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Journal articles on the topic 'Structure and agency'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 31 January 2023

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1

Cairns, Stephen. "Agency." Architectural Research Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 2009): 105–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1359135509990182.

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‘Agency’ is a beguiling word. It has the immediacy of a call-to-arms and the remoteness and anonymity of a bureaucratic function. Agency, as action in the world, underpins revolutionary social change, and the representation of someone else's interests – usually at a distance – in a governmental or business context. It is implicated in both the agitprop of the Reclaim the Streets network, or Brazil's Homeless Workers Movement, and in state bureaucracies such as the UK Border Agency, or commercial franchises such as the Western Union. The term encapsulates two quite distinctive forms of action: one individuated, collective and immediate; and the other systemic, anonymised and bureaucratic. It is no accident, then, that in academic literature ‘agency’ is often paired with ‘structure’, and in the binarised form, structure/agency, is used to refer to the tension between the creative actions of individuals and the social, political and economic structures that supposedly constrain them. The fact that architects are expected to exercise agency in both of these senses – as creative actors and as representatives of their clients' interests – gives the theme further significance.

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2

Choi, Danny Woosik, Hyun Kyung Chatfield, and Robert Evans Chatfield. "Agency or stewardship?" International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management 30, no. 3 (March 19, 2018): 1352–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijchm-09-2016-0536.

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Purpose This study aims to empirically investigate agency and stewardship theories in the US lodging market by examining the influence of fiscal and non-fiscal leadership structures on the debt financing decisions of lodging firms. Design/methodology/approach Secondary financial data have been collected for USA-based lodging firms. Subsequently, bivariate correlation, pooled ordinary least square) and endogeneity analyses have been performed on the data. Findings The findings support the significant influence of some corporate governance attributes on the capital structure of US lodging firms and show the limited applicability of agency and stewardship theories. Practical implications Theoretical and managerial implications are suggested in terms of balancing leadership structure attributes from the agency and stewardship theories, the capital structure of lodging firms and the future research. Originality/value Despite its importance considering the intensive capital and relatively high liabilities needed for success in the lodging industry, the influence of leadership structure on capital structure has not been examined either empirically or theoretically. Leadership structure attributes, both fiscal and non-fiscal, are included in the study to gain a richer understanding of their influence. The outcomes of the analysis suggest managerial implications for leadership structure as well as theoretical generalizability for agency and stewardship theories within the lodging industry.

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3

Michney, Todd M. "Structure versus Agency Redux." Journal of Urban History 40, no. 2 (January 21, 2014): 380–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0096144213508616.

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Bulbeck, Chilla. "Articulating structure and agency." Women's Studies International Forum 24, no. 2 (March 2001): 141–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0277-5395(01)00161-3.

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5

King, Anthony. "Overcoming Structure and Agency." Journal of Classical Sociology 9, no. 2 (May 2009): 260–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468795x09102125.

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6

Smith, Michael. "How Much of a New Agenda? International Structures, Agency, and Transatlantic Order." Politics and Governance 10, no. 2 (May 18, 2022): 219–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i2.4985.

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This article focuses on the links between transatlantic relations—a structured array of markets, hierarchies, networks, ideas, and institutions—and broader elements of international structure and world order. It argues that the changing state of transatlantic relations reflects changes in the structure of the relations themselves, but also structural change in the global and domestic arenas and how such change shapes or reflects the actions of a wide variety of agents. The first part of the article briefly explores the importance of international structure in order to identify the global forces that shape the context for transatlantic relations. The article then examines the key mechanisms in transatlantic relations which interact to create forms of transatlantic order; these create spaces for a wide variety of agents, operating within broader elements of international and domestic structure, and the article illustrates this through the ways in which the EU’s “new agenda for EU–US relations” sought to shape transatlantic interactions during the first year of the Biden presidency. The article examines the implications of transatlantic responses to the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, and concludes that despite the move to enhanced EU–US cooperation in the short term, the interaction of structures, mechanisms, and actors will contribute to continuing differentiation of transatlantic relations, at least in the medium term, whatever the preferences of US and EU policy-makers.

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7

Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. "Two stories about structure and agency." Review of International Studies 20, no. 3 (July 1994): 241–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500118054.

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So stark and swift was the collapse of the Cold War structure of international relations that few yet pretend to have been expecting it. The magnitude of the changes involved has forced practitioners and theorists alike into radical rethinking. For practitioners, the old certainties have gone and it is unclear what political and security structures will replace those of the Cold War: whether it will be a New World Order or a New World Disorder is still very much open to debate. But for international relations theorists the events have focused attention on the nature of international political structures. What kind of structures can international systems represent if they can be changed so fundamentally and so easily? Neo-realists especially have to rethink a dominant discourse which relies heavily on established regularities and on the stability of the bipolar system. What does it say for Waltz's conception of international structure if it can be so easily transcended by unit factors? If structural theories of international relations can say nothing about an event as momentous as the collapse of the Cold War system, what can they say anything about? Neo-realists could ignore the fact that their theories could not account for transformations of international structure precisely because these theories did explain the regularity and stability of bipolarity. Now that is gone, theorists have to look again at what they mean by a structure. Moreover, the nature of agency has to be reexamined; for neo-realists human agency was essentially irrelevant at the structural level of explanation, yet the collapse of the Cold War system seemed to depend very largely on active and calculating agents. Questions concerning the nature of agency and the meaning of structure and the relationship between them are now more relevant than ever in international relations theory.

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8

Imbroscio, David L. "Structure, Agency, and Democratic Theory." Polity 32, no. 1 (September 1999): 45–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3235333.

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9

Lash, Scott, Pierre Bourdieu, and Richard Nice. "Structure, Agency, and Practical Knowledge." Contemporary Sociology 21, no. 2 (March 1992): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2075406.

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10

Gray, Clive. "Structure, Agency and Museum Policies." Museum and Society 14, no. 1 (June 9, 2017): 116–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.29311/mas.v14i1.629.

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This paper reports on the results of recent empirical research on the interaction of structure and agency in the museums sector in England in the context of policy-making within individual museums and galleries. Policy in the museums sector is subject to a large number of political, economic, social and technological pressures and demands that are both externally and internally created: the management of these pressures and demands provides the opportunity for the establishment of multiple responses by the members of individual organizations. The effects of hierarchy, organizational and functional centrality, accountability and professionalism in this process, and the manner in which legitimacy and ideology are employed as central resources by museums staff, are identified. The focus on an under-researched issue allows for an original evaluation of claims and assumptions about what drives the policy choices that are made within museums.Key Words: Museum policy, structure and agency, England

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11

Hughes, James. "Agency versus structure in reconciliation." Ethnic and Racial Studies 41, no. 4 (October 23, 2017): 624–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2018.1381340.

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12

Ang, James S., Rebel A. Cole, and James Wuh Lin. "Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of Finance 55, no. 1 (February 2000): 81–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00201.

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13

Jacobides, Michael G., and Sidney G. Winter. "Capabilities: Structure, Agency, and Evolution." Organization Science 23, no. 5 (October 2012): 1365–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0716.

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14

NEW, CAROLINE. "Structure, Agency and Social Transformation." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24, no. 3 (September 1994): 187–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1994.tb00252.x.

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15

Albiston, Catherine R. "Structure, Agency, and Working Law." Law & Social Inquiry 44, no. 04 (October 11, 2019): 1221–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2019.52.

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Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights (2016), by Lauren Edelman, presents an integrated theory of endogeneity that explains how organizational responses to civil rights laws undermine civil rights protections, preserve managerial prerogatives, and redefine judicial interpretations of compliance. Structural dynamics baked into organizations and driven by legitimacy and meaning produce organizational practices that appear to prohibit discrimination but do little to change discrimination on the ground. Working Law raises important questions for future research: Under what conditions might symbolic structures be effective? How does power affect the institutionalization of some symbols of compliance but not others? Can legal reforms limit the effects of endogeneity?

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16

Hay, Colin, and Daniel Wincott. "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism." Political Studies 46, no. 5 (December 1998): 951–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00177.

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17

Breyer, Daniel. "The Structure of Cognitive Agency." Acta Analytica 31, no. 3 (December 23, 2015): 285–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0279-3.

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18

Afiouni, Fida, and Charlotte M. Karam. "Structure, agency, and notions of career success." Career Development International 19, no. 5 (September 2, 2014): 548–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cdi-01-2013-0007.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore notions of career success from a process-oriented perspective. The authors argue that success can be usefully conceptualized as a subjectively malleable and localized construct that is continually (re)interpreted and (re)shaped through the interaction between individual agency and macro-level structures. Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs a qualitative methodology drawing on 32 in-depth semi-structured interviews with female academics from eight countries in the Arab Middle East. Findings – Findings of this study provide an empirical validation of the suggested Career Success Framework and moves toward an integrative model of objective and subjective career success criteria. More specifically, the findings showed that women's definitions of success are: first, localized in that they capture considerations relating to predominant institutions in the region (i.e. family and gender ideology); second, subjectively malleable in that they capture women's agency embedded in specific macro-level structures; and finally, process oriented in that they reflect a dynamic interaction between the structure agency as well as the subsequent actions, strategies, and behaviors women adopt to alleviate tension and reach their personal notions of career success. Practical implications – The authors suggest that there may be value in customizing human resource management policies in the region around the salience of family and community service. Moreover, organizations can play a pivotal role in supporting women to work through the experienced tensions. Examples of such support are mentoring programs, championing female role models, and designing corporate social responsibility initiatives geared toward shifting mandated gender structures in the region. Finally, the authors argue that organizations could benefit by supporting women's atypical patterns of career engagement to allow for interactions with wider circles of stakeholders such as the community. This requires organizations to rethink their career success criteria to allow for the integration of non-traditional elements of career. Social implications – Adopting a more process-oriented view of career success avoids reification by drawing attention to local macro-level structures as well as individual agency. It also suggests that existing norms for how “success” is understood are only one element in a wider process of what it means to be “successful”, thereby opening space for more diverse and localized conceptualizations. Originality/value – This paper provides a more process-oriented consideration of career success, highlighting the importance of understanding how perceived tensions shape an individual's behaviors, actions, and career strategies. The value of this contribution is that it allows us to better understand the complex interaction of structure and agency in shaping an individual's notions of career success.

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Singh, Sourabh. "Role of Political Habitus in Shaping Dynamics of Democracy: Insights from Nehruvian and Gandhian Period of Democracy in India." Comparative Sociology 14, no. 5 (November 25, 2015): 682–714. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341366.

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I have developed a theory regarding the relations among political structure, elite agency and democratization processes that overcomes the political structure/elite agency duality currently plaguing democracy consolidation studies. Using Bourdieu’s insights on the structure/agency relation to empirically examine the Nehruvian (1947–71) and Gandhian (1971–77) periods of Indian democracy, I show that the elite’s role in democratization processes is shaped by their political habitus, which in turn is structured by historically specific political structures. Furthermore, neither the elite’s political habitus nor the political structures that influence it are immune to change. Political structures are shaped by intraparty conflicts among the elite to establish their political authority. Since political structures change because of the changing state of conflict among the political elite, the milieu in which the elite’s political habitus is conditioned also changes. In the changing political milieu, the existent elite’s political sensibilities are reconfigured, and the sensibilities of the new generation of political elite, who have differing interests in democratization processes, become mature.

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20

Manning, John F. "Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules." Columbia Law Review 96, no. 3 (April 1996): 612. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1123259.

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21

Chingara, Remigio, and Jan Heystek. "Leadership as agency in the context of structure." International Journal of Educational Management 33, no. 7 (November 4, 2019): 1596–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijem-01-2018-0028.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how principals, deputy principals, heads of departments (HoDs) and teachers as leaders exercise their agency within and through the organisational structure of their schools to improve academic quality. Design/methodology/approach A case study was conducted in the wider context of school-based leadership. Principals, deputy principals, HoDs and teachers selected by means of purposive sampling from six primary and secondary schools in Harare Province of Zimbabwe participated in the study. Findings Leaders in schools in Harare Province were found to have the capacity to use their agency within and through the organisational structure to improve pass rates. They were able to use their agency to work within the supposed rigid bureaucratic organisational structures to enable bureaucratic organisational structures, or, in participants’ views, democratic structures. Research limitations/implications Some limitations of the research ought to be considered. The research scope and site had its limitations. The research site was limited to a few primary and secondary schools in Harare Province (one out of ten provinces) of Zimbabwe. Although the sampling procedures were implemented to ensure good representation of participants’ views, the sampling was limited to a few schools. Owing to time and financial constraints, a larger sample could not be selected to conduct the interviews. These limitations are acknowledged, but they do not undervalue the significance of the study, as they can provide potential avenues for further research. For example, the study may be replicated in rural provinces of Zimbabwe. Such further research could help improve school leadership in Zimbabwe. Practical implications Principals, deputy principals, HoDs and teachers as leaders can exercise their agency in the structure of their schools to improve academic quality, expressed as and measured by pass rates. School leaders who have a positive attitude and requisite experience are able to change the rigid bureaucratic structures of their schools to enable bureaucratic structures, which are similar to democratic structures. Originality/value This paper provides a critical perspective on how leaders exercise their agency in the context of the organisational structure of their schools to improve academic quality.

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22

FLEETWOOD, STEVE. "Structure, institution, agency, habit, and reflexive deliberation." Journal of Institutional Economics 4, no. 2 (August 2008): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137408000957.

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AbstractThe conceptual apparatus referred to generally as agency-structure or agency-institution is central to a great deal of social science, especially Institutional Economics. Despite its centrality, this apparatus has never been able to fully explain how institutions and social structures influence agents' intentions and actions. Economist, Geoff Hodgson and Sociologist, Margaret Archer have been at the forefront of endeavours to provide such an explanation. Section 1 of this paper elaborates upon Hodgson's ideas on institutional rules, habits, habituation, and the notion of reconstitutive downward causation. Section 2 elaborates upon Archer's ideas on structures, reflexive deliberation and the notion of an internal domain of mental primacy, and ends with a critical look at Archer's (brief) comments on rules and habits. The conclusion shows how a more nuanced understanding of structures, institutions, agency, habits, and deliberation, can inform research into a specific area, namely the analysis of labour markets.

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23

Boudreau, François, Piotr Sztompka, and Francois Boudreau. "Agency and Structure: Reorienting Social Theory." Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 21, no. 3 (1996): 442. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3341782.

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24

Lewis, Tracy R., and David E. M. Sappington. "Optimal Capital Structure in Agency Relationships." RAND Journal of Economics 26, no. 3 (1995): 343. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555992.

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25

Lugones, Maria C. "Structure/Antistructure and Agency under Oppression." Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 10 (1990): 500–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil1990871027.

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26

Heinz, Walter R. "Structure and agency in transition research." Journal of Education and Work 22, no. 5 (November 2009): 391–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13639080903454027.

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27

Crossley, James. "Agency, Structure, Change, Power…and Jesus." Bulletin for the Study of Religion 43, no. 3 (September 19, 2014): 20–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/bsor.v43i3.20.

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28

Gocek, Gregory G. "Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure." CFA Digest 43, no. 2 (May 2013): 14–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v43.n2.35.

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29

Arditi, Jorge, and Piotr Sztompka. "Agency and Structure: Reorienting Social Theory." Contemporary Sociology 24, no. 2 (March 1995): 278. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2076922.

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30

François, Pascal, and Franck Missonier-Piera. "The Agency Structure of Loan Syndicates." Financial Review 42, no. 2 (May 2007): 227–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2007.00169.x.

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31

Skowronek, Stephen. "Theory and History, Structure and Agency." Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 3 (September 1999): 672–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-2141.2003.00055.x.

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32

Wang, Yong. "Agency: The Internal Split of Structure." Sociological Forum 23, no. 3 (September 2008): 481–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2008.00087.x.

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33

Jackson, Michael. "Orders and obedience: structure and agency." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 26, no. 7/8 (July 2006): 309–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01443330610680407.

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34

Chernenko, Sergey, C. Fritz Foley, and Robin Greenwood. "Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure." Financial Management 41, no. 4 (September 4, 2012): 885–914. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2012.01214.x.

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35

Bishop, Paul. "The Changing Structure of Estate Agency." Service Industries Journal 13, no. 4 (October 1993): 307–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02642069300000075.

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36

Hewitt, John P. "Structure, Agency, and the Internal Conversation." Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 33, no. 6 (November 2004): 731–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009430610403300664.

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37

Eccles, Jacquelynne S. "Agency and Structure in Human Development." Research in Human Development 5, no. 4 (December 8, 2008): 231–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15427600802493973.

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38

ter Meulen, Alice G. B. "Agency, argument structure, and causal inference." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31, no. 6 (December 2008): 728–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x08006055.

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AbstractLogically, weighting is transitive, but similarity is not, so clustering cannot be either. Entailments must help a child to review attribute lists more efficiently. Children's understanding of exceptions to generic claims precedes their ability to articulate explanations. So agency, as enabling constraint, may show coherent covariation with attributes, as mere extensional, observable effect of intensional entailments.

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39

Williams, Joseph T. "Financial and Industrial Structure with Agency." Review of Financial Studies 8, no. 2 (April 1995): 431–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.2.431.

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40

Dowding, Keith. "Agency and structure: Interpreting power relationships." Journal of Power 1, no. 1 (April 2008): 21–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17540290801943380.

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41

Langworthy, Robert H. "Police department size and agency structure." Journal of Criminal Justice 13, no. 1 (January 1985): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2352(85)90023-6.

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Riley, Alexander. "The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency." Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 40, no. 6 (November 2011): 712–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094306111425016t.

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43

Kontuš, Eleonora. "Agency costs, capital structure and corporate performance." Ekonomski vjesnik 34, no. 1 (2021): 73–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.51680/ev.34.1.6.

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Purpose: The aim of this study is, first to describe and explore equity agency costs; second, to explore the impact of capital structure on equity agency costs; and finally, to examine the impact of agency costs on the performance of listed companies. Methodology: Panel data regression has been used for research data analysis. Results: The results of the work show that equity to capital and long-term debt to capital variables have a positive and significant impact on the agency costs of listed companies in the Republic of Croatia. The study indicates that long-term debt to capital variable has a negative and significant impact on the agency costs of listed companies in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, we find evidence to suggest that changes in agency costs have little or no effect on the performance of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The findings suggest that the capital structure decisions affect the agency costs of listed companies and the agency costs may affect corporate performance. Conclusion: This study makes a number of contributions to the agency costs literature. It presents the first study of agency costs of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic that uses panel data, a technique that enables us to isolate both cross section and time series effects. The present paper can help managers to better understand equity agency costs and their effects on corporate performance.

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Raj, Mahendra, and Mazida Abdul-Malik. "Ownership, structure and agency costs in UK firms." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 3 (2007): 303–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3c2p7.

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This paper investigates the impact of firm type and ownership structure on agency costs in UK firms. Prior literature suggests that agency costs are significantly higher when an outsider manages the firm. In this paper, we examine the agency costs associated with different types of firms such as subsidiary, holding, foreign-owned and limited companies. We extend our analysis by examining the agency costs for firms with various levels of diffuse ownership. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms with single ownership incur lower agency cost. In addition, we find that the type of firm does contribute to the increase or decrease of agency cost

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Krishna-Swamy, C. R., and Mary M. Pashley. "Ownership structure, agency costs, and discount rates." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 3 (2007): 240–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3c2p1.

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In this paper, we explore the effects of agency costs on discount rates for public sector enterprises as well as private sector enterprises. Ownership structure has a direct impact on agency costs, and discount rates. We show this through an application of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. With the addition of agency costs, the discount rate, under uncertainty, for public sector enterprises (PSEs) as well as private sector enterprises (PVTSEs) becomes a variation of the CAPM risk adjusted discount rate plus a premium for agency costs. In some circumstances the impact of agency costs “cancels out,” otherwise it remains a relevant input to the calculation of required rates of return. For PSEs, under risk neutrality, the discount rate is the risk-free rate plus a premium for agency costs

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46

Clinton, Joshua D., and David E. Lewis. "Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences." Political Analysis 16, no. 1 (April 13, 2007): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm009.

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The study of bureaucracies and their relationship to political actors is central to understanding the policy process in the United States. Studying this aspect of American politics is difficult because theories of agency behavior, effectiveness, and control often require measures of administrative agencies' policy preferences, and appropriate measures are hard to find for a broad spectrum of agencies. We propose a method for measuring agency preferences based upon an expert survey of agency preferences for 82 executive agencies in existence between 1988 and 2005. We use a multirater item response model to provide a principled structure for combining subjective ratings based on scholarly and journalistic expertise with objective data on agency characteristics. We compare the resulting agency preference estimates and standard errors to existing alternative measures, discussing both the advantages and limitations of the method.

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47

Pontikes, Elizabeth G., and Violina P. Rindova. "Shaping Markets Through Temporal, Constructive, and Interactive Agency." Strategy Science 5, no. 3 (September 2020): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2020.0110.

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In this introductory essay, we develop a theoretical framework of agency as a basis for strategic shaping and market transformation. We conceive of agency as both constrained and enabled by structure, and we build on sociological views that treat market structures as pairings of cultural schemas and material resources that are mutually sustaining. Structures contain the seeds for change because contradictions and conflicts that are inherent to structure inspire agents to imagine a new order and provide pathways to enact them. We theorize three connected forms of agency. Constructive agency captures agents’ ability to differently apply schemas to mobilize resources and improve their strategic positions. Temporal agency underlies agents’ autonomy and individuation, and enables agents to envision new possibilities. Interactive agency captures the collective nature of agency, where interactions among heterogeneous actors provide opportunities for agents to persuade others of their changing conceptions and learn new schemas, expanding agents’ repertoires for shaping opportunities.

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48

Hubbard, Gill. "The Usefulness of Indepth Life History Interviews for Exploring the Role of Social Structure and Human Agency in Youth Transitions." Sociological Research Online 4, no. 4 (February 2000): 102–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5153/sro.390.

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This paper discusses the usefulness of indepth life history interviews in illustrating the role of social structure and human agency in youth transitions. Drawing on sociological theory and youth transition research, the paper highlights how the role of structure and agency has been perceived by youth researchers. Whilst this literature acknowledges the interplay between structure and agency in transitional processes, the appropriateness of particular research methods for explicating structure and agency needs to be further elucidated. Using data from a study of youth transitions in rural areas of Scotland, a range of transitional experiences from two indepth life history interviews is presented here. This exploratory exercise suggests that life history interviews enable researchers to explore how far social structures provide opportunities and constraints for human agents at the same time as showing how individuals, with their own beliefs and desires, take actions despite the social structures that underlie the immediacy of their experiences.

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Boyle, Joseph. "Intention, Permissibility, and the Structure of Agency." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89, no. 3 (2015): 461–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq201561561.

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Lee, Seok Weon. "Moral hazard, agency problem and ownership structure." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 2 (2006): 116–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p12.

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Using a sample of recent Korean banking industry for 1994-2000, we examine how the effectiveness of managerial ownership is affected by the regulatory regimes in banking industry and the banks’ moral hazard incentives. We found that the managers of the banks in the higher moral-hazard group (the group of banks that are known to have greater moral hazard incentives in the literature such as the banks with lower charter value, greater asset size and lower equity capital) tend to have greater incentives to align their interests to those of stockholders by taking on more risk as managerial ownership rises, compared to the banks in the lower moral-hazard group, but only over the relatively deregulated period 1994-1997. Thus, in terms of only addressing the owner/manager agency problem, the owner/manager agency problem of banks can be easily addressed by changing their insider holdings or ownership structure, in particular when the banks have relatively higher moral-hazard incentives and banking regulations are loose. But we also found that this increased risk-taking has not ultimately resulted in better performance of the bank. This result may suggest a very important policy implication regarding the safety of the banking industry. If the increased risk-taking with greater managerial ownership does not contribute to improving the bank profitability, taking on more risk could end up with only increasing the possibility of failure of the bank. Therefore, the increase in insider holdings to address the owner/manager agency problem may have to be associated with closer and more frequent monitoring of the banks’ risk-taking behavior.

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