Academic literature on the topic 'Stealthy attacks on ICS'
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Journal articles on the topic "Stealthy attacks on ICS"
Mokhtari, Sohrab, Alireza Abbaspour, Kang K. Yen, and Arman Sargolzaei. "A Machine Learning Approach for Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control Systems Based on Measurement Data." Electronics 10, no. 4 (February 8, 2021): 407. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics10040407.
Full textZhao, Xiaosong, Lei Zhang, Yixin Cao, Kai Jin, and Yupeng Hou. "Anomaly Detection Approach in Industrial Control Systems Based on Measurement Data." Information 13, no. 10 (September 25, 2022): 450. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info13100450.
Full textPuzankov, Sergey. "Stealthy SS7 Attacks." Journal of ICT Standardization 5, no. 1 (2017): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.13052/jicts2245-800x.512.
Full textNa, Gyujin, Hanbit Lee, and Yongsoon Eun. "A Multiplicative Coordinated Stealthy Attack for Nonlinear Cyber-Physical Systems with Homogeneous Property." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2019 (August 29, 2019): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/7280474.
Full textSHINOHARA, Takumi, and Toru NAMERIKAWA. "Perfect Stealthy Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems." Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers 54, no. 3 (2018): 309–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.9746/sicetr.54.309.
Full textDegue, Kwassi Holali, Jerome Le Ny, and Denis Efimov. "Stealthy attacks and attack-resilient interval observers." Automatica 146 (December 2022): 110558. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2022.110558.
Full textWang, Zhenqian, and Yongqiang Wang. "Pulse-Coupled Oscillators Resilient to Stealthy Attacks." IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 66, no. 12 (June 1, 2018): 3086–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tsp.2018.2824285.
Full textLi, Xuerong, Ping Zhang, and Hongli Dong. "Robust Stealthy Covert Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems." IFAC-PapersOnLine 55, no. 6 (2022): 520–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.07.181.
Full textRubinstein, Benjamin I. P., Blaine Nelson, Ling Huang, Anthony D. Joseph, Shing-hon Lau, Satish Rao, Nina Taft, and J. D. Tygar. "Stealthy poisoning attacks on PCA-based anomaly detectors." ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 37, no. 2 (October 16, 2009): 73–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1639562.1639592.
Full textDash, Pritam, Mehdi Karimibiuki, and Karthik Pattabiraman. "Stealthy Attacks against Robotic Vehicles Protected by Control-based Intrusion Detection Techniques." Digital Threats: Research and Practice 2, no. 1 (March 2021): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3419474.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Stealthy attacks on ICS"
Czarlinska, Aleksandra. "Stealthy attacks and defense strategies in competing sensor networks." [College Station, Tex. : Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2946.
Full textFlamholz, David B. "Baiting for defense against stealthy attacks on cyber-physical systems." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121858.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 63-64).
The goal of this thesis is to develop a defense methodology for a cyber-physical system (CPS) by which an attempted stealthy cyber-attack is detected in near real time. Improvements in networked communication have enabled vast and complex dynamic control systems to exploit networked control schemes to seamlessly integrate parts and processes. These cyber-physical systems exhibit a level of flexibility that was previously unavailable but also introduce communication channels that are vulnerable to outside interference and malicious intervention. This thesis considers the effects of a type of stealthy attack on a class of CPS that can be modeled as linear time-invariant systems. The effects of this attack are studied from both the perspective of the attacker as well as the defender. A previously developed method for conducting stealthy attacks is introduced and analyzed.
This method consists of injecting malicious actuation signals into the control input of a CPS and then designing a sensor attack to conceal the effect of the actuator attack. The result is an attack that cannot be detected upon inspection of the Kalman filter residual. Successful implementation of this attack is shown to require the attacker to attain perfect model knowledge in order for the attack to be stealthy. Based on the execution of past attacks on CPS, this thesis proposes an attacker who starts their attack by "fishing" for critical and confidential system information such as the model parameters. A method is then proposed in which the defender attempts to feed the attacker a slightly falsified model, baiting the fishing attacker with data that will make an attack detectable. Because the attacker's model is no longer correct, their attack design will induce a mean-shift in the Kalman filter residual, breaking the stealthiness of the original attack formula.
It is then shown that the defender can not only detect this faulty attack, but use observations of the Kalman filter residual to regain more accurate state estimates, mitigating the effect of the attack.
by David B. Flamholz.
S.M.
S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering
Myers, David. "Detecting cyber attacks on industrial control systems using process mining." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2019. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/130799/1/David_Myers_Thesis.pdf.
Full textAlbinsson, Felix, and Jesper Riedl. "HONEYPOT – To bee or not to bee: A study of attacks on ICS/SCADA systems." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för innovation, design och teknik, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-54563.
Full textAmini, Elham [Verfasser], Christian [Akademischer Betreuer] Boit, Bernd [Akademischer Betreuer] Szyszka, Christian [Gutachter] Boit, Bernd [Gutachter] Szyszka, Jean-Pierre [Gutachter] Seifert, and Navid [Gutachter] Asadi. "A structure for protection of security-sensitive ICs against attacks through silicon backside / Elham Amini ; Gutachter: Christian Boit, Bernd Szyszka, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Navid Asadi ; Christian Boit, Bernd Szyszka." Berlin : Technische Universität Berlin, 2021. http://d-nb.info/1238140831/34.
Full text黃啟彥. "On Study of Stealthy Attacks in a Process Control System with Model-based Anomaly Detection Protection." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68172228210520738824.
Full text國立交通大學
電控工程研究所
98
Process control systems (PCS) are widely used in modern infrastructures and industrial plants for stabilizing safety-critical processes. Any disruption in such systems may cause serious human injuries and environmental disasters. In 2008, Lin et al.~proposed a model-based anomaly detection module (abbreviated to mADM) to assure the security and stability of a well-studied Tennessee-Eastman process control system (TE-PCS). By taking advantages of cumulating the differences between real and simulated signals, mADM was able to detect an attack that compromises one or more sensors to crash the system. To evaluate the robustness of mADM, we study the stealthy attacks launched by an insider who may (1) know the detection and response strategies of mADM or (2) adjust the parameters of mADM so that these stealthy attacks may successfully attack the system without being detected by mADM. After analyzing mADM, we prove that a general stealthy attack signal can be represented by three types of curves, convex curve (cv), slope (sl), and concave curve (cc), depending on the cumulative differences of signals. By conducting a series of experiments on TE-PCS, we can identify the weakest sensor and the most effective way to stealthily attack this sensor. We also show that, if an insider cannot adjust the parameter settings and the parameters are well configured, he may not be able to crash the system. In the case that the insider obtains the permission to adjust the parameter settings, mADM should self-check whether the settings fall within valid ranges. Over-the-threshold settings may lead to a crash without being detected while under-the-threshold values may result in frequent false alarms and increase the operating costs. In the end, we also demonstrate three case studies to discuss that stealthy attacks may decrease the profits from 0.06% to 41%, depending on the ratio of costs and sales prices.
Books on the topic "Stealthy attacks on ICS"
Inc, Game Counselor. Game Counselor's Answer Book for Nintendo Players. Redmond, USA: Microsoft Pr, 1991.
Find full textSepowski, Stephen J., ed. The Ultimate Hint Book. Old Saybrook, CT: The Ultimate Game Club Ltd., 1991.
Find full textNinja Science: Camouflage, Weapons, and Stealthy Attacks. Capstone, 2016.
Find full textLusted, Marcia Amidon. Ninja Science: Camouflage, Weapons, and Stealthy Attacks. Capstone, 2016.
Find full textLusted, Marcia Amidon. Ninja Science: Camouflage, Weapons, and Stealthy Attacks. Capstone, 2021.
Find full textLusted, Marcia Amidon. Ninja Science: Camouflage, Weapons and Stealthy Attacks. Raintree Publishers, 2016.
Find full textLusted, Marcia Amidon. Ninja Science: Camouflage, Weapons, and Stealthy Attacks. Capstone, 2021.
Find full textNinja Science: Camouflage, Weapons and Stealthy Attacks. Raintree Publishers, 2017.
Find full textLusted, Marcia Amidon. Ninja Science: Camouflage, Weapons, and Stealthy Attacks. Capstone, 2016.
Find full textInc, Game Counsellor, ed. The Game Counsellor's answer book for Nintendo Game players: Hundredsof questions -and answers - about more than 250 popular Nintendo Games. Redmond, Washington: Microsoft Press, 1991.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Stealthy attacks on ICS"
Kleinmann, Amit, Ori Amichay, Avishai Wool, David Tenenbaum, Ofer Bar, and Leonid Lev. "Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems." In Computer Security, 93–109. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72817-9_7.
Full textOsman, Amr, Jeannine Born, and Thorsten Strufe. "Mitigating Internal, Stealthy DoS Attacks in Microservice Networks." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 500–504. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91081-5_37.
Full textSandberg, Henrik. "Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Feedback Systems Revisited." In Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, 61–78. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65048-3_4.
Full textStewin, Patrick. "Study of a Stealthy, Direct Memory Access Based Malicious Software." In Detecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory, 33–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13515-1_4.
Full textde Meulenaer, Giacomo, and François-Xavier Standaert. "Stealthy Compromise of Wireless Sensor Nodes with Power Analysis Attacks." In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 229–42. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16644-0_21.
Full textAl-Shaer, Ehab, and Syed Fida Gillani. "Agile Virtual Infrastructure for Cyber Deception Against Stealthy DDoS Attacks." In Cyber Deception, 233–57. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32699-3_10.
Full textStewin, Patrick. "A Primitive for Revealing Stealthy Peripheral-Based Attacks on the Computing Platform’s Main Memory." In Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, 1–20. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41284-4_1.
Full textTian, Jiwei, Buhong Wang, Tengyao Li, Fute Shang, Kunrui Cao, and Jing Li. "Stealthy and Sparse False Data Injection Attacks Based on Machine Learning." In Cyberspace Safety and Security, 337–47. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37337-5_27.
Full textAnwar, Adnan, Abdun Naser Mahmood, and Mark Pickering. "Data-Driven Stealthy Injection Attacks on Smart Grid with Incomplete Measurements." In Intelligence and Security Informatics, 180–92. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31863-9_13.
Full textOswald, David. "Side-Channel Attacks on SHA-1-Based Product Authentication ICs." In Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications, 3–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_1.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Stealthy attacks on ICS"
Papadimitratos, Panagiotis, and Jing Deng. "Stealthy pre-attacks against random key pre-distribution security." In ICC 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2012.6364226.
Full textTang, Jin, and Yu Cheng. "Quick Detection of Stealthy SIP Flooding Attacks in VoIP Networks." In ICC 2011 - 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2011.5963248.
Full textLiu, H., and M. S. Kim. "Real-Time Detection of Stealthy DDoS Attacks Using Time-Series Decomposition." In ICC 2010 - 2010 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2010.5501975.
Full textHartmann, Laura, and Steffen Wendzel. "How Feasible are Steganographic and Stealth Attacks on TIA Project Metadata of ICS: A Case Study with Real-world Data." In EICC '21: European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3487405.3487661.
Full textKelly, Janiece, Seth Richter, and Mina Guirguis. "Stealthy attacks on pheromone swarming." In 2013 IEEE International Multi-Cognitive Methods in SituationDisciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA 2013). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cogsima.2013.6523861.
Full textAnnavaram, Devakumar, Subham Sahoo, and Sukumar Mishra. "Stealth Attacks in Microgrids: Modeling Principles and Detection." In 2021 9th IEEE International Conference on Power Systems (ICPS). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icps52420.2021.9670061.
Full textTeixeira, Andre, Iman Shames, Henrik Sandberg, and Karl H. Johansson. "Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems." In 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2012.6483441.
Full textRath, Suman, Ioannis Zografopoulos, and Charalambos Konstantinou. "Stealthy Rootkit Attacks on Cyber-Physical Microgrids." In e-Energy '21: The Twelfth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3447555.3466576.
Full textGoes, Romulo Meira, Eunsuk Kang, Raymond Kwong, and Stephane Lafortune. "Stealthy deception attacks for cyber-physical systems." In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2017.8264281.
Full textAqil, Azeem, Ahmed O. F. Atya, Trent Jaeger, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, Karl Levitt, Patrick D. McDaniel, Jeff Rowe, and Ananthram Swami. "Detection of stealthy TCP-based DoS attacks." In MILCOM 2015 - 2015 IEEE Military Communications Conference. IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/milcom.2015.7357467.
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