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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Supervenience

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Academic literature on the topic 'Supervenience'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 9 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Supervenience"

1

Binhi, Vladimir. "D. Chalmers’ argument from logical supervenience in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness." Философская мысль, no. 4 (April 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2021.4.35459.

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The subject of this research is D. Chalmers’ argument in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness –sentience or qualia – explanation on the basis of dualism of the low-level physical and high-level mental propertoes of the brain. The dualism of properties in the philosophy of consciousness means that consciousness is a high-level property, supervenient on the physical properties of the brain. Chalmers introduces the concept of logical supervenience and explains the phenomenal consciousness by the fact that psychical properties are supervenient on physical properties naturally, rather than logically. This comprises the essence of Chalmers' concept of naturalistic dualism. The article reviews the concept of supervenience in most commonly used form, and the definition of logical and natural supervenience. Supervenience becomes logical and/or natural due to the fact that its definition includes the modal term “possibility”, which concedes different interpretations: possibility by virtue of the laws of nature – nomic possibility, and logical possibility. The author demonstrates that the definition of logical supervenience, which leans on the concept of identity, makes sense only in the context of transtemporal, rather than transworld identity. Such circumstance substantially changes the meaning of the definition of logical supervenience. The novelty of this work consists in showing that unlike the logical and natural possibilities, logical and natural supervenience are different names for the same type of relationship. The conclusion is formulated that naturalistic dualism, which claims their fundamental difference, cannot explain the phenomenal consciousness using this distinction.

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Ladyman, James. "Supervenience: Not local and not two-way." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 630. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04250142.

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This commentary argues that Ross & Spurrett (R&S) have not shown that supervenience is two-way, but they have shown that all the sciences, including physics, make use of functional and supervenient properties. The entrenched defender of Kim's position could insist that only fundamental physics describes causal relations directly, but Kim's microphysical reductionism becomes completely implausible when we consider contemporary physics.

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DE DONATO RODRÍGUEZ, Xavier, and Marek POLANSKI. "Superveniencia, propiedades maximales y teoría de modelos (Supervenience, Maximal Properties, and Model Theory)." THEORIA 21, no. 3 (September 6, 2006): 257–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.520.

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We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general.

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Noonan, Harold W. "Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited." Metaphysica 21, no. 1 (April 28, 2020): 151–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0004.

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AbstractBlackburn argues against naturalistic moral realism. He argues that there is no conceptual entailment from satisfying a naturalistic predicate to satisfying a moral predicate. But the moral is conceptually supervenient on the natural. However, this conjunction of conceptual supervenience with lack of conceptual entailment is something the non-realist can explain, but the realist cannot. I argue first that Blackburn’s best formulation of his challenge is his first one. Subsequently he reformulates it as a demand for a ‘ban on mixed worlds’. Critics have directed their arguments against this formulation but they are ineffective against Blackburn’s first formulation. My second thesis is, even so formulated the realist can meet the challenge. The bare conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural can be given a realist explanation by understanding names of moral properties as descriptive names of natural properties.

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Gouvea, Rodrigo A. dos S. "Physicalism without identity." Trans/Form/Ação 43, no. 2 (June 2020): 253–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43n2.14.p253.

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Abstract This paper presents and discusses the most influential attempts to characterize physicalism without postulating relations of identity between the physical and the prima facie non-physical. The first section deals with a possible criticism that these attempts are misguided, since they contradict the physicalist slogan “everything there is physical.” In the second section, I elucidate the different formulations of the physicalist supervenience claim, and argue that none of them consists in an adequate characterization of physicalism. Three reasons are given in favor of this conclusion: their compatibility with forms of dualism (or pluralism); the fact that the supervenience relation is left unexplained; and Kim’s causal exclusion argument, which asserts that merely supervenient entities (i.e., ones that are not in identity relations with strictly physical entities) must be epiphenomenal. The third section presents the general features of another identity-independent attempt to characterize physicalism, namely realization physicalism. According to this view, tokens of prima facie non-physical types are realized by tokens of strictly physical types performing functional roles that specify the nature of the former. The third section also shows how realization physicalism deals with the objections that make physicalist supervenience claims inadequate for characterizing physicalism.

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Noonan, H. W. "Supervenience." Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 146 (January 1987): 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220062.

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Ridge, Michael. "Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience." Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, no. 3 (2007): 330–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468107083248.

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AbstractIn this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how Shafer-Landau's proffered strategy to explain supervenience not only fails to explain supervenience, but that it also has a number of implausible consequences. The more general lesson is that strategies which may work well for explaining supervenience in the philosophy of mind and other areas cannot be assumed to carry over successfully to the metaethical context. We should therefore treat so-called 'companions in guilt' arguments in this area of philosophy with considerable skepticism.

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Zangwill, Nick. "Moral Supervenience." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 240–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/msp19952015.

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Zagwill, Nick. "Explaining Supervenience." Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 509–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1997_15.

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Hendel, Giovanna. "Psychophysical Supervenience." Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 115–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2002_27.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Supervenience"

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Hendel, Giovanna Enrica. "Psychophysical supervenience." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.323131.

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Lee, Barry John. "Co-location and microphysical supervenience." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.270565.

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Pérez, Diana Inés. "Some Problems for Aesthethic Supervenience." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112789.

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In the last half century,there were several attempts to adopt the notion of supervenience in order to shed light on the claim of generality that is involved in aesthetic judgments. In this paper I will show the difficulties brought up by the transposition of the notion of supervenience from other areas of philosophy to the philosophy of art and I will also show the intrinsic difficulties of this project. First, I will revise the origins of the notion of supervenience in contemporary ethics and philosophy of mind, as well as the theoretical framework in which this notion was first introduced. Second, I will revise the arguments for and against aesthetic supervenience in the field of analytic philosophy of art. In the rest of this work, I will try to argue against the viability of applying this notion to the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. I will point out the difficulties of identifying the base properties of such relationship, and then the difficulties of identifying the supervenient properties. In this way I will show that there are good reasons to argue that it will not be fruitful to use the notion of supervenience in order to understand the peculiarities of aesthetic judgments. Finally, I will point out a number of additional difficulties for the thesis of aesthetic supervenience which do not seem able to be satisfactorily solved.
En el último medio siglo se ha intentado adoptar la noción de supervenienciapara echar luz sobre la pretensión de generalidad que hay involucrada en el juicio estético. En este trabajo voy a mostrar las dificultades que genera esta transposición de la noción de superveniencia desde otros ámbitos de la filosofía ala filosofía del arte. Voy a mostrar también las dificultades que conlleva este proyecto. En primer lugar, repasaré los orígenes de la noción de superveniencia en la ética y la filosofía de la mente contemporáneas, así como el marco teórico dentro del cual esta noción fue introducida. En segundo lugar, revisaré los argumentos a favor y en contra de la superveniencia estética que se han sucedido en el ámbito de la filosofía analítica del arte. En el resto del trabajo intentaré argumentar en contra de la viabilidad de aplicar la noción de superveniencia a la relación entre las propiedades estéticas y las no-estéticas de un objeto. Señalaré primero las dificultades para identificar las propiedades que deberían considerarse la base de tal relación, y luego las dificultades para identificar las propiedades supervenientes. De esta manera, mostraré que hay buenas razones para sostener que no es fructífero utilizar la noción de superveniencia para avanzar en la comprensión de la peculiaridad del juicio estético. Finalmente, mencionaré una serie de dificultades adicionales para la tesis de la superveniencia estética que no parecen poder resolverse satisfactoriamente.

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Rowlands, Mark. "Anomalism, supervenience, and explanation in cognitive psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d22daaac-1094-424e-91ce-dc39e9da644f.

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This thesis defends the claim that the principle of methodological solipsism can play no role in the formation of the theories of cognitive psychology. Corresponding to this negative claim, but assuming a comparatively minor role, will be the positive claim that a scientific psychology ought to deal in explanations which relate mental states in virtue of their semantic contents. The basis of the case against methodological solipsism is the claim that the explanatory properties invoked by this principle are indivlduation dependent on properties of semantic content. In Chapter I the idea of methodological solipsism will be discussed, and two forms distinguished. One of the versions of methodological solipsism identified invokes the explanatory notion of the narrow content of a mental state. The other version invokes the notion of formal or syntactic properties possessed by mental states. In both cases it will be argued that these properties can be identified only by way of the semantic contents of their associated mental states. The notion of narrow content will be discussed in Chapter II. The case against that version of methodological solipsism which invokes syntactic properties will be constructed in Chapters III-V. The latter argument constitutes the bulk of the thesis, and derives from considerations centred around the principles of anomalism, supervenience, and the relation between them. These arguments are intended to be of independent interest as solutions to certain persistent problems in the philosophy of mind.

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Van, Iersel Eric. "Beyond supervenience, an alternative approach to the mental-physical relation." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/MQ65058.pdf.

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VAZ, RAFAEL DE OLIVEIRA. "CAUSATION, IDENTITY AND SUPERVENIENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9108@1.

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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Procurando formular o conceito de mente, a Filosofia da Mente se baseou em três noções fundamentais: causação, identidade e superveniência. A crença na dicotomia entre aspectos físicos e aspectos inextensos de nossa experiência permanece um problema de considerável dificuldade. A possibilidade de diálogo tanto em uma teoria monista quanto dualista é dificultada porque cada abordagem demanda por um princípio, uma relação ou operação que solucione o problema da ligação entre corpo, mente e mundo. Noções subseqüentes, como intencionalidade, consciência ou qualia, permanecerão fechadas em seus próprios escopos conceituais. Por este motivo, analisar como cada noção fundamental é empregada auxilia na compreensão de restrições e avanços, permitindo desde a definição dos métodos apropriados de tratamento aos problemas de cada domínio às teorias que melhor se adequarão às suas possíveis resoluções.
Trying to formulate the concept of mind, the Philosophy of the Mind has based itself on three fundamental notions: causation, identity and supervenience. The belief in the dichotomy between physical aspects and inextense aspects of our experience remains a problem of considerable difficulty. The possibility of dialogue as much in a dualist as in a monist theory is hardened because each boarding demands for a principle, a relation or operation to solve the problem of linking body, mind and world. Subsequent notions, as intentionality, consciousness or qualia, will remain closed in its proper conceptual scopes. For this reason, to analyze as each fundamental notion is used assists in the understanding of restrictions and advances, allowing since the definition of appropriate methods of treatment to the problems of each domain to the theories that will suit better to its possible resolutions.

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Brown, Helen Angela. "The relation between social and individualistic phenomena : reduction, determination or supervenience." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1991. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1131/.

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This thesis aims to analyse in detail the metaphysical relation between social and individualistic phenomena. Social phenomena are taken to include social entities such as institutions or social groups, the social properties of these social entities and also the social properties of individuals. Individualistic phenomena include physical, physiological and mental or psychological properties of individuals. Chapter 1 considers whether social phenomena could be reduced to individualistic phenomena. A discussion of reduction, in so far as it would be applicable to the metaphysical relation between social and individualistic phenomena, reveals that this relation cannot be the one which holds between social and individualistic phenomena. In Chapter 2 a weaker relation than reduction is considered, viz the relation of determination. This is found to hold promise, especially in so far as it captures the relation between mental and physical phenomena. Reasons are considered which make it likely that this relation could be applied to social and individualistic phenomena. Chapter 3 considers a detailed formulation of one specific version of determination: supervenience. Again, the relation as it is applied to mental and physical phenomena is discussed, some objections are raised to it and modifications suggested. This relation is applied to the social-individualistic case in Chapter 4. Examples of its application are analysed and some doubts are raised as to the scope of its application. In this version it applies only to the social and individualistic properties of people. In the final chapter, the relation of supervenience is generalized in order that its application to the relation between social and individual phenomena be extended to cover the relation between social entities and their properties as well as the social properties of individuals. It is shown that all these aspects of the social can be taken to supervene on individualistic phenomena. In this respect, supervenience is shown to be at least a potential candidate for the relation holding between social and individualistic phenomena. Some caveats are raised in the conclusion.

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Kyriacou, Christos. "Epistemic justification puzzle." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/5608.

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The thesis explores the semantics of epistemic justification discourse, a very important part of overall epistemic discourse. It embarks from a critical examination of referentialist theories to arrive at a certain nonreferential, expressivist approach to the semantics of epistemic justification discourse. That is, it criticizes the main referentialist theories and then goes on to argue for an expressivist approach on the basis of its theoretical capacity to outflank the problems referentialist theories meet. In the end, I also identify some problems for a prominent expressivist theory and, as a response to these problems, propose a novel norm-expressivist approach that seems to evade these problems. In particular, in Ch.1 I introduce what I call ‘the epistemic justification puzzle’ and then in Chs.2-4 criticize naturalistic referential theories: analytic naturalistic reductionism, synthetic naturalistic reductionism and epistemic kinds realism. In Ch.5 I criticize nonnaturalist referential theories: what I call ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism and J.McDowell’s (1994) more sophisticated quietist version of nonnaturalism. Next, in Ch.6 I introduce the semantic programme of expressivism and go on to construct a simple version of epistemic norm-expressivism (inspired by A.Gibbard (1990)) in order to explain how expressivism can easily outflank the identified problems of referentialist theories. This simple norm-expressivist theory, however, is only used as a theoretical ‘toy’ for the mere sake of motivating the possibility of expressivism, as in Ch.7 I go on to argue for a more sophisticated version of norm-expressivism: habitsendorsement expressivism. In Ch.7 I introduce a prominent expressivist theory of moral and knowledge discourses, namely, plan-reliance expressivism (credited to A.Gibbard (2003, 2008)) and extend it cover the epistemic justification discourse. I then identify some problems for plan-reliance expressivism as extended to cover justification discourse and in response to these problems propose habits-endorsement expressivism. Habits-endorsement expressivism builds on the intuition that (justified) belief-fixation is habitual and exploits the theoretical flexibility of the notion of habits in order to overcome the identified problems of plan-reliance expressivism.

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Mitchell, Steven Cole. "Against Metaethical Descriptivism: The Semantic Problem." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/202935.

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In my dissertation I argue that prominent descriptivist metaethical views face a serious semantic problem. According to standard descriptivism, moral thought and discourse purports to describe some ontology of moral properties and/or relations: e.g., the term `good' purports to refer to some property or cluster of properties. Central to any such theory, then, is the recognition of certain items of ontology which, should they actually exist, would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts. And since one commonly accepted feature of moral thought and discourse is a supervenience constraint, descriptivists hold that any ontology suitable for morality would have to supervene upon non-moral ontology. But this lands descriptivists with the task of providing a semantic account capable of relating this ontology to moral terms and concepts. That is, they must explain why it is that certain items of ontology and not others would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts, in a way that is consistent with the supervenience constraint. I argue that this important explanatory task cannot be carried out. And because the problem generalizes from metaethics to all normativity, we are left with good reason to pursue alternatives to descriptivist accounts of normative semantics.

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Johansson, Magnus. "Kvasirealistisk Motivation." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Philosophy, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8301.

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Books on the topic "Supervenience"

1

Rowlands, Mark. Supervenience and materialism. Aldershot, Hants, England: Avebury, 1995.

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Brożek, Bartosz, Antonino Rotolo, and Jerzy Stelmach, eds. Supervenience and Normativity. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61046-7.

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Rowlands, Mark. Supervenience and materialism. Aldershot: Avebury, 1995.

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Drai, Dalia. Supervenience and realism. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999.

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E, Savellos Elias, and Yalçin Ümit D, eds. Supervenience: New essays. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

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The self, supervenience, and personal identity. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 1997.

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Supervenience and mind: Selected philosophical essays. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

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Schnieder, Benjamin, Miguel Hoeltje, and Alex Steinberg. Varieties of dependence: Ontological dependence, grounding, supervenience, response-dependence. Munich: Philosophia, 2013.

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Gerhard, Preyer, and Siebelt Frank, eds. Reality and Humean supervenience: Essays on the philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

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Leitão, Helder Martins. Da contestação: Réplica, tréplica e articulados supervenientes. 9th ed. Porto: Almeida & Leitão, Lda, 2003.

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Book chapters on the topic "Supervenience"

1

Krohs, Ulrich. "Supervenience." In Encyclopedia of Systems Biology, 2028. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9863-7_1625.

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Peterson, Gregory. "Supervenience." In Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, 2217. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8265-8_200179.

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Craver, Carl F. "Stochastic Supervenience." In Eppur si muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer, 163–70. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52768-0_11.

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Weatherson, Brian. "Humean Supervenience." In A Companion to David Lewis, 99–115. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118398593.ch8.

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Laurier, Daniel. "Reasons and Supervenience." In Supervenience and Normativity, 67–88. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61046-7_4.

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Bunzl, Martin. "Supervenience and Reductionism." In The Context of Explanation, 73–84. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_6.

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Francescotti, Robert. "Supervenience and Physicalism." In Physicalism and the Mind, 29–45. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9451-0_2.

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Cresswell, M. J. "Modality and Supervenience." In Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 156–72. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2139-9_11.

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Wiggins, David. "Identity and Supervenience." In Individuals, Essence and Identity, 247–65. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0_12.

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Seager, William. "Emergence and Supervenience." In Natural Fabrications, 121–54. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29599-7_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Supervenience"

1

NOORDHOF, PAUL. "COUNTERFACTUALS, CAUSATION AND HUMEAN SUPERVENIENCE." In Proceedings of the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053_0011.

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Montecucco, Luisa. "Can Supervenience Save the Mental?" In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International Academy of the Philosophy of Science. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812776617_0012.

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Motarle, Dhiossen Garbin, and Salma Ribeiro Makki. "O INSTITUTO DA REVISÃO/RESOLUÇÃO E O DESEQUILÍBRIO CONTRATUAL SUPERVENIENTE A PANDEMIA DE COVID-19." In Fórum Nacional de Publicações-Ano I. Home Editora, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46898/home.9786584897007.58.

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