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1
Hendel, Giovanna Enrica. "Psychophysical supervenience." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.323131.
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Lee, Barry John. "Co-location and microphysical supervenience." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.270565.
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Pérez, Diana Inés. "Some Problems for Aesthethic Supervenience." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112789.
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In the last half century,there were several attempts to adopt the notion of supervenience in order to shed light on the claim of generality that is involved in aesthetic judgments. In this paper I will show the difficulties brought up by the transposition of the notion of supervenience from other areas of philosophy to the philosophy of art and I will also show the intrinsic difficulties of this project. First, I will revise the origins of the notion of supervenience in contemporary ethics and philosophy of mind, as well as the theoretical framework in which this notion was first introduced. Second, I will revise the arguments for and against aesthetic supervenience in the field of analytic philosophy of art. In the rest of this work, I will try to argue against the viability of applying this notion to the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. I will point out the difficulties of identifying the base properties of such relationship, and then the difficulties of identifying the supervenient properties. In this way I will show that there are good reasons to argue that it will not be fruitful to use the notion of supervenience in order to understand the peculiarities of aesthetic judgments. Finally, I will point out a number of additional difficulties for the thesis of aesthetic supervenience which do not seem able to be satisfactorily solved.En el último medio siglo se ha intentado adoptar la noción de supervenienciapara echar luz sobre la pretensión de generalidad que hay involucrada en el juicio estético. En este trabajo voy a mostrar las dificultades que genera esta transposición de la noción de superveniencia desde otros ámbitos de la filosofía ala filosofía del arte. Voy a mostrar también las dificultades que conlleva este proyecto. En primer lugar, repasaré los orígenes de la noción de superveniencia en la ética y la filosofía de la mente contemporáneas, así como el marco teórico dentro del cual esta noción fue introducida. En segundo lugar, revisaré los argumentos a favor y en contra de la superveniencia estética que se han sucedido en el ámbito de la filosofía analítica del arte. En el resto del trabajo intentaré argumentar en contra de la viabilidad de aplicar la noción de superveniencia a la relación entre las propiedades estéticas y las no-estéticas de un objeto. Señalaré primero las dificultades para identificar las propiedades que deberían considerarse la base de tal relación, y luego las dificultades para identificar las propiedades supervenientes. De esta manera, mostraré que hay buenas razones para sostener que no es fructífero utilizar la noción de superveniencia para avanzar en la comprensión de la peculiaridad del juicio estético. Finalmente, mencionaré una serie de dificultades adicionales para la tesis de la superveniencia estética que no parecen poder resolverse satisfactoriamente.
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Rowlands, Mark. "Anomalism, supervenience, and explanation in cognitive psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d22daaac-1094-424e-91ce-dc39e9da644f.
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This thesis defends the claim that the principle of methodological solipsism can play no role in the formation of the theories of cognitive psychology. Corresponding to this negative claim, but assuming a comparatively minor role, will be the positive claim that a scientific psychology ought to deal in explanations which relate mental states in virtue of their semantic contents. The basis of the case against methodological solipsism is the claim that the explanatory properties invoked by this principle are indivlduation dependent on properties of semantic content. In Chapter I the idea of methodological solipsism will be discussed, and two forms distinguished. One of the versions of methodological solipsism identified invokes the explanatory notion of the narrow content of a mental state. The other version invokes the notion of formal or syntactic properties possessed by mental states. In both cases it will be argued that these properties can be identified only by way of the semantic contents of their associated mental states. The notion of narrow content will be discussed in Chapter II. The case against that version of methodological solipsism which invokes syntactic properties will be constructed in Chapters III-V. The latter argument constitutes the bulk of the thesis, and derives from considerations centred around the principles of anomalism, supervenience, and the relation between them. These arguments are intended to be of independent interest as solutions to certain persistent problems in the philosophy of mind.
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Van, Iersel Eric. "Beyond supervenience, an alternative approach to the mental-physical relation." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/MQ65058.pdf.
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VAZ, RAFAEL DE OLIVEIRA. "CAUSATION, IDENTITY AND SUPERVENIENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9108@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROProcurando formular o conceito de mente, a Filosofia da Mente se baseou em três noções fundamentais: causação, identidade e superveniência. A crença na dicotomia entre aspectos físicos e aspectos inextensos de nossa experiência permanece um problema de considerável dificuldade. A possibilidade de diálogo tanto em uma teoria monista quanto dualista é dificultada porque cada abordagem demanda por um princípio, uma relação ou operação que solucione o problema da ligação entre corpo, mente e mundo. Noções subseqüentes, como intencionalidade, consciência ou qualia, permanecerão fechadas em seus próprios escopos conceituais. Por este motivo, analisar como cada noção fundamental é empregada auxilia na compreensão de restrições e avanços, permitindo desde a definição dos métodos apropriados de tratamento aos problemas de cada domínio às teorias que melhor se adequarão às suas possíveis resoluções.
Trying to formulate the concept of mind, the Philosophy of the Mind has based itself on three fundamental notions: causation, identity and supervenience. The belief in the dichotomy between physical aspects and inextense aspects of our experience remains a problem of considerable difficulty. The possibility of dialogue as much in a dualist as in a monist theory is hardened because each boarding demands for a principle, a relation or operation to solve the problem of linking body, mind and world. Subsequent notions, as intentionality, consciousness or qualia, will remain closed in its proper conceptual scopes. For this reason, to analyze as each fundamental notion is used assists in the understanding of restrictions and advances, allowing since the definition of appropriate methods of treatment to the problems of each domain to the theories that will suit better to its possible resolutions.
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Brown, Helen Angela. "The relation between social and individualistic phenomena : reduction, determination or supervenience." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1991. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1131/.
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This thesis aims to analyse in detail the metaphysical relation between social and individualistic phenomena. Social phenomena are taken to include social entities such as institutions or social groups, the social properties of these social entities and also the social properties of individuals. Individualistic phenomena include physical, physiological and mental or psychological properties of individuals. Chapter 1 considers whether social phenomena could be reduced to individualistic phenomena. A discussion of reduction, in so far as it would be applicable to the metaphysical relation between social and individualistic phenomena, reveals that this relation cannot be the one which holds between social and individualistic phenomena. In Chapter 2 a weaker relation than reduction is considered, viz the relation of determination. This is found to hold promise, especially in so far as it captures the relation between mental and physical phenomena. Reasons are considered which make it likely that this relation could be applied to social and individualistic phenomena. Chapter 3 considers a detailed formulation of one specific version of determination: supervenience. Again, the relation as it is applied to mental and physical phenomena is discussed, some objections are raised to it and modifications suggested. This relation is applied to the social-individualistic case in Chapter 4. Examples of its application are analysed and some doubts are raised as to the scope of its application. In this version it applies only to the social and individualistic properties of people. In the final chapter, the relation of supervenience is generalized in order that its application to the relation between social and individual phenomena be extended to cover the relation between social entities and their properties as well as the social properties of individuals. It is shown that all these aspects of the social can be taken to supervene on individualistic phenomena. In this respect, supervenience is shown to be at least a potential candidate for the relation holding between social and individualistic phenomena. Some caveats are raised in the conclusion.
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Kyriacou, Christos. "Epistemic justification puzzle." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/5608.
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The thesis explores the semantics of epistemic justification discourse, a very important part of overall epistemic discourse. It embarks from a critical examination of referentialist theories to arrive at a certain nonreferential, expressivist approach to the semantics of epistemic justification discourse. That is, it criticizes the main referentialist theories and then goes on to argue for an expressivist approach on the basis of its theoretical capacity to outflank the problems referentialist theories meet. In the end, I also identify some problems for a prominent expressivist theory and, as a response to these problems, propose a novel norm-expressivist approach that seems to evade these problems. In particular, in Ch.1 I introduce what I call ‘the epistemic justification puzzle’ and then in Chs.2-4 criticize naturalistic referential theories: analytic naturalistic reductionism, synthetic naturalistic reductionism and epistemic kinds realism. In Ch.5 I criticize nonnaturalist referential theories: what I call ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism and J.McDowell’s (1994) more sophisticated quietist version of nonnaturalism. Next, in Ch.6 I introduce the semantic programme of expressivism and go on to construct a simple version of epistemic norm-expressivism (inspired by A.Gibbard (1990)) in order to explain how expressivism can easily outflank the identified problems of referentialist theories. This simple norm-expressivist theory, however, is only used as a theoretical ‘toy’ for the mere sake of motivating the possibility of expressivism, as in Ch.7 I go on to argue for a more sophisticated version of norm-expressivism: habitsendorsement expressivism. In Ch.7 I introduce a prominent expressivist theory of moral and knowledge discourses, namely, plan-reliance expressivism (credited to A.Gibbard (2003, 2008)) and extend it cover the epistemic justification discourse. I then identify some problems for plan-reliance expressivism as extended to cover justification discourse and in response to these problems propose habits-endorsement expressivism. Habits-endorsement expressivism builds on the intuition that (justified) belief-fixation is habitual and exploits the theoretical flexibility of the notion of habits in order to overcome the identified problems of plan-reliance expressivism.
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Mitchell, Steven Cole. "Against Metaethical Descriptivism: The Semantic Problem." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/202935.
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In my dissertation I argue that prominent descriptivist metaethical views face a serious semantic problem. According to standard descriptivism, moral thought and discourse purports to describe some ontology of moral properties and/or relations: e.g., the term `good' purports to refer to some property or cluster of properties. Central to any such theory, then, is the recognition of certain items of ontology which, should they actually exist, would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts. And since one commonly accepted feature of moral thought and discourse is a supervenience constraint, descriptivists hold that any ontology suitable for morality would have to supervene upon non-moral ontology. But this lands descriptivists with the task of providing a semantic account capable of relating this ontology to moral terms and concepts. That is, they must explain why it is that certain items of ontology and not others would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts, in a way that is consistent with the supervenience constraint. I argue that this important explanatory task cannot be carried out. And because the problem generalizes from metaethics to all normativity, we are left with good reason to pursue alternatives to descriptivist accounts of normative semantics.
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Johansson, Magnus. "Kvasirealistisk Motivation." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Philosophy, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8301.
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Beckman, Emma. "Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8770.
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Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.
This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.
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Barragan, Oscar R. "The puzzling nature of material objects: A study of co-location." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2015. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/332590.
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PhilosophyPh.D.
My goal in this dissertation is to analyze the question, why is co-location a problem for the metaphysics of material objects? I believe that the existing literature on the topic identifies three possible answers to this question: Either, (i) co-location is a problem because it violates the no-coincidence principle, or because (ii) co-location violates the claim that the best available explanation for the relationship between objects that share the same empirically discriminable properties is the relationship of numerical identity, or finally because (iii) co-location violates the thesis of microphysical determination. I argue that (i), (ii), and (iii) are not sufficient reasons to think that co-location is metaphysically problematic, and that a denial of these assumptions does not warrant a rejection of co-location. I maintain that, instead, if co-location is a problem, it is so in virtue of violating a more basic assumption. Co-location is a problem for the view that the individuation and persistence conditions of any given material object is completely and solely determined by the physical or material properties of such an object. I advance reasons to believe that the latter view is fundamental in the sense that (i), (ii), and (iii), are consequences of it, and that co-location is in conflict with (i), (ii) and (iii), because it questions the basic physicalist view that provides the conditions for (i), (ii), and (iii). The fact that (i), (ii) and (iii) depend on the belief that physical properties exhaust the individuation and persistence of material objects, explains why they are not good reasons against co-location: They cannot establish that co-location is a problem for an account of material objects because they depend on the belief that co-location denies. Therefore, (i), (ii), and (iii) provide no more than three different ways of begging the question against co-location. I argue that, in order to show that co-location is a problem, we must show that physicalism with respect to material objects is the correct, or at least the most plausible, metaphysics of material objects, and this is something that neither (i), (ii), or (iii) can show. This statement of the relationship between co-location and anti-colocation reasons is also a contribution to the discussion of co-location.
Temple University--Theses
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Robson, David. "A study in metaphysics for free will : using models of causality, determinism and supervenience in the search for free will." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2014. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/48781/.
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We have two main aims: to construct mathematical models for analysing determinism, causality and supervenience; and then to use these to demonstrate the possibility of constructing an ontic construal of the operation of free will - one requiring both the presentation of genuine alternatives to an agent and their selecting between them in a manner that permits the attribution of responsibility. Determinism is modelled using trans-temporal ontic links between discrete juxtaposed universe states and shown to be distinct from predictability. Causality is defined on a temporal sequence of δ-algebras and quantified using a measure. The measure leads to definitions of causal overdetermination and epiphenomena. Proofs are constructed to demonstrate deterministic universes must carry their properties essentially but not necessarily locally. We argue determinism and causality are separate doctrines. These models and results are marshalled to put the case that a counterfactual construal of ontic choice cannot work. In response we propose ‘immanence' - a modified form of indeterminism whereby a universe can present choices to its denizens. We prove that beings subsumed within a universe cannot pilot their own actions. We then argue these beings can exercise free will only when selecting between choices inhering within immanent relata. A being is responsible for its selections if and only if it is constituted of a temporally evolving deterministic substructure. Our proposal is novel: it avoids injecting indeterminism into the decision process. Topological models for property supervenience are developed and used to reconstruct standard definitions from the literature. These are then used to demonstrate considerations of supervenience do not affect our arguments. We have demonstrated that a model of the exercise of free will involving both genuine choices and responsibility is possible but can only operate within a non-deterministic universe possessing specific traits.
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Medlow, Sharon Denise. "Mechanisms of mental causation: An examination of the theories of Anomalous Monism and Direct Realism with regard to their proposals concerning the causal role of human mentality in the natural world." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/678.
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One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor's thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson's proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.
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Medlow, Sharon Denise. "Mechanisms of mental causation: An examination of the theories of Anomalous Monism and Direct Realism with regard to their proposals concerning the causal role of human mentality in the natural world." University of Sydney. Psychology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/678.
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One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor�s thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson�s proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.
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Sias, James. "Naturalism and Moral Realism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/21.
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My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.
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Melin, Eva. "Social delaktighet i teori och praktik : Om barns sociala delaktighet i förskolans verksamhet." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för pedagogik och didaktik, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-87845.
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This thesis seeks to explain social participation in pre-schools for children with and without Down’s syndrome. The explanation is achieved by use of an explanatory model of social participation, designed on the basis of critical realism, which has been used in an empirical study of how social participation emerges in practice. Mechanisms have been abstracted. It is assumed that recognition mechanism produces social participation and reification mechanism social exclusion. The results show that the agency of the personnel affects the possibilities for the recognition mechanism to produce social participation. Within the agency of the personnel, the internal relationship between the child perspective, i.e. how children's place in society is understood, and the relationship to the child's perspective, i.e. how children's participation is regarded, either prevents or makes possible activation of the mechanism. The child perspective has, through the empirical study, been seen to take two different forms: either that children are similar, with similar needs, or that they are different, with different needs. If children are defined as similar, the structures will accommodate all children, enabling them to be socially involved in the same activities. If children are defined as different, different structures are created for different groups of children. Groups are segregated from each other, preventing the children from being socially involved in joint activities. The relationship to the child's perspective has emerged in relation to the roles of the child as an agent, as a collective subject, and as an individual subject. The role definition affects the degree of constraint imposed on the possibilities for action that are offered, and thus affects the opportunity costs and degrees of freedom of the children. These determine the activation of recognition mechanism and social participation in the situation.
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Miller, Elizabeth Louise. "No Metaphysics within Physics?" Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11403.
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This dissertation has three parts. In "Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience," I defend David Lewis's metaphysical doctrine of Humean supervenience, and traditional metaphysical reductionism more generally, against an alleged holistic threat encapsulated in the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, realism about quantum mechanics is compatible with Humean reductionism.Philosophy
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Almeida, Júnior José Gladstone. "Análise da teoria da superveniência da consciência." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFC, 2014. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/22541.
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ALMEIDA JÚNIOR, José Gladstone. Análise da teoria da superveniência da consciência. 2014. 93f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014.Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-17T13:51:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5)
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Certainly consciousness is something extremely familiar and, at the same time, enigmatic for us. Its phenomenal aspect, called phenomenal consciousness, imposes a number of barriers to reductionist approaches proposed by physicist/functionalist framework. Such are the difficulties raised by phenomenal consciousness to that reductionist approaches that the problem concerning that aspect of consciousness is the “hard problem of consciousness”. Considering its apparent irreducibility, it is necessary to analyze a framework which have as core an attempt to conciliate the phenomenal consciousness with a minimum commitment with physicalism, insofar as the necessity of a physical substrate that instantiates our conscious experiences is presupposed. Given that impasse the supervenience of consciousness theory arises with the aim of demonstrating a relation of dependence/determination established between the set of consciousness proprieties and the set of physical proprieties of the brain without, however, necessarily entailing a reduction of the former to the last set. Thus, the aim established in this work consist in analyzing in details the supervenience of consciousness theory and the framework which it inserts and, posteriorly, arguing about the reasons that make that theory unable to provide a substantial relation between consciousness and its physical substrate.
Certamente a consciência é algo extremamente familiar e, ao mesmo tempo, enigmático para nós. Seu aspecto fenomenal, denominado de consciência fenomenal, impõe inúmeras barreiras às abordagens reducionistas propostas pelo quadro teórico fisicista/funcionalista. Tamanhas são as dificuldades suscitadas pela consciência fenomenal a estas abordagens reducionistas que o problema referente a este aspecto da consciência constitui o “problema difícil da consciência”. Considerando sua aparente irredutibilidade, se faz necessário analisar um quadro teórico que tenha como cerne a tentativa de conciliar a consciência fenomenal com um compromisso mínimo com o fisicismo, na medida em que se pressupõe a necessidade de um substrato físico que instancie nossas experiências conscientes. Diante deste impasse a teoria da superveniência da consciência surge com o objetivo de demonstrar uma relação de dependência/determinação estabelecida entre o conjunto de propriedades da consciência e o conjunto de propriedades físicas do cérebro sem, no entanto, implicar necessariamente em uma redução do primeiro ao segundo conjunto. Desta forma, o objetivo estabelecido neste trabalho consiste em analisar pormenorizadamente a teoria da superveniência da consciência e o quadro teórico no qual esta se insere e, posteriormente, argumentar sobre os motivos que fazem desta uma teoria incapaz de fornecer uma relação substancial entre a consciência e seu substrato físico.
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Junior, Josà Gladstone Almeida. "AnÃlise da teoria da superveniÃncia da consciÃncia." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2014. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=19213.
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CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel SuperiorCertamente a consciÃncia à algo extremamente familiar e, ao mesmo tempo, enigmÃtico para nÃs. Seu aspecto fenomenal, denominado de consciÃncia fenomenal, impÃe inÃmeras barreiras Ãs abordagens reducionistas propostas pelo quadro teÃrico fisicista/funcionalista. Tamanhas sÃo as dificuldades suscitadas pela consciÃncia fenomenal a estas abordagens reducionistas que o problema referente a este aspecto da consciÃncia constitui o âproblema difÃcil da consciÃnciaâ. Considerando sua aparente irredutibilidade, se faz necessÃrio analisar um quadro teÃrico que tenha como cerne a tentativa de conciliar a consciÃncia fenomenal com um compromisso mÃnimo com o fisicismo, na medida em que se pressupÃe a necessidade de um substrato fÃsico que instancie nossas experiÃncias conscientes. Diante deste impasse a teoria da superveniÃncia da consciÃncia surge com o objetivo de demonstrar uma relaÃÃo de dependÃncia/determinaÃÃo estabelecida entre o conjunto de propriedades da consciÃncia e o conjunto de propriedades fÃsicas do cÃrebro sem, no entanto, implicar necessariamente em uma reduÃÃo do primeiro ao segundo conjunto. Desta forma, o objetivo estabelecido neste trabalho consiste em analisar pormenorizadamente a teoria da superveniÃncia da consciÃncia e o quadro teÃrico no qual esta se insere e, posteriormente, argumentar sobre os motivos que fazem desta uma teoria incapaz de fornecer uma relaÃÃo substancial entre a consciÃncia e seu substrato fÃsico.
Certainly consciousness is something extremely familiar and, at the same time, enigmatic for us. Its phenomenal aspect, called phenomenal consciousness, imposes a number of barriers to reductionist approaches proposed by physicist/functionalist framework. Such are the difficulties raised by phenomenal consciousness to that reductionist approaches that the problem concerning that aspect of consciousness is the âhard problem of consciousnessâ. Considering its apparent irreducibility, it is necessary to analyze a framework which have as core an attempt to conciliate the phenomenal consciousness with a minimum commitment with physicalism, insofar as the necessity of a physical substrate that instantiates our conscious experiences is presupposed. Given that impasse the supervenience of consciousness theory arises with the aim of demonstrating a relation of dependence/determination established between the set of consciousness proprieties and the set of physical proprieties of the brain without, however, necessarily entailing a reduction of the former to the last set. Thus, the aim established in this work consist in analyzing in details the supervenience of consciousness theory and the framework which it inserts and, posteriorly, arguing about the reasons that make that theory unable to provide a substantial relation between consciousness and its physical substrate.
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Olson, Jonas. "Axiological Investigations." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala : Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis : Universitetsbiblioteket [distributör], 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-5751.
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Silveira, Neto Antônio Gonçalves da Mota. "O direito superveniente nos recursos extraordinário e especial." Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, 2009. http://tede2.unicap.br:8080/handle/tede/913.
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This present study focus on the supervenient law in the exceptionals petitions both “ extraordinário” and “ especial” . However, it is known that there are imposed limits that are included in the prequestioning and also the lawsuit, determined by specific moment of the process when analyzing the subjective elements and the objective elements, that must remains unchangeable. That way, the exceptional petitions can establish, first of all what is the most relevant, then the peculiarities and hypothesis that fits. It is also important to understand the subject to find elements which identify lawsuit, that is the triple identity and also the establishment of the lawsuit, genesis e use nowadays. After all, it is a way of searching searching an ideal system for this approach. At the end, the objective is to bring up together the institute representative, so that the two different areas in a litigation, respecting even the contradictory terms, the law act and also the right acquired, which can be a benefit of the ius superveniens
O presente trabalho foca no cabimento do direito superveniente nos recursos excepcionais, a saber: extraordinário e especial. Contudo, reconhece-se e respeita-se os limites impostos pela necessária exigência do prequestionamento, bem como pela estabilização de demanda, determinativa de que, após específico momento processual os elementos subjetivos(partes) e o elementos objetivos(causa de pedir e pedido), restam por inalteráveis. Procura-se, assim, caracterizar os recursos excepcionais, estabelecendo o que há de mais relevante em comum, depois as peculiaridades e hipóteses de cabimento. Ato contínuo, examina-se o prequestionamento e sua vertentes. Coloca-se também o necessário estudo dos elementos que identificam a demanda, isto é, a tríplice identidade, além de, posteriormente, a estabilização da demanda, sua gênese e aplicabilidade atual. Por fim, trata-se da temática proposta, buscando sistematizá-la. Busca-se, assim, conciliar os institutos propostos, para que as partes em litígio, uma vez respeitado o princípio do contraditório, o ato jurídico e o direito adquirido sejam, efetivamente, beneficiados com o ius superveniens.
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Bueno, Isabelle Ferrarini. "Da extinção do acordo de acionistas por causa superveniente." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/169684.
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O acordo de acionistas é instrumento que serve à adequação da disciplina societária aos interesses pessoais e patrimoniais dos acionistas. Tais acordos têm natureza jurídica contratual e parassocial, em razão de estarem intrinsecamente ligados aos pactos sociais. Em razão de serem contratos e, portanto, estarem submetidos à teoria geral dos contratos, e, ao mesmo tempo, estarem tão fortemente coligados à seara social, surgem dificuldades na resolução de questões limítrofes entre o direito civil e o direito societário. Esses problemas aparecem especialmente quando se trata da extinção por causa superveniente do acordo, existindo dúvidas na doutrina e na jurisprudência quanto à possibilidade de aplicação aos pactos parassociais das hipóteses de extinção aplicáveis aos contratos em geral. Com o objetivo de auxiliar na solução dessa questão, no presente estudo, são examinadas as causas supervenientes de extinção dos contratos, mais especificamente, as hipóteses de expiração de termo ou de implemento de condição resolutiva, de resilição, de resolução, por inadimplemento ou por onerosidade excessiva, de impossibilidade superveniente inimputável, de morte das partes, e, ainda, os cenários em que existe insolvência ou dissolução das partes ou da própria sociedade, os quais têm, após um exame genérico quanto a seus aspectos conceituais, verificada a sua aplicabilidade ao acordo de acionistas e os efeitos que produzem em sua esfera. São respeitados, contudo, os temperamentos necessários em decorrência de sua natureza parassocietária.The shareholders’ agreement is an instrument that serves the adequacy of the corporate discipline to the shareholders’ personal and equity interests. Such agreements have the legal nature of contracts that are inserted in the companies’ corporate structure, being intrinsically connected to the bylaws and to the companies’ articles of associations. Because they are contracts, and therefore are subject to the general theory of contracts, and at the same time are so strongly linked to the corporate sphere, difficulties arise in solving border issues between Civil Law and Corporate Law. These problems appear especially when it comes to the termination of the agreements because of supervening causes, leaving scholars and courts in doubt as to the possibility of applying to the shareholders’ agreements the extinction hypotheses applicable to contracts in general. With the aim of assisting in the solution of this issue, the present study examines the supervening causes of termination of shareholders’ agreements, more specifically, the hypothesis of expiration of the term or implementation of a condition, terminations with and without cause, unenforceable supervening impossibility, death of the parties, and also the scenarios in which there is insolvency or dissolution of the parties in the agreement or of the company itself, which, after a general examination of their conceptual aspects, were submitted to a verification concerning their applicability to the shareholders' agreement and concerning the effects to be produced on such agreements, respecting, however, their nature as contracts inserted in the corporate structure.
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Martins, José Tenório Bezerra. "A influência dos fatos supervenientes ao processo em andamento." Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, 2010. http://tede2.unicap.br:8080/handle/tede/889.
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The present work analyzes the Influence of the Supervenient Facts into the Progress Process, in face of the article 462 of the Brazilian Civil Process Code. The study begins, with emphasis in the juridical institute of the Lawsuit´s stabilization present at the two legal statutes and their devices, with the analysis of the comparative aspects between the Canonic Procedural Law and the Civil Procedural Law. It talks about the juridical institute of the demand´s cause, their theories that objective to define and put it and locate on which theory our CPC adopted it and, finally, analyzes the influence of these facts in face of article 462 of the CPC, its influence in face of the judged thing, the Open legal System, the Emergency in the Procedural System, the legal security, the relativização of the considered thing and the Modulation of the decisions of the Supreme Federal Court. The research method was based on the reading of the bibliography about the juridical institutes which have relation with the project´s theme, based on the jurisprudence of the National and Greater Tribunals, on the brazilian and foreign doctrine, and based on an concret case´s precedent. The results of the study made a better comprehension of the project, with an precedent´s indication, and it contributived to the objective´s execution, specially to the judgements of the Local Tribunals, of the Justice Superior Tribunal and of the Federal Superior Tribunal, with the modulation of their respective decisions.
Trata o trabalho de analisar a Influência dos fatos supervenientes ao processo em andamento, em face do artigo 462 do Código de Processo Civil. O estudo parte, com ênfase no instituto jurídico da Estabilização da demanda nos dois diplomas legais e seus respectivos dispositivos, da analise dos aspectos comparativos entre o Direito Processual Canônico e o Direito Processual Civil. Discorre sobre o instituto jurídico da causa de pedir, suas teorias que procuram defini-la e posiciona-se sobre qual teoria o nosso CPC a adotou e, por fim, analisa a influência desses fatos em face do artigo 462 do CPC, sua influência em face da coisa julgada, o Sistema jurídico Aberto, a Emergência no Sistema Processual, a segurança jurídica, a relativização da coisa julgada e a Modulação das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal. O método de pesquisa tomou por base a leitura do repertório bibliográfico sobre os institutos jurídicos que se relacionam com tema do projeto, com aporte na jurisprudência dos Tribunais Nacionais e Superiores, em doutrina, nacional e estrangeira, bem como abordado precedente de um caso concreto. Os resultados do estudo fizeram com que melhor esclarecesse o entendimento do projeto, com indicação de precedente, e contribuísse para o cumprimento do seu objetivo, especialmente aos julgados de Tribunais Locais, do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e do Supremo Tribunal Federal, com a modulação de suas respectivas decisões.
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Saint-Germier, Pierre. "Les arguments de concevabilité." Thesis, Lyon, École normale supérieure, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015ENSL0994.
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Les arguments de concevabilité sont des arguments philosophiques reposant sur le principe selon lequel tout ce qui est concevable est possible. Cette thèse se propose d'évaluer à un niveau général cette forme d'argumentation en s'appuyant sur des exemples historiques et contemporains. les arguments de concevabilité, quelle que soit la position philosophique qu'ils visent à défendre, soulèvent en effet des difficultés qui leur sont communes et ont trait principalement (i) à la définition de la notion de possibilitée, (ii) à la définition de la notion de concevabilité, et (iii) à la légitimité de l'inférence allant de l'une à l'autre. Le travail consiste d'abord (chapitres 1-3) à construire la catégorie que constituent les arguments de concevabilité en spécifiant notamment le genre de thèses philosophiques qu'ils peuvent chercher à établir. Une fois précisés les objectifs que les arguments de concevabilité peuvent viser, il s'engage (chapitres 4-8) dans l'examen de savoir si les ressources fournies par Ia concevabilité et l'inférence menant du concevable vers le possible suffisent à les atteindre. Pour ce faire, le travail propose une analyse détaillée des différentes formes de possibilité (chapitres 4-5) et de concevabilité (chapitres 6-8) impliquées dans ces arguments. II aboutit à une position dite sceptique modérée au sujet de la validité de cette forme d'argumentation, sur la base de la démonstration que, pour les thèses philosophiques qui nécessitent l'etablissement d'une possibilité métaphysique, la concevabilitée s'avère être un guide insuffisamment fiable, quelle que soit la manière dont on comprend la concevabilité. Mais il défend aussi l'idée que le fait que les arguments de concevabilité ne soient pas toujours concluants n'implique pas qu'ils sont depourvus d'utilité argumentative: car ils nous obligent à clarifier les implications modales de nos conceptions philosophiques et la manière dont nous pouvons raisonner au sujet de ces implications. Cette conception des arguments de concevabilité est appliquée pour finir à la clarification d'un chapitre essentiel de la philosophie de la cognition contemporaine relatif à la possibilité de fournir une explication naturaliste (physicaliste) de la conscience phénoménale, et ou un argument de concevabilité qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre, dit argument des zombis, joue un rôle essentielConceivability arguments are philosophical arguments which rely crucially on the principle according to which conceivability entails possibility. This dissertation provides an analysis and a critical assessment of this kind of argumentative strategy, on the basis of contemporary and historical examples. Various possible explanations of the notion of conceivability are considered and it is argued that the inference from conceivability to possibility does not enable conceivability arguments to reach all their intended conclusions, especially those pertaining to substantial metaphysical issues
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Silva, Rodrigo Tellechea. "Sociedades anônimas fechadas: direitos individuais dos acionistas e cláusula compromissória estatuária superveniente." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-11122015-090418/.
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A tese propõe uma análise multidisciplinar e dogmática da arbitragem societária, notadamente do processo de inclusão de cláusula compromissória no estatuto social de sociedades anônimas fechadas, com base em uma deliberação assemblear tomada pela regra da maioria (fase pré-arbitral). O ponto de partida do trabalho é o exame da dimensão jurídica do contrato de sociedade aliado à verificação dos limites da autonomia privada dos sócios na definição da estrutura do negócio jurídico societário, à compreensão da categoria dos direitos subjetivos e dos traços fundamentais que formam a tipologia das anônimas fechadas, incluindo o tratamento dado aos direitos individuais dos acionistas. Ato contínuo, desloca-se a discussão para as esferas arbitral e constitucional, com especial atenção para os pressupostos da arbitragem como método de resolução de conflitos. O cerne do trabalho reside na relação entre a situação subjetiva ativa do acionista de manifestar sua vontade favorável ou contrariamente à escolha da arbitragem e a eficácia da regra da maioria como pilar de funcionamento das sociedades anônimas. Sustenta-se que a escolha da arbitragem constitui um direito fundamental de todo o acionista, cuja renúncia depende de manifestação, expressa ou tácita, de sua vontade, a qual não pode ser elidida ou alterada pelo estatuto ou pela assembleia geral majoritária sem o seu consentimento. Após examinar as correntes doutrinárias sobre o tema no Brasil e as possíveis alternativas para resolver o imbróglio, o estudo concluiu que a alteração legislativa que cria uma hipótese adicional de recesso representa a melhor solução para a problemática.The thesis examines arbitration in corporate law, namely the inclusion of a statutory arbitration clause in the by-laws of a closely held corporation based on a deliberation taken by the majority rule (pre-arbitration phase). The study starts by analyzing the legal aspects of the corporate contract together with the limits of shareholders autonomy in defining the structure of such contract and the characteristics that form the typology of corporations, including shareholders individual rights. The discussion then moves on the arbitration and constitutional spheres, particularly to the premises of arbitration as a form of settling conflicts. The core of the thesis is the relation between the prerogative of a shareholder to express its will in favor of or against arbitration and the incidence of the full effects of the majority rule as an essential element in the structure of a corporation. The study sustains that the choice for arbitration is a fundamental right of all shareholders, which is why renunciation depends on their express or tacit individual manifestation and therefore, majority deliberation cannot in itself insert or remove it from by-laws. Finally, the thesis provides different scholars understandings on the issue as well as the main possible alternatives to dealt with it. The creation of an additional hypothesis of appraisal right within the existing law is suggested as the best solution to solve this conundrum.
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Brown, Robin Gordon. "The supervenient person : physicalist foundations for a mentalistic psychology." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.508055.
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Guibo, Antonio Rugero. "A Imutabilidade da causa de pedir e o fato superveniente no processo civil brasileiro." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2005. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/9114.
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Previous issue date: 2005-08-04nenhum
The present work is related to the study of the tension between, on one side, the necessity of the steadiness of the dispute by which the claimant is not allowed to modify the cause of action, and on the other side, the recognition that the new facts have to be taken into consideration by the judge, thus interfering on the judgement of the lawsuit. The main goal is to examine the origin and historic evolution of the cause of action as the identifying element of the lawsuit, to arrive at the study of the steadiness of the dispute theme in the comparative law, as well as in the Brazilian statutory law. Further, the problem is analyzed as the way it is presented in the current civil proceeding s system, where a parallel is made with a very similar but not identical institute, the contingency principle. Also the different implications of the preclusive characteristic of the res judicata are analysed, if it is related to a new fact which benefits the claimant and the defendant, as well as the relation of the steadiness theme of the lawsuit with the congruency and causality principles. Finally, the question is posed from the appeal theory point of view. The purpose of the present work is to seek a systematization of the concepts involved which allows the harmonization of the rules which will take to the steadiness of the lawsuit, due to the necessity of dealing with the new fact. Without prejudice to the discussion in respect to the theoretical aspects, it is intended not to lose track of the practical interest of seeking criteria capable of making operable, coherent and efficient the group formed by the above mentioned institutes, with the view to delimitate the exact reach of the immutability of the cause of action in the Brazilian civil proceeding s system, due to the appearance of new facts.
O presente trabalho volta-se para o estudo da tensão existente entre, de um lado, o imperativo da estabilização da demanda, segundo o qual é vedado ao autor alterar a causa petendi, e de outro, o reconhecimento de que os fatos supervenientes devem ser tomados em consideração pelo juiz, influindo, assim, no julgamento da lide. Busca-se, primeiramente, examinar a origem e evolução histórica da causa petendi, como elemento identificador da ação, para chegar ao estudo da temática da estabilização da demanda, tanto no direito comparado quanto no direito positivo brasileiro. Passa-se, então, à análise do problema tal como se apresenta no ordenamento processual em vigor, quando se traça um paralelo com um instituto bastante correlato, porém distinto, que é o princípio da eventualidade. Examinam-se, ainda, as diferentes implicações decorrentes da eficácia preclusiva da coisa julgada, conforme se trate de fato superveniente que beneficie o autor ou o réu, bem como a relação da temática da estabilização da demanda com os princípios da congruência e da causalidade. Por fim, coloca-se a questão sob a ótica da teoria dos recursos. O objetivo do presente trabalho é buscar uma sistematização dos conceitos envolvidos, de modo a harmonizar as normas tendentes à estabilização da demanda, em face da necessidade de lidar com o fato superveniente. Sem prejuízo da discussão quanto aos aspectos teóricos, pretende-se não perder de vista o interesse prático na busca de critérios aptos a tornar operável, coerente e eficiente o conjunto formado pelos institutos mencionados, com vistas a delimitar o exato alcance do postulado da imutabilidade da causa de pedir no direito processual civil brasileiro, em face da ocorrência de fatos supervenientes.
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Iaquinto, S. "ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/359599.
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This thesis is devoted to fragmentalism, a non-standard tense realism introduced by Kit Fine (Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford: OUP, pp. 261-320, 2005). In the first three chapters, I will show how to develop a fragmentalist version of presentism – which I will call fragmentalist presentism – in order to face some of the problems usually ascribed to standard presentism. In particular, the goal of the fist chapter is to search for a way to reconcile the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), i.e., the thesis that truth supervenes on facts, with a presentist metaphysics. According to what we might call unrestricted CTT, the truth of past- and future-tensed sentences supervenes – respectively – on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities (and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present), she seems to lack the resources to accept both past- and future-tensed true sentences and unrestricted CTT. I will argue that by endorsing fragmentalist presentism one can uphold past- and future-tensed truths together with unrestricted CTT.
In the second chapter, I argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, I will show how to reconcile – within Fine’s non-standard tense realism – a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world.
Many four-dimensionalists think of continuants as mereological sums of stages from different times. These sums would perdure, that is, they would persist by having different stages. This view is generally taken to be incompatible with presentism: if there is no time except the present, then nothing can be a sum of such stages. The aim of the third chapter is to show that fragmentalist presentism provides us with the tools to embrace both a presentist metaphysics and (a non-standard version of) perdurantism.
In the last chapter, I will extend the fragmentalist approach to modality, by analysing the modal analogue of fragmentalist presentism. The simplest quantified modal logic is generally regarded as incompatible with actualism, the view that everything there is is actual. It is usually held that whoever wants to preserve the former while embracing the latter is somehow bound to enrich the inventory of the world with entities able to play the role traditionally ascribed to possibilia: abstract individualities or contingently non-concrete entities. I will hold that there is another way to reconcile actualism and the simplest quantified modal logic (a way that commits us to accept neither abstract individualities nor contingently non-concrete entities), by exploiting what we might call fragmentalist actualism.
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Souza, Júnior Antonio Carlos Ferreira de. "A cessação dos efeitos da coisa julgada das relações tributárias continuativas em face de superveniente decisão do STF." Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, 2011. http://tede2.unicap.br:8080/handle/tede/473.
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Previous issue date: 2011-08-10Is it possible to stop the concrete effects of a res judicata in a continuative tax legal relationship after a Supreme Court decision in the same issue? This research explores this question in two different ways: first, from Legal Theory point of view, will be analyzed the formal institutions related with object, with especial attenction to the unconstitutional norm sanction; second, confronting all theoretical models, this research collected data from one of Brazilian High Corts (Superior Tribunal de Justiça) and from High Administrative Court for Tax Disputes (Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais) with the scope to get a qualitative diagnosis of judicial and administrative decision making in disputes envolving the same object of this dissertantion. From these premisses, was found a trend to assign biding effects to Supreme Court precedents related to tax issues, inserting a new normative expectation to be obeyed by Governement and taxpayers. So, without any legislative reform, any incidental Supreme Court colegial decision can modify res judicata state of right, allowing the interruption of the future effectiveness of such sentences
O presente trabalho tem por o objeto de pesquisa pretende, a partir da contextualização da teoria do direito e direito positivo vigente, estabelecer a resposta para a seguinte pergunta: É possível a cessação dos efeitos da coisa julgada de relações jurídicas continuativas em matéria tributária em face de superveniente decisão plenária do Supremo Tribunal Federal? Para tanto, divide-se o trabalho em duas partes. Na primeira parte, analisaremos os seguintes aspectos: a) enfoque da teoria do direito, onde se estabelecem as premissas teóricas que serão contextualizadas no curso de todo o trabalho; b) complementando as premissas iniciais desenvolvidas anteriormente, analisa-se sanção de inconstitucionalidade sob a ótica constitucional. Ainda estudaremos o modelo teórico difundido pela maior parte da doutrina que o contrapõe ao direito positivo nacional; c) em seguida, a partir do estudo sistemático da coisa julgada e da eficácia da decisão plenária do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre as relações jurídicas tributárias, serão indicadas as premissas menores do trabalho. Na segunda parte, busca-se, a partir da coleta de dados dos repositórios de jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais, estabelecer uma análise qualitativa do modelo decisório definido por aquele órgão. A partir das premissas articuladas, conclui-se que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, ao menos no que se refere à relação tributária, atribui um caráter vinculativo às decisões plenárias do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Tal caráter constitui verdadeira alteração do arcabouço normativo prévio, pois insere uma nova expectativa normativa que deve ser obedecida pela administração pública e os contribuintes. Logo, a superveniente decisão do STF possui o condão de alterar o estado de direito da sentença atingida pela coisa julgada, o que permite a sustação da eficácia futura da sentença, por meio da ação de modificação
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Júnior, Antonio Carlos Ferreira de Souza. "A cessação dos efeitos da coisa julgada das relações tributárias continuativas em face de superveniente decisão do STF." Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, 2011. http://www.unicap.br/tede//tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=597.
Full textAbstract:
O presente trabalho tem por o objeto de pesquisa pretende, a partir da contextualização da teoria do direito e direito positivo vigente, estabelecer a resposta para a seguinte pergunta: É possível a cessação dos efeitos da coisa julgada de relações jurídicas continuativas em matéria tributária em face de superveniente decisão plenária do Supremo Tribunal Federal? Para tanto, divide-se o trabalho em duas partes. Na primeira parte, analisaremos os seguintes aspectos: a)
enfoque da teoria do direito, onde se estabelecem as premissas teóricas que serão contextualizadas no curso de todo o trabalho; b) complementando as premissas iniciais
desenvolvidas anteriormente, analisa-se sanção de inconstitucionalidade sob a ótica constitucional. Ainda estudaremos o modelo teórico difundido pela maior parte da doutrina que o contrapõe ao direito positivo nacional; c) em seguida, a partir do estudo sistemático da coisa julgada e da eficácia da decisão plenária do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre as relações jurídicas tributárias, serão indicadas as premissas menores do trabalho. Na segunda parte,
busca-se, a partir da coleta de dados dos repositórios de jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais, estabelecer uma análise qualitativa do modelo decisório definido por aquele órgão. A partir das premissas articuladas, conclui-se que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, ao menos no que se refere à relação tributária, atribui um caráter vinculativo às decisões plenárias do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Tal caráter
constitui verdadeira alteração do arcabouço normativo prévio, pois insere uma nova expectativa normativa que deve ser obedecida pela administração pública e os contribuintes.
Logo, a superveniente decisão do STF possui o condão de alterar o estado de direito da sentença atingida pela coisa julgada, o que permite a sustação da eficácia futura da sentença, por meio da ação de modificaçãoIs it possible to stop the concrete effects of a res judicata in a continuative tax legal relationship after a Supreme Court decision in the same issue? This research explores this question in two different ways: first, from Legal Theory point of view, will be analyzed the formal institutions related with object, with especial attenction to the unconstitutional norm sanction; second, confronting all theoretical models, this research collected data from one of Brazilian High Corts (Superior Tribunal de Justiça) and from High Administrative Court for Tax Disputes (Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais) with the scope to get a qualitative diagnosis of judicial and administrative decision making in disputes envolving the same object of this dissertantion. From these premisses, was found a trend to assign biding effects to Supreme Court precedents related to tax issues, inserting a new normative expectation to be obeyed by Governement and taxpayers. So, without any legislative reform, any incidental Supreme Court colegial decision can modify res judicata state of right, allowing the interruption of the future effectiveness of such sentences
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Brito, JoÃo Aurino Mendes. "O advento da ConstituiÃÃo Federal de 1988 e a inconstitucionalidade superveniente do artigo 791 da consolidaÃÃo das leis trabalhistas." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2007. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=4242.
Full textAbstract:
Em 1943, vem a lume a ConsolidaÃÃo das Leis do Trabalho, que traz em seu bojo a autorizaÃÃo legal para que as prÃprias partes possam, por si mesmas, sem a assistÃncia de advogados e valendo-se, para tanto, do âjus postulandiâ ali previsto no
art. 791 do referido diploma, judicialmente patrocinar os seus interesses no Ãmbito da JustiÃa do Trabalho, organismo que contou, atà 1999, na sua composiÃÃo, com os juÃzes classistas leigos e temporÃrios, representantes de empregados e de
empregadores. Apesar de as normas reguladoras do exercÃcio da advocacia no Brasil nÃo dispensarem a atuaÃÃo do advogado nas lides de natureza trabalhista, âo jus postulandiâ de que trata o art. 791 da CLT, que nÃo foi, atà agora, objeto de especÃfico e direto controle de constitucionalidade por parte do Supremo Tribunal Federal, vem sendo aplicado atà hoje, mesmo depois de promulgada a ConstituiÃÃo Federal de 5.10.1988, jà que a validade daquela norma consolidada foi expressamente reafirmada pela SÃMULA 329 do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho,
nada obstante o Art. 133 da CF/88 estabelecer a indispensabilidade do advogado na administraÃÃo da justiÃa. O Advento da CF/88, no entanto, na nossa concepÃÃo,
cristalizou a inconstitucionalidade superveniente do referido dispositivo celetista, tanto porque o advogado passou a ser considerado como parte essencial ao funcionamento do organismo destinado à administraÃÃo da JustiÃa (art. 133 da
CF/88), quanto porque a Lei Fundamental de 1988 erigiu à categoria de direito(preceito) fundamental, o acesso (qualificado) à jurisdiÃÃo (Art. 5Â, Inc. LV) e a garantia de que o Estado prestaria assistÃncia jurÃdica integral e gratuita aos
necessitados, como previsto no inciso LXXIV do referido art. 5Â da Carta Magna, que tambÃm impÃs, na mesma linha de lÃgica decorrÃncia, ao Estado, o dever de organizar a Defensoria PÃblica da UniÃo (art. 134 e parÃgrafos da CF/88), instrumento por meio do qual essa assistÃncia jurÃdica integral e gratuita aos
necessitados (CF/88, Art. 5Â, Inc. LXXIV) deveria ser disponibilizada. E se o acesso qualificado à jurisdiÃÃo (CF/88, art. 5Â, Inc. LV) e se o dever de prestar assistÃncia jurÃdica aos necessitados (CF/88, art. 5Â, Inc. LXXIV) sÃo preceitos fundamentais, afigura-se Ãbvio que todas as demais disposiÃÃes constitucionais a eles (a esses preceitos) correlatas, inclusive a do art. 133 da CF/88, sà existem para o fim de exatamente realizar (concretizar) e de dar densidade normativa a esses mesmos preceitos. Ao lado disso, considere-se que a extinÃÃo da representaÃÃo paritÃria, imposta pela Emenda Constitucional n 24/99, que a excluiu definitivamente da 20 estrutura dos ÃrgÃos integrantes da JustiÃa do Trabalho, demoliu, irremediavelmente, o argumento dos que entendiam que sendo a justiÃa laboral
integrada por juÃzes leigos, nela podiam postular as prÃprias partes sem a intervenÃÃo de advogados, inclusive porque cada um desses representantes classistas das categorias que se digladiam no contexto do conflito trabalhista, alÃados à condiÃÃo de juÃzes nÃo togados, atuaria na defesa dos interesses dos
membros dessas respectivas classes de trabalhadores e de empregadores. Nada obstante, a AÃÃo Direta de Inconstitucionalidade de n 1.127-8 (DF), proposta pela
AssociaÃÃo dos Magistrados Brasileiros (AMB) contra dispositivos do atual Estatuto da OAB (Lei n 8.906/94) veio a ser considerada, em 17.05.2006, pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), como procedente em parte, mantendo-se, em face disso, o âjus postulandiâ das partes no Ãmbito da JustiÃa do Trabalho, apesar de esta, jà desde 09.12.1999, por forÃa da Emenda Constitucional n 24/99, nÃo mais contar, na sua composiÃÃo, com juÃzes leigos e temporÃrios representantes de empregados e
de empregadores. Sendo assim, como o Art. 791 da CLT positiva direito prÃconstitucional cuja aplicabilidade, expressamente reafirmada por SÃMULA do TST, finda por ensejar o flagrante descumprimento de preceitos fundamentais (sobretudo
os encartados nos incisos LV e LXXIV do art. 5 da Carta Magna de 1988), somente a ArgÃiÃÃo de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF), nos termos do previsto na Lei n 9.882, de 3.12.1999, se afigura ser o mecanismo apropriado para se obter, de parte do STF, a formal declaraÃÃo dessa inconstitucionalidade, com o conseqÃente e definitivo expurgo do art. 791 da CLT do ordenamento jurÃdico nacional, o que concorrerÃ, por certo, para a final observÃncia e integral efetividade dos preceitos fundamentais fixados, preponderantemente, nos incisos LV e LXXIV do art. 5 da Carta da RepÃblica
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Cardoso, Fernando da Costa. "Por que rejeitar o reducionismo em ética?: falacia naturalista e superveniencia moral na obra de G. E. Moore." Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1843/ARBZ-7X4DPB.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation aims, in the metaethical level, to investigate the question of the naturalization of Ethics in the work of G. E. Moore (1873-1958). Moore has developed an argument aimed to test
the truth of an naturalized ethics. His anwser, at his first book, Principia Ethica (1903), was negative because he sustained that every attempt to naturalize ethics implies in a mistake, the naturalistic fallacy, a fallacy which existence could be proved by the experiment of the open
question argument. In answer to this, Moore developed and defended a non-naturalistic position in the ethical field. The difficults involved in this non-naturalistic conception of ethics nevertheless led him to review his initial position and to develop what could be view as a discovery : the supervenient character of the ethical properties over the natural properties. This is the path that the dissertation pretends to follow.A presente dissertacao aborda, no plano metaetico, a questao da naturalizacao da etica a partir dos trabalhos de G. E. Moore (1873 1958). Moore desenvolveu uma argumentacao visando testar a validade de uma etica naturalizada. Sua resposta inicial apresentada no livro Principia Ethica (1903), negativa, passa pela constatacao de que todas as tentativas nesse sentido acarretam um erro fundamental, a saber, a falácia naturalista, falacia essa que seria confirmada pelo experimento do argumento da questão aberta. Dessa posicao inicial, nosso autor passou a defesa de uma posicao nao-naturalista no campo da etica. No entanto, as dificuldades em torno dessa posicao levaram-no a uma reavaliacao de suas posicoes iniciais e ao que pode ser considerado uma descoberta: o carater superveniente das propriedades morais frente as propriedades naturais. E esse percurso que procuramos percorrer e compreender na dissertacao.
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Roncarolo, Francesca. "Lo ius superveniens tra esigenze di tutela del legittimo affidamento e legalità dell’azione amministrativa, nella dimensione italiana, francese ed europea." Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01D010.
Full textAbstract:
L’étude s’occupe de l’affirmation progressive d’instruments de tutelle de la confiance légitime des privés par rapport aux conflits de loi dans le temps, qui conditionnent l’adoption ou l’efficacité des actes administratifs individuels favorables, grâce à une analyse de droit comparé entre Italie, France et Union Européenne. Après l’illustration des notions découlant du principe de légalité et du principe de sécurité juridique, qui ont été élaborées dans le deux Pays, les cas jurisprudentiels et normatifs plus récents du droit italien et français sont étudiés. Ils concernent notamment le changement normatif qui intervient soit pendant la procédure administrative non contentieuse et qui est finalisée à l’adoption d’un acte favorable, soit pendant le développement de situations en cours, en affectant l’efficacité d’un acte individuel à effet durable. Cette reconstruction permet de catégoriser les hypothèses dans lesquelles la reconnaissance de la confiance légitime du privé soit juridiquement possible, ainsi que de vérifier les moyens de protection de ces positions subjectives, mises à la disposition par l’Italie et la France. Enfin, on analyse les solutions dégagées sur le thème au niveau européen, par la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne, la Cour Européenne du Droit de l’Homme, ainsi que parle système de droit allemande, qui est devenu un modèle de référence en matière de confiance légitime au niveau européen. La recherche est donc destinée à évaluer l’adéquation de ces deux systèmes de droit aux impulsions de l’Union européenne et à vérifier leur aptitude au respect des standards européens d’effectivité de protectionThe dissertation examines the impact of new legislation that negatively affects the asset of private interests, carried out by administrative action. The comparative analysis focuses on the Italian and French legal systems, as they share a similar legal tradition in the field of administrative law. The work is aimed at verifying, through the study of the most recent case law, the existence of a position of legitimate expectation recognised to the administrated subjects with respect to the modification of laws over time, under two different aspects : within a proceedings, as well as during on-going situation created by provisions of long-lasting bindingness. The work analyses the available means of protection and it verifies the current position on the matter in the aforementioned normative systems. In the last part, the work studies the inputs on the subject matter given by the decisions of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, taking the analysis to a supra-national level; it also highlights the influence exercised by the German law on the issue of legitimate expectation, as the German system represent the principal referring model
Lo studio si occupa dell’impatto esercitato dalle sopravvenienze normative che incidonosfavorevolmente sull’assetto di interessi dei privati, realizzato dall’azione amministrativa.L’analisi, di diritto comparato, si concentra sui sistemi di diritto italiano e francese, accumunati da una tradizione storico-giuridica affine nel campo del diritto amministrativo. Attraverso l’analisi della casistica giurisprudenziale più recente, siverifica l’esistenza di una posizione giuridica di legittimo affidamento degli amministratiin sede di successione di leggi nel tempo, in due ambiti: in fase endoproccedimentale,nonché nel successivo svolgersi di situazioni in corso instaurate da provvedimenti adefficacia durevole. Sono vagliati gli strumenti di tutela a disposizione e verificati imutamenti in atto – a oggi – sul tema, nei due sistemi di diritto citati.Successivamente, l’indagine dà conto degli impulsi giurisprudenziali della Corte diGiustizia dell’Unione Europea e della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, portandol’analisi a un livello sovranazionale e accennando anche all’influenza esercitata, inmateria, dal principale modello di riferimento in materia di legittimo affidamento, ossiadall’ordinamento tedesco.La ricerca è stata condotta sia in Italia sia in Francia, attraverso un percorso di dottorato svolto in co-tutela, attivato tra l’Università Statale degli Studi di Milano e l’Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonnne
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Ribeiro, Henrique de Morais. "Monadismo e fisicismo: um ensaio sobre as relações mente-corpo." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-13092012-094622/.
Full textAbstract:
Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto.This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.
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RONCAROLO, FRANCESCA. "LO IUS SUPERVENIENS TRA ESIGENZE DI TUTELA DEL LEGITTIMO AFFIDAMENTO E LEGALITÀ DELL¿AZIONE AMMINISTRATIVA, NELLA DIMENSIONE ITALIANA, FRANCESE ED EUROPEA." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/547132.
Full textAbstract:
The dissertation examines the impact of new legislation that negatively affects the asset of private interests, carried out by administrative action.
The comparative analysis focuses on the Italian and French legal systems, as they share a similar legal tradition in the field of administrative law. The work is aimed at verifying, through the study of the most recent case law, the existence of a position of legitimate expectation recognised to the administrated subjects with respect to the modification of laws over time, under two different aspects: within a proceedings, as well as during on-going situation created by provisions of long-lasting bindingness. The work analyses the available means of protection and it verifies the current position on the matter in the aforementioned normative systems.
In the last part, the work studies the inputs on the subject matter given by the decisions of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, taking the analysis to a supra-national level; it also highlights the influence exercised by the German law on the issue of legitimate expectation, as the German system represent the principal referring model.
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Paull, Richard Cranston. "Supervenience relations and their significance." 1994. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI9420675.
Full textAbstract:
Supervenience is the impossibility of independent variation. A crude statement of supervenience would be the claim that things cannot differ in some respect without differing in some other respect. For example, to say that the mental supervenes on the physical is to say that there cannot be mental differences without physical differences. The basic idea behind supervenience can be developed in a number of ways. My dissertation contains a detailed study of the different supervenience relations found in the literature. I consider their logical relations to one another and their relative strengths and weaknesses. I then develop new, more useful supervenience relations. In general, supervenience is supposed to be a nonreductive dependence relation. A primary goal of my dissertation is to determine the nature and philosophical significance of the dependence relation provided by supervenience. So, for example, I attempt to determine whether materialism is adequately formulated as a supervenience thesis. Recently, many have claimed that it is not. They claim that the mental could supervene on the physical without being asymmetrically dependent on the physical in the way that materialism requires. I respond by agreeing that supervenience is not sufficient for the relevant sort of dependence, but I contend that the supervenience of the mental on the physical is a nontrivial necessary condition on materialism. So the question of the supervenience of the mental on the physical is significant, for if it fails to hold, then materialism is false. Thus, I defend the importance of supervenience to philosophy while acknowledging that some of the recent criticisms of supervenience are sound.
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Kerchner, Breanna. "The Viability of David Lewis's Theory of Humean Supervenience." Diss., 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/3862.
Full textAbstract:
I present a defense of David Lewis's metaphysical theory of Humean Supervenience. I provide novel motivations for his theory, and look to current physical science research for support of the metaphysical theory. I draw heavily on analogies between Humean Supervenience and classical discussions of the nature of space-time. I also defend Humean Supervenience against four major philosophical objections using considerations from physics and metaphysics.
Dissertation
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"Can non-reductive physicalism save mental causation?: assessment on Jaegwon Kim's supervenience/exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism." 2012. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896947.
Full textAbstract:
Wong, Wai Kin."November 2011."
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-116).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Chapter Chapter 1: --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.7
Chapter 1.1 --- Mental causation´ؤintroduction to the problem --- p.7
Chapter 1.2 --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.8
Chapter 1.2.1 --- "A brief introduction to physicalism´ؤlayered model, supervenience, and physical closure" --- p.8
Chapter 1.2.2 --- What is the mind from a physicalist perspective? --- p.12
Chapter 1.3 --- Non-reductive physicalism stated --- p.14
Chapter 1.3.1 --- Commitments and generally accepted claim of physicalism --- p.14
Chapter 1.3.2 --- Reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism --- p.15
Chapter 1.3.3 --- The non-reductive physicalist's view on mental causation --- p.19
Chapter 1.4. --- What is next? --- p.20
Chapter Chapter 2: --- Kim's supervienience/exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism --- p.21
Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.21
Chapter 2.2 --- Supervenience argument --- p.22
Chapter 2.3 --- Exclusion argument --- p.25
Chapter 2.4 --- Implications of the supervenierice/exclusion argument --- p.28
Chapter 2.5 --- Objections to the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.29
Chapter Chapter 3: --- Kim on the principle of causal/explanatory exclusion --- p.33
Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.33
Chapter 3.2 --- Kim's realist commitment --- p.35
Chapter 3.3 --- Kim's argument for explanatory exclusion --- p.36
Chapter 3.4 --- From the principle of explanatory exclusion to the principle of causal exclusion --- p.38
Chapter 3.5 --- Kim's view on non-standard overdetermination and how the gap between EEP and CEP is bridged --- p.39
Chapter 3.6 --- Kim's view on causation --- p.43
Chapter 3.7 --- Further implications of production causation for the exclusion argument --- p.47
Chapter Chapter 4: --- Two concepts of causation and the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.53
Chapter 4.1 --- The counterfactual analyses of causation´ؤa general overview --- p.55
Chapter 4.2 --- How the dependence conception of causation helps non-reductive physicalists to avoid the causal exclusion principle --- p.59
Chapter 4.3 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (I) --- p.62
Chapter 4.3.1 --- Loewer's objections to the use of production conception in the formulation of the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.63
Chapter 4.3.2 --- The first reason put forward by Loewer --- p.63
Chapter 4.3.3 --- Loewer's argument for (2) --- p.68
Chapter 4.4 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (II) --- p.73
Chapter 4.4.1 --- Can a non-reductive physicalist distinguish epiphenomena from a genuine causal process by the dependence conception of causation? --- p.74
Chapter 4.4.2 --- Does agency require production? --- p.78
Chapter 4.4.3 --- Kim's third objection on omissions --- p.79
Chapter 4.4.4 --- Loewer's responses to Kim's second and third objections --- p.82
Chapter 4.4.5. --- Further discussion on Kim's second and third objections --- p.84
Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion --- p.87
Chapter Chapter 5: --- Does Yablo's determination proposal help to solve the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism? --- p.88
Chapter 5.1. --- Yablo's idea elaborated --- p.89
Chapter 5.1.1 --- Yablo's argument for the determination proposal --- p.91
Chapter 5.1.2 --- The primacy of the causal status of mental events --- p.94
Chapter 5.2 --- Evaluating Yablo's idea --- p.96
Chapter 5.2.1 --- Are mental properties determinables of physical properties? --- p.97
Chapter 5.2.2 --- The story is not ended. The crux of the issue is not whether the determination proposal is literally true --- p.100
Chapter 5.2.3 --- Why is proportionality constraint not the solution? --- p.102
Chapter 5.3 --- What about the causal exclusion principle? --- p.107
Chapter 5.4 --- Conclusion --- p.108
Chapter Chapter 6: --- The final conclusion´ؤthe exclusion problem remains unsolved --- p.110
Responses to the external review --- p.Error! Bookmark not defined.
Bibliography --- p.113
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Janik, Bartosz. "Superweniencja i ugruntowanie norm prawnych : analiza filozoficznoprawna." Praca doktorska, 2019. https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/87118.
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"Emergence and Cosmic Hermeneutics." Doctoral diss., 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.18736.
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abstract: Emergentism offers a promising compromise in the philosophy of mind between Cartesian substance dualism and reductivistic physicalism. The ontological emergentist holds that conscious mental phenomena supervene on physical phenomena, but that they have a nature over and above the physical. However, emergentist views have been subjected to a variety of powerful objections: they are alleged to be self-contradictory, incompatible with mental causation, justified by unreliable intuitions, and in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I defend the emergentist position against these objections. I clarify the concepts of supervenience and of ontological novelty in a way that ensures the emergentist position is coherent, while remaining distinct from physicalism and traditional dualism. Making note of the equivocal way in which the concept of sufficiency is used in Jaegwon Kim's arguments against emergent mental causation, I argue that downward causation does not entail widespread overdetermination. I argue that considerations of ideal a priori deducibility from some physical base, or "Cosmic Hermeneutics", will not themselves provide answers to where the cuts in the structure of nature lie. Instead, I propose reconsidering the question of Cosmic Hermeneutics in terms of which cognitive resources would be required for the ideal reasoner to perform the deduction. Lastly, I respond to the objection that emergence in the philosophy of mind is in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I suggest that a kind of weak ontological emergence is a viable form of explanation in many fields, and discuss current applications of emergence in biology, sociology, and the study of complex systems.Dissertation/Thesis
Ph.D. Philosophy 2013
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Tardif, Dominique. "La continuité psychologique selon Derek Parfit : examen critique d'un critère d'identité." Thèse, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/22178.
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Carvalho, Ana Luísa. "A prova superveniente nos Tribunais Superiores." Master's thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10451/11786.
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Este trabalho tem como objecto a análise da junção de documentos na fase do recurso, na área dos recursos civis. Ao nível das disposições legais, o CPC contém os artigos 523.º e 524.º, que se inserem na fase da instrução e, especificamente, na fase recursal encontrar-se-ão os artigos 693.º-B e 727.º, que regulam a junção de documentos no recurso de apelação e no recurso de revista, respectivamente. O regime da junção de documentos difere consoante se esteja em sede de recurso de apelação ou em recurso de revista. Não obstante, ambos têm em comum o facto de exigirem a junção de documentos com as alegações de recurso. Isto é, para além dos requisitos que ambos os artigos impõem, é sempre necessário que a parte apresente os documentos com as alegações. Ultrapassado este primeiro pressuposto, cabe à parte justificar a junção tardia com algum dos casos excepcionais previstos na lei. O problema da tempestividade da junção de documentos deriva, fundamentalmente, da existência de alguns princípios cuja interpretação e aplicação causa problemas de articulação. Por um lado, o princípio da celeridade processual exige que a decisão seja dada em tempo útil, podendo, por isso, considerar-se que há uma obrigatoriedade que se prende com a resposta do tribunal, às pretensões apresentadas pelas partes, ser dada em prazo razoável. No plano factual, é algo que se revela de difícil conformação, pois a duração do processo sofre influência de vários factores, entre eles, a complexidade da causa, as provas existentes, ou a colaboração das partes com o juiz. Por outro lado, no que tange ao princípio da economia processual, há que referir que o processo civil deve conseguir atingir um resultado justo, resolvendo o maior número possível de litígios (dentro de um mesmo processo), recorrendo apenas a actos eformalidades que sejam indispensáveis.192 É igualmente dada uma visão geral da forma como os tribunais portugueses aplicam a lei, no concernente à possibilidade de juntar documentos quando o processo se encontrar na fase recursória, utilizando, para isso, alguma jurisprudência nacional. Finalmente, ainda que de forma muito sintética, também é visto o regime paralelo da junção de pareceres na fase de recurso, recorrendo aqui, igualmente, às tendências da jurisprudência actual.The object of this thesis is analyzing the possibility that the parts have to attach documents on Appeal. The Code of Civil Process contains some articles which regulate this matter- articles 523.º and 524.º- that we find on the instruction part, and the articles 693.º -B and 727.º, which are specific to backup system. These articles focus the possibility provided to parts, on the cause, to join documents on applies to judicial decisions. The scheme differs if we are on the recourse to court of appeal or to high court of Justice. In spite of this difference, they have in common the fact that both require the presentation of the documents with the written appeal. That means that, beyond the requires, it´s always necessary that the part presents documents with the claims. Concluded this first requirement, the part needs to justify the delay with one of those justifications that the law gives. The question of timing to present documents is essentially due to the existence of certain principles, whose interpretation and application carries articulation problems. On one hand, the procedural expedite involves a decision given in a short period of time. Therefore, this could mean that exist an obligation from the court to provide a response to the parties’ claims within a reasonable time193. However, in fact, it´s something very hard to achieve, once the duration of the procedure suffers influences, such as the complexity of the cause, the available evidences or the cooperation of theparties with the judge. On the other hand, the principle of procedure economy refers the civil procedure should be able to reach a fair result, solving the highest number of litigations (on the same process), using only the acts and formalities needed. 194 It will also be given an overview about the way that the courts apply the law, concerning to the possibility to join documents on the appeal courts, using some Portuguese jurisprudence. Finally, it will be given a succinct framework regarding the junction of lawyers, teachers or technicians opinions, also analyzing some jurisprudence.
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Guerra, Carolina Silva. "Factos supervenientes em recurso civil." Master's thesis, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10451/50651.
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O presente estudo versa sobre a admissibilidade e cognoscibilidade em sede de recurso – atendendo aos fundamentos e diferentes competências reconhecidas aos tribunais de recurso, teremos principalmente em atenção o recurso de apelação - de factos supervenientes, i.e., factos ocorridos ou conhecidos pelas partes após o encerramento da discussão em primeira instância.
Considerando que o processo cognitivo da instância recorrida e de recurso devem ser harmoniosos, começaremos por abordar as regras de funcionamento do processo cognitivo da primeira instância da perspetiva dos diversos tipos de factos, concluindo que o conhecimento dos factos essenciais nucleares depende de alegação das partes em momentos processuais específicos sob pena de preclusão da sua alegação posterior. Diferentemente, os factos complementares e concretizadores ou instrumentais que resultem da instrução da causa, e bem assim os factos notórios e de conhecimento funcional poderão ser conhecidos oficiosamente pelo tribunal, independentemente de alegação das partes.
Daqui extraem-se duas conclusões relativamente ao regime de alegação e conhecimento de factos novos em sede de recurso. Em primeiro, que com o encerramento da discussão em primeira instância preclude a possibilidade de as partes alegarem os factos essenciais nucleares que fossem conhecidos até esse momento, os quais não poderão ser alegados em recurso. Em segundo, que os factos sujeitos ao conhecimento oficioso do tribunal recorrido poderão ser também conhecidos oficiosamente pelo tribunal de recurso.
Relativamente aos factos essenciais, os quais se encontram sujeitos ao ónus de alegação das partes, a questão é objeto de divergências doutrinárias e jurisprudenciais, as quais irradiam essencialmente da remissão do artigo 703.º para o artigo 611.º do CPC. A nosso ver, atendendo ao fim e fundamentos da apelação, às competências reconhecidas à Relação na reapreciação da matéria de facto, e à inexistência de uma autorização expressa à alegação de factos supervenientes, esta não é permitida.This study deals with the admissibility and knowledgeability in the appeal - given the grounds and different jurisdictions recognized to the Court of Appeal, we will mainly focus on the appeal - of supervening facts, i.e., facts that occurred or were known by the parties after the closing of the first instance discussion. Considering that the cognitive process of the appealed and appeal instance must be harmonious, we will begin by addressing the rules of operation of the cognitive process of the first instance from the perspective of the various types of facts, concluding that knowledge of the core essential facts depends on the allegation of the parties at specific procedural moments under penalty of preclusion of their subsequent allegation. Differently, the complementary and concrete or instrumental facts that result from the investigation of the cause, as well as the notorious facts and facts of functional knowledge may be known by the court of its own motion, regardless of the allegation of the parties. Two conclusions can be drawn from this regarding the regime of claim and knowledge of new facts on appeal. First, that with the closure of the first instance discussion, the parties will not be able to allege the core essential facts that were known up to that point, which cannot be alleged on appeal. Second, that the facts which are subject to the knowledge of the appealed court of its own motion may also be known by the appeals court of its own motion. Regarding the essential facts, which are subject to the parties' burden of allegation, this issue raises doctrinal and jurisprudential divergences, which essentially radiate from the reference of article 703.º to article 611.º of the CPC. In our opinion, given the purpose and grounds of the appeal, the recognized powers of the Court of Appeal in the review of the matter of fact, and the lack of express authorization for the allegation of supervening facts, this allegation is not allowed.
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(10711287), Berman Chan. "The Metaphysics of Goodness." Thesis, 2021.
Find full textAbstract:
What is it for something to be good? Using the example
of an Ebola-like microbe, I argue that a merely kind-based account of goodness
is defective (Chapter 1). I offer instead an account that is both kind-based
and platonic (Chapter 2). On such an account, goodness turns out to be
non-natural (Chapter 3). However, non-naturalists can explain why the goodness
of an individual supervenes on its natural properties, by appealing to the
essence of the kind to which it belongs (Chapter 4).
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Ferreira, Ana Luísa Miranda. "A liquidação societária e a responsabilidade pelo passivo superveniente." Master's thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/18945.
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Costa, Mariana Fontes da. "Da Alteração Superveniente das Circunstâncias - Em Especial à Luz da Dogmática dos Contratos Bilateralmente Comerciais." Doctoral thesis, 2016. https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/94333.
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Costa, Mariana Fontes da. "Da Alteração Superveniente das Circunstâncias - Em Especial à Luz da Dogmática dos Contratos Bilateralmente Comerciais." Tese, 2016. https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/94333.
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Gabriel, Nicole Escudeiro. "A admissibilidade de alegação e conhecimento de factos supervenientes em sede de recurso cível." Master's thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10451/22393.
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A questão objeto de estudo é a de saber se é admissível às partes alegar e ao tribunal conhecer de factos essenciais supervenientes que se prendam com o mérito da causa, em sede de recurso cível. Para o efeito consideramos factos supervenientes aqueles que ocorram ou sejam conhecidos posteriormente ao encerramento da discussão em 1.ª instância.
De fora do nosso objeto ficam os factos velhos, os de conhecimento oficioso, os relativos a pressupostos processuais, os notórios, bem como os factos não essenciais, uma vez que a discussão em torno da sua admissibilidade ou não é bastante mais pacífica.
Segundo o entendimento tradicional na doutrina e segundo a Jurisprudência amplamente maioritária em Portugal, salvo o caso excecional em que exista acordo entre as partes, o tribunal de recurso só pode conhecer de factos supervenientes que foram alegados até ao encerramento da discussão em 1.ª instância. Como fundamento para esta orientação é utilizado essencialmente o princípio da estabilidade da instância e a consideração de que em Portugal vigora um sistema de recursos de reponderação.
Perfilhamos outra orientação. A nosso ver a estabilidade da instância nem sempre se deve impor e na verdade o sistema de recursos português não é de pura reponderação. Baseando-nos na remissão legal prevista no art.º 663.º, n.º 2, que determina a aplicação em recurso do art.º 611.º, e tendo em vista a economia processual e a verdade material, consideramos admissível a alegação e o conhecimento de factos essenciais supervenientes relativos ao mérito da causa em sede de recurso, desde que respeitadas algumas limitações.
Não existindo acordo entre as partes, devem admitir-se os factos supervenientes desde que, no caso concreto, não se verifique uma perturbação inconveniente para o julgamento do pleito, sendo que esta é uma ponderação que ficará a cargo do julgador. As partes deverão ainda agir de boa fé e deverá ser assegurado o contraditório.The question object of study is to know if is admissible to the parties allege and to the court decide about essential supervenient facts concerning the substance of the case, in civil appeal. To this end we consider supervening facts those which occur or are known after the close of the discussion in judicial court. Outside of our object are old facts, facts of its own motion, facts concerning the procedural prerequisites and notorious facts, as well as non-essential facts, once the discussion on their admissibility or not is much more peaceful. According to the traditional understanding of the doctrine and according to the majority Jurisprudence in Portugal, unless the exceptional case where there is agreement between the parties, the appellate court can only take cognizance of supervenient facts which were alleged until the end of the discussion in judicial court. As a foundation for this orientation is essentially used the principle of stability of the proceedings and the fact that in Portugal there is an appeal for reweighting system. We follow another orientation. We believe the stability of the proceedings should not always be imposed and also that the portuguese appeals system is not pure reweighting. Based on the legal remission provided in the art.º 663.º, n.º 2, which determines the application on appeal of the art.º 611, and in view of procedural economy and the material fact, we consider admissible the allegation and knowledge of essential supervenient facts concerning the substance of the case on appeal, as long as some limitations are respected. In case of no agreement between the parties, the supervenient facts must be admitted as long as, in the particular case, there is not an inconvenient disturbance of the dispute, and this is a consideration that shall be judge’s responsibility. The parties must also act in good faith and the contradictory must be ensured.
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Choo, Dongryul. "How to be an aesthetic realist lessons from moral realism and a case study in the metaphysics of supervenient properties /." 1994. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/32577624.html.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1994.Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-180).