Journal articles: 'Strategic candidates'

1

Bateson, Regina. "Strategic Discrimination." Perspectives on Politics 18, no. 4 (September 16, 2020): 1068–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s153759272000242x.

Full text

Abstract:

Why are women and people of color under-represented in U.S. politics? I offer a new explanation: strategic discrimination. Strategic discrimination occurs when an individual hesitates to support a candidate out of concern that others will object to the candidate’s identity. In a series of three experiments, I find that strategic discrimination exists, it matters for real-world politics, and it can be hard to overcome. The first experiment shows that Americans consider white male candidates more electable than equally qualified Black and white women, and to a lesser extent, Black men. These results are strongly intersectional, with Black women rated less electable than either Black men or white women. The second experiment demonstrates that anti-Trump voters weigh Democratic candidates’ racial and gender identities when deciding who is most capable of beating Donald Trump in 2020. The third experiment finds that while some messages intended to combat strategic discrimination have no effect, diverse candidates can increase their perceived electability by showing that they have a path to victory. I conclude by arguing that strategic discrimination is especially salient in contemporary U.S. politics due to three parallel trends: increasing diversity among candidates, growing awareness of sexism and racism, and high levels of political polarization.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Dekel, Eddie, and Michele Piccione. "The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2014): 164–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.162.

Full text

Abstract:

Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting). (JEL D72)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

NORRANDER, BARBARA. "The Attrition Game: Initial Resources, Initial Contests and the Exit of Candidates During the US Presidential Primary Season." British Journal of Political Science 36, no. 3 (May 17, 2006): 487–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000251.

Full text

Abstract:

In contests for the presidential nominations from the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, the duration of candidacies determines both the winning candidate (i.e., the one who outlasts his or her opponents) and the amount of intraparty conflict before the nomination is bestowed. This article analyses how strategic considerations lead some candidates to exit the race more quickly than others. Factors which could shape such strategic considerations include initial candidate assets and characteristics (national poll standings, fund-raising totals and occupational background), initial contest outcomes (Iowa and New Hampshire) and structural variables (proportional representation delegate distribution rules, party, front-loaded calendar). Results from a duration model indicate that poll standings, money (in a curvilinear pattern), New Hampshire and Iowa results, occupational backgrounds and the front-loading of the primary calendar shaped the length of candidacies for presidential contestants from 1980 to 2004. Candidates lacking in initial assets or early victories leave the nomination race in a process most resembling a game of attrition.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Nishimura, Tsubasa. "Parties’ Strategic Recruitment and Candidates’ Localness:." Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association 71, no. 2 (2020): 2_280–2_302. http://dx.doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.71.2_280.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Chambers, Christopher P. "Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning." Economic Theory 33, no. 2 (August 29, 2006): 285–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0146-y.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Bizzotto, Jacopo, and Benjamin Solow. "Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure." Games 10, no. 3 (July 6, 2019): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030029.

Full text

Abstract:

Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Asako, Yasushi. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting." Journal of Theoretical Politics 31, no. 4 (September 18, 2019): 626–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875516.

Full text

Abstract:

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Spoon, Jae-Jae, and Amalia Pulido-Gómez. "Strategic alliances: Red, green, or “watermelon” candidates in Mexican legislative elections." Party Politics 26, no. 6 (November 8, 2018): 760–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068818809529.

Full text

Abstract:

What role do small parties play in new democracies? Although some research has posited that these parties developed to promote policies that the major parties were not addressing, we argue that they are as opportunistic as their larger party competitors. To test our argument, we examine the legislative electoral alliances between the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) in single member districts from 2006 to 2015. In alliance districts, the parties distribute the districts between them: those in which the candidate is from the PRI and those in which the candidate is from the PVEM. There is then a second dynamic in these electoral alliances: Many of the PVEM candidates are former PRI politicians, whom we refer to as “watermelon” candidates, as they are green on the outside and red on the inside. We argue that the parties will select the alliance strategy that will be most electorally beneficial—running a PRI, PVEM, or watermelon candidate. We find that running a PRI or watermelon candidate increases the alliance’s probability of winning. Our findings have important implications for understanding Mexican party politics as well as the role of small parties and party competition in developing democracies.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Mwesigwa, David, and Gilbert Obici. "Candidate’s physical attractiveness as a consequence in an election." International Journal of Public Policy and Administration 5, no. 1 (July 19, 2022): 43–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.47941/ijppa.934.

Full text

Abstract:

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to deconstruct election results within the framework of candidate’s physical attractiveness. There is a mounting fear that modern-day political institutions are not presenting candidates with the social aptitude that they need to become successful in election processes. This deficiency has placed a growing burden on political parties to boost the victory of their candidates by making sure that the process of selecting candidates transforms into a rewarding time of political victory. In view of the countless contestations and proof of the dearth of social abilities in political parties, the emphasis of this article is on how political parties in Uganda can identify appealing candidates for the modern-day voter. Methods: By means of a desk review technique, definitions are given as well as an earlier theory as a basis for a projected model of enhancing candidate victory. Findings: The findings reveal that candidate’s physical attractiveness contributes positively towards the election outcome given that candidates that are physically less attractive are likely to score lower in an election. Unique contribution of theory, practice and policy: The study suggests that to neglect the power of a candidate’s physical attractiveness in an election is comparable to surrendering election victory to the opponent. For effective application, political party leaderships should include the elements of physical attractiveness in their strategic plans when choosing candidates for the next election cycle.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Jacobson, Gary C. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86." American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 (September 1989): 773–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962060.

Full text

Abstract:

Analysis of both district-level and aggregate time-series data from postwar House elections supports the thesis that strategic political elites play a pivotal role in translating national conditions into election results and therefore in holding members of Congress collectively accountable for the government's performance. More high-quality candidates run when prospects appear to favor their party; they also win significantly more votes and victories than other candidates in equivalent circumstances. Thus, strategic career decisions both reflect and enhance national partisan tides. The electoral importance of strategic politicians has grown over time in tandem with the trend toward candidate-centered electoral politics. This has rendered the effects of national forces less automatic, more contingent, thus threatening the capacity of elections to enforce some degree of collective responsibility.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Banda, Kevin K., and Thomas M. Carsey. "Two-stage elections, strategic candidates, and campaign agendas." Electoral Studies 40 (December 2015): 221–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.09.008.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Fey, Mark. "Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (March 1997): 135–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2952264.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper investigates the dynamics of the “wasted vote” phenomenon and Duverger's Law. I construct a theoretical model in order to consider how preelection polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and how that information acts over time to decrease the support of the trailing candidate. The results shed light on how public opinion polls can aggregate information in the electorate and coordinate voters on the viable candidates in the election. Specifically, I show that in a Bayesian game model of strategic voting there exist non-Duvergerian equilibria in which all three candidates receive votes (in the limit). These equilibria require extreme coordination, however, and any variation in beliefs leads voters away from them to one of the Duvergerian equilibria. Thus, non-Duvergerian equilibria are unstable, while two-party equilibria are not. In addition, I describe how preelection polls provide information to voters about the viability of candidates and can thus be used by voters to coordinate on a Duvergerian outcome.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Dickson, Eric S., and Kenneth Scheve. "Social Identity, Electoral Institutions and the Number of Candidates." British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (March 19, 2010): 349–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123409990354.

Full text

Abstract:

The empirical literature in comparative politics holds that social cleavages affect the number of candidates or parties when electoral institutions are ‘permissive’, but it lacks a theoretical account of the strategic candidate entry and exit decisions that ultimately determine electoral coalitions in plural societies. This article incorporates citizen-candidate social identities into game-theoretic models of electoral competition under plurality and majority-runoff electoral rules, indicating that social group demographics can affect the equilibrium number of candidates, even in non-permissive systems. Under plurality rule, the relationship between social homogeneity and the effective number of candidates is non-monotonic and, contrary to the prevailing Duvergerian intuition, for some demographic configurations even the effective number of candidates cannot be near two. Empirical patterns in cross-national presidential election results are consistent with the theoretical model.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Bouton, Laurent. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections." American Economic Review 103, no. 4 (June 1, 2013): 1248–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.4.1248.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Finally, runoff systems with a threshold below 50 percent produce an Ortega effect that may lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser. (JEL C72, D72)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Kartik, Navin, and R. Preston McAfee. "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition." American Economic Review 97, no. 3 (May 1, 2007): 852–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.3.852.

Full text

Abstract:

We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter's utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate's character. This structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters, since a policy platform affects voters' utilities not only directly, but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate's character. The model generates a number of predictions, starting with a failure of the median voter theorem. (JEL D72, D82)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

BASINGER, SCOTT J., and MICHAEL J. ENSLEY. "Candidates, Campaigns, or Partisan Conditions? Reevaluating Strategic-Politicians Theory." Legislative Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (August 2007): 361–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298007781699654.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Haber, Judith. "Strategic Use of Political Influence: Endorsement of Political Candidates." Journal of the American Psychiatric Nurses Association 10, no. 4 (August 2004): 195–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078390304267415.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Zhirnov, Andrei, and Mariam Mufti. "The Electoral Constraints on Inter-Party Mobility of Candidates: The Case of Pakistan." Comparative Politics 51, no. 4 (June 1, 2019): 519–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041519x15647434970045.

Full text

Abstract:

This article investigates the electoral constraints on the inter-party mobility of candidates. We argue that the prevalent mode of interactions among candidates, voters, and parties in local, district-level electoral markets shapes the strategic constraints faced by potential party switchers. We suggest that strong linkages between voters and political parties reduce the market value of the candidates outside of their political parties, thereby constraining their inter-party mobility. These expectations are evaluated using candidate- and district-level data from Pakistan from 1988–2013. The results show that the strength of voter-party linkages in an electoral district, as measured by the lack of electoral volatility and the extent of straight-ticket voting in national and provincial elections, has a positive effect on the propensity of candidates to switch parties.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Wang, Ching-Hsing, Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, and Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang. "Does candidate nomination in districts increase party votes of small parties? Evidence from the 2016 Taiwan legislative elections." Japanese Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (July 16, 2018): 461–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109918000129.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis study addresses why small parties nominate candidates to run in the district elections and how nomination of district candidates could influence small parties’ share of party votes in Taiwan. Previous studies on party's strategic entry in the mixed electoral system demonstrate the existence of ‘contamination effect’ in various Western democracies. While ‘contamination effect’ suggests that party would gain more proportional representation (PR) seats by increasing its number of candidate nomination in the single-member-district (SMD) races, we contend that small parties should also take the strength of nominated candidates into consideration. Nominating strong candidates in SMD competitions could generate positive ‘spillover effect’ to party's PR tier. By focusing on the 2016 Taiwan legislative election, our findings suggest that first, small parties need to fulfill the institutional requirements in order to qualify for running in the party-list election; second, the ‘contamination effect’ exists in Taiwan, but it is conditional; and finally, candidates’ strength creates positive ‘spillover effect’ on party's proportional seats.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Gieczewski, Germán. "Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 3 (August 1, 2022): 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180033.

Full text

Abstract:

I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates’ and voters’ policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters’ threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters’ bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is strategic, as in that case strong incumbents face weaker competition. The paper also compares the welfare properties of seniority caps and stochastic term limits. (JEL C78, D72)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Hale, Isaac D. "Abandon Ship? An Analysis of Strategic Voting among Liberal Democrat Voters in the 2015 UK Election." Parliamentary Affairs 73, no. 3 (February 26, 2019): 503–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsz007.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Strategic voting occurs when voters make vote choices using their ex ante expectations about the results of an election in addition to their sincere candidate preferences. While there is ample theoretical reason to believe strategic voting should occur under certain electoral conditions and institutional arrangements, the evidence for it in the literature has been mixed. I theorise that the polarisation of the two main British political parties and the highly publicised predictions of defeat for Britain’s primary national third party, the Liberal Democrats, make the 2015 UK election an ideal case for studying strategic voting. I adapt established methods of identifying strategic voting to this election and find evidence that Liberal Democrat voters in the UK voted strategically for Labour and Conservative candidates to maximise their odds of affecting the electoral outcome in their constituency.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Maier, Jürgen, and Carolin Jansen. "When do candidates attack in election campaigns? Exploring the determinants of negative candidate messages in German televised debates." Party Politics 23, no. 5 (October 16, 2015): 549–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815610966.

Full text

Abstract:

Content analyses of televised debates indicate that candidates often attack each other. Unfortunately, we know very little about when candidates go negative. Furthermore, most research is focusing on the United States. This paper contributes in several ways to our understanding of when candidates choose negative messages. First, we identify some previously unnoticed factors and assign them to three broad categories: a candidate’s (personal and political) profile, the debate format, and the strategic context of a debate. Second, we use a unique data set based on all German televised debates. Third, we run multivariate models to investigate which variables are responsible for the use of attacks. Our results indicate that attacks are very popular. Candidates attack if they belong to the opposition, if they compete at the national level, and if they are behind in the polls. In addition, personality can affect the use of attacks.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Carsey, Thomas M., Robert A. Jackson, Melissa Stewart, and James P. Nelson. "Strategic Candidates, Campaign Dynamics, and Campaign Advertising in Gubernatorial Races." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 11, no. 3 (July 11, 2011): 269–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440011413085.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Ishihara, Akifumi. "Strategic candidacy for political compromise in party politics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 32, no. 3 (July 2020): 389–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629820927082.

Full text

Abstract:

We study political competition among parties with policy-motivated candidates and demonstrate two-party competition where one of them has no chance of winning in the general election. If there are multiple candidates in a party, then the party can nominate the representative contingent on who are the rivals in the general election. Given that the winning party takes such a strategy, the opponent party is willing to run even with no chance of winning the general election since policy compromises can be induced from the winning party. We further demonstrate that introducing primary elections into the nomination process may induce more ideological polarization or more moderation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Lin, Luc Chia-Shin. "Facebook Politics: Strategic Network Campaigning in the 2012 Taiwan Presidential Election." Media International Australia 155, no. 1 (May 2015): 54–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x1515500107.

Full text

Abstract:

The networked nature of social media allows users to link their pre-existing connections and develop new types of online relationships. This study aimed to examine the relationships between candidates' camps and ‘netizens' during the 2012 Taiwan presidential election. To benefit from the rapid growth of social networking, political candidates have used social media as an election campaign tool. However, the strategic approach of these candidates seems to contradict the networked nature of social media, especially in terms of friendship. Through in-depth interviews with campaign staff, journalists and scholars, this research found that a new concept – strategic network campaigning (SNC) – can be proposed. Combining ‘two-step flow’ communication, para-social relationships and network society theory, SNC explains how election camps mimic Facebook's networked nature by placing staff in the network to influence netizens. Through SNC, campaign staff develop hubs that they can control, establish friend-like relationships with netizens, and influence perceptions of candidates.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Alves, Marcos Antônio, Cristiano Lopes Carvalhaes, and Paulo Roberto de Sousa. "Pós-graduação Lato Sensu: apontamentos para a gestão estratégica a partir das expectativas dos candidatos." ForScience 8, no. 2 (December 3, 2020): e00858. http://dx.doi.org/10.29069/forscience.2020v8n2.e858.

Full text

Abstract:

O objetivo deste artigo foi analisar o perfil de candidatos a cursos de Pós-Graduação Lato Sensu e identificar pontos estratégicos para uma melhor condução do curso e aprendizagem do aluno. Um questionário foi aplicado e continha questões demográficas e outras relacionadas com as expectativas da formação, motivos para cursá-la e critérios de decisão. Um total de 136 candidatos foram entrevistados e eles externaram a importância de cada item em uma escala Likert de 1 a 9 pontos. Os resultados indicaram que dentre os candidatos entrevistados, a maioria compreendeu: homens (61.03%), entre 20 e 29 anos (49.26%), solteiros (61.03%), que concluíram graduação (94.11%) em instituições privadas (75%) entre 2016-2015 (26.47%) ou 2014-2011 (37.5%). A formação é buscada por iniciativa própria e eles demonstraram alta expectativa quanto à formação teórica e profissional. Módulos comuns para diferentes cursos, ações de marketing aproveitando as oportunidades de mercado, descontos para ex-alunos de graduação e especialização e currículo voltado ao mercado foram as principais proposições percebidas e discutidas. Este trabalho retoma um tema de grande importância para a educação superior, fornece uma revisão normativa histórica e pode servir de apoio para gestores educacionais, empresas privadas e pesquisadores envolvidos nesta formação. Palavras-chave: Pós-Graduação Lato Sensu. Especialização. Educação superior. Perfil do candidato. Lato Sensu postgraduate courses: strategic management based on candidates’ expectations Abstract The aim of this paper was to analyze the profile of candidates for Lato Sensu Postgraduate courses and to identify strategic points for a better conduction of the course and students learning. A survey was conducted with demographic and course expectations questions, considering the reasons for taking it and decision-making. A total of 136 candidates were interviewed and they expressed the importance of each item on a 1-9 point Likert scale. The results indicated that among the candidates interviewed, the majority were: men (61.03%); 20-29 years old (49.26%); single (61.03%); who completed their undergraduate degree (94.11%); in private institutions (75%); between 2016-2015 (26.47%) or 2014-2011 (37.5%). The graduation is sought on their own initiative and they showed high expectations regarding theoretical and professional training. Common modules for different courses, marketing actions taking advantage of market opportunities, discounts for undergraduate and specialization students and curriculum aimed at the market were the main proposals perceived and discussed. This research takes up a topic of great importance for higher education, provides a historical normative review and may be used as support for educational managers, business and researchers involved in this field. Keywords: Lato Sensu Postgraduate Courses. Specialization. Strategic Management. Candidates’ Profile.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

BATTO, NATHAN F. "Strategic Defection from Strong Candidates in the 2004 Taiwanese Legislative Election." Japanese Journal of Political Science 9, no. 1 (April 2008): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002800.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractSNTV engenders incentives to vote strategically not only against probable losers but also against candidates seen as possible runaway winners. This paper uses survey and election data from the 2004 Taiwanese legislative election to argue that excessive strategic voting against the strongest candidates was at the root of coordination failures. Further, I argue that strong personal votes play a role in mitigating these failures by constructing a stable foundation of votes that is not subject to the wild swings produced by strategic voting.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign." American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 527–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944793.

Full text

Abstract:

Interpretations of electoral campaigns have pointed to two mutually exclusive strategies: candidates are expected to focus either on policy issues or on personal image. We argue, however, that social psychologists' notion of priming offers an empirically grounded and theoretically plausible campaign strategy for treating image and issues as interconnected strategic concerns. Based on both quantitative and historical analysis of John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign, we find that the candidate's policy positions were related to results from his private public opinion polls. Archival and interview evidence suggests that Kennedy deliberately used these popular issues to shape the electorate's standards for evaluating his personal attributes (rather than to win over utility-maximizing voters). We conclude that the study of priming offers one important approach to reintegrating research on candidate strategy and voter behavior.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Bullock, Charles S., Ronald Keith Gaddie, and Ben Smith. "White Voters, Black Representatives, and Candidates of Choice." American Review of Politics 26 (November 1, 2005): 267–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2005.26.0.267-289.

Full text

Abstract:

The challenge of minority representation is an important area of public policy that relies heavily on the work of political scientists. Minority voting rights in the United States encompasses not just access to the ballot, but also guarantees that the ballot has meaning in areas with historic discrimination. In this paper we explore the nomination and election of African-American congressional representatives, with an emphasis on the unsuccessful primary re-nomination fight of Cynthia McKinney. Relying on both precinct level racial participation data and also unique, voter-level information on the partisanship of all white primary participants, we ascertain the extent to which the African-American incumbent’s loss to an African-American challenger was a product of strategic voting by white Republicans under Georgia’s open primary law. We also draw conclusions about the implications of such strategic white voting for the election of African-American candidates of choice, and discuss the implications of those conclusions for the interpretation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Lisowski, Grzegorz. "Coalitional Strategic Behaviour in Collective Decision Making." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 10 (April 3, 2020): 13722–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i10.7133.

Full text

Abstract:

In my PhD project I study the algorithmic aspects of strategic behaviour in collective decision making, with the special focus on voting mechanisms. I investigate two manners of manipulation: (1) strategic selection of candidates from groups of potential representatives and (2) influence on voters located in a social network.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Nashmi, Eisa Al, and David Lynn Painter. "Oh Snap: Chat Style in the 2016 US Presidential Primaries." Journal of Creative Communications 13, no. 1 (December 25, 2017): 17–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0973258617743619.

Full text

Abstract:

Based on Goffman’s theories of self-presentation and framing, this exploratory investigation adapted Videostyle and Webstyle protocols to analyse the 2016 US presidential primary candidates’ Snapchat posts. This quantitative content analysis ( N = 871) coded for the visual content, production techniques, nonverbal content and frames used by the five candidates who used Snapchat as a strategic tool to engage voters throughout the course of the 2016 US primary campaign. The results indicate Clinton (D) deviated from the other candidates in the visual and nonverbal content as well as the frames used in her snaps. The implications of these findings on gendered self-presentation theory as well as inferences about the campaigns’ strategic social media motivations and effectiveness are also explored.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Chauchard, Simon. "Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections." Asian Survey 58, no. 2 (March 2018): 341–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.2.341.

Full text

Abstract:

Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner’s dilemma. Fearing that their opponents will distribute handouts, they distribute them themselves to counter, or neutralize, their opponents’ strategies.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Rossini, Patrícia, Jeff Hemsley, Sikana Tanupabrungsun, Feifei Zhang, and Jennifer Stromer-Galley. "Social Media, Opinion Polls, and the Use of Persuasive Messages During the 2016 US Election Primaries." Social Media + Society 4, no. 3 (July 2018): 205630511878477. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2056305118784774.

Full text

Abstract:

Political campaigns’ use of digital technologies has been a topic of scholarly concern for over two decades, but most studies have been focused on analyzing the use of digital platforms without considering contextual factors of the race, like public opinion polls. Opinion polls are an important information source for citizens and candidates and provide the latter with information that might drive strategic communication. In this article, we explore the relationship between the use of social media in the 2016 US presidential elections and candidates’ standing in public opinion polls, focusing on the surfacing and primary stages of the campaign. We use automated content analysis to categorize social media posts from all 21 Republican and Democratic candidates. Results indicate that a candidate’s performance in the polls drives certain communicative strategies, such as the use of messages of attacks and advocacy, as well as the focus on personal image.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Ruchika and Asha Prasad. "Untapped Relationship between Employer Branding, Anticipatory Psychological Contract and Intent to Join." Global Business Review 20, no. 1 (July 5, 2017): 194–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0972150917713897.

Full text

Abstract:

In the ever-changing business environment and fluctuating expectations of current generation from its employer, employer branding has become an important tool for organizations to establish themselves as the employer of choice amongst prospective employees. It is serving as the strategic tool for all the sectors to attract and retain the right pool of employees to gain strategic advantage and edge over competitors. The purpose of this article is to identify the dimensions of employer branding and its impact on the formation of anticipatory psychological contract (APC) and final intent of a candidate to join an organization. Using the qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews from final year students of MCA and B.Tech., it provides an insight into how various dimensions of employer branding lead to the formation of APC and generates the final intent among the candidates to join an organization. It comprehensively analyzes the relationship between all three constructs, employer branding, APC and a candidate’s intent to join an organization in the form of a conceptual framework. The result reflects the direct relationship between employer branding and a candidate’s intent to join an organization and indirect relationship with APC as a mediator between the two. It also demonstrates the direct relationship between employer branding and APC. Managerial implications of the study are also discussed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Busch, Ian. "Buying the Boat -Choosing a Ship for the Sealift Conversion Program." Marine Technology and SNAME News 36, no. 01 (January 1, 1999): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/mt1.1999.36.1.1.

Full text

Abstract:

One of the first steps in any ship conversion program is determining which ship to convert. The Strategic Sealift Programs offered an opportunity to develop a tool for selecting the ship, and then put that tool to use for an actual conversion program. A preference based, measure of merit system was used based on the Governments technical requirements for the converted ship. The selection tool served to narrow the choice set of candidate hulls such that ship owners could be pursued and a class of ships finally selected. The system used to review each of the candidates will be reviewed, as well as some of the particulars of the candidates. The factors that resulted in selecting the class that was converted will also be discussed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Verge, Tània, and Nina Wiesehomeier. "Parties, Candidates, and Gendered Political Recruitment in Closed-List Proportional Representation Systems: The Case of Spain." Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 4 (October 26, 2018): 805–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912918807086.

Full text

Abstract:

Throughout the world, the number of women elected to legislatures has risen dramatically. Most of the quantitative research explaining party, district, or national differences has focused on the aggregate rather than the candidate level thereby overlooking women’s access to party ballots. In examining both the election and selection stages, we focus on Spain, a closed-list proportional representation system where parties have tight control over their ballots and the election of candidates is largely a function of rank orders on the ballot. In this South European democracy women’s representation in the national parliament has experienced an incremental track, reaching 39 percent in 2016. Party differences in gender outcomes and policies promoting equal gender representation did not vanish once a legislated quota was introduced in 2007. The empirical analysis builds on an original set of candidate longitudinal data covering nine elections held between 1986 and 2016. Specifically, we test how party and candidate factors differentially affect the selection of men and women to party ballots and their likelihood of getting elected. We show that strategic discrimination against female candidates affects all parties and it happens irrespective of candidates’ political experience, which explains why male overrepresentation has been significantly reduced but not overturned.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Hijriani, Astria, and Aprillia Dewi. "Priority Determination of Application Candidate Using Ward and Peppard’s Composite Matrix Portfolio and Business Process Analysis for Customer Relationship Management (CRM)." Systemic: Information System and Informatics Journal 4, no. 1 (November 15, 2018): 30–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.29080/systemic.v4i1.322.

Full text

Abstract:

By using CRM, the organization will be able to identify of what customer requires and needs, thus will improve the service. The designing of CRM the Computer Science Department using Zachman Framework is one of the approach methods that can describe a more complex and thorough system information design. Zachman Framework has not provided a method for determining the priority of the application candidates that will be designed. Even though there are several methods to determine the priority of candidates of the information system, in this research the authors use the Ward and Peppard’s composite matrix portfolio and business process analysis for priority to determine the priority of application candidates. The phase of candidates determination by using Ward and Peppard’s composite matrix and business process is the identification of information related to Computer Science Department, SWOT analysis, business process and value chain analysis, the analysis of ISO 9001:2008 quality procedure implementation related to customer, the determination of application’s candidate, and the implementation of the questionnaire mapping of application candidate. The results are in the form of mapping for each application candidate/application system into four quadrants which are provided in composite matrix for the decision-making process. The matrix consists of key operational, strategic, high potential and support. The mapping of application candidate/information system is suitable with the contribution of each information system toward the CRM in Computer Science Department, University of Lampung. The mapping on Ward and Peppard’s composite matrix is then used to separate the application candidates into two groups, the main priority of application group/information system and non-main priority of application group/information system. There are five information systems which are classified into main priority application group/information system and recommended to be developed in further research.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Gherghina, Sergiu, and Mihail Chiru. "Voting after Watching: The Strategic Role of Election Polls." European Review 20, no. 2 (March 30, 2012): 210–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798711000548.

Full text

Abstract:

The November 2009 Romanian presidential elections illustrate the process through which media exposure to exit polls during the election day allows strategic voting in the least expected situations (i.e. in the first round of a two-ballot setting). Organized in a two-round system in which the first two competitors qualify for the second round, these elections display one unsolved dilemma. The difference registered in elections between the two challengers is twice as large as the average support in the pre-election polls (a comparable difference was never registered in post-communist Romania). Our quantitative analysis uses election results from the past two decades and aggregated poll data from 2009 and reveals that a large share of the Romanian electorate avoids wasting votes and casts them for candidates with real winning chances. This article argues that polls presented to the voters, by the media during the elections, made the difference. They were used as electoral strategies to trigger strategic voting and thus promote specific candidates.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Bodanza, Gustavo, and Sebastián Linares Lejarraga. "Rousseau’s General Will as a Bound for Strategic Self-Interested Voting." REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFÍA 48, no. 1 (May 6, 2022): 69–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/rlf2022263.

Full text

Abstract:

Condorcet’s voting method, as its extension known as the Kemeny-Young rule, is often seen as the incarnation of Rousseau’s general will. But the Kemeny-Young rule has problems when cycles in the social ranking arise. In particular, it can lead to choose a “covered” alternative, i.e. one for which there are candidates with better performances in pairwise comparisons. On the other hand, the uncovered set, the set of all the alternatives that are not covered, puts limits to insincere votes of sophisticated voters under certain conditions. Basically, voting insincerelly for a non-preferred alternative in order to favor the actually preferred candidate would lead to the choice of an uncovered alternative. We argue that Rousseau’s general will could be embodied in a different kind of rule than Kemeny-Young’s, with both epistemic credentials and whose outcomes are within the uncovered set altogether. In this work we begin to explore that possibility.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Paul, Newly, and Chance York. "I Approve This Candidate: The Strategic Use of Ad Endorsements in the 2008 Election." PS: Political Science & Politics 48, no. 04 (October 2015): 584–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096515000803.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACTContextual and strategic factors that influence the use of endorsements in political advertisements represent an underexplored area of the scholarly literature, resulting in a gap between the art and science of campaigning and the advertising-effects literature. This article uses data from the Wisconsin Ad Project to study endorsements in ads aired during the 2008 election cycle. We show that endorsements are used strategically by campaigns and that four factors—candidate characteristics, campaign characteristics, ad format, and timing—affect whether an ad containing an endorsement is aired. Specifically, endorsements are more likely to appear in positive ads, are primarily used by incumbents and female candidates, are less likely to appear in competitive races, and tend to air less frequently as a campaign progresses.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

WEI, JUDY CHIA YIN. "The Strategic Coordination under Quasi-SNTV: A Case Study of Hong Kong." Japanese Journal of Political Science 18, no. 1 (February 14, 2017): 155–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109916000359.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis article aims to explore the effects of quasi-SNTV (Single Non-transferable Vote) under the Largest Remainder Proportional Representation (LRPR) in Legislative Council (LegCo) elections in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) after the British handover of 1997. Although the quasi-SNTV results from the inability of political parties to control their candidates, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) can obtain more seats in total than they could by coordinating around one single list if they can successfully control their party label and the political camps can coordinate different parties and candidates. The quasi-SNTV in Hong Kong is notable for the strategic coordination found in its alliances, a key aspect that differentiates it from Colombia's quasi-SNTV. The DP's failure can be attributed to its internal conflicts and the lack of coordination among the pro-democracy alliances. In contrast to the democratic camp, which lacks any overriding authority to coordinate different parties and candidates, the pro-China's united front machinery facilitates coordination and helps the DAB perform better than the DP in quasi-SNTV.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Born, Richard. "Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters." American Political Science Review 80, no. 2 (June 1986): 599–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1958276.

Full text

Abstract:

To resolve the paradoxical finding that economic conditions and presidential popularity powerfully relate to quadrennial movement in the House vote, but explain little individual voting variation, Jacobson and Kernell have advanced their “strategic politicians” model of midterm elections. Purportedly, the early-year political environment helps determine how many of a party's strong potential contenders risk challenging incumbents; voters in turn respond to the quality of candidates before them in November, and thus indirectly reward the party favored by this early-year environment. Despite its current prominence, however, the theory does not stand up to empirical investigation. A time-series equation of midterm outcomes regressed on early-year national conditions does not fare particularly well when contrasted with comparable equations assuming direct-effects voting. Furthermore, challenger quality has only a weak influence on individual voters—subordinate, in fact, to the effects of economic attitudes and presidential evaluations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Rusydi Umar, Imam Riadi, and Purwono. "Comparison of SVM, RF and SGD Methods for Determination of Programmer's Performance Classification Model in Social Media Activities." Jurnal RESTI (Rekayasa Sistem dan Teknologi Informasi) 4, no. 2 (April 20, 2020): 329–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.29207/resti.v4i2.1770.

Full text

Abstract:

The failure of most startups in Indonesia is caused by team performance that is not solid and competent. Programmers are an integral profession in a startup team. The development of social media can be used as a strategic tool for recruiting the best programmer candidates in a company. This strategic tool is in the form of an automatic classification system of social media posting from prospective programmers. The classification results are expected to be able to predict the performance patterns of each candidate with a predicate of good or bad performance. The classification method with the best accuracy needs to be chosen in order to get an effective strategic tool so that a comparison of several methods is needed. This study compares classification methods including the Support Vector Machines (SVM) algorithm, Random Forest (RF) and Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). The classification results show the percentage of accuracy with k = 10 cross validation for the SVM algorithm reaches 81.3%, RF at 74.4%, and SGD at 80.1% so that the SVM method is chosen as a model of programmer performance classification on social media activities.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Maškarinec, Pavel. "Ticket splitting, strategic voting and personal vote in the 2012 Mongolian elections." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 235–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.08.002.

Full text

Abstract:

This article examines ticket splitting under Mongolia's new mixed-member majoritarian system used for the elections in 2012, reaching several conclusions. First, we confirm that strategic ticket splitting depends on party size, as especially candidates of larger parties receive, on average, more district votes. Second, we show that strategic voting is not a universal phenomenon under the Mongolian mixed-member majoritarian system. Finally, as personal vote rather than strategic voting generally influences electoral behaviour of Mongolian voters at the district level, we hypothesize that institutional factors alone are not sufficient to explain both ticket splitting and strategic voting.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Reed, Steven R. "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case." British Journal of Political Science 20, no. 3 (July 1990): 335–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400005871.

Full text

Abstract:

Japan uses simple plurality elections with multi-member districts to elect its lower house. This system tends to produce competition among n + 1 candidates per district. This ‘law of simple plurality elections’ is a structural generalization akin to Duverger's Law. Evidence from Japan also indicates that the causal mechanism behind this ‘law’ is not strategic voting, although strategic voting occurs, but elite coalition building. It is further argued that the connection between structure and behaviour is learning and not rationality. Equilibria are reached slowly through trial and error processes. Once reached, the equilibrium is unstable because parties and candidates try to change it. Even without rational actors and stable equilibria, however, this structural generalization accurately describes the dynamics of electoral competition at the district level in Japan.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Jaelani, Anton T., Anupreeta More, Masamune Oguri, Alessandro Sonnenfeld, Sherry H. Suyu, Cristian E. Rusu, Kenneth C. Wong, et al. "Survey of Gravitationally lensed Objects in HSC Imaging (SuGOHI) – V. Group-to-cluster scale lens search from the HSC–SSP Survey." Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 495, no. 1 (April 21, 2020): 1291–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mnras/staa1062.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACT We report the largest sample of candidate strong gravitational lenses belonging to the Survey of Gravitationally lensed Objects in HSC Imaging for group-to-cluster scale (SuGOHI-c) systems. These candidates are compiled from the S18A data release of the Hyper Suprime-Cam Subaru Strategic Program (HSC–SSP) Survey. We visually inspect ∼39 500 galaxy clusters, selected from several catalogues, overlapping with the Wide, Deep, and UltraDeep fields, spanning the cluster redshift range of 0.05 < zcl < 1.38. We discover 641 candidate lens systems, of which 536 are new. From the full sample, 47 are almost certainly bona fide lenses, 181 of them are highly probable lenses, and 413 are possible lens systems. Additionally, we present 131 lens candidates at galaxy scale serendipitously discovered during the inspection. We obtained spectroscopic follow-up of 10 candidates using the X-shooter. With this follow-up, we confirm eight systems as strong gravitational lenses. Of the remaining two, one of the sources is too faint to detect any emission, and the other has a tentative redshift close to the lens redshift, but additional arcs in this system are yet to be observed spectroscopically. Since the HSC–SSP is an ongoing survey, we expect to find ∼600 definite or probable lenses using this procedure and even more if combined with other lens finding methods.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Pusparimba, Tasya Maurhena, Yusa Djuyandi, and Ratnia Solihah. "Strategi Pemenangan Jokowi dan Ma’ruf Amin dalam Pemilihan Presiden 2019 melalui Pencitraan Politik." PERSPEKTIF 10, no. 2 (July 8, 2021): 555–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.31289/perspektif.v10i2.4786.

Full text

Abstract:

This study aims to see the winning strategy of the candidate pairs for Jokowi and Ma'ruf Amin in the 2019 presidential election, especially in terms of political imagery. Using Newman and Shet's theory by looking at reinforcement strategies, rationalization strategies, inducement strategies, and confrontation strategies. The method used is descriptive qualitative research methods through in-depth interviews and literature review. Primary data was obtained through interviews with resource persons, namely the success team and volunteer team for the Indonesia Maju coalition, secondary data consisting of books and related documents. The results showed that the candidate pairs Jokowi and Ma'ruf Amin tried to carry out various strategic tactics in order to present themselves as candidates who had a populist image, were liked, were honest and had a dominant ideology of democratic-socialism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Hemsley, Jeff, Jennifer Stromer-Galley, Bryan Semaan, and Sikana Tanupabrungsun. "Tweeting to the Target: Candidates’ Use of Strategic Messages and @Mentions on Twitter." Journal of Information Technology & Politics 15, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2017.1338634.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Dellis, Arnaud. "Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate? †." Games 13, no. 4 (July 31, 2022): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13040053.

Full text

Abstract:

Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? The paper investigates this question in the context of a laboratory experiment where a centrist candidate is added to the race between a left candidate and a right candidate. The experimental design varies the polarization of the left and right candidates. The paper focuses on the effect of party polarization on the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate through strategic voting behavior with experimental subjects acting as voters. The paper yields two main results: (1) party polarization initially improves the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate; and (2) the effect of party polarization on the electoral prospects of the centrist weakens and ultimately disappears as elections are repeated. This happens because party polarization slows down the speed at which voters desert their candidate and vote strategically for the centrist in an apparent attempt at preventing the election of the candidate on the opposite side.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

BENOIT, KENNETH, DANIELA GIANNETTI, and MICHAEL LAVER. "Voter Strategies with Restricted Choice Menus." British Journal of Political Science 36, no. 3 (May 17, 2006): 459–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712340600024x.

Full text

Abstract:

Mixed-member electoral systems require voters simultaneously to cast ballots in single-member districts (SMD) and multimember, proportional representation (PR) constituencies. It may be that not all parties offer candidates in both electoral contexts, however. In this event would-be voters for some parties may find themselves ‘frustrated’ by the restricted choice menu on offer in the SMD, being effectively forced to split their vote between different parties. Here we explore the different behaviours of frustrated voters in the 1996 mixed-member election to Italy's Chamber of Deputies, characterizing these as being either in some sense non-strategic (concerned above all with the relative policy platforms of candidates) or strategic (concerned above all to influence the eventual composition of government). Using an extended method for ecological inference, we parameterize and estimate rates of different types of ticket-splitting at the district level, and link the degree of what we characterize as strategic voting to the relative policy distance between the respective local representatives of the Italian pre-electoral coalitions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Journal articles on the topic 'Strategic candidates'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles