Academic literature on the topic 'Strategic counterintelligence'
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Journal articles on the topic "Strategic counterintelligence"
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Stouder, Michael D., and Scott Gallagher. "Counterintelligence Outreach: Building a Strategic Capability." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 1 (November 20, 2014): 143–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.924820.
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Block, Alan A., and John C. McWilliams. "On the Origins of American Counterintelligence: Building a Clandestine Network." Journal of Policy History 1, no. 4 (October 1989): 353–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030600004656.
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The subject of American counterintelligence has generated a considerable amount of scholarship in recent years, the bulk of that research focusing on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Those agencies were and continue to be commonly recognized as having fulfilled the primary role as the nation's intelligence-gatherers. Within this vast intelligence community exists a microcosm in the form of counterespionage, or more euphemistically, counterintelligence.
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Жук, Т. І. "TASKS AND PRINCIPLES OF ENSURING THE INTERACTION OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE BODIES WITH OTHER ENTITIES OF THE SECURITY SECTOR FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL PROTECTION." Juridical science 2, no. 4(106) (April 3, 2020): 82–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.32844/2222-5374-2020-106-4-2.10.
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The purpose of the article is to formulate the tasks and principles of ensuring the interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other actors in the security sector in order to protect national interests. The article is devoted to the disclosure of tasks and principles of interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other subjects of the security sector for the purpose of protection of national interests. It is determined that in the studied context the tasks answer the question why it is necessary to organize the implementation of situational or systematic jointly coordinated actions of counterintelligence bodies with other security sector entities and what positive results can be achieved by using this activity to protect national interests. It is noted that the basis for its organization and implementation should be considered the need for a permanent counterintelligence regime, ie timely receipt of operational information that will prevent the implementation of intelligence and subversive activities to the detriment of Ukraine by foreign intelligence services or organizations and groups. It is emphasized that it is not entirely appropriate to generalize the interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other actors in the security sector in order to protect national interests only by the existence of a permanent counterintelligence regime, as it has a number of other tasks – global and specific. These tasks are formed by specially authorized authorities – the strategic management of the security sector and the direct leadership of counterintelligence agencies. In order to do this correctly, efficiently and properly (within the legal norms), these entities must be guided by specific principles. They are classified into two groups – general principles of ensuring the interaction of counterintelligence bodies with other actors in the security sector in order to protect national interests related to the administrative procedure and special principles dictated by the specifics of counterintelligence activities.
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HEINEMAN, Noelle, and Ioannis NOMIKOS. "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE BALKANS AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE METHODS OF TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS." INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERINCE "STRATEGIESXXI" 18, no. 1 (December 6, 2022): 141–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2971-8813-22-17.
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In the post-Cold War era, new challenges emerged that have threatened regional and global security. Before the turn of the 21st century, the world was primarily dominated by states, but now, non-state actors are of critical importance in national and international security in today's globalizing and multipolar world. Of these non-state actors, transnational organized crime networks and groups have become a key security threat in the national, regional, and global environment. Transnational organized crime groups threaten to destabilize basic societal, economic, and political institutions and values. While all nations face the threat of transnational organized crime groups, those post-war and post-conflict nations in transition are especially fragile to the effects that transnational organized crime groups can have on a nation's government, economy, and society. The Balkan region has all been plagued by conflict and instability since the civil wars of the 1990s. Today, the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean region has reemerged with strategic importance as the instability of nations in these regions are particularly susceptible to external malign influence by state and non-state actors. Concerns regarding the rise of transnational organized crime and its relationship with religious extremist groups have caused the international community to refocus on the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean regions. Increasingly, transnational organized crime groups along with international terrorist groups are beginning to share organizational and operational features. Additionally, when it becomes advantageous, these groups will partner with each other. Transnational organized crime networks and groups have grown in both size and sophistication, and many major groups behave and assume the structure of secret organizations. Powerful transnational organized crime groups have developed in accordance with the structures of their host countries, which is why it is these groups flourish in those countries with more fragile political institutions. The ways in which transnational organized crime groups think and operate have made them successful. These groups take their illicit business ventures seriously, and understanding what these groups do, how they operate, and who they work with is critical in defeating them. By examining effective counterintelligence methods, this paper will focus on the strategic importance of transnational organized crime in the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean region, with a particular focus on Albania.
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Tripolone, Gerardo. "Sin lugar para la contrainteligencia militar en Argentina: análisis jurídico de un posible vacío legal/ No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap." URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, no. 26 (February 11, 2020): 24–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.17141/urvio.26.2020.4214.
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La legislación argentina establece cuatro actividades para el Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional: inteligencia nacional, contrainteligencia, inteligencia criminal e inteligencia estratégico militar. La Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Estratégico Militar (DINIEM), dependiente del Ministerio de Defensa, es la encargada de realizar la última tarea nombrada, mientras que la ley coloca a cargo de la Agencia Federal de Inteligencia la producción de contrainteligencia. El objetivo de este artículo es abordar un problema jurídico que no ha sido tratado por la literatura especializada: la falta de regulación precisa de la contrainteligencia militar, actividad que no encuentra un lugar claro en la legislación. Mediante decretos del Poder Ejecutivo, la tarea es llevada adelante por la DINIEM, al menos parcialmente, lo cual tensiona la legislación de defensa nacional, que veda el involucramiento de las Fuerzas Armadas en asuntos internos del Estado, en especial en tareas de inteligencia. La metodología empleada es la propia de la ciencia jurídica, pero atendiendo al contexto histórico-político de la normativa que se analiza. Se concluye que la legislación nacional ha habilitado un margen de discrecionalidad en el Poder Ejecutivo, que permite asignar la función de contrainteligencia militar a más de un organismo, con todos los problemas que esto genera.
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The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Ministry of Defense, produces the military-strategic intelligence, while the Federal Intelligence Agency produces counterintelligence. The aim of this paper is to study a legal problem that has not been addressed in literature: the lack of regulation on military counterintelligence, which has no place in the national legislation. The executive branch has decided that the DINIEM carries out at least part of the military counterintelligence activities. This decision enables a military office to carry out an intelligence task inside the State, something that stresses the legal limits of the operations of Armed Forces. The methodology of legal science is used to analyze the problem, but taking into account the historical and political context of the legislation. It is concluded that the legislation allows the executive branch to decide discretionally about the appointed office to develop military counterintelligence.
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Yang, Shao-yun. "Unauthorized Exchanges: Restrictions on Foreign Trade and Intermarriage in the Tang and Northern Song Empires." T’oung Pao 108, no. 5-6 (November 10, 2022): 588–645. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685322-10805002.
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Abstract This essay reexamines late Tang and Northern Song laws that appear to prohibit private trade, communication, and intermarriage with foreigners, and concludes that they were rooted in early Tang policies rather than an increase in anti-foreign or proto-nationalist sentiment. It also argues that in the Northern Song, restrictions on foreign trade and intermarriage gave way to more liberal or targeted approaches, the main exceptions being strategic restrictions on trade along the northern borders and maritime trade with Đại Việt and Koryŏ. When the Song state implemented or contemplated restrictions on intermarriage in certain frontier locations, this was typically for strategic reasons of counterintelligence, not xenophobia or ethnic segregation.
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Reynolds, Nicholas. "The “Scholastic” Marine Who Won a Secret War: FRANK HOLCOMB, THE OSS, AND AMERICAN DOUBLE-CROSS OPERATIONS IN EUROPE." Marine Corps History 6, no. 1 (September 24, 2020): 18–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.35318/mch.2020060102.
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This article focuses on a little-known contribution to Allied victory in Europe after D-Day by a part of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Special Counterintelligence (SCI) teams of the X-2 (Counterintelligence) Branch. Using a combination of private papers, unpublished studies, and OSS records, the author looks through the eyes of the commander of the SCI teams, Frank P. Holcomb, son of wartime Commandant General Thomas Holcomb. A Marine Corps reservist and OSS officer, Holcomb received a rudimentary orientation from the British in counterespionage and deception operations before creating his own highly successful units to perform those missions. In short order, the OSS went from having almost no such capability to neutralizing every German stay-behind agent in France and Belgium and turning a number of them back against the enemy to feed the Third Reich deceptive reports, accepted as genuine, thereby making a significant contribution to the security of the Allied armies. This article offers examples of OSS successes as testament to the skill and fortitude of a Marine Reserve officer serving on independent duty.
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Mashingaidze, Sivave. "Harmonizing intelligence terminologies in business: Literature review." Journal of Governance and Regulation 3, no. 4 (2014): 156–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v3_i4_c1_p8.
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The principal objective of this article is to do a literature review of different intelligence terminology with the aim of establishing the common attributes and differences, and to propose a universal and comprehensive definition of intelligence for common understanding amongst users. The findings showed that Competitive Intelligence has the broadest scope of intelligence activities covering the whole external operating environment of the company and targeting all levels of decision-making for instance; strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence and operative intelligence. Another terminology was found called Cyber IntelligenceTM which encompasses competitor intelligence, strategic intelligence, market intelligence and counterintelligence. In conclusion although CI has the broadest scope of intelligence and umbrella to many intelligence concepts, still Business Intelligence, and Corporate Intelligence are often used interchangeably as CI.
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NOVYTSKYI, V. "Strategic principles for ensuring information security in modern conditions." INFORMATION AND LAW, no. 1(40) (March 22, 2022): 111–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2022.1(40).254349.
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The hybrid information threats and challenges distributed by the Russian Federation are considered. The main provisions of the modern Information Security Strategy of Ukraine are outlined. The content, purpose and tasks of the Information Security Strategy are revealed. The conceptual principles of the state information policy in modern conditions are detailed. Typical types of threats of external information influence are highlighted. Emphasis is placed on the peculiarities of conducting special information operations against Ukraine. The strategic principles of information security are generalized. The tasks and achievements of the domestic special service in the field of information security are summarized. It is proposed to clarify the competence of the domestic special service to preserve the function of information security in terms of its reform. The directions of the further activity of the Security Service of Ukraine in the framework of the implementation of counterintelligence and operational-investigative measures aimed at preventing and localizing Russian destructive activities to the detriment of state interests in the information sphere have been identified.
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Simandan, Dragos. "Iterative lagged asymmetric responses in strategic management and long-range planning." Time & Society 28, no. 4 (January 12, 2018): 1363–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0961463x17752652.
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Actors in competitive environments are bound to decide and act under conditions of uncertainty because they rarely have accurate foreknowledge of how their opponents will respond and when they will respond. Just as a competitor makes a move to improve their standing on a given variable relative to a target competitor, she should expect the latter to counteract with an iterative lagged asymmetric response, that is, with a sequence of countermoves ( iteration) that is very different in kind from its trigger ( asymmetry) and that will be launched at some unknown point in the future ( time lag). The paper explicates the broad relevance of the newly proposed concept of “iterative lagged asymmetric responses” to the social study of temporality and to fields as diverse as intelligence and counterintelligence studies, strategic management, futures studies, military theory, and long-range planning. By bringing out in the foreground and substantiating the observation that competitive environments place a strategic premium on surprise, the concept of iterative lagged asymmetric responses makes a contribution to the never-ending and many-pronged debate about the extent to which the future can be predicted.
Books on the topic "Strategic counterintelligence"
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Counterspy: Memoirs of a counterintelligence officer in World War II and the Cold War. Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2004.
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Burnhardt, Douglas. Competitive Intelligence: How To Acquire & Use Strategic Intelligence & Counterintelligence (Management Briefings Executive Series). Financial Times Management, 2003.
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Counterspy: Memoirs of a Counterintelligence Officer in World War II and the Cold War. Potomac Books Inc., 2005.
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Johnson, Loch K., ed. The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.001.0001.
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The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence is about intelligence and national security. The text examines the topic in full, beginning with an examination of the major theories of intelligence. It then shifts its focus to how intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems that come with transforming “raw” information into credible analysis, and the difficulties in disseminating intelligence to policymakers. It also considers the balance between secrecy and public accountability, and the ethical dilemmas that covert and counterintelligence operations routinely present to intelligence agencies. Throughout, contributors factor in broader historical and political contexts that are integral to understanding how intelligence agencies function in our information-dominated age. The book is organized into the following sections: theories and methods of intelligence studies; historical background; the collection and processing of intelligence; the analysis and production of intelligence; the challenges of intelligence dissemination; counterintelligence and counterterrorism; covert action; intelligence and accountability; strategic intelligence in other nations.
Book chapters on the topic "Strategic counterintelligence"
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Henshaw, Andrew D. "Strategic counterintelligence." In Understanding Insurgent Resilience, 259–88. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2020. | Series: Cass military studies: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003028116-11.
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O’Sullivan, Adrian. "Strategic Deceivers." In Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran), 95–100. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137555571_7.
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Trim, P. "A Strategic Marketing Intelligence Framework Reinforced by Corporate Intelligence." In Managing Strategic Intelligence, 55–68. IGI Global, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-243-5.ch004.
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The chapter examines how marketing strategists and corporate intelligence officers can work together in order to provide a high level, proactive strategic intelligence operation that enhances marketing strategy development and implementation. A variety of activities relating to marketing strategy, corporate intelligence and corporate security are highlighted. Aspects of corporate counterintelligence are addressed in the context of gathering intelligence, and guidance is provided as to how organizational strategists can develop a strategic marketing intelligence framework that incorporates a counterintelligence dimension. The main advantage of the strategic marketing intelligence framework is that it acts as a vehicle to integrate the organizational intelligence efforts and activities at the highest-level. It also facilitates the creation of an intelligence culture.
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Sims, Jennifer E. "Intelligence Lessons from the Spanish Armada." In Decision Advantage, 93—C4.P82. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508046.003.0004.
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Abstract Queen Elizabeth and King Philip both suffered from poor strategic intelligence, but the queen’s intelligence and counterintelligence gained her identifiable advantages at every other level. Lessons from the Armada case include these: (1) Decision-makers are integral to the process of gaining intelligence advantages. The queen’s seemingly indecisive style contributed to her ability to balance contradictory sources, generate competitive collection architectures, and learn under pressure. (2) Intelligence works best when competitors understand relative uncertainties and build intelligence into their strategies. (3) Certainty almost always decreases the likelihood of warning because it discourages collection on the possibility of error; covert action, which is the secret execution of pre-determined policy, has a similar effect, while also putting sources at risk of loss or politicization. (4) Intelligence liaison can close gaps in intelligence collection but at the risk of increased counterintelligence threats, potential loss of sources and methods, and vulnerabilities to deception. (5) Counterintelligence (CI) can contribute to or damage positive intelligence. It improved England’s relative intelligence capabilities by revealing what Spain thought it needed to know or do to win (its competitive strategies). But, by influencing or eliminating the king’s sources on what England planned to do, CI damaged Spain’s situational awareness.
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George, Roger Z. "9. Intelligence and Strategy." In Strategy in the Contemporary World, 144–64. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198807100.003.0009.
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This chapter examines the role of intelligence in the development and execution of strategy. It begins with a discussion of what intelligence is all about and how its utility has been viewed by strategists. In particular, it considers the different components of the ‘intelligence cycle’, namely, intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and special intelligence missions that rest on effective counterintelligence and counterespionage. It then charts the history of US intelligence, from its use to support cold war strategies of containment and deterrence to its more recent support to US strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It also reviews the challenges and causes of ‘strategic surprise’, citing a number of historical cases such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how the US intelligence community has performed since reforms were made in response to 9/11 and its focus on new threats posed by cyberwar and cyber-attacks.
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George, Roger Z. "9. Intelligence and Strategy." In Strategy in the Contemporary World, 145–64. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780192845719.003.0009.
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This chapter examines the role of intelligence in the development and execution of strategy. It begins with a discussion of what intelligence is all about and how its utility has been viewed by strategists. In particular, it considers the different components of the ‘intelligence cycle’, namely, intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and special intelligence missions that rest on effective counterintelligence and counterespionage. It then charts the history of US intelligence, from its use to support cold war strategies of containment and deterrence to its more recent support to US strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It also reviews the challenges and causes of ‘strategic surprise’, citing a number of historical cases such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how the US intelligence community has performed since reforms were made in response to 9/11 and its focus on new threats posed by cyberwar and cyberattacks.
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Tromly, Benjamin. "From Revolution to Provocation." In Cold War Exiles and the CIA, 169–91. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840404.003.0007.
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Chapter 7 examines the CIA espionage and psychological-warfare operations against the USSR that involved the most important and most controversial Russian exile organization, the People’s Labor Alliance. Operations to infiltrate agents directly into the USSR by plane ended in fiasco due to Soviet counterintelligence, which thwarted the NTS operations and pursued measures to penetrate and subvert the émigré organization from within. In response, the CIA turned to a strategy of utilizing the NTS as an instrument of psychological warfare, spreading disinformation about the exiles in order to incite the Soviet state into costly countermeasures. Such an effort to manipulate the fiction of émigré political influence demonstrated the increasingly complex and marginal-gains nature of Cold War competition between intelligence agencies.
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Fernández, Johanna. "Organizational Decline." In The Young Lords, 335–78. University of North Carolina Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469653440.003.0012.
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Amid polarized deliberations about the organization’s future and with many in its leadership advocating a stronger nationalist orientation, the Young Lords launch two branches in Puerto Rico: in El Caño and Aguadilla. The move to Puerto Rico, for which the group was ill prepared, combined with the decline of the broader movement’s mass character, weakened the ability of the Young Lords to remain connected to the grassroots. Before its final demise, on the request of prisoners, the Young Lords served as mediators during the Attica Rebellion. By 1973, Young Lord membership had declined considerably. At around the same time, key members of the organization left, including its talented writer and political strategist Juan Gonzalez. The chairperson of the organization’s central committee, the authoritarian Gloria Fontanez also married Don Wright, a man who became a sheriff in the south after the demise of the movements and who is believed to have been an FBI agent. Fueled by government repression carried out by COINTELPRO—the Counterintelligence Program of the FBI —political inexperience, and growing dogmatism, the Young Lords became entangled in violent internecine conflict that led to the organization’s demise in 1976.
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Sims, Jennifer E. "A Theory of Intelligence in International Politics." In Decision Advantage, 405—C13.P174. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508046.003.0013.
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Abstract The case studies have illustrated four measures or capacities of intelligence power that must be superior to an adversary’s for intelligence advantage to be achieved: (1) collection (the number, integration, central management, and range over domain); (2) anticipation or sufficient detachment from policy to discover the unexpected (quality of oversight); (3) transmission (the level of trust measured by sharing of sources and methods and policy requirements across the intelligence-policy divide); and (4) selective secrecy. Which of these capacities will be most important in any given contest will depend on the terrain of uncertainty: the opening distribution of knowledge (uncertainty) among the contestants and the extent to which strategies exploit that distribution. The importance of intelligence readiness—the optimization of all four capacities—cannot be overemphasized when designing an intelligence system. Often, reforms are based on the last perceived failure, thus doing damage to capabilities essential for general readiness. Counterintelligence targets, not just an adversary’s intelligence operations, but all four missions or capacities. The United States optimized its collection capabilities during the Cold War, but failed to develop readiness for when it would end. Some capacities were allowed to wither; others were actively dismissed, such as the transmission function, which manifests now as overclassification system and vulnerability to deception.
Reports on the topic "Strategic counterintelligence"
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Van Cleave, Michelle K. Counterintelligence and National Strategy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada471485.
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