Journal articles on the topic 'Strategic counterintelligence'

The subject of American counterintelligence has generated a considerable amount of scholarship in recent years, the bulk of that research focusing on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Those agencies were and continue to be commonly recognized as having fulfilled the primary role as the nation's intelligence-gatherers. Within this vast intelligence community exists a microcosm in the form of counterespionage, or more euphemistically, counterintelligence.

The purpose of the article is to formulate the tasks and principles of ensuring the interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other actors in the security sector in order to protect national interests. The article is devoted to the disclosure of tasks and principles of interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other subjects of the security sector for the purpose of protection of national interests. It is determined that in the studied context the tasks answer the question why it is necessary to organize the implementation of situational or systematic jointly coordinated actions of counterintelligence bodies with other security sector entities and what positive results can be achieved by using this activity to protect national interests. It is noted that the basis for its organization and implementation should be considered the need for a permanent counterintelligence regime, ie timely receipt of operational information that will prevent the implementation of intelligence and subversive activities to the detriment of Ukraine by foreign intelligence services or organizations and groups. It is emphasized that it is not entirely appropriate to generalize the interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other actors in the security sector in order to protect national interests only by the existence of a permanent counterintelligence regime, as it has a number of other tasks – global and specific. These tasks are formed by specially authorized authorities – the strategic management of the security sector and the direct leadership of counterintelligence agencies. In order to do this correctly, efficiently and properly (within the legal norms), these entities must be guided by specific principles. They are classified into two groups – general principles of ensuring the interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other actors in the security sector in order to protect national interests related to the administrative procedure and special principles dictated by the specifics of counterintelligence activities.

In the post-Cold War era, new challenges emerged that have threatened regional and global security. Before the turn of the 21st century, the world was primarily dominated by states, but now, non-state actors are of critical importance in national and international security in today's globalizing and multipolar world. Of these non-state actors, transnational organized crime networks and groups have become a key security threat in the national, regional, and global environment. Transnational organized crime groups threaten to destabilize basic societal, economic, and political institutions and values. While all nations face the threat of transnational organized crime groups, those post-war and post-conflict nations in transition are especially fragile to the effects that transnational organized crime groups can have on a nation's government, economy, and society. The Balkan region has all been plagued by conflict and instability since the civil wars of the 1990s. Today, the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean region has reemerged with strategic importance as the instability of nations in these regions are particularly susceptible to external malign influence by state and non-state actors. Concerns regarding the rise of transnational organized crime and its relationship with religious extremist groups have caused the international community to refocus on the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean regions. Increasingly, transnational organized crime groups along with international terrorist groups are beginning to share organizational and operational features. Additionally, when it becomes advantageous, these groups will partner with each other. Transnational organized crime networks and groups have grown in both size and sophistication, and many major groups behave and assume the structure of secret organizations. Powerful transnational organized crime groups have developed in accordance with the structures of their host countries, which is why it is these groups flourish in those countries with more fragile political institutions. The ways in which transnational organized crime groups think and operate have made them successful. These groups take their illicit business ventures seriously, and understanding what these groups do, how they operate, and who they work with is critical in defeating them. By examining effective counterintelligence methods, this paper will focus on the strategic importance of transnational organized crime in the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean region, with a particular focus on Albania.

La legislación argentina establece cuatro actividades para el Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional: inteligencia nacional, contrainteligencia, inteligencia criminal e inteligencia estratégico militar. La Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Estratégico Militar (DINIEM), dependiente del Ministerio de Defensa, es la encargada de realizar la última tarea nombrada, mientras que la ley coloca a cargo de la Agencia Federal de Inteligencia la producción de contrainteligencia. El objetivo de este artículo es abordar un problema jurídico que no ha sido tratado por la literatura especializada: la falta de regulación precisa de la contrainteligencia militar, actividad que no encuentra un lugar claro en la legislación. Mediante decretos del Poder Ejecutivo, la tarea es llevada adelante por la DINIEM, al menos parcialmente, lo cual tensiona la legislación de defensa nacional, que veda el involucramiento de las Fuerzas Armadas en asuntos internos del Estado, en especial en tareas de inteligencia. La metodología empleada es la propia de la ciencia jurídica, pero atendiendo al contexto histórico-político de la normativa que se analiza. Se concluye que la legislación nacional ha habilitado un margen de discrecionalidad en el Poder Ejecutivo, que permite asignar la función de contrainteligencia militar a más de un organismo, con todos los problemas que esto genera. Abstract The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Ministry of Defense, produces the military-strategic intelligence, while the Federal Intelligence Agency produces counterintelligence. The aim of this paper is to study a legal problem that has not been addressed in literature: the lack of regulation on military counterintelligence, which has no place in the national legislation. The executive branch has decided that the DINIEM carries out at least part of the military counterintelligence activities. This decision enables a military office to carry out an intelligence task inside the State, something that stresses the legal limits of the operations of Armed Forces. The methodology of legal science is used to analyze the problem, but taking into account the historical and political context of the legislation. It is concluded that the legislation allows the executive branch to decide discretionally about the appointed office to develop military counterintelligence.

Abstract This essay reexamines late Tang and Northern Song laws that appear to prohibit private trade, communication, and intermarriage with foreigners, and concludes that they were rooted in early Tang policies rather than an increase in anti-foreign or proto-nationalist sentiment. It also argues that in the Northern Song, restrictions on foreign trade and intermarriage gave way to more liberal or targeted approaches, the main exceptions being strategic restrictions on trade along the northern borders and maritime trade with Đại Việt and Koryŏ. When the Song state implemented or contemplated restrictions on intermarriage in certain frontier locations, this was typically for strategic reasons of counterintelligence, not xenophobia or ethnic segregation.

This article focuses on a little-known contribution to Allied victory in Europe after D-Day by a part of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Special Counterintelligence (SCI) teams of the X-2 (Counterintelligence) Branch. Using a combination of private papers, unpublished studies, and OSS records, the author looks through the eyes of the commander of the SCI teams, Frank P. Holcomb, son of wartime Commandant General Thomas Holcomb. A Marine Corps reservist and OSS officer, Holcomb received a rudimentary orientation from the British in counterespionage and deception operations before creating his own highly successful units to perform those missions. In short order, the OSS went from having almost no such capability to neutralizing every German stay-behind agent in France and Belgium and turning a number of them back against the enemy to feed the Third Reich deceptive reports, accepted as genuine, thereby making a significant contribution to the security of the Allied armies. This article offers examples of OSS successes as testament to the skill and fortitude of a Marine Reserve officer serving on independent duty.

The principal objective of this article is to do a literature review of different intelligence terminology with the aim of establishing the common attributes and differences, and to propose a universal and comprehensive definition of intelligence for common understanding amongst users. The findings showed that Competitive Intelligence has the broadest scope of intelligence activities covering the whole external operating environment of the company and targeting all levels of decision-making for instance; strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence and operative intelligence. Another terminology was found called Cyber IntelligenceTM which encompasses competitor intelligence, strategic intelligence, market intelligence and counterintelligence. In conclusion although CI has the broadest scope of intelligence and umbrella to many intelligence concepts, still Business Intelligence, and Corporate Intelligence are often used interchangeably as CI.

The hybrid information threats and challenges distributed by the Russian Federation are considered. The main provisions of the modern Information Security Strategy of Ukraine are outlined. The content, purpose and tasks of the Information Security Strategy are revealed. The conceptual principles of the state information policy in modern conditions are detailed. Typical types of threats of external information influence are highlighted. Emphasis is placed on the peculiarities of conducting special information operations against Ukraine. The strategic principles of information security are generalized. The tasks and achievements of the domestic special service in the field of information security are summarized. It is proposed to clarify the competence of the domestic special service to preserve the function of information security in terms of its reform. The directions of the further activity of the Security Service of Ukraine in the framework of the implementation of counterintelligence and operational-investigative measures aimed at preventing and localizing Russian destructive activities to the detriment of state interests in the information sphere have been identified.

Actors in competitive environments are bound to decide and act under conditions of uncertainty because they rarely have accurate foreknowledge of how their opponents will respond and when they will respond. Just as a competitor makes a move to improve their standing on a given variable relative to a target competitor, she should expect the latter to counteract with an iterative lagged asymmetric response, that is, with a sequence of countermoves ( iteration) that is very different in kind from its trigger ( asymmetry) and that will be launched at some unknown point in the future ( time lag). The paper explicates the broad relevance of the newly proposed concept of “iterative lagged asymmetric responses” to the social study of temporality and to fields as diverse as intelligence and counterintelligence studies, strategic management, futures studies, military theory, and long-range planning. By bringing out in the foreground and substantiating the observation that competitive environments place a strategic premium on surprise, the concept of iterative lagged asymmetric responses makes a contribution to the never-ending and many-pronged debate about the extent to which the future can be predicted.

The article defines the legal basis for the organization and conduct of investigative activities of the Security Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Attention is drawn to the content of the constituent documents (instructions and resolutions) that governed the procedure for detention, questioning, analysis and systematization of the information received. It was established that according to the internal procedure for organizing the activities of the SB OUN, investigative activity was considered the second after intelligence, a component of counterintelligence protection. For example, in one of the instructions for the Volyn referendum of the OUN SB «Fighting Sexuality and Provocation» it was pointed out the need for purposeful counteraction to the NKVD-NKDB agent. Two dominant areas of work were clearly identified - the prevention and disruption of shares of Soviet special services; conducting their own ideological work in order to raise revolutionary sentiment among the population. The instructions «What a SB officer should know in the fight against an agent» outlined the procedural aspects of investigative actions during the interrogation of Soviet agents. A mandatory requirement was to find out the location of the military units, their command staff, the location and plans of recruiting military recruits and other strategic military facilities, including those under construction. It was found that the organizational forms of conducting investigative actions by Ukrainian nationalists were borrowed from the Soviet NKVD-NKDB bodies, but were modified in accordance with the requirements set by the leaders of the UN Security Council. The practice of investigative activity has led to the separation of two specific types of interrogation: with the «head» (the use of persuasion, logical techniques); with a «hand» (force interrogation with the use of physical coercion, torture). The ideological component was an important part of the interrogation process. The interrogation of the suspect was to be carried out exclusively by the investigator, who had previously been interested in the case, collected operational materials and more. It was a natural rule that allowed the results of the investigation to be achieved. Most of the instructions given were based on Soviet counterparts and were modified to effectively counter the detained NKVD-NKDB staff. The decisive attitude towards physical and moral means of coercion was a significant lack of investigative actions of the OUN SB. Physical torture became natural, as evidenced by the transcripts of the suspects’ interrogations, and most of these cases ended in death.

AbstractIntelligence scholars are drawing on behavioural decision theory to improve decision-making under risk and uncertainty in intelligence and counterintelligence. Such an undertaking is essentially lacking without the Austrian school’s concepts of knowledge, discovery, (entrepreneurial) judgement, ignorance, rational calculation and, more generally, its analysis of human action in the face of true uncertainty. Decision theory, both orthodox and behavioural, depicts decision rather narrowly as a prioritisation task undertaken within a delineated problem space where the probabilities “sum to one”. From such a perspective, certain perennial challenges in intelligence and counterintelligence appear resolvable when in fact they are not, at least not when approached from the usual direction. We explain how Austrian concepts can complement efforts to improve intelligence decision-making. We conclude that the future strategic value of intelligence analysis is located beyond information acquisition, however fast and however vast. Intelligence agencies have no price signals to help them determine how much intelligence to produce. And governments have no price signals to moderate their appetites for the intelligence product. Ultimately, those agencies that recognise the implications of intelligence agencies as non-price institutions and adapt their decision-making processes may find that they have the upper hand over their rivals.

The political process is moving onto the Internet. Both within the United States and internationally, individuals, interest groups, and even nations are using the Internet to find each other, discuss the issues, and further their political goals. The Internet has also played an important role in recent conflicts. As a result, overseas segments of the Internet can be a useful tool for U. S. Department of Defense, both for gathering and for disseminating information. By monitoring public message traffic and alternative news sources from around the world, early warning of impending significant developments could be developed, in advance of more traditional means of indications and warning. Commentary placed on the Internet by observers on the scene of low-intensity conflicts overseas could be useful to U. S. policy making. During larger scale conflicts, when other conventional channels are disrupted, the Internet can be the only available means of communication into and out of the affected areas. Internet messages originating within regions under authoritarian control could provide other useful intelligence. Public messages conveying information about the intent of overseas groups prone to disrupting U. S. military operations can provide important counterintelligence. The Internet could also be used offensively as an additional medium in psychological operations campaigns and to help achieve unconventional warfare objectives. Used creatively as an integral asset, the Internet can facilitate many U. S. Department of Defense operations and activities.

This paper reports on results drawn from a comprehensive database formed from public financial reports and a proprietary benchmarking survey conducted by a major competitive intelligence consulting firm. Our overall aim is to identify different circumstances in which knowledge development and knowledge protection have greater or lesser importance. Very little work has been done on a industry-wide (or wider) basis concerning intellectual capital and/or competitive intelligence activities in firms and how that may vary according to circumstances. The wider study and database are designed to better address such questions. In this study, we look at one piece of this overall research program, specifically how competitive intelligence activity varies in distinctive environments. Based on these results, as practitioners better understand their environments, they can make better decisions on the level and aggressiveness of their own CI operations as well as on protection and counterintelligence efforts. The results will also begin to move scholarly work in the field into these new areas of macro studies and strategic choices.

Does the arrival of the network society mean we are now a culture of collectors, a society of sharers? We mused about these questions while assembling this M/C Journal issue, which has its genesis in a past event of ‘shared’ confusion. Alex Burns booked into Axel Bruns’s hotel room at the 1998 National Young Writer’s Festival (NYWF) in Newcastle. This ‘identity theft’ soon extended to discussion panels and sessions, where some audience members wondered if the NYWF program had typographical errors. We planned, over café latte at Haddon’s Café, to do a co-session at next year’s festival. By then the ‘identity theft’ had spread to online media. We both shared some common interests: the music of Robert Fripp and King Crimson, underground electronica and experimental turntablism, the Internet sites Slashdot and MediaChannel.org, and the creative possibilities of Open Publishing. “If you’re going to use a pseudonym,” a prominent publisher wrote to Alex Burns in 2001, “you could have created a better one than Axel Bruns.” We haven’t yet done our doppelgänger double-act at NYWF but this online collaboration is a beginning. What became clear during the editorial process was that some people and communities were better at sharing than others. Is sharing the answer or the problem: does it open new possibilities for a better, fairer future, or does it destroy existing structures to leave nothing but an uncontrollable mess? The feature article by Graham Meikle elaborates on several themes explored in his insightful book Future Active: Media Activism and the Internet (New York: Routledge, London: Pluto Press, 2002). Meikle’s study of the influential IndyMedia network dissects three ‘compelling founder’s stories’: the Sydney-based Active software team, the tradition of alternative media, and the frenetic energy of ‘DiY culture’. Meikle remarks that each of these ur-myths “highlights an emphasis on access and participation; each stresses new avenues and methods for new people to create news; each shifts the boundary of who gets to speak.” As the IndyMedia movement goes truly global, its autonomous teams are confronting how to be an international brand for Open Publishing, underpinned by a viable Open Source platform. IndyMedia’s encounter with the Founder’s Trap may have its roots in paradigms of intellectual property. What drives Open Source platforms like IndyMedia and Linux, Tom Graves proposes, are collaborative synergies and ‘win-win’ outcomes on a vast and unpredictable scale. Graves outlines how projects like Lawrence Lessig’s Creative Commons and the Free Software Foundation’s ‘GNU Public License’ challenge the Western paradigm of property rights. He believes that Open Source platforms are “a more equitable and sustainable means to manage the tangible and intangible resources of this world we share.” The ‘clash’ between the Western paradigm of property rights and emerging Open Source platforms became manifest in the 1990s through a series of file-sharing wars. Andy Deck surveys how the ‘browser war’ between Microsoft and Netscape escalated into a long-running Department of Justice anti-trust lawsuit. The Motion Picture Association of America targeted DVD hackers, Napster’s attempt to make the ‘Digital Jukebox in the Sky’ a reality was soon derailed by malicious lawsuits, and Time-Warner CEO Gerald Levin depicted pre-merger broadband as ‘the final battleground’ for global media. Whilst Linux and Mozilla hold out promise for a more altruistic future, Deck contemplates, with a reference to George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia (1938), that Internet producers “must conform to the distribution technologies and content formats favoured by the entertainment and marketing sectors, or else resign themselves to occupying the margins of media activity.” File-sharing, as an innovative way of sharing access to new media, has had social repercussions. Marjorie Kibby reports that “global music sales fell from $41.5 billion in 1995 to $38.5 billion in 1999.” Peer-to-Peer networks like KaZaA, Grokster and Morpheus have surged in consumer popularity while commercial music file subscription services have largely fallen by the wayside. File-sharing has forever changed the norms of music consumption, Kibby argues: it offers consumers “cheap or free, flexibility of formats, immediacy, breadth of choice, connections with artists and other fans, and access to related commodities.” The fragmentation of Australian families into new diversities has co-evolved with the proliferation of digital media. Donell Holloway suggests that the arrival of pay television in Australia has resurrected the ‘house and hearth’ tradition of 1940s radio broadcasts. Internet-based media and games shifted the access of media to individual bedrooms, and changed their spatial and temporal natures. However pay television’s artificial limit of one television set per household reinstated the living room as a family space. It remains to be seen whether or not this ‘bounded’ control will revive family battles, dominance hierarchies and power games. This issue closes with a series of reflections on how the September 11 terrorist attacks transfixed our collective gaze: the ‘sharing’ of media connects to shared responses to media coverage. For Tara Brabazon the intrusive media coverage of September 11 had its precursor in how Great Britain’s media documented the Welsh mining disaster at Aberfan on 20 October 1966. “In the stark grey iconography of September 11,” Brabazon writes, “there was an odd photocopy of Aberfan, but in the negative.” By capturing the death and grief at Aberfan, Brabazon observes, the cameras mounted a scathing critique of industrialisation and the searing legacy of preventable accidents. This verité coverage forces the audience to actively engage with the trauma unfolding on the television screen, and to connect with their own emotions. Or at least that was the promise never explored, because the “Welsh working class community seemed out of time and space in 1960s Britain,” and because political pundits quickly harnessed the disaster for their own electioneering purposes. In the early 1990s a series of ‘humanitarian’ interventions and televised conflicts popularized the ‘CNN Effect’ in media studies circles as a model of how captivated audiences and global media vectors could influence government policies. However the U.S. Government, echoing the coverage of Aberfan, used the ‘CNN Effect’ for counterintelligence and consensus-making purposes. Alex Burns reviews three books on how media coverage of the September 11 carnage re-mapped our ‘virtual geographies’ with disturbing consequences, and how editors and news values were instrumental in this process. U.S. President George W. Bush’s post-September 11 speeches used ‘shared’ meanings and symbols, news values morphed into the language of strategic geography, and risk reportage obliterated the ideal of journalistic objectivity. The deployment of ‘embedded’ journalists during the Second Gulf War (March-April 2003) is the latest development of this unfolding trend. September 11 imagery also revitalized the Holocaust aesthetic and portrayal of J.G. Ballard-style ‘institutionalised disaster areas’. Royce Smith examines why, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, macabre photo-manipulations of the last moments became the latest Internet urban legend. Drawing upon the theoretical contributions of Jean Baudrillard, Roland Barthes and others, Smith suggests that these photo-manipulations were a kitsch form of post-traumatic visualisation for some viewers. Others seized on Associated Press wire photos, whose visuals suggested the ‘face of Satan’ in the smoke of the World Trade Center (WTC) ruins, as moral explanations of disruptive events. Imagery of people jumping from the WTC’s North Tower, mostly censored in North America’s press, restored the humanness of the catastrophe and the reality of the viewer’s own mortality. The discovery of surviving artwork in the WTC ruins, notably Rodin’s The Thinker and Fritz Koenig’s The Sphere, have prompted art scholars to resurrect this ‘dead art’ as a memorial to September 11’s victims. Perhaps art has always best outlined the contradictions that are inherent in the sharing of cultural artefacts. Art is part of our, of humanity’s, shared cultural heritage, and is celebrated as speaking to the most fundamental of human qualities, connecting us regardless of the markers of individual identity that may divide us – yet art is also itself dividing us along lines of skill and talent, on the side of art production, and of tastes and interests, on the side of art consumption. Though perhaps intending to share the artist’s vision, some art also commands exorbitant sums of money which buy the privilege of not having to share that vision with others, or (in the case of museums and galleries) to set the parameters – and entry fees – for that sharing. Digital networks have long been promoted as providing the environment for unlimited sharing of art and other content, and for shared, collaborative approaches to the production of that content. It is no surprise that the Internet features prominently in almost all of the articles in this ‘share’ issue of M/C Journal. It has disrupted the existing systems of exchange, but how the pieces will fall remains to be seen. For now, we share with you these reports from the many nodes of the network society – no doubt, more connections will continue to emerge. Citation reference for this article Substitute your date of access for Dn Month Year etc... MLA Style Burns, Alex and Bruns, Axel. ""Share" Editorial" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0304/01-editorial.php>. APA Style Burns, A. & Bruns, A. (2003, Apr 23). "Share" Editorial. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 6,< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0304/01-editorial.php>