Academic literature on the topic 'State-controlled monopoly'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'State-controlled monopoly.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Journal articles on the topic "State-controlled monopoly"
1
Katsoudas, Dimitrios. "Greece: A politically controlled state monopoly broadcasting system." West European Politics 8, no. 2 (April 1985): 137–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402388508424530.
Full text
2
Akyuwen, Rory Jeff. "Monopoly of State-Owned Enterprise of Social Justice." Pattimura Law Journal 1, no. 2 (March 1, 2017): 98. http://dx.doi.org/10.47268/palau.v1i2.2016.91.
Full textAbstract:
The role of the state through BUMN becomes so important when it is formulated in a provision as formulated in Article 33 Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, where the production branches which are important for the State and which affect the livelihood of the public must be controlled by Country. Here it indicates the authority of the State to participate in economic activities through the operation of production branches that can be categorized as important for the State and considered vital and strategic for the interest of the State.This is based on the reasons as formulated in the explanatory section of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, so that the benefits of the production branches do not fall into the hands of individuals, the State actively takes the role to cultivate it because the production branch is considered important and which control the livelihood of the people for the greatest prosperity of the people. State-Owned Enterprises is formed with the aim of contributing to the development of the national economy in general and the state's revenue in particular; The pursuit of profit; To hold general benefit in the form of providing goods and / or services of high quality and adequate for the fulfillment of the livelihood of the public; Pioneering business activities that have not yet been implemented by the private sector and cooperatives and actively providing guidance and assistance to weak economic entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and communities.SOEs are given the right to monopoly in the economic field which is considered to control the livelihood of many people.
3
Akyuwen, Rory Jeff. "Monopoly of State-Owned Enterprise of Social Justice." Pattimura Law Journal 1, no. 2 (March 31, 2017): 98. http://dx.doi.org/10.47268/palau.v1i2.91.
Full textAbstract:
The role of the state through BUMN becomes so important when it is formulated in a provision as formulated in Article 33 Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, where the production branches which are important for the State and which affect the livelihood of the public must be controlled by Country. Here it indicates the authority of the State to participate in economic activities through the operation of production branches that can be categorized as important for the State and considered vital and strategic for the interest of the State.This is based on the reasons as formulated in the explanatory section of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, so that the benefits of the production branches do not fall into the hands of individuals, the State actively takes the role to cultivate it because the production branch is considered important and which control the livelihood of the people for the greatest prosperity of the people. State-Owned Enterprises is formed with the aim of contributing to the development of the national economy in general and the state's revenue in particular; The pursuit of profit; To hold general benefit in the form of providing goods and / or services of high quality and adequate for the fulfillment of the livelihood of the public; Pioneering business activities that have not yet been implemented by the private sector and cooperatives and actively providing guidance and assistance to weak economic entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and communities.SOEs are given the right to monopoly in the economic field which is considered to control the livelihood of many people.
4
Apăvăloaei, Matei-Alexandru, Octavian-Dragomir Jora, and Mihaela Iacob. "Voting with Your Brain or Heart, Hands or Feet? An Enquiry in the Microeconomics of Intra- and Inter- National Political Competition." Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence 13, no. 1 (May 1, 2019): 889–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2019-0078.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This paper is an interdisciplinary analysis of the benefits and limits of political competition. We start from the economic theory of monopoly and extend its implications on matters concerning political action. If the state is defined as the institution that holds the monopoly on coercion over a given territory, are the democratic selection process (internal political competition) and the possibility open to an economic agent to leave for more economically free jurisdictions (international political competition) enough to temper its reach? By referring to the inherent limits that plague collective action, voter rational ignorance, and the possibility of redistributing benefits and incumbent decision-maker collaboration when it comes to trading votes, we argue that democratic competition cannot be considered an effective restraint against political discretion. Because of this, we consider that international political competition can offer better protection against political action. However, even the possibility of voting with one’s feet or observing the political milieu in another territory become manageable if political decision-makers decide to collude at the international level. Also, emigration is an economically costly and psychologically exacting decision that ultimately implies choosing between two state-controlled jurisdictions. Therefore, even the choice of voting with one’s feet is a second-best solution that, in practice, might not prove to be an effective restraint on the state’s monopoly discretion.
5
Lai, M. B., A. Cavicchi, K. Rickertsen, A. M. Corsi, and L. Casini. "Monopoly and wine: the Norwegian case." British Food Journal 115, no. 2 (February 8, 2013): 314–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00070701311302267.
Full textAbstract:
PurposeThe Norwegian retail market for alcoholic beverages is controlled by a state monopoly. Wine and other alcoholic beverages above 4.75 per cent alcohol, can only be bought in government stores called The Wine Monopoly (Vinmonopolet in Norwegian) or consumed in hotels, restaurants, bars, pubs, or catering firms. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the Norwegian wine market and present some of the major opportunities and constraints facing foreign producers.Design/methodology/approachThe objective of this article is twofold: first, to explain the role of the actors in the Norwegian wine market and second, to identify the market opportunities for Italian and other foreign producers. The organisation of the monopoly, the strategies wine producers may use to introduce new wines into the market, and the marketing levers that can be used to utilise the market opportunities are of special interest. The key informant techniques as well as official statistics are used.FindingsComparing the outcome of the authors' field research, done during the winter of 2010, with government statistics on wine consumption, it is clear that the competitive environment evolves daily. Consumers' tastes and perceptions play a crucial role in this dynamism.Originality/valueThere have not been many studies of the effects of the alcohol monopoly on the Norwegian market. Therefore, it is of particular interest to investigate the organisation of the Norwegian alcohol monopoly and how wine producers may successfully introduce new wines into this market. This paper makes a positive contribution to the literature in this field, giving some promotion strategies which could be achievable and could work in the Norwegian wine market.
6
Sang Hyun, Moon. "Global Pressure, Local Adjustment: The Political Economy of Telecommunication Liberalization in Korea in the 1990s." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 22, no. 2 (February 28, 2008): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps22201.
Full textAbstract:
This paper examines the political and economic implications of the liberalization of international telecommunications in South Korea in the 1990s and the changing roles of the South Koran state. Until the end of the 1980s, the South Korean telecommunications sector was controlled by a public monopoly. With the internal political and economic need for industrial restructuring, various external forces have driven liberalization of the telecommunications industry since the late 1980s. Intertwined with the national political economy, those external forces and, more generally, structural transformations in the global political economy have also significantly affected the nature and roles of the South Korean state.
7
Vernikov, A. "National Champions and the Competitive Structure of the Russian Banking Market." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 3 (March 20, 2013): 94–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-3-94-108.
Full textAbstract:
We assess the effect that the industrial policy of growing state-controlled national champions in Russia had on concentration and competitiveness of the banking system in 2000—2012. A modified method of calculating the indicators of market concentration suggests that the main segments of the market have crossed the threshold of high concentration, whereas the household deposits market has approached a monopoly situation. Supremacy of public banks enhances their market power and enables collecting rent that boosts profitability. We suggest that Russia’s industrial policy in banking might be similar to that of China.
8
Ghaya, Kalyani, and Srikanth Hariharan. "Competition Law in the Energy Sector: The European Experience." European Energy and Environmental Law Review 20, Issue 5 (October 1, 2011): 197–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eelr2011018.
Full textAbstract:
The article critically analyzes the evolution of competition law in the energy sector of the European Union. It highlights the efforts that are taken up by the European Commission to ensure that there is a single market for the energy sector. The article's scope spans from the natural monopoly days where the energy sector was controlled by the State to days of State-aid control. Inter alia, the paper mainly deals with the anti-competitive practices that the EU had to face in the energy sector and the measures that were adopted by the EC to see that there is free and fair competition in the energy sector, leading to the beneficial development of the ultimate consumer.
9
Seim, Katja, and Joel Waldfogel. "Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions." American Economic Review 103, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 831–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.831.
Full textAbstract:
We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry. (JEL D42, D72, L11, L12, L43, L81)
10
Eaton, Sarah. "The Gradual Encroachment of an Idea: Large Enterprise Groups in China." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (May 23, 2014): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v31i2.4331.
Full textAbstract:
This article illuminates the ideational foundations of China's 'large enterprise strategy', an early experiment in China's efforts to employ industrial policy to cultivate a group of state-controlled business groups. Based on archival research, the author argues that Chinese policymakers believed the development of state-owned large enterprises would bring several kinds of benefits, both economic and political. Drawing eclectically from Marxian economics and the history of capitalist development in East Asia, they argued that large enterprises could serve as both engines of domestic development and as safeguards and vanguards in the context of China's re-entry to the global marketplace. These enterprise groups were also seen as key elements in a market-conforming model of state control that senior officials began to envision and plan for as early as the late 1980s. The archival documents also shed light on internal debate in the 1980s and 1990s about the pros and cons of promoting monopolies, the substance of which anticipates much of the current heated discussion about China's 'monopoly industries' (longduan hangye垄断行业).
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "State-controlled monopoly"
1
Cowan, Paula, and n/a. "'Of The People, By The People, For The People' Workers' Compensation in Queensland: The Rise and Fall of a Policy Community." Griffith University. Griffith Business School, 2005. http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-root/public/adt-QGU20060223.103131.
Full textAbstract:
The central question posed in this thesis is why has the Queensland model of workers' compensation been so enduring? The legislation remained largely intact from 1916 until 2001, with the exception of the years from 1996 to 1998. This was so despite the fact the central feature of a state-controlled monopoly that underpinned this model was always potentially divisive in line with the variances between liberal-conservative traditions and social-democratic ideals that subsisted in broader political culture. In addressing this question of longevity, this thesis explores the capacity of an initially contentious piece of legislation to draw strong support from former opponents, and the argument is put forward that it is best explained through the development and operation of a policy community that fostered a shared set of core values relative to broad workers' compensation policy preferences. These core values were compulsory state monopoly, no fault insurance and full access to common law. Thus, the longevity of the legislation is attributed to the continued support by key stakeholders of these core values. The thesis also demonstrates that policy community relations deteriorated during the 1990s as governments responded to broader political pressures precipitated by reform agendas. Inconsistencies in core values and policy outcomes for each stakeholder emerged as governments attempted to assert unprecedented control over the direction of workers' compensation in order to meet broader political goals. The legislation was threatened as relations within the policy community proved unsustainable when existing core values were contested.
2
Cowan, Paula. "'Of The People, By The People, For The People' Workers' Compensation in Queensland: The Rise and Fall of a Policy Community." Thesis, Griffith University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/365385.
Full textAbstract:
The central question posed in this thesis is why has the Queensland model of workers' compensation been so enduring? The legislation remained largely intact from 1916 until 2001, with the exception of the years from 1996 to 1998. This was so despite the fact the central feature of a state-controlled monopoly that underpinned this model was always potentially divisive in line with the variances between liberal-conservative traditions and social-democratic ideals that subsisted in broader political culture. In addressing this question of longevity, this thesis explores the capacity of an initially contentious piece of legislation to draw strong support from former opponents, and the argument is put forward that it is best explained through the development and operation of a policy community that fostered a shared set of core values relative to broad workers' compensation policy preferences. These core values were compulsory state monopoly, no fault insurance and full access to common law. Thus, the longevity of the legislation is attributed to the continued support by key stakeholders of these core values. The thesis also demonstrates that policy community relations deteriorated during the 1990s as governments responded to broader political pressures precipitated by reform agendas. Inconsistencies in core values and policy outcomes for each stakeholder emerged as governments attempted to assert unprecedented control over the direction of workers' compensation in order to meet broader political goals. The legislation was threatened as relations within the policy community proved unsustainable when existing core values were contested.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Full Text
Books on the topic "State-controlled monopoly"
1
Lokaneeta, Jinee. Violence. Edited by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199328581.013.50.
Full textAbstract:
In this chapter, I discuss the ways in which violence as a concept has been studied over time. In contrast to legitimizing constructions of the state as representing the “monopoly of violence” linked to maintaining order, feminist scholars have pointed to the sexual and racial violence that ground the state and imperial orders. From theoretical discussions of the “sexual contract” that precedes and informs the “social contract” (Pateman 1988) to historical studies of slavery, colonial violence, ethnic conflicts, and genocide, feminist analyses have shattered states’ claims concerning their “rational, controlled, and purposive” deployment of violence for the public good. Instead, they have drawn attention to group-based patterns of violence enacted by some to the detriment of others within and beyond national communities whether in the context of genocide, war, civil conflict, and state sponsored terror or in everyday lives. Feminist theorists have also examined the complex roles of states, non state actors from dominant classes and communities and individual perpetrators in the enactment of violence with impunity and they have traced intricate modes of resistance in response to violence.
Book chapters on the topic "State-controlled monopoly"
1
"Greece: A Politically Controlled State Monopoly Broadcasting System." In Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe, 145–60. Routledge, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203989272-10.
Full text
2
Reemtsma, Jan Philipp. "Power and Violence." In Trust and Violence, translated by Dominic Bonfiglio. Princeton University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691142968.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter paints a picture of modernity as a fragmented and legally regulated power structure underwritten by a state monopoly on violence. This power structure allows functional differentiation to thrive and determines modernity's practices of social trust. It also defines the risks: institutions licensed to use violence that cannot themselves be controlled by violence; the deregulation of the entire power structure should those institutions turn against the state; the subversion of the power structure when too much of the population participates in violence. These risks can be described as crises of trust, and crises of trust are always crises of trust about the trust of others.
3
Smith, Vincent, and Lorna Woods. "Competition Law and Telecommunications." In Telecommunications Law and Regulation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807414.003.0013.
Full textAbstract:
Telecommunications regulation was born from the need to police the removal of state-owned telecommunications monopolies in Europe from the 1980s onwards. Indeed, the telecommunications sector is not a market which has developed naturally. Instead it was a response to governmental choices, originally to create a state monopoly and, in the late twentieth century, to move to market provision, ultimately to be controlled by general competition law. This chapter introduces these competition rules and illustrates how they have been applied in the telecommunications context. Since competition law applies across all sectors, the law and practice developed in competition cases from other areas also plays an important role in deciding how competition law applies to telecommunications operators.
4
Miller, Chris. "Rise of the Energy Giants." In Putinomics. University of North Carolina Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469640662.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
Forcing energy firms to pay taxes was one of Putin’s greatest successes, but the methods he used exacerbated Russia’s most persistent problem: a corrupt and inefficient energy sector. Khodorkovsky’s Yukos company was handed over to Rosneft, a new state-owned oil champion controlled by Putin’s long-time associate Igor Sechin. At the same time, Putin established control over the natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, without taking serious steps to reform governance. The 2000s did see some positive steps in the energy sector, particularly with regard to a new tax regime that provided strong incentives for firms to increase output—and Russia’s oil and gas output surged forward as a result. Yet a significant portion of Russia’s energy windfall was wasted through corruption and mismanagement.
5
Kozerska, Ewa, and Tomasz Scheffler. "State and Criminal Law of the East Central European Dictatorships." In Lectures on East Central European Legal History, 207–39. Central European Academic Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54171/2022.ps.loecelh_9.
Full textAbstract:
The chapter is devoted to discussing constitutional and criminal law as it existed in selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1989 (Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Hungary, and Poland). As a result of the great powers’ decisions, these countries came under the direct supervision of the Soviet Union and adopted totalitarian political solutions from it. This meant rejecting the idea of the tripartite division of power and affirming the primacy of the community (propaganda-wise: the state pursuing the interests of the working class) over the individual. As a result, regardless of whether the state was formally unitary or federal, power was shaped hierarchically, with full power belonging to the legislative body and the body appointing other organs of the state. However, the text constantly draws attention to the radical discrepancy between the content of the normative acts and the systemic practice in the states mentioned. In reality, real power was in the hands of the communist party leaders controlling society through an extensive administrative apparatus linked to the communist party structure, an apparatus of violence (police, army, prosecution, courts, prisons, and concentration and labor camps), a media monopoly, and direct management of the centrally controlled economy. From a doctrinal point of view, the abovementioned states were totalitarian regardless of the degree of use of violence during the period in question. Criminal law was an important tool for communist regimes’ implementation of the power monopoly. In the Stalinist period, there was a tendency in criminal law to move away from the classical school’s achievements. This was expressed, among other means, by emphasizing the importance of the concept of social danger and the marginalization of the idea of guilt for the construction of the concept of crime. After 1956, the classical achievements of the criminal law doctrine were gradually restored in individual countries, however – especially in special sections of the criminal codes – much emphasis was placed on penalizing acts that the communist regime a priori considered to be a threat to its existence. Thus, also in the field of criminal law, a difference was evident between the guarantees formally existing in the legislation and the criminal reality of the functioning of the state.
6
Henningsen, Lars N. "Provinsmatadorer mellem fyrstegunst og borgermisundelse. Otte-koncernen i Ekernførde i Slesvig 1700–1770." In Hvem styrte byene? Nordisk byhistorie 1500–1800, 273–95. Cappelen Damm Akademisk/NOASP, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/noasp.149.ch10.
Full textAbstract:
The provincial ‘matadors’: Between royal favour and the envy of the burghers. The Otte dynasty in Ekernførde in Schleswig 1700–1770 The Otte dynasty did not possess notable land in the town of Ekernførde in Schleswig in 1700–1770, and its members did not become landlords, and the family members owned only two estates near their residence. Thus, Ekernførde should not be considered a ‘landlord town’ as defined by Finn-Einar Eliassen. However, Christian Otte and his son Friedrich Wilhelm Otte gained a dominant position in the town. Their path to success was facillitated by unique business talent, the social networks they built, and their contacts in the local council and the central administration in Copenhagen. The Otte dynasty managed to establish the largest single-proprietor shipping company in Denmark outside Copenhagen. Therefore, one must conclude that Ekernførde was, for a certain period, a privatised monopoly town. This occurred despite the fact that the Danish state systematically kept a tight grip on urban sites by providing state tenants with power and authority. In addition, these statal measures were underpinned by manifold administrative and judicial regulations. Yet statal bureaucratisation of the towns in Denmark did not prevent ‘matadors’ like the Otte family from growing and obtaining strong economic and social positions. They also benefited from royal favour, which triggered envy and dissatisfaction in other merchant families. One should not assume that the Otte dynasty is a unique example of ‘matadors’ in Denmark, and they were not the only ones who anchored their dominant position without owning the land the town was built on, but rather on various political and economic resources. Consequently, this study of Ekernførde indicates that other small towns in Denmark most likely fostered dynasties and ‘matadors’ temporarily. However, it is clear that Schleswig became less controlled by statal bureaucracy compared to other parts of the Danish Realm. More studies are needed to explore the whole picture of the political economy of Denmark in the 18th century.
Conference papers on the topic "State-controlled monopoly"
1
Alkhoury, Philip, Mourad Aït-Ahmed, Abdul-Hamid Soubra, and Valentine Rey. "Vibration Control of an Offshore Wind Turbine." In ASME 2021 40th International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/omae2021-62210.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract In order to reduce their cost, offshore wind turbines (OWTs) must have a powerful generator and a minimum overall weight. This has the consequence of making the OWT structure sensitive to dynamic excitations even at low frequencies. Indeed, modern multi-megawatt OWTs are composed of slender flexible and lightly damped components. The excessive vibrations of the OWT structure can impact the wind energy conversion to electricity, decrease the fatigue lifetime and even result in a total collapse of the structure when exposed to harsh environmental conditions. It is therefore important to reduce the unwanted vibrations of an OWT by implementing an appropriate control device that enhances its structural safety. Motivated by the potential of the structural control methods in suppressing OWTs vibration, this paper proposes the design of a controlled active tuned mass damper (ATMD) system to reduce the nacelle/tower out-of-plane vibration of a monopile-supported 10 MW DTU OWT subjected to combined wave and wind loads. Compared to previous works, the main originality of this paper is the inclusion of a state estimator, Linear Quadratic (LQ) observer, within an optimal control schema. The state observer aims to drastically reduce the number of required system states. Indeed, as some measurements are practically impossible, all system states cannot be obtained. In this study, a fully coupled multi-degree of freedom (MDOF) analytical model of a monopile-supported OWT developed in [4] is used for this purpose. The optimal control schema makes use of the robust LQR feedback controller to establish the ATMD actuator control force. The developed active control schema proved to efficiently reduce the nacelle/tower vibration.