Journal articles on the topic 'Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North'

Crisis within the armed southern sudanese movement. The remorseless fighting between factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) are widely seen as evidence that the Southern Sudanese movement is fatally damaged, mainly on tribal grounds. This attempt to discern the factors at work concludes that they are primarily political : they are the Southern expression of Africa’s current wave of aspiration for democracy, group identity and human rights. The great flaw in the Southern organisation is that it is an army, not a political movement — SPLA not SPLM. Yet the driving force of the South’s search for identity and justice means that resolution of the conflict can only be political, not military, and that the SPLM/SPLA ’s internal dissensions cannot ultimately be fatal. The political nature of the wider war means that the questions facing the South remain essentially the same, whatever can be its eventual formal relationship with the North.

Most of the researches on peace agreements conclude that power-sharing arrangements included in these are mostly to the detriment of long-term democratic transformation. The basic argument of these studies is that peace deals consolidate mainly the power of the signatories to the detriment of other major political forces. This article illustrates that, in contrast to many cases, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in 2005 between the government of Sudan represented by the ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), has led to an important political transformation in state structure as well as in power relations. Although the CPA enhanced the legitimacy of the SPLM and the NCP and consolidated their political domination, it, nevertheless, contributed to a significant political opening for other political forces in the North and in the South. The CPA put an end to the historically exclusive political hegemony of the North. This article focuses on the dynamics of relations between the SPLM and the NCP during the transitional period and illustrates how these dynamics have impacted upon the process of political transformation.

The Second Sudanese Civil War was a conflict between the Sudanese government and a separatist group from South Sudan, namely the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It was the most prolonged violent conflict in African history (1983-2005). The conflict officially ended after the signing of the Naivasha Agreement in 2005. In this agreement, there was an effort to resolve the conflict with a consociational approach that carried out project sharing between the conflicting parties. However, this agreement did not succeed in making Sudan free from conflict. This article will present an analysis of the failure to implement the consociational approach in creating positive peace in Sudan and South Sudan The findings of this research are that the power-sharing carried out in this agreement only involves elites. Apart from that, the distribution of resources other than oil has yet to be carried out, which should also be divided, taking into account identity factors.

AbstractOn 22 July 2009 a Tribunal of five leading international lawyers rendered their award at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), thereby redrawing the boundaries of Abyei, a small patch of land in the centre of Sudan and source of violent conflict throughout recent years. The arbitration was initiated by the two signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that in 2005 brought an end to the longest civil war in Africa. Both parties, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, expressed satisfaction with the award, which conceivably saved the CPA from potential collapse. This article examines the legal oddities which accompanied the settlement of the dispute over the Abyei area. It analyses both the referral of the dispute to the PCA through the lens of the Sudanese Constitution and the legal ambiguities of the award itself.

The long civil war in the Sudan between the government and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is usually simply described as a war between ‘the Arab North’ and ‘the African South.’ Equally simply, it is understood as a continuation, by new means and in new circumstances, of nineteenth-century and earlier inequalities between free people and unfree people, and of hostilities between slavers and those they preyed upon. In the twentieth century these asymmetries came to be represented by a religious distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, these apparent distinctions between free and unfree, and between Muslim and non-Muslim begin to blur when we ask who is making them. Likewise, at closer inspection, the division into “the Arab North” and “the African South” begins to fragment and reconstitute into a complexity of alliances and interest groups. These complexities become more evident as engagement moves from hostile encounters in the remote vastness of the Sudan to peace negotiations and press conferences in hotels and offices in capital cities. In the latter settings marginalized populations can be heard. Of special here interest are the three culturally ‘southern’ populations whose homelands are in the geo-political North: Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and South Blue Nile. In January 2003, a public statement, headed “Let us not be denied the right to decide on our future,” was delivered to the North-South peace conference in Kenya by a local NGO, the Relief Organisation of Fazugli (ROOF), on behalf of “the people of South Blue Nile.” It demanded that their representatives, along with those of the Nuba Mountains and Abyei be included in the current peace negotiations.

Southern Sudanese civilian populations have been trapped in a rising tide of ethnicised, South-on-South, military violence ever since leadership struggles within the main southern opposition movement – the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – split into two warring factions in August 1991. This paper traces the devastating impact of this violence on a particularly volatile and fractured region of contemporary South Sudan: the oil rich heartlands of the Western Upper Nile Province. Foregrounding the historical experiences and grassroots perspectives of Nuer civilian populations in this region, the paper shows how elite competition within the southern military has combined with the political machinations of the national Islamic government in Khartoum to create a wave of inter- and intra-ethnic factional fighting so intense and intractable that many Nuer civilians have come to define it as ‘a curse from God’. Dividing Sudan's seventeen-year-long civil war (1983–present) into four distinct phases, the paper shows how successive forms and patterns of political violence in this region have provoked radical reassessments of the precipitating agents and ultimate meaning of this war on the part of an increasingly demoralised and impoverished Nuer civilian population.

The political deduction in political security issues has become one of the topics that related with the attention of researchers and specialists. On the philosophical level, the deduction based on a certain reason to be as the basis for proving a specific issue that cannot be tackled by the existence of contradictions between two extremes - paradigm (Security and Instability). So that, the future of political security in Sudan is still instability, although the international community's ability to impose their Comprehensive Peace Agreement since February 2005, and according to the requirements of what included in the clauses of the agreement to complete the procurement of democratic transition period, as for the Sudanese opposition forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement which are represented the real partners of power. So, the ability of the National Congress Party at that time could have power to consolidate its inclusiveness as a dominant political party. From the another hand, the possibilities to infer the dimensions of political security in Sudan are ready to restore the army’s control over the political life, but with the need to maintain the settlement of critical political issues according to a new criteria that take into account the demands of civil forces; However, the civilian leadership was still inactive by as a result of internal divisions and rivalries within, so that the local, regional and international pressures remain to be the only source of strength to achieve a kind of consensus and satisfaction to overcome the critical period and accomplish what can be achieved for the benefit of the political security for Sudan, at the present and future alike. Finally, the absence of mechanisms for managing the divergent interests between civil and military leaders may lead to an unstable civil-military alliance, and they concern about losing of the whole absolute privileges and powers that they enjoyed during the past three decades for the rule of former President Omar al-Bashir, leaving the civilian leadership in 2019 to be as a drastically situation in its inability to form a united front that pushed towards neutralizing the military’s authority or resorting to confront a new period as a returning of violence as what happened in the past. As for the multiplicity of factors affecting on the political security crisis in Sudan, it meant that there is no real solution to subsequent crises in the future, so that the possibility of shifting towards civilian rule remains the only way to manage differences. And the differences between civilians and military alike might erupted at any reason or incentive.

Abstract This article examines multiple aspects that prompted the emergence and development of the women’s movement in South Sudan. It intends to outline challenges and opportunities for the women’s movement over the years. Indeed, there are numerous sociocultural, economic, political, and structural aspects that impinge on women’s collective actions and mobilization. Nevertheless, this article focuses on how the efforts of the women’s movement strived to articulate and promote critical issues related to women and gender in South Sudan that are partly constrained by three interrelated factors: its close association with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), persistent civil wars and political instability, and donor agencies’ influence on its agenda and activities. The paper argues that, without any tangible changes in these dynamics, the women’s movement in South Sudan will not be able to simultaneously and effectively tackle practical and strategic gender concerns and interests and achieve gender equality in South Sudan.

The United States played a key role in South Sudanese independence, which was decided in a 2011 referendum, and provided diplomatic support and humanitarian aid. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, the United States supported and advocated for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which became the new country’s government. Though largely taking a back seat in meditation efforts run by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and neighboring countries in, its internal stabilization the United States and its international partners have an interest in ensuring a lasting settlement to the present conflict in South Sudan, addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by the civil war, and preventing destabilizing regional spillover.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) has for decades presented a “New Sudan” as its “vision.” But SPLM/A’s official ideology was socialism and its vision a united secular and socialist Sudan. With time, this vision became “New Sudan” and its presumptive guiding ideology became “The New Sudan Vision” (NSV) without any official institutionalisation of this NSV. In fact, “NSV” does not appear in the Movement’s founding manifesto until the revision of the manifesto in 2008 when NSV was incoherently included. I argue, therefore, that the New Sudan Vision was not really an SPLM/A political ideology but John Garang’s ideology. Besides, its immediate disappearance in South Sudan after the death of John Garang and the overwhelming vote for independence was an unequivocal rejection of NSV by the South Sudanese.

The paper analyses the emergence of the National Congress Party (N.C.P.) within the context of the recent political history of Sudan in post 1989 era. The date marks the time when Islamists in Sudan assumed power following a coup d’état led by General Omer Al-Bashir, latter on came to be known as the Ingaz regime. The significance of the experience of this Party emanates from the fact that, though it started as a one ruling party, it managed to conclude in 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (C.P.A.) a major peace agreement ending one of the longest internal wars in Africa. The Agreement was included in the Constitution of the country, consequently hosting Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the movement which led the rebellion to become a partner party/movement in the rule of the country. The paper reflects on this power sharing experience during the Interim Period up to 2011 wherein the Referendum on Self-determination of South Sudan resulted in dividing the Country into two sovereign states.

The paper publishes archival material - verdicts of the Military Court of the People's Liberation Army, which operated in the area of southeastern Srem in 1944. The verdicts were handed down in criminal proceedings against eighteen Serbs, natives of Srem, who were accused of collaborating with the "Chetnik movement of Draža Mihailović". The documents are stored in the Historical Archive of Belgrade. They have not been originally published until now, and therefore, their content brings new light to contemporary historiography, which dispels the prevailing opinion that Eastern Srem was strongly partisan. At the same time, the content of the original archival material opens up a dilemma in the field of legal science: were the decisions of the Military Court justifed and fair? The objective of the paper is to deepen knowledge from the history of the development of military justice, as well as knowledge regarding specific events during 1944 in the part of the occupied Kingdom of Yugoslavia - southeastern Srem

Armed, cattle-herding men in Africa are often assumed to be at a relational and spatial distance from the ‘legitimate’ armed forces of the government. The vision constructed of the South Sudanese government in 2005 by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement removed legitimacy from non-government armed groups including localised, armed, defence forces that protected communities and cattle. Yet, militarised cattle-herding men of South Sudan have had various relationships with the governing Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army over the last thirty years, blurring the government – non government boundary. With tens of thousands killed since December 2013 in South Sudan, questions are being asked about options for justice especially for governing elites. A contextual understanding of the armed forces and their relationship to government over time is needed to understand the genesis and apparent legitimacy of this violence.

The conflict in South Sudan became the only viable violent way of expressing underlying discontentment with the style of governance adopted by the incumbent government and unresolved issues from the 1991 split which occurred when Dr. Riak Machar, one of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (splm/a) leaders at the time, now turned rebel leader, fell out with Dr. John Garang, the chairman of the splm/a. The split, notably referred to as the “Nassir split”, led communities from both the Dinka and Nuer tribes to turn against each other. The referendum, a consequence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the government in Khartoum, Sudan, and the splm/a, led to an overwhelming vote for secession, later paving way for the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011. The existing tension took on a violent expression. The article analyses occurrences the splm/a command pursued on a secessionist agenda in the 21 years of armed struggle and the attainment of independence on the 9 July 2011. It further denotes the insurgents’ pursuit of armed confrontation and the government’s response to the belligerents’ actions, while providing a genesis of the belligerence and laws governing non–international armed conflicts.

Both the Agreement signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area and, the subsequent United Nations Security Resolution 1990 (2011) that established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) made provision for the establishment of the Joint Abyei Police Service among other institutions. However, the non-implementation of this important body has created a law-and-order vacuum in the Abyei Area and a security nightmare for UNISFA. This study critically examined the impact of the absence of the Abyei Joint Police Service on law and order, with particular emphasis on UNISFA’s initiatives in managing issues of criminality in the area. The work used primary and secondary sources including UN documents for data collection and analysis using qualitative design. The findings revealed that the establishment of the Community Protection Committee (CPC) and the work of the Community Liaison Office significantly reduced criminality in the Abyei Area leading to the de-escalation of the conflict. The paper recommends greater capacity building and logistical support to the CPC to ensure its continuous functionality and efficiency.

The phenomenon of Sufism in the tariqa movements played a significant role in Islamic reform and the growth of nationalism in North Africa from the 19th to 20th centuries. This phenomenon which started as a neo-Sufism for Islamic reform, gradually turned into a nationalist movement. Therefore, Sufism is assumed to be a part of Islam that occupies the basic component of national identity and is a symbol of the struggle for independence of Muslim countries in North Africa. This study aims to discuss "the role and influence of Sufism for the revival of Islam, resistance to Western colonialism, the role of Islamic reform, and the process of nationalism and independence of Muslim countries in North Africa." These problems are analyzed based on historical, social, and political approaches related to issues of modern civilization in the Islamic world. This research concludes that, firstly the Sufism movement in the modern period in North Africa is developed in tariqa schools located in Idrisiyah, Sanusiyah, Khatmiyah, Tijaniyah, Qadiriyah, and Sammaniyah. Furthermore, the Sufism movement always shows the intertwined elements of teachings and rituals as well as the influences of social and political developments. Secondly, the teachings of the tariqa are able to increase religious awareness by fulfilling spirituality and improving people's morality, thereby developing, modifying, and actualizing leadership associated with Sufis. Thirdly, Sufism shows a very significant social force regarding the growth of nationalism in North Africa, which is used as the basis for their participation in the socio-political field, with various forms of protest or resistance. In collaboration with religious and community leaders, the leadership of the Sufis has also succeeded in bringing about the independence of national countries such as Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan since the mid-20th century. During that time, many Sufists occupied important positions in government.

In this article, the South Sudan conflict will be analyzed by examining the IGAD mediation process between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A IO). The study will look into factors that prompted the IGAD states to call for an emergency meeting and initiate peace talk just few days after the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013. The study will use the Readiness Theory to examine the factors that pushed the parties to the negotiation table and enable the IGAD to succeed or failed. Although the mediation was somehow shaky characterized with mistrust and suspicion among the parties, The IGAD mediators was also questionable since some of the IGAD states were already perceived has taken part in one way or other. The study will explore two major factors; first the factor that led to the agreement between the parties and the second one will be looking into assumption of readiness theory applicable to this case study. In conclusion, the study will investigate the level of mistrust and suspicion which was very high through out the negotiation and almost failed the talk to the level of parties being coerced to sign an agreement against their will of which government presented number of reservations to the mediator and went unaddressed will in many observers’ opinion was the cause of the July 2016 J1 dog-fight. But the IGAD continue pd pushing for peaceful settlement of the conflict and initiated handshake and face-to-face meetings between the leaders which eventually resulted into the Khartoum revitalized agreement in September 2018. Other arrangements also followed such as the spiritual retreat in Vatican in April 2019, which was attended by almost all leaders, but despite all these, still the motivation is in question and the time will prove this wrong.

In all of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria was the first country to be infected by the wind of democratization that swept the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s. The country became a political laboratory for the rest of the Arab world, as liberalization opened spaces for moderate and radical Islamic groups to contest elections. Unfortunately, these elections quickly descended into a long drawn-out and brutal war with the secularist rulers. This bitter battle, fought most fiercely between 1992-99, turned Algeria into a hot spot, thereby raising the question of whether democracy is feasible in the Muslim world. Frederic Volpi's new book seeks to answer this question by analyzing the process of political liber­alization and the severe problems it generated in Algeria. Volpi presents early and mid-twentieth-century North African schol­ars' reinterpretations of the Islamic creed that activated the emergence of anti-secularist movements in the Maghreb as a point of departure for his historical narrative of the Algerian conflict. Although Algeria's militant movement was coopted by the state party (the National Liberation Front [FLN]) and lost its dynamism during the post-independence years, it still sought to change the political system by operating from the community level, where it had built a network of associations. The author shows how this network's provision of services designed to meet the people's welfare needs helped thrust Islamic leaders into the political limelight as they uti­lized their organizational capacities and authority to transform the 1988 October food riots into a political protest ...

In a world where Asia occupies again her historical role, after two centuries of European and North American domination – an “aberration”, according to Kishore Mahbubani –, the lega-cy of traditions from this continent in Latin American in-tellectual life and politics appears slightly. Thus maoism in-formed several political currents and generations of political activists, such as PCB, AP or PCdoB. Apart from definitions, they were interested in the way of thinking of Chinese communists, unlikely winners, which opened perspectives as to how to conceive revolution in Brazil in a way more cohe-rent with its historical originality, geographical complexity, and level of development. Aspects formerly seen as hindran-ces became beacons of hope: rural economic preponderance, especially peasant struggles in the Northeast or Maringa etc. Some examples from the continent favoured this bet. Ten years after the proclamation of the People's Republic of Chi-na, a Cuban revolutionary movement achieved power coming from the rural areas. The phrase “the countryside surrounds the city”, gaining power in the 1960´s, seemed to be realized here as well as with national liberation wars in Viet Nam, Asia, Africa and Latin America (Naxalites, MPLA, Sendero luminoso etc.). For young Brazilian activists, under strong repression from the military dictatorship since 1964, especially with AI 5 in 1968, maoism offered a new horizon. Apart from the change in model, perspectives opened in the arts, or currents such as feminism etc., the Little Red Book (although clandestine) representing an incentive to struggle, and a solidarity link with other fighters around the world.

The present article reveals the history of relations between the south-western unions of communities of Dagestan and the Kingdom of Kakheti in the second half of the 18th - early 19th century. It is established that political and economic contacts between them, due to mutual cooperation, were generally of a peaceful and good-neighbourly nature. In the second half of the 18th century there was a significant strengthening of military-political and cultural ties between Georgia and Dagestan. The arrival of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus in the early 19th century not only shifted the balance of military and political forces in the region, but also radically changed the nature of trade and economic relations between Dagestan and Georgia. In this regard, the main attention is paid to the processes that began after the loss of Georgian statehood, when the border Dagestan communities tried to negotiate with the new authorities. Furthermore, the author reveals the policy of Dagestan feudal rulers, whom the unions of Dagestan communities saw as intermediaries in their relations with the Russian Empire. On the basis of numerous sources, both already published and identified by the author in the Central historical archive of Georgia, the article considers the most important events that took place in the region during the study period. According to the author, before the appointment of A. P. Ermolov to the Caucasus, St. Petersburg did not rush to assert its power there, content at first with "external signs of citizenship" of the highlanders. With the arrival of the latter, who pursued the policy on the well-known principle of "divide and conquer", the trade and economic blockade of the highlanders of Western Dagestan increased significantly, leading to their subsequent active participation in the people's liberation movement of the highlanders of the North-East Caucasus in the 20-50s' of the 19th century..

While a stalemate in the predominantly Tamil North and East of Sri Lanka continues despite Indian intervention on the government's behalf, in the Sinhala South death squads associated with the pseudo People's Liberation Front, the JVP, have been ruthlessly eliminating its opponents. The United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), having created and nurtured popular racism for over thirty years in order to get into power (through a ready-made Sinhalese majority of 70 per cent of the population), * would now like to draw back from the brink of another crippling civil war, this time in the South. But they are unable to do so because the JVP has taken up the Sinhala cause and pushed it to the point of social fascism through assassination and murder. Popular racism based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism promoted in the schools and expressed in song, textbook and media served to fuel the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983, in which thousands were killed at the hands of street mobs. Some of the most violently anti- Tamil propaganda (deriving inspiration from mythical Sinhalese history) has emanated from the present government. Colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese was justified on the pretext of protecting ancient Buddhist shrines. And it is an open secret that ministers hired their own hit squads in the 1983 pogrom. When, in a bid to end the unwinnable war with the Tamils, the UNP signed the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, allowing Indian troops to operate on Sri Lankan soil, it alienated the very Sinhala nationalists it had itself fostered. And it was the JVP which capitalised on the resentment over India's interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Accusing the UNP government (and other supporters of the Accord) of treachery, it enlarged and deepened popular racism into fanatical patriotism. But what has given the JVP terror tactics a hold over the population has been the steady erosion of democratic freedoms, on the one hand, and the self-abasement of the Left, on the other. Both the SLFP and UNP governments have postponed elections to stay in power, but the UNP went further and got itself re-elected en bloc on a phoney referendum to postpone elections. Local elections were never held under the SLFP and whatever elections took place under the UNP have either been rigged and/or carried out under conditions of massive intimidation. In the process, the political literacy that the country once boasted has been lost to the people and, with it, their will to resist. At the same time the collaborationist politics of the Left in the SLFP government of 1970-77 have not only served to decimate its own chances at the polls (it obtained not a single seat in the election of 1977) but also to leave the working-class movement defenceless. So that it was a simple matter for the UNP government to crush the general strike of 1980, imprison its leaders and throw 80, 000 workers permanently out of work. And it has been left to the JVP to pretend to take up the socialist mantle of the Left even as it devotes itself to the racist cause of the Right, and so win the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist people. In the final analysis the choice before the country is that of two terrors: that of the state or that of the JVP. Below we publish an analysis of the situation as at October 1988, put out by the underground Campaign for Social Democracy in the run up to the presidential elections.

Abstract This article explores radio broadcasting and monitoring by and about Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) leader John Garang during Sudan's second civil war, focusing on the core period of Radio SPLA broadcasting (1984–91). Through oral history, memoirs, and international monitoring reports, the article analyzes radio conversations between Garang and his critics — northern Sudanese, southern Sudanese, and international — to argue that radio battles directly shaped the struggle for political authority between Garang and the Sudanese government, and within the SPLM/A elite. Radio allowed Garang to speak to a dispersed audience within and beyond Sudan, presenting an alternative history of Sudan, publicizing his vision of a New Sudan, and asserting his pseudo-sovereign control of SPLM/A-held territory. However, Radio SPLA did not exist in a vacuum; Garang's rivals responded on government and international radio to criticize his leadership in targeted, personal terms. Radio thus powerfully mediated between personal, national, and international politics during the SPLM/A's liberation struggle.

This paper will examine the existing constraints to addressing relief and repatriation needs in nongovernment-held areas and point to areas of possible change. Nongovernment-held areas are held by a force other than a central government army. In the case of Tigray, these areas were not only inaccessible to the army of the former central government of Ethiopia (GOE), but were also administered by an opposition force, theTigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Relative to other national liberation movements, the TPLF's administrative system was quite developed; in addition, the movement controlled a wide area encompassing most of rural Tigray and, by 1988, the whole of the region. Effective access was maintained from neighbouring Sudan, and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) operated as an effective disaster management agency.

The crisis in South Sudan that broke out on the 15th of December 2013 has been the gravest political debacle in the five years of the country’s independence. This crisis typifies the general political and social patterns of post-independence politics of nation-states that are borne out of armed struggles in Africa. Not only does the crisis expose a reluctance by the nationalist leaders to continue with nation-building initiatives, the situation suggests the struggle for political control at the echelons of power within the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement. This struggle has been marred by the manufacturing of political identity and political demonization that seem to illuminate the current political landscape in South Sudan. Be that as it may, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hurriedly intervened to find a lasting solution however supportive of the government of President Salva Kirr and this has suggested interest based motives on the part of the regional body and has since exacerbated an already fragile situation. As such, this article uses the Fanonian discourse of post-independence politics in Africa to expose the fact that the SPLM has degenerated into lethargy and this is at the heart of the crisis.

The rise in splinter groups within rebel movements and opposition groups has serious implications for conflict resolution efforts. Yet existing literature has not sufficiently touched on the key implications and factors that lead to the split and fragmentation of rebel groups. One of the conflicts that have been impacted by the problem of fragmentation of warring parties is the South Sudan conflict. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has experienced internal fragmentation historically during the struggle for independence from Sudan and today during the civil war that began in 2011. New groups have emerged claiming to be paying allegiance to leaders and pursuing a different course. This paper argues that internal fragmentation within the SPLM constitutes a serious threat to peace in Africa’s youngest nation. The author examines the motivations behind such fragmentations and their implication in the understanding of the South Sudan prolonged conflict. The paper begins by examining the causes of the South Sudan conflict and the patterns of violence, and it assesses wartime governance and the fragmentation of the groups. The study concludes with a set of recommendations for the resolution of the conflict.

In the summer of 1999, four ships carrying 599 Fujianese people arrived on the west coast of Canada. They survived a desperate and dangerous journey only for the Canadian Government to put them in prison. After numerous deportations, there are still about 40 of these people in Canadian prisons as of January 2001. They have been in jail for over a year and a half under mere suspicion of flight risk. About 24 people have been granted refugee status. Most people deported to China have been placed in Chinese prisons and fined. It is worth remembering that these migrants may have been undocumented but they are not "illegal" in that they have mobility rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes everyone's right to leave any country and to seek asylum. It can be argued that it is not the migrants who are illegal, but the unjust laws that criminalize their freedom of movement. In considering people's rights, we need to keep in mind not only the civil and political rights that the West tends to privilege, but equally important social and economic rights as well. As a local response to a global phenomenon, Direct Action Against Refugee Exploitation (DAARE) formed in Vancouver to support the rights of the Fujianese women, eleven of whom at the time of writing are still being held in the Burnaby Correctional Centre for Women (BCCW). In DAARE’s view, Immigration Canada's decision to detain all these people is based on a racialized group-profiling policy which violates basic human rights and ignores Canadian responsibility in the creation of the global economic and societal conditions which give rise to widespread migration. In light of the Canadian government's plans to implement even more punitive immigration legislation, DAARE endorses the Coalition for a Just Immigration and Refugee Policy's "Position Paper on Bill C31." They call for humanitarian review and release for the remaining Fujianese people. This review would include a few released refugee claimants who are still in Canada, children, women who were past victims of family planning, people facing religious persecution and, of course, those who are still in prison after 18 months and who have never been charged with any crime. Suspicion of flight risk is not a valid reason to incarcerate people for such a long time. Who Is a Migrant? The lines between "voluntary" and "forced" migration are no longer adequate to explain the complexities of population movements today. Motives for forced displacement include political, economic, social and environmental factors. This spectrum runs from the immediate threats to life, safety and freedom due to war or persecution, to situations where economic conditions make the prospects of survival marginal and non-existent. (Moussa 2000). Terms like "economic migrant" and "bogus refugee" have been used in the media to discredit migrants such as the Fujianese and to foster hostility against them. This scapegoating process oversimplifies the situation, for all refugees and all migrants are entitled to the basic respect due all human beings as enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. There can be multiple reasons for an individual to migrate—ranging from family reunification to economic pressures to personal survival; to fear of government corruption and of political persecution, to name just a few. The reduction of everything to merely the economic does not allow one to understand why migration is occurring and likely to increase in the future. Most immigrants to Canada could also be described as economic migrants. Conrad Black is an economic migrant. The privileging of rich migrants over poor ones romanticizes globalization as corporate progress and ignores the immense human suffering it entails for the majority of the world's population as the gap between the wealthy and the poor rapidly increases. Hundreds of years ago, when migrants came to this aboriginal territory we now call Canada, they came in order to survive—in short, they too were "economic migrants." Many of those migrants who came from Europe would not qualify to enter Canada today under its current immigration admissions guidelines. Indeed, over 50% of Canadians would not be able to independently immigrate to Canada given its current elitist restrictions. One of the major reasons for an increase in migration is the destruction of rural economies in Asia and elsewhere in the world. Millions of people have been displaced by changes in agriculture that separate people from the land. These waves of internal migration also result in the movement of peoples across national borders in order to survive. Chinese provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong, whose people have a long history of overseas travel, are particularly common sources of out-migration. In discussing migration, we need to be wary of how we can inadvertently reinforce the colonization of First Nations people unless we consciously work against that by actively supporting aboriginal self-determination. For example, some First Nations people have been accused of "smuggling" people across borders—this subjects them to the same process of criminalization which the migrants have experienced, and ignores the sovereign rights of First Nations people. We need ways of relating to one another which do not reenact domination, but which work in solidarity with First Nations' struggles. This requires an understanding of the ways in which racism, colonialism, classism, and other tactics through which "dividing and conquering" take place. For those of us who are first, second, third, fourth, fifth generation migrants to this land, our survival and liberation are intimately connected to that of aboriginal people. History Repeating Itself? The arrival of the Fujianese people met with a racist media hysteria reminiscent of earlier episodes of Canadian history. Front page newspaper headlines such as "Go Home" increased hostility against these people. In Victoria, people were offering to adopt the dog on one of the ships at the same time that they were calling to deport the Chinese. From the corporate media accounts of the situation, one would think that most Canadians did not care about the dangerous voyage these people had endured, a voyage during which two people from the second ship died. Accusations that people were trying to enter the country "illegally" overlooked how historically, the Chinese, like other people of colour, have had to find ways to compensate for racist and classist biases in Canada's immigration system. For example, from 1960 to 1973, Canada granted amnesty to over 12,000 "paper sons," that is, people who had immigrated under names other than their own. The granting of "legal" status to the "paper sons" who arrived before 1960 finally recognized that Canada's legislation had unfairly excluded Chinese people for decades. From 1923 to 1947, Canada's Chinese Exclusion Act had basically prevented Chinese people from entering this country. The xenophobic attitudes that gave rise to the Chinese Exclusion Act and the head tax occurred within a colonial context that privileged British migrants. Today, colonialism may no longer be as rhetorically attached to the British empire, but its patterns—particularly the globally inequitable distribution of wealth and resources—continue to accelerate through the mechanism of transnational corporations, for example. As Helene Moussa has pointed out, "the interconnections of globalisation with racist and colonialist ideology are only too clear when all evidence shows that globalisation '¼ legitimise[s] and sustain[s] an international system that tolerates an unbelievable divide not only between the North and the South but also inside them'" (2000). Moreover, according to the United Nations Development Programme, the income gap between people in the world's wealthiest nations and the poorest nations has shifted from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990 and to 74:1 in 1997. (Moussa 2000) As capital or electronic money moves across borders faster than ever before in what some have called the casino economy (Mander and Goldsmith), change and instability are rapidly increasing for the majority of the world's population. People are justifiably anxious about their well-being in the face of growing transnational corporate power; however, "protecting" national borders through enforcement and detention of displaced people is a form of reactive, violent, and often racist, nationalism which scapegoats the vulnerable without truly addressing the root causes of instability and migration. In short, reactive nationalism is ineffective in safe-guarding people's survival. Asserting solidarity with those who are most immediately displaced and impoverished by globalization is strategically a better way to work towards our common survival. Substantive freedom requires equitable economic relations; that is, fairly shared wealth. Canadian Response Abilities The Canadian government should take responsibility for its role in creating the conditions that displace people and force them to migrate within their countries and across borders. As a major sponsor of efforts to privatize economies and undertake environmentally devastating projects such as hydro-electric dams, Canada has played a significant role in the creation of an unemployed "floating population" in China which is estimated to reach 200 million people this year. Punitive tactics will not stop the movement of people, who migrate to survive. According to Peter Kwong, "The well-publicized Chinese government's market reforms have practically eliminated all labor laws, labour benefits and protections. In the "free enterprise zones" workers live virtually on the factory floor, laboring fourteen hours a day for a mere two dollars—that is, about 20 cents an hour" (136). As Sunera Thobani has phrased it, "What makes it alright for us to buy a t-shirt on the streets of Vancouver for $3, which was made in China, then stand up all outraged as Canadian citizens when the woman who made that t-shirt tries to come here and live with us on a basis of equality?" Canada should respond to the urgent situations which cause people to move—not only on the grounds upon which Convention refugees were defined in 1949 (race, religion, nationality, social group, political opinion) which continue to be valid—but also to strengthen Canada's system to include a contemporary understanding that all people have basic economic and environmental survival rights. Some migrants have lives that fit into the narrow definition of a UN Convention refugee and some may not. Those who do not fit this definition have nonetheless urgent needs that deserve attention. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives has pointed out that there are at least 18 million people working in 124 export zones in China. A living wage in China is estimated to be 87 cents per hour. Canadians benefit from these conditions of cheap labour, yet when the producers of these goods come to our shores, we hypocritically disavow any relationship with them. Responsibility in this context need not refer so much to some stern sense of duty, obligation or altruism as to a full "response"—intellectual, emotional, physical, and spiritual—that such a situation provokes in relations between those who "benefit"—materially at least—from such a system and those who do not. References Anderson, Sarah, et al. Field Guide to the Global Economy. New York: New Press, 2000. Canadian Council of Refugees. "Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons." February 20, 2000. Canadian Woman Studies: Immigrant and Refugee Women. 19.3 (Fall 1999). Chin, Ko-lin. Smuggled Chinese. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Coalition for a Just Immigration and Refugee Policy. "Position Paper on Bill C31." 2000. Davis, Angela. The Angela Davis Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, Foundation Against Trafficking in Women, and International Human Rights Law Group. "Human Rights Standards for the Treatment of Trafficked Persons." January 1999. Henry, Frances and Tator, Carol. Racist Discourses in Canada's English Print Media. Toronto: Canadian Foundation for Race Relations, 2000. Jameson, Fredric and Miyoshi, Masao, Eds. The Cultures of Globalization. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Kwong, Peter. Forbidden Workers. New York: New Press, 1997. Mander, Jerry and Goldsmith, Edward, Eds. The Case Against the Global Economy. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996. Moussa, Helene. "The Interconnections of Globalisation and Migration with Racism and Colonialism: Tracing Complicity." 2000. ---. 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