its definition includes the modal term “possibility”, which concedes different interpretations: possibility by virtue of the laws of nature – nomic possibility, and logical possibility. The author demonstrates that the definition of logical supervenience, which leans on the concept of identity, makes sense only in the context of transtemporal, rather than transworld identity. Such circumstance substantially changes the meaning of the definition of logical supervenience. The novelty of this work consists in showing that unlike the logical and natural possibilities, logical and natural supervenience are different names for the same type of relationship. The conclusion is formulated that naturalistic dualism, which claims their fundamental difference, cannot explain the phenomenal consciousness using this distinction.

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2

Ladyman, James. "Supervenience: Not local and not two-way." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 630. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04250142.

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This commentary argues that Ross & Spurrett (R&S) have not shown that supervenience is two-way, but they have shown that all the sciences, including physics, make use of functional and supervenient properties. The entrenched defender of Kim's position could insist that only fundamental physics describes causal relations directly, but Kim's microphysical reductionism becomes completely implausible when we consider contemporary physics.

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3

DE DONATO RODRÍGUEZ, Xavier, and Marek POLANSKI. "Superveniencia, propiedades maximales y teoría de modelos (Supervenience, Maximal Properties, and Model Theory)." THEORIA 21, no. 3 (September 6, 2006): 257–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.520.

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We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general.

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4

Noonan, Harold W. "Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited." Metaphysica 21, no. 1 (April 28, 2020): 151–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0004.

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AbstractBlackburn argues against naturalistic moral realism. He argues that there is no conceptual entailment from satisfying a naturalistic predicate to satisfying a moral predicate. But the moral is conceptually supervenient on the natural. However, this conjunction of conceptual supervenience with lack of conceptual entailment is something the non-realist can explain, but the realist cannot. I argue first that Blackburn’s best formulation of his challenge is his first one. Subsequently he reformulates it as a demand for a ‘ban on mixed worlds’. Critics have directed their arguments against this formulation but they are ineffective against Blackburn’s first formulation. My second thesis is, even so formulated the realist can meet the challenge. The bare conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural can be given a realist explanation by understanding names of moral properties as descriptive names of natural properties.

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5

Gouvea, Rodrigo A. dos S. "Physicalism without identity." Trans/Form/Ação 43, no. 2 (June 2020): 253–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43n2.14.p253.

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Abstract This paper presents and discusses the most influential attempts to characterize physicalism without postulating relations of identity between the physical and the prima facie non-physical. The first section deals with a possible criticism that these attempts are misguided, since they contradict the physicalist slogan “everything there is physical.” In the second section, I elucidate the different formulations of the physicalist supervenience claim, and argue that none of them consists in an adequate characterization of physicalism. Three reasons are given in favor of this conclusion: their compatibility with forms of dualism (or pluralism); the fact that the supervenience relation is left unexplained; and Kim’s causal exclusion argument, which asserts that merely supervenient entities (i.e., ones that are not in identity relations with strictly physical entities) must be epiphenomenal. The third section presents the general features of another identity-independent attempt to characterize physicalism, namely realization physicalism. According to this view, tokens of prima facie non-physical types are realized by tokens of strictly physical types performing functional roles that specify the nature of the former. The third section also shows how realization physicalism deals with the objections that make physicalist supervenience claims inadequate for characterizing physicalism.

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6

Noonan, H. W. "Supervenience." Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 146 (January 1987): 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220062.

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7

Ridge, Michael. "Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience." Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, no. 3 (2007): 330–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468107083248.

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AbstractIn this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how Shafer-Landau's proffered strategy to explain supervenience not only fails to explain supervenience, but that it also has a number of implausible consequences. The more general lesson is that strategies which may work well for explaining supervenience in the philosophy of mind and other areas cannot be assumed to carry over successfully to the metaethical context. We should therefore treat so-called 'companions in guilt' arguments in this area of philosophy with considerable skepticism.

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8

Zangwill, Nick. "Moral Supervenience." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 240–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/msp19952015.

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9

Zagwill, Nick. "Explaining Supervenience." Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 509–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1997_15.

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10

Hendel, Giovanna. "Psychophysical Supervenience." Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 115–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2002_27.

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11

Carlin, Laurence. "ASCRIPTIVE SUPERVENIENCE." Southwest Philosophy Review 13, no. 1 (1997): 47–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview19971315.

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12

Loewer, Barry. "Humean Supervenience." Philosophical Topics 24, no. 1 (1996): 101–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199624112.

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13

Papineau, D. "Why supervenience?" Analysis 50, no. 2 (March 1, 1990): 66–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/50.2.66.

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14

ZANGWILL, NICK. "Moral Supervenience." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20, no. 1 (September 1995): 240–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1995.tb00315.x.

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15

Heil, John. "Supervenience Deconstructed." European Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 2 (August 1998): 146–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00055.

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16

Hattiangadi, Anandi. "Moral supervenience." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3-4 (2018): 592–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1436034.

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AbstractIt is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.

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17

Reza, Juan Rolando. "Java supervenience." Computer Languages, Systems & Structures 38, no. 1 (April 2012): 73–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cl.2011.08.002.

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18

Newman, Micah. "Chemical supervenience." Foundations of Chemistry 10, no. 1 (February 13, 2007): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10698-006-9029-3.

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19

Robson, David. "Topological supervenience." Synthese 193, no. 9 (September 15, 2015): 2865–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0891-1.

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20

Morris, Kevin. "Supervenience Physicalism, Emergentism, and the Polluted Supervenience Base." Erkenntnis 79, no. 2 (May 29, 2013): 351–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9497-5.

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21

Zhong, Lei. "Why Causation is Biconditional but not Proportional." American Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 3 (July 1, 2022): 263–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.04.

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Abstract In this article, I defend a biconditional counterfactual account of causation, which places equal emphasis on what I call “the presence condition” and “the absence condition,” whereas Lewis's classical counterfactual theory focuses only on the absence condition. I attempt to show that biconditionalism provides a promising treatment of supervenient causation, namely, causal cases involving the supervenience relationship. Although some philosophers confuse this account with the proportionality constraint on causation, I argue that biconditionalism is distinct from and superior to proportionalism in accommodating our reliable causal intuitions.

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22

Marras, Ausonio. "Functionalism without multiple supervenience." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 632. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04270145.

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Multiple supervenience is a problematic notion whose role can well be served by a contextualized or properly restricted standard notion of supervenience. It is furthermore not needed to defend functionalism against Kim's charge that cross-classifying taxonomies imply a serious form of dualism; nor does Ross & Spurrett's (R&S's) Kitcherian account of the metaphysics of causation crucially depend on multiple supervenience.

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23

Scheutz, Matthias. "“Causation” is only part of the answer." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 634–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04300142.

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Although Ross & Spurrett (R&S) successfully fend off the threat of Kim's “supervenience argument” by showing that it conflates different notions of causation, their proposal for a dynamic systems answer to the mind-body problem is itself yet another supervenience claim in need of an explanation that justifies it. The same goes for their notion of “multiple supervenience.”

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24

DEMPSEY, LIAM P. "Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience." Dialogue 51, no. 3 (September 2012): 373–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217312000662.

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In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates dispels the spectre epiphenomenalism, squares nicely both with the phenomenology of embodiment and the subjectivity of experience, and does not conflict with the supposed multiple realizability of consciousness.

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25

Ruben, David-Hillel. "Beyond Supervenience and Construction." Journal of Social Ontology 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 121–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2014-0033.

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AbstractI assume that identity theories and reductive strategies generally about the relationship between both the physical and the mental and the non-social and the social fail and I remind the reader why this is so. The mind cannot be reduced to body and the social (and this includes social action) cannot be reduced to what goes on in the minds of individuals and to their non-social actions, even when physical environment is added to the allegedly reducing base. I canvass two alternatives: supervenience and constructivism. My discussion of supervenience is by way of a survey of the work of others. Supervenience turns out to be too ‘brute’ a relation to account for the mind-body or the nonsocial-social relationships (I explain the idea of ‘brute’ in the paper). Supervenience is essentially a co-variance relation and even if the social were to supervene on the nonsocial, or the mental on the physical, supervenience leaves that co-variance inexplicable and mysterious. I ask whether constructivist solutions could explain the co-variance between levels any better (I look specifically at the work of John Searle) and I raise some issues with regard to the ability of constructivism to explain these relationships. Searle sees the institutional and social world through the perspective of various levels, in ways similar to the way in which the reductionist and the supervenience theorists did. My main argument is to offer an analogue problem for constructivism that was raised for supervenience. I conclude that constructivism could escape the problem of ‘brute’ co-variation between levels only by adopting a thoroughgoing irrealist perspective on the institutional and social.

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26

Ristic, Sanela, and Zivan Lazovic. "Consciousness, supervenience, and reduction." Theoria, Beograd 53, no. 3 (2010): 27–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1003027r.

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The main topic of this paper is the question whether, and to what extent, the supervenience theses may help us in dealing with the problem of the consciousness and understanding the relation between mantal and physical properties. In the first two sections, the content and versions of the supervenience theses are specified and illustrated on some recent views like emergentism and Davidson's anomalious monism. The following sections deal with connections between the supervenience theses and types of reduction which are usually employed within the science. The conclusion is that the supervenience theses is not of a great avail in resolving the problem of consciossnes because it only points out to a covariance of mental and physical properties without suggesting any account why such-and-such neural mechanisms and processes give rise to specific mental properties.

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27

Hill, Christopher S., and Mark Rowlands. "Supervenience and Materialism." Philosophical Review 107, no. 1 (January 1998): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998318.

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28

Zangwill, Nick. "Long Live Supervenience." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50, no. 4 (1992): 319. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431405.

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29

McFetridge, I. G. "Supervenience, Realism, Necessity." Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 140 (July 1985): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2218904.

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30

Peterson, Gregory R. "Emergence and Supervenience." Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical 29, no. 3 (2002): 23–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/traddisc2002/200329337.

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31

Post, John F. "Sense and Supervenience." Philo 4, no. 2 (2001): 123–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philo20014211.

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32

Corabi, Joseph A. "Purified by supervenience." Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 3.2, no. 2 (2015): 149–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.19079/metodo.3.2.149.

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33

Parsons, Terence. "Tropes and Supervenience." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, no. 3 (September 1991): 629. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107884.

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34

Stalnaker, Robert. "Varieties of Supervenience." Noûs 30 (1996): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216245.

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35

Douven, I. "STYLE AND SUPERVENIENCE." British Journal of Aesthetics 39, no. 3 (March 1, 1999): 255–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/39.3.255.

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36

Fodor, Jerry, and Martin Davies. "Individualism and Supervenience." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60, no. 1 (July 1, 1986): 235–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/60.1.235.

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37

Caston, Victor. "ARISTOTLE AND SUPERVENIENCE." Southern Journal of Philosophy 31, S1 (March 1993): 107–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb00696.x.

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38

Leuenberger, Stephan. "Supervenience in Metaphysics." Philosophy Compass 3, no. 4 (July 2008): 749–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00150.x.

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39

Hick, D. H. "Aesthetic Supervenience Revisited." British Journal of Aesthetics 52, no. 3 (July 5, 2012): 301–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ays024.

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40

Humphreys, Paul. "Emergence, Not Supervenience." Philosophy of Science 64 (December 1997): S337—S345. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392612.

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41

Mogi, Ken. "Supervenience and qualia." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 5 (October 1999): 844–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99392190.

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The privileged position of neural activity in biological neuroscience might be justified on the grounds of the nonlinear and all-or-none character of neural firing. To justify the neuron doctrine in cognitive neuroscience and make it both plausible and radical, we must consider the supervenience of elementary mental properties such as qualia on neural activity.

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42

Heil, John. "III-Aristotelian Supervenience." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 115, no. 1pt1 (April 2015): 41–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00383.x.

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43

Bonevac, Daniel. "Semantics and supervenience." Synthese 87, no. 3 (June 1991): 331–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00499816.

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44

Steinberg, Alex. "Defining Global Supervenience." Erkenntnis 79, no. 2 (June 21, 2013): 367–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9498-4.

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45

Van Cleve, James. "Supervenience and closure." Philosophical Studies 58, no. 3 (March 1990): 225–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00368283.

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46

Kincaid, Harold. "Supervenience and explanation." Synthese 77, no. 2 (November 1988): 251–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00869436.

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47

ZANGWILL, NICK. "Long Live Supervenience." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50, no. 4 (September 1, 1992): 319–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540_6245.jaac50.4.0319.

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48

Bovens, Luc. "Principles of supervenience." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 3 (September 1994): 294–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409412346111.

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49

Jack, Andrew. "Materialism and supervenience." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 4 (December 1994): 426–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409412346241.

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50

Von Kutschera, Franz. "Supervenience and reductionism." Erkenntnis 36, no. 3 (May 1992): 333–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00204133.

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