Relevant bibliographies by topics / Strategia nucleare / Journal articles

Journal articles on the topic 'Strategia nucleare'

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Strategia nucleare.
Author: Grafiati
Published: 11 March 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Strategia nucleare.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Affek, Jarosław. "Strategiczne siły jądrowe Federacji Rosyjskiej." Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne 50, no. 2 (June 30, 2016): 64–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/athena.2016.50.04.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Pierre, Andrew J., Desmond Ball, and Jeffrey Richelson. "Strategic Nuclear Targeting." Foreign Affairs 65, no. 1 (1986): 181. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20042875.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Hill III, Ralph S., Kenneth R. Balkey, Bryan A. Erler, and C. Wesley Rowley. "ICONE15-10614 ASME Nuclear Codes & Standards Risk Management Strategic Planning." Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE) 2007.15 (2007): _ICONE1510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/jsmeicone.2007.15._icone1510_336.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Treverton, Gregory F., and Charles L. Glaser. "Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy." Foreign Affairs 70, no. 2 (1991): 177. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20044724.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Cohen, Eliot A., and Pavel Podvig. "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033029.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Mazarr, Michael J. "On Strategic Nuclear Policy." SAIS Review 9, no. 1 (1989): 157–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sais.1989.0047.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Gaietta, Michele. "La dorsale nucleare iraniana." STORIA URBANA, no. 131 (November 2011): 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/su2011-131005.

Full text
Abstract:
In questi ultimi dieci anni, il programma nucleare iraniano ha assunto una valenza cruciale per la definizione dei rapporti tra la Repubblica islamica dell'Iran e una parte rilevante della comunitŕ internazionale. Nonostante sia necessario valutare quanto le ambizioni nucleari di questo paese possano ulteriormente influenzare gli equilibri politico- strategici regionali, č altrettanto significativo analizzare come, storicamente, questo quadro regionale abbia inciso sulle decisioni assunte dall'Iran - monarchico e rivoluzionario - rispetto alle tempistiche di costruzione e al posizionamento territoriale dei propri siti nucleari. Puň essere quindi tracciata una "dorsale" Teheran-Esfahan-Bushehr che mette in relazione i principali siti nucleari iraniani attualmente in funzione, snodandosi sul corridoio strategico che dal Mar Caspio lambisce le acque del Golfo Persico. Questa "dorsale" include l'impianto di arricchimento di Natanz, principale oggetto della contesa con la comunitŕ internazionale, che dista pochi chilometri dal punto d'incontro delle direttrici che collegano Bagdad con Herat (e Kabul), Kuwait City con Ashgabat, il confine turco-armeno a nord-est con quello pakistano a sud-ovest. La centralitŕ politica assunta dal programma nucleare per l'Iran si traduce quindi in una "centralitŕ territoriale", a riprova del profondo radicamento tra questa questione e la concezione strategica dell'intero paese.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Rueter, Theodore, and Thomas Kalil. "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Winter." World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 587–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010538.

Full text
Abstract:
This essay explores the effect of the “nuclear winter” thesis upon the strategic debate. Both “hawks” and “doves” responded to the nuclear winter thesis in an ideological manner, illustrating the theological nature of the debate on nuclear strategy. Hawks used the nuclear winter data to argue for limited nuclear options, strategic modernization, environmentally sensitive weapons, and strategic defense. Doves used the same information to argue for mutual assured destruction, arms control, and/or global disarmament. Another group of analysts, the “pragmatic Center,” exhibited a more flexible, subtle understanding of the nuclear dilemma.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Cimbala, Stephen J. "Russia's Evolving Strategic Nuclear Deterrent." Defense & Security Analysis 23, no. 3 (September 2007): 257–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790701573873.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Yost, David S. "Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces." International Affairs 77, no. 3 (July 2001): 531–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00205.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
11

Cain, Stephen Alexis. "Strategic Nuclear Forces: Unrealistic Planning." Public Budgeting & Finance 9, no. 4 (December 1989): 94–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5850.00842.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
12

Siddiqi, Asif A. "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (review)." Technology and Culture 43, no. 4 (2002): 822–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tech.2002.0184.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
13

Colombo, U. "Nuclear fusion - a strategic approach." Plasma Physics and Controlled Fusion 31, no. 10 (August 1, 1989): 1477–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0741-3335/31/10/301.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
14

Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexandre Debs. "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation." International Security 39, no. 2 (October 2014): 7–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00177.

Full text
Abstract:
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers reliable protection. Opportunity requires that the state pursuing nuclear weapons possess high relative power vis-à-vis its adversaries or enjoy the protection of a powerful ally. Whereas a relatively weak state without a powerful ally lacks the opportunity to develop a nuclear capability, one with such an ally lacks the willingness to do so. Therefore, only powerful states or relatively weak states with allies that do not guarantee fulfillment of at least some of their key security goals will acquire the bomb. These claims are supported by the overall pattern of nuclear proliferation as well as detailed analyses of the Soviet, Iraqi, Pakistani, South Korean, and West German nuclear development cases.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
15

Ball, Desmond. "Controlling Theatre Nuclear War." British Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (July 1989): 303–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400005500.

Full text
Abstract:
Over the past decade, both official defence establishments and independent strategic analysts have devoted increasing attention to the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems which support the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and to the role of these systems in crises and in strategic nuclear war-fighting. In particular, specific consideration has been given to such critical issues as the extent to which current strategic C3I systems enhance crisis stability or instability, and whether or not they would serve to control escalation in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange or, because of their vulnerabilities, would in fact contribute to the dynamics of the escalation process.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
16

Prasad Singh, Hanuman. "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING STRATEGIC STABILITY." International Journal of Advanced Research 10, no. 03 (March 31, 2022): 01–04. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/14356.

Full text
Abstract:
Introduction of artificial intelligence(AI) in the nuclear weapons system exerts the stabilizing as well as destabilizing effect on strategic stability. AI enables informed decision making, development of more survivable delivery vehicle, physical and cyber security of nuclear assets, reduction in possibility of human error, surveillance of compliance of non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, integration of heterogeneous weapons for better performance, and underwater de-mining, etc. Simultaneously, by contrast, the threat to nuclear deterrence and nuclear assets from hypersonic glide vehicle leading to capability race, remote sensing over autonomous surface and underwater vehicles threatening invulnerable second strike capability, Patrov incident like situations possibility and requirement of human interference, instability inherent in threat detection with the deployment of AI driven more survivable and less controllable platforms including UCAVs, UAVs, UUVs, SLBMs, etc. are threatening the strategic stability. Which must be mitigated for long-lasting global peace through the development of universally accepted code of conduct in line with 1949 Geneva convention and Universal declaration of human rights 1948, etc, deliberation for risk reduction in regional as well as global stages, track two and 1.5 diplomacy, enabling human intervention in nuclear weapon launch system, commitment for No first use policy, complex interdependence etc.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
17

Abbasi, Rizwana, and Sufian Ullah. "Rising Strategic Instability and Declining Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia – A Pakistani Perspective." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 10, no. 1 (May 31, 2022): 215–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.18588/202202.00a207.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
18

deLeon, Peter. "Rethinking nuclear conflict: Strategic implications of a nuclear winter." Defense Analysis 3, no. 4 (December 1987): 319–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430178708405315.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
19

Kim, T. "Asymmetric strategic problems in nuclear nonproliferation." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 2 (March 5, 2014): 191–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu002.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
20

Selth, Andrew. "Nuclear Strategic Superiority: Rhetoric or Reality?" War & Society 4, no. 2 (September 1986): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/war.1986.4.2.95.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
21

Mount, Adam. "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint." Survival 57, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1069991.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
22

BASRUR, RAJESH M. "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture." Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (March 2001): 181–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038002004.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
23

Chyba, Christopher F., and Robert Legvold. "Conclusion: Strategic Stability & Nuclear War." Daedalus 149, no. 2 (April 2020): 222–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01799.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
24

Tuttle, Andrew C. "Book Review: The Strategic Nuclear Balance." Armed Forces & Society 18, no. 2 (January 1992): 276–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9201800211.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
25

Gartzke, Erik, and Matthew Kroenig. "A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (January 27, 2009): 151–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330039.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
26

Knepper, Jennifer. "Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture." Comparative Strategy 27, no. 5 (October 21, 2008): 451–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930802430080.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
27

Ferrero, Christopher J. "Israel’s strategic interest in nuclear disarmament." Comparative Strategy 38, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 167–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606658.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
28

Segal, Gerald. "Lawrence on strategic studies." Review of International Studies 11, no. 3 (January 1, 1985): 235–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500114469.

Full text
Abstract:
The problem of strategy in the nuclear age is simple–how to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Unfortunately, the solution to the problem is far from simple, Philip Lawrence's belief that students of strategic studies do not appreciate the moral, political and military complexities of the issues is both unfair and unscrupulous. To be sure, strategic studies like most disciplines has its fair share of crazies. But to label such extremists as models of the discipline is akin to blaming all politicians for the horrors-of Hitler or Pol Pot. Students of strategy have shown themselves to be far more sophisticated, and the problems they analyse are more complex, than Lawrence admits. Strategic studies deserves a better press.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
29

Kostic, Marina. "Strategic stability and the possibilities of China's involvement in the strategic arms control negotiations." Medjunarodni problemi 72, no. 4 (2020): 678–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp2004678k.

Full text
Abstract:
Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
30

Rogers, Paul. "Analyzing strategic nuclear policy and Nuclear diplomacy and crisis management." International Affairs 68, no. 3 (July 1992): 521–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2622987.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
31

Clary, Christopher, and Vipin Narang. "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities." International Security 43, no. 3 (February 2019): 7–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340.

Full text
Abstract:
Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
32

Egres, Dorottya. "Strategic maneuvering in extended polylogues." Journal of Argumentation in Context 10, no. 2 (July 5, 2021): 145–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jaic.20003.egr.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract This paper presents the analysis of the Hungarian nuclear expansion controversy using a conceptual framework that links strategic maneuvering with an extended polylogical controversy and evaluates the strategic maneuvering of political, environmentalist and expert actors. The paper aims to show that the three aspects of strategic maneuvering (audience demand, topical potential, presentational devices) are flexible enough that they can be analyzed when the object of study is not a spatially and temporally localized argumentative situation, but a decade-long debate with multiple actors. In 2014, Hungary signed a deal with Russia to finance 80% of the investment costs and supply two new reactors to maintain the 40–50% of nuclear energy in the national energy production.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
33

Ayesha Rana. "Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia: An Analysis." Strategic Studies 38, no. 2 (August 9, 2018): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.53532/ss.038.03.00147.

Full text
Abstract:
The South Asian security environment is in a state of flux due to the rivalry of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both the states cannot be retracted; however, it is critically important to maintain a stable and credible deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan has often proposed India to develop a “strategic restraint regime” to avert the possibility of a total war that could culminate in a nuclear war. To establish such a regime, there is a need to improve bilateral relations and increase cooperation in the nuclear domain. To avoid chances of nuclear use, India and Pakistan should reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons by spending less on nuclear weapons development. This paper tries to examine the challenges to strategic stability in South Asia from domestic, regional and global perspectives and also explores that how the interplay of these challenges is undermining the South Asian strategic stability. The role of major powers, especially the US, has also been analysed for a thorough understanding of an already fragile security situation in the region.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
34

Zeb, Rizwan, and Ali Khan Ghumro. "ASSURED RETALIATION: MAKING SENSE OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE." Asia-Pacific - Annual Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia 39 (February 20, 2022): 161–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol39.iss0.4400.

Full text
Abstract:
Employing the qualitative and historical analysis method, this paper overviews the Chinese nuclear doctrine and how it has evolved over the years with particular focus on the Chinese policy of ‘no-first use of nuclear weapons’ and its future. This paper argues that to understand the role assigned to the nuclear weapons in the Chinese defense policy, one must comprehend Chinese strategic thinking and where does nuclear weapons lie in this thinking. The paper further argues that for a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking, it is imperative to be cognizant of the strategic language and vocabulary used by the Chinese strategic thinkers. The paper also analyses the command and control set up for the Chinese nuclear weapons and the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability. The argument put forth is that the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capabilities is mostly exaggerated as it has security implications for American interests regionally and globally. The paper also argues that despite new emerging threats in the technological domain, China would continue pursuing the policy of no first use in the foreseeable future.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
35

Sundari, Rio. "Strategi Amerika Serikat dalam Menekan Pengembangan Nuklir Iran." Frequency of International Relations (FETRIAN) 1, no. 2 (February 27, 2020): 314–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/fetrian.1.2.314-340.2019.

Full text
Abstract:
The purpose of this research “United States strategy in Suppressing Iran's Nuclear Development” as a critical analysis related to the controversy over nuclear development conducted by Iran. In the history of Iran's nuclear development, the United States is one of the countries that fully support this nuclear development. However, the dynamics of relations between Iran and the United States are a factor in the status of nuclear development. As a result, Iranian attitudes and policies that are not in line with the United States will result in a decline in American support for Iran’s nuclear development. Finally, in 2018 the US announced its exit from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and decided to impose economic sanctions on Iran which coincided with Iranian support for Syria which was contrary to US political attitudes. This research uses qualitative research methods using secondary data such as books, journals, articles, and other sources to provide analysis of this case. This research results in a finding of efforts and strategies carried out by the United States to suppress Iran’s nuclear development. This was done because of two things, first, related to the interests of the United States in the Middle East. Iran’s political stance is often at odds with the politics of the United States. Second, reduce and maintain the hegemony of Israel as a close ally of the United States in the Middle East.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
36

Riqiang, Wu. "Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability." International Security 44, no. 4 (April 2020): 84–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00376.

Full text
Abstract:
Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests an alternative logic. Given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, uncertain retaliation can have a strong deterrent effect, and assured retaliation is not necessary. A simplified nuclear exchange model developed to evaluate China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the United States in 2000 and 2010 shows that China's nuclear retaliatory capability has been and remains far from assured. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States promised to maintain strategic stability with China; therefore, the 2010 scenario can be considered as a baseline for China-U.S. strategic stability. Both China and the United States are developing or modernizing their strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The technical competition between China and the United States favors each in different ways. A hypothetical scenario of China versus the United States in 2025 reveals that China-U.S. strategic stability will likely be maintained at no lower than its 2010 level.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
37

Anin, A. "Influence of Strategic Offensive Armaments in Non-Nuclear Outfit on Strategic Stability." World Economy and International Relations, no. 6 (2011): 45–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2011-6-45-55.

Full text
Abstract:
The article deals with one of the most pressing issues in the spring of 2010 at the concluded Russian-American negotiations on a new START Treaty (DSNV-2010), namely to the issue of strategic non-nuclear offensive armaments (SNOA). As the author argues, the Russian and Western expert communities are is just beginning to analyze what has been achieved in this respect at DSNV-2010. Despite all the difficulties in the negotiating process, new DSNV includes an agreement on a temporary compromise to alleviate the problem.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
38

Arbatov, A., A. Pikaev, and V. Dvorkin. "Nuclear Terrorism: Political, Strategic and Technologic Dimensions." World Economy and International Relations, no. 11 (2006): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2006-11-3-16.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
39

Booth, Ken. "The nuclear dilemma in American strategic thought." International Affairs 65, no. 1 (1988): 119–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2620992.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
40

Norris, Robert S., and William M. Arkin. "U.S. strategic nuclear forces, end of 1998." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 78–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2968/055001026.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
41

Norris, Robert S., and William M. Arkin. "Russian strategic nuclear forces, end of 1998." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 2 (March 1, 1999): 62–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2968/055002013.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
42

Cheng, Ta-Chen. "The Evolution of China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons." Defense & Security Analysis 22, no. 3 (September 2006): 241–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790600933863.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
43

Postol, Theodore A. "Strategic confusion—with or without nuclear winter." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 2 (February 1985): 14–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1985.11455905.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
44

Norris, Robert S., and William M. Arkin. "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1994." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, no. 1 (January 1995): 69–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1995.11658033.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
45

Ghosh, P. K. "Economic dimension of the strategic nuclear triad." Strategic Analysis 26, no. 2 (April 2002): 277–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160208450044.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
46

Powell, Robert. "The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence." Political Science Quarterly 100, no. 1 (1985): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2150861.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
47

Freedman, Lawrence. "Strategic defence in the nuclear age: Introduction." Adelphi Papers 27, no. 224 (September 1987): 3–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679328708457551.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
48

Schulte, Paul. "The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear Weapons." Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1 (April 2013): 195–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.771058.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
49

Treverton, Gregory F., and Robert E. Osgood. "The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought." Foreign Affairs 66, no. 4 (1988): 872. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043495.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
50

CIMBALA, STEPHEN. "Conventionalizing US and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2004): 599–617. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040490519947.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the bibliographies on the topic 'Strategia nucleare' for other source types:
Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography