Journal articles on the topic 'Spain – Emigration and immigration – Government policy'

The article considers the problems of Spanish immigration within the period of 1981–2015, namely, its dynamics, latest tendencies and socio-economic characteristics (including changes in nationality, gender, age and educational structures of immigrants). Primarily, the stress is made on an in-depth analysis of the following main features of immigrants’ population in Spain: the levels of their incomes, the unemployment rate, the living standards. The author makes a conclusion that Spanish immigrants constitute not only a majority of poor population in the country but they are also ones of the poorest in Europe. It is particularly evident against the background of their impact upon the economic activity and employment’s rate of the country’s population and economic growth. At the considered period all the mentioned indicators were noticeably higher for immigrants than for local labor force, not saying of the positive immigrants’ influence on the growth and rejuvenation of Spanish people. Secondly, a considerable part in the article is devoted to the analysis of the immigration policy of Spanish government during the considered period of time. The author singles out the specific stages of this policy and shows that its contents and approaches modified in strict dependence of political factors. The Spanish Socialist Working Party was the beginner of the immigration policy in 1985 which always had the most liberal character particularly when it was concerned to the immigrant social and labor integration based on human rights equality. On the contrary, immigration policy of the now ruling conservative Partido Popular has more pragmatic, selective and rigid approach to foreign labor force legislation.

Since Poland joined the European Community, it has been transforming from a country of emigration into an emigration-immigration one. Year by year an increase of immigrants coming to Poland has been observed, which involves the Polish government and local authorities taking actions within the implementation of migration policy. The multifaceted processes of integration take place on the levels of linguistics, culture, education, and social activation aimed at combating social exclusion of this group of Polish inhabitants.

Purpose – How do economic prosperity, health expenditure, savings, price-stability, demographic change, democracy, corruption control, press freedom, government effectiveness, human development, foreign aid, physical security, trade openness and financial liberalization play-out in the fight against health-worker crisis when existing emigration levels matter? Despite the acute concern of health-worker crisis in Africa owing to emigration, lack of relevant data has made the subject matter empirically void over the last decades. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – A quantile regression approach is used to assess the determinants of health-worker emigration throughout the conditional distributions of health-worker emigration. This provides an assessment of the determinants when existing emigrations levels matter. Findings – Findings provide a broad range of tools for the fight against health-worker brain-drain. As a policy implication, blanket emigration-control policies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different levels of emigration. Thus to be effective, immigration policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of the crisis and tailored differently across countries with the best and worst records on fighting health-worker emigration. Originality/value – This paper has examined the theoretical postulations of a World Health Organization report on determinants of health-worker migration.

The paper presents the policy of the Young Turks and the attitude of the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia towards the emigration of Muhajirs from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Ottoman Empire, and later their return to the homeland. The Serbian Government opposed the emigration of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Ottoman Empire and refused to provide assistance to those who moved to the area under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte. On the other hand, the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia supported and helped the movement of Muhajirs back to their homeland. For the purposes of writing this paper, we used primarily published and unpublished archival material of Serbian origin, the contemporary press, and relevant literature.

Purpose – Owing to lack of relevant data on health human resource (HHR) migration, the empirical dimension of the health-worker crisis debate has remained void despite abundant theoretical literature. A health worker crisis is growing in the world. Shortages in health professionals are reaching staggering levels in many parts of the globe. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – A quantile regression approach is used to examine the determinants of health-worker emigration throughout the conditional distributions of health-worker emigration. This provides an investigation of the determinants when existing emigrations levels matter. The author assesses the determinants of emigration in the health sector through-out the conditional distribution of HHR emigration. Findings – The findings have been presented in two main strands: when existing emigration levels are low and when existing emigration levels are high. In the former case (when existing emigration levels are low), wealth-effects have the following implications. First, while economic prosperity is a good tool against nurse brain drain in middle income countries (MICs), health expenditure is a good instrument against physician brain drain in low income countries (LICs). Second, whereas positive demographic change fuels the problem in LICs, it mitigates the issue in their MIC counterparts. Third, savings, government-effectiveness, foreign-aid and inflationary pressures only accentuate the problem for both income groups. Fourth, corruption-control becomes a vital tool for emigration-control in both income-brackets. Fifth, while trade openness mitigates physician emigration in LICs, financial openness has the opposite effect on nurse emigration. In the latter case (when existing immigration levels are high), the following conclusions have been drawn. First, While economic prosperity fights nurse emigration only in LICs, savings is a tool against physician emigration only in their MIC counterparts. Second, health expenditure and inflationary pressures are relevant tools in the battle against physician resource flight. Third, whereas, government effectiveness is an important policy measure for mitigating emigration in LICs, human development plays a similar role in MICs. Fourth, democracy, press-freedom, foreign-aid and financial openness fuel emigration in either income strata. Fifth, population growth and trade openness are important tools in the fight against brain-drain. Sixth, the HIV infection rate is a deterrent only to nurse emigration. Originality/value – This paper complements existing literature by empirically investigating the World Health Organization hypothetical determinants of health-worker migration in the context of globalization when income-levels matter. In plainer terms, the work explores how the wealth of exporting countries play-out in the determinants of HHR emigration.

The aim of this paper is to consider measures that contribute to the regulation of temporary and circular migration, as well as reintegration in the countries of the Western Balkans, which have long faced numerous and diverse challenges of labor emigration. Immediately after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, a large number of migrant workers returned to the countries of the Western Balkans. Migrant workers, especially those who are staying abroad temporarily, have faced sudden and numerous migration challenges, but they also want to return to work abroad as soon as the conditions are met. Therefore, in order to improve the position and protect the rights of international migrants as efficiently as possible in the future, it is necessary to develop measures that can complement the activities of the Western Balkan countries to regulate and encourage temporary and circular migration, as well as reintegration of migrant workers upon return. This is particularly important in the context of the complex challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, as the contribution of both highly-skilled and low-skilled foreign workers has been shown to be an integral part of the sustainability of the state system in immigration countries. They will increasingly direct immigration policies towards measures to attract the necessary foreign workers. Therefore, emigration countries should work on improving legislation, developing inter-institutional cooperation and strengthening the capacity of actors at both national and local levels of government and building an approach that includes cooperation of whole of government approach, including the scientific and civil sector. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was shown that migration policy should rapidly develop measures that reduce the costs and negative effects of migration to the lowest possible level, both for migrants and their families who often remain in the country of origin.

This article is devoted to the relationship between interwar Ukrainian political emigrants and local authorities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). A comparative analysis of the attitude of the Yugoslav authorities towards Russian and Ukrainian emigrants was conducted. The Russophilia of Yugoslav authorities, who viewed the Ukrainian question through the lense of the Russian emigrants, was described. The idea of Pan-Slavism had been spreading in the Balkans for a long time, which facilitated the legitimization of friendly relations between the southern Slavs (primarily Serbs) and Russians, whom Serbs considered as protectors from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Yugoslavia sided with the anti-Bolshevik White Movement, an ally of the Entente, which had a positive impact on the situation of Russian emigrants. The young state was in need of professionals with a good command of foreign languages and European culture. Many emigrants met those requirements. Therefore, in the early 1920s, several thousands of emigrants worked in the public service. The reigning Karadjordjević dynasty had marital ties with the Romanov dynasty. A former Russian diplomat was among advisers to the king and the head of government. The immigration from the former Russian Empire was addressed by the Royal Court as well as several ministries and central government institutions. Direct support to the immigrants was provided by the State Commission for Assistance to Russian Refugees. Yugoslavia was a center of political and religious immigration for Russians and a provincial center for Ukrainian emigration. It is concluded that the Yugoslav authorities did not distinguish Ukrainians from Russian emigrants, therefore, any specific policy towards them was not carried out. The degree of interaction of Ukrainian emigrants with local authorities in Yugoslavia varied geographically (Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, and Serbia and Macedonia, on the other) and in time (in the first half of the 1920s and from the mid-1920s until the beginning of World War II). Keywords: authorities, emigration, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia.

Foreign-born population in Slovakia has been growing steadily over recent years. Since 2018, foreigners from the so-called third countries have become dominant within the immigrant population. The migration crisis due to the Pandemic seems not affected the patterns of migration to Slovakia. We would argue that the need in Slovakia‘s domestic labour market affected immigration flows more than anything else. Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic, due to emigration flows, there was a shortage of labour in the country. However, as a result of the restrictive measures taken by the government in response to the Pandemic, changes are taking place, which also has an impact on the employment of foreigners. During the Pandemic, several laws regulating the legal status of foreigners in the Slovak Republic have been amended. This article focuses on the legislative developments in shaping the Slovak migration policy in the near future.

Agreement of Democratic Parties in the Years 1948-1950 – an Attempt to Consolidate the Milieu of Polish Political Immigration After his arrival to London in 1947, Stanisław Mikołajczyk undertook endeavors to form a national committee, which would be a projection of the World War II quadruple agreement, which brought together Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna), Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy) and National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe). The creation of the Agreement of Democratic Parties was to be the initial step towards the future cooperation and functioning. Yet the National Party was not interested in such cooperation and the Agreement turned out to be a weak entity, unable to conduct active policy among Polish emigration. Differences between parties proved to be too big a barrier, among others regarding the question of the legality of Polish government in exile. The final blow to Mikołajczyk’s concept was the creation of Political Council by National Party, Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Liberty Movement “Independence and Democracy” (Polski Ruch Wolnościowy „Niepodległość i Demokracja”).

The migration crisis of 2015 has left its mark on many EU countries. Some, such as Greece or Spain, were countries on the front line. Others, namely Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden became destination countries for many newcomers. Some, like the countries of the Visegrad Group, opposed the actions and decisions of the EU made in the face of the crisis. European solidarity has become a big question mark and we can observe a serious upsetting of the whole integration project which is, of course, up for discussion. This state of affairs consisted of the attitudes towards the crises of such countries as Poland or Hungary, where anti-immigration and populist parties came to power, creating a vision of flexible solidarity on the European political scene. The purpose of this article is to analyse the Polish migration policy, show the direction of the changes in its construction along with the change of government and the societal reaction to strangers, as a direct result of actions taken by the ruling parties. It is important to understand the political, economic and social context of the changes occurring in the social consciousness and to attempt to formulate a forecast for the future.

International labor migration is one of the most important elements of the modern global economy. Amid growing knowledge economy, migration of highly skilled specialists plays an increasingly important role. For Israel, as an immigrant society, migration issues have been of paramount importance since the early days of the independent state. However, in the first decades the discussion focused mainly around the influence of immigrants on the economic development of the country and identification of the most effective ways to adapt immigrants. At present, the Israeli economic model is built in such a way that the institutions of the knowledge economy are at its core, that requires a significant amount of labor with an appropriate level of skills. At the same time, today Israel witnesses emigration of such specialists, mainly to the United States. This paper is devoted to the analysis of the current situation. The article substantiates the relevance of the chosen topic not only for Israel, but also for other economically developed countries and gives a brief bibliographic review in the field. Next, the author analyzes the tendencies of high skilled work force immigration to Israel at the present stage through the analysis of the supply and demand in the country's labor market in the high-tech sector and assessment of the government programs created to attract foreign non-Jewish specialists to the country which appear to be not effective. The article also deals with the problems of emigration of high skilled workers from Israel. An overview of the magnitude of the phenomenon is given based on international comparisons; main reasons of the trend are identified and analyzed; government programs for the return of compatriots are assessed. It is argued that Israel should pursue a more effective policy to attract highly skilled non-Jewish immigrants into the country, which will fully realize the existing positive externalities and dampen the problem of brain drain.

In recent years, the issues of integration – related on the one hand to people referred to as foreigners, immigrants, newcomers, etc. – and on the other hand to host societies – have been gaining importance in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Poland. Before the political and socio-economic transformation at the turn of the 1980s and the 1990s, it was a country relatively closed to international migration. Only in the early 1990s did it open up to migration fl ows. That was also the time when the state’s policy in this area had been gradually emerging. The preparations for EU membership enforced the process of developing a national migration policy. Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 and to the Schengen zone in 2007 saw its full involvement in EU migration governance in terms of internal and external policies, and thus the further europeanisation of national law, public policy, and practices in the field of migration management. Recent years have seen a change in Poland’s migration status, which has now become an emigration-immigration state, and the near future may bring about its transition into a new immigration state, especially in connection with the influx of large numbers of forced migrants from Ukraine since the end of February 2022. At the time of writing, that is mid-2022, Poland does not have a formalised integration policy at the central level. National law provides integration measures only for benefi ciaries of international protection (persons with refugee status and subsidiary protection), which concerns a very small group of foreigners. However, the last two decades have seen increased involvement at the local government level (especially in cities) in integration. This is a process taking place in local communities with the support of other actors such as NGOs, informal associations, or universities. One such example is Warsaw, the capital of Poland, where the largest number of migrants, both voluntary and forced, live. This paper aims to explore the selected practices undertaken by some of Warsaw’s municipal institutions and offi ces, which can be treated as an important part of the local integration policy and which could be a role model for other cities less experienced in immigrant integration.

Este artículo se pregunta si: ¿la política migratoria restrictiva elaborada y puesta en marcha por el gobierno francés, a través de la aceleración de las salidas y de la reducción de las entradas, que pretende reducir el número de inmigrantes y favorecer une inmigración de trabajo tratando de atraer a los más cualificados, permitirá hacer frente a los nuevos retos impuestos por el envejecimiento de la población, el aumento de la mortalidad y la disminución de la población activa? Defendemos la hipótesis según la cual, esta política carece de sentido en un contexto caracterizado por un bajo saldo migratorio, porque la llegada continua pero reducida de inmigrantes no compensa el envejecimiento de la población, provocará una falta de mano de obra, un declive de la actividad económica y una crisis del sistema de pensiones, por el aumento de los jubilados y el descenso de la población activa. Más allá, se repercutirá tanto en el crecimiento económico como en el Estado de Bienestar. A pesar de estos datos, el gobierno francés se empeña en aplicar su política de inmigración en razón de las ideas de los gobernantes, de la presión de la extrema derecha y de la visión cortoplazista de los cargos electos.This article asks whether the restrictive policy on migration drawn up and implemented by the French government speeding up emigration and reducing immigration in an effort to reduce the number of immigrants and encourage an immigrant workforce, in an attempt to attract more skilled workers, will enable them to overcome the new challenges imposed by the ageing of the population, the increase in the mortality rate and the reduction of the active population.We defend the hypothesis that this policy does not make any sense in a context characterised by a low balance of migration, because the constant albeit reduced stream of immigrants arriving in the country is no compensation for the ageing population. It will lead to a lack of manpower, a decline in economic activity and a crisis in the pension system, because of the increase in the number of pensioners and the slump in the active population. Beyond that, it will have repercussions on both economic growth and on the Welfare State. Despite these facts, the French government is set on applying its policy on immigration in line with the ideas of the people in power, of the pressure from the extreme right and of the short-term view of the politicians.

Incorporating Muslim Migrants in the West: The French Model of IntegrationThe Muslim emigration to France is connected with many social, religious and political problems. The worshippers of Islam were admitted to settle, but not to integrate with French society and the national economy. Although, according to the French scheme of integration, all people are equal before the law and it is unlawful to emphasise differences, life in France does not reflect the Republican idea any more, and instead of creating the French nation as one community, a multicultural society unable to assimilate newcomers is being born.There are numerous stereotypes in French society that push aside Algerians and Moroccans, especially those living in the suburbs, and put them in conflict with the French legal system. This approach should change and the French must cease perceiving Muslims as strangers and realise they are lawful citizens, an inseparable part of their everyday life. The successive generations of Muslim immigrants should no longer be pushed to the margins of social life because of their ethnic origin, name, religion, and culture.The violent riots in France in 2005 and 2007, however, were caused not only by cultural conflict but also by the recession of the French economy. The main problem in the French suburbs is the high level of unemployment (40%) caused by the numerous meanders of the immigration policy. Instead of facilitating employment for immigrants, the government demands special professional training even for jobs which do not require such qualifications.

AbstractThe terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 were one of the most traumatic events in recent Spanish domestic history, and have had a profound influence in internal policy as well as determining the strategy of its foreign and security policy. In many sectors it has created a climate in which there are serious negative repercussions in the acceptance and integration of immigrants from Morocco, bearing in mind that most of the people detained and put on trial are from that country but were residing in Spain. However, if the March 11 terrorist attacks are an important factor militating against Moroccan integration in Spain, the truth is that for many years they have had greater difficulties in integrating into the host community than other immigrant groups. This paper argues that Spanish-Moroccan political relations constitute further factors that create special difficulties for Moroccan immigrants in their integration into Spanish society. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis, the paper first describes in section one the specific Spanish migration context, firstly from the demographic point of view, analysing the rapid change of Spain from an emigrant country to an immigrant country and the increase in foreign population over recent years and, secondly from cultural point of view when it discusses the already existing diversities among the different Spanish regions and, finally, from a legal point of view the paper studies the changeable and unstable Spanish law on migration. The main goal of this introductory section is to show the general problems of integration applicable to all immigrant groups living in Spain, including Moroccans. Secondly, in sections two and three, the paper attempts to examine the unequal treatment against Moroccan immigrants and argues that this situation is not only due to Spanish attitudes toward immigrants in general and the social, racial and religious characteristic of Moroccan immigrants but also because there are other political reasons related to the relations between the Spanish and Moroccan Governments that affect the situation of Moroccans in Spain because of their nationality. In order to show this unequal treatment of Moroccan immigrants in comparison with other immigrant groups, section two describes the main examples of clear discrimination: specific racist and xenophobic attacks against Moroccans in Spain; employment discrimination against Moroccans; and the institutional declarations that negatively affect Moroccans. The third section attempts to demonstrate how old and recent political crisis and controversies in the fields of fishing, agricultural, territorial disputes, and illegal immigration controls between both countries constitute factors which have made the integration of Moroccan labourers in Spain more difficult. The fourth section shows how the political crises and conflicts between Spain and Morocco have worsened the Spanish population's perception of Morocco and have influenced the treatment Moroccan immigrants receive in Spain. Finally, the last section contains several conclusions as a warning to the Spanish Government to improve its relations with Moroccan Authorities not only to obtain institutional and political results but also to bring about positive consequences for Moroccans living in Spain.

In Spain, the evolution of rural areas has followed very different paths depending on the area. While some areas have experienced a continuous demographic decline, others, like Catalonia, have followed the opposite trend thanks to internal and, to a lesser extent external, immigration. This article presents a detailed and original study of the evolution of the population in rural areas during the period 1979–2005, explaining the main reasons for this migration process and later establishing that schools act as an important pole of attraction for young couples with a high degree of cultural diversity. It presents an innovative and inclusive school model that ensures educational success of all the children and respects the cultural idiosyncrasy of the students and families. The three objectives mentioned correspond to three consecutive research projects, each of which provides complementary information to the previous one and all of which shed light on the relationship between demographic revival, cultural diversity and inclusive rural schools. They also pay special attention to factors that make this revival possible. The first objective, approached from a qualitative perspective, shows that, in contrast to the most alarmist theses, there was demographic growth between 1975 and 2005, which was especially notable between 2000 and 2005. The second objective, approached from a qualitative perspective, explains that while young couples emigrate to rural areas for diverse reasons, these reasons can be organized into subjective and structural factors, the school being one of the most important. The third objective, based on a case study of six “alternative” rural schools, proposes an ideal type of school based on the most radical innovative and inclusive principles. This article provides a detailed analysis of demographic evolution in rural Catalonia during a period in which we lacked data, and it expands the sociological factors explained until now regarding contemporary emigration to rural areas. Finally, from a socio-educational perspective, it provides complementary knowledge with regards to rural schools, analyzing the characteristics of “alternative” rural schools and presenting a school prototype that aims to be radically innovative and inclusive.

Although Salvadoran emigration to the United States is one of the most important migratory flows emanating from Latin America, there is insufficient information about the predictors of first unauthorized migration from El Salvador to the United States. In this study, we use data from the Latin American Migration Project–El Salvador (LAMP-ELS4) to perform an event history analysis to discern the factors that influenced the likelihood that a Salvadoran household head would take a first unauthorized trip to the United States between 1965 and 2007. We take into account a series of demographic, social capital, human capital, and physical capital characteristics of the Salvadoran household head; demographic and social context variables in the place of origin; as well as economic and border security factors at the place of destination. Our findings suggest that an increase in the Salvadoran civil violence index and a personal economic crisis increased the likelihood of first-time unauthorized migration. Salvadorans who were less likely to take a first unauthorized trip were business owners, those employed in skilled occupations, and persons with more years of experience in the labor force. Contextual variables in the United States, such as a high unemployment rate and an increase in the Border Patrol budget, deterred the decision to take a first unauthorized trip. Finally, social capital had no effect on the decision to migrate; this means that for unauthorized Salvadoran migrants, having contacts in the United States is not the main driver to start a migration journey to the United States. We suggest as policy recommendations that the United States should award Salvadorans more work-related visas or asylum protection. For those Salvadorans whose Temporary Protected Status (TPS) has ended, the United States should allow them to apply for permanent residency. The decision not to continue to extend TPS to Salvadorans will only increase the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. The United States needs to revise its current immigration policies, which make it a very difficult and/or extremely lengthy process for Salvadorans and other immigrants to regularize their current immigration status in the United States. Furthermore, because of our research findings, we recommend that the Salvadoran government — to discourage out-migration — invest in high-skilled job training and also offer training and credit opportunities to its population to encourage business ventures.

The article considers the formation of the demographic situation in Ukraine during its independence, namely - from 1991 to 2022. The authors analyzed the main demographic indicators - birth rate, mortality rate, natural increase, average life expectancy in the country over the past thirty years. In the first years of our country's acquisition of statehood, in addition to positive natural population growth, the increase in its number was also facilitated by a positive balance of migration due to a significant influx of immigrants. However, the deepening socio-economic crisis in 1992-1995 led to a sharp decline in birth rates, a deepening of natural population decline due to negative natural growth, and mass migration abroad in search of work. For the first time since this period, a negative balance of migration was recorded in Ukraine, and from that time until 2022, the volume of emigration exceeds immigration. Indicators of natural population movement have significant differences in the regions of Ukraine, urban and rural settlements. The highest values ​​are traditionally preserved in Volyn, Rivne and Zakarpattia oblasts, and the lowest ones are in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. The study allowed us to draw conclusions about the negative demographic phenomena - a rapid decline in population due to a significant decrease in birth rates, high mortality rates, the spread of the phenomenon of "aging" of the population. All this leads to the inevitable depopulation in the country, which confirms the demographic loss of about 10 million people during the study period (due to natural population decline and high migration in the mid-1990s and early XXI century). The demographic situation in rural areas remains particularly catastrophic. Negative demographic trends are exacerbated by the mass exodus of young people to study and work in the cities. Among the main factors that influenced the formation of the current demographic situation in Ukraine are: socio-economic (high unemployment, migration abroad, low level and quality of life compared to other countries in the European region), environmental (high level of industrial pollution) certain regions, uncontrolled application of mineral fertilizers to agricultural land, radiation emissions associated with the Chernobyl disaster), natural (Covid-19 epidemic), military (active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022). The demographic catastrophe in Ukraine, connected with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, deserves special attention. The huge direct and indirect losses suffered by the country are due to the direct deaths during the hostilities, as well as the mass migration of people abroad since the beginning of the war. The losses will be assessed by demographers and statistical services after the war, but it is already worth considering the directions of a comprehensive demographic policy in Ukraine in the postwar period, which will restore the country's demographic potential. This work requires the coordinated work of demographers, geographers, economists and government and local government representatives. The authors outlined only the most important vectors of the formation of a new demographic policy in postwar Ukraine. They plan to pay more attention to these aspects by continuing further research. Keywords: population reproduction, birth rate, mortality, natural movement, life expectancy

The author brings forth a range of information on forced migration of the Serb population from the Croatian part of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 (NDH). Almost one third of the population were Serbs in the NDH. One of the methods of solving ?the Serbia issue? in the NDH was migrating the Serbs into Serbia. The other methods were forced conversions of the Serbian population, namely physical killings. The adopted legal provisions made the terror policy over Serbian population legitimate. A conference was held on June 4th in the German legation in Zagreb. At the meeting it was agreed that Slovenians from Styria were to be moved to NDH, and Serbs from the NDH to Serbia. Deportation was to be carried out in three waves. The first wave was to last from June 7th to July 5th and 5000 Slovenian intellectuals from Lower Styria were to be deported directly to Serbia, except for catholic priests who were to be deported to the NDH. Orthodox priests from the NDH were to be deported to Serbia together with their families. In the second wave, lasting from June 10th to August 30th, 25,000 Slovenians from Slovenia were to be deported to the NDH and NDH was to deport just as many Serbs. In the last wave (from September 15th to October 31st), 65,000 Slovenian peasants from the Gorenjska region (Upper Carniola region) were to be deported to the NDH, and NDH was to migrate just as many Serbs to Serbia, as well as 30,000 Serbs whose citizenship was not acknowledged by the NDH. The government of the NDH founded an office for this purpose under the name State Directorate for Renewal. The migration of the Serbs from NDH began in June of 1941. Volunteers from the Salonika Front were then moved from their properties in Slavonia and Srem. Their total number was about 28,000. Then the Orthodox priests were migrated. According to the lists made by the NDH authorities, 327 of them were migrated from the NDH. 104 priests from the Croatian part of NDH were moved away in an organized manner. One part of them managed to escape before they were arrested. The migration of priests was carried out through transit camps in Caprag and Pozega. Massive deportations of the Serbian population through transit camps in Caprag, Bjelovar and Pozega began with the arresting of Serbs in Zagreb in the first half of July 1941, and then continued in other districts of northern Croatia and Bosnia. The total number of migrations in an organized manner from the Croatian part of the NDH up to the beginning of September 1941, according to the name list drawn up in 2012, amounted to 9875 Serbs, although that number was not final since there were greater disparities for certain districts. By the end of September 1941, the Ustashas migrated 14,733 Serbs out of the NDH in a legal way. Croatians from Dalmatia, Herzegovina and the Croatian Zagorje as well as displaced Slovenians primarily originally from Styria, moved into their houses. The authorities of NDH confiscated the property of the forced out Serbs. Other forms of the Ustasha terror, like massive killings, caused intensive illegal emigration of Serbs from NDH to Serbia, which, according to German data, had already increased to around 180,000 relocated Serbs by the end of July, although it seems this number exceeded 200,000 by the end of September. Organized migration was ceased in October 1941 after the German authorities in Serbia forbid further immigration of Serbs from the NDH mainly because of the uprising in western Serbia. Part of the banished Serbs from the Pozega concentration camp were returned home to the districts of Osijek, Garesnica, Krizevac, Virovitica and Ludbreg. However, from the documentation of the Commissariat for Refugees in Belgrade, it is evident that the research on the migration of Serbs from Croatia and the whole of NDH was not finished in 1941, so the number of 200,000 of forced migrants who have left is not final.

The conjunction between the last few decades’ public policy changes and the impact of the growth of immigration in Spain has had a transformative effect on the third sector. The government trend toward outsourcing the management of international development cooperation programs and social services has shifted much of the state’s responsibility onto the shoulders of civil society organizations. The context has subjected them to tensions and changes in the way they take action and the way they are organized. This article, based on two research projects, explores the adaptations and new forms of relationships among the main actors involved in the field of migration and development.

This review focuses on a monograph written by Jayne Persian, lecturer at the University of Southern Queensland (Australia). The work is the first complex study devoted to the adaptation of former “displaced persons” (more particularly, émigrés from the Soviet Union) in Australia between the 1940s and 1960s. The work refers to an extensive complex of documents from the National Archives of Australia, the National Archives (United Kingdom), the Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University, and interviews with former “displaced persons” residing in Australia. The study is very important because it provides new information on the second wave of Soviet emigration, which is seldom examined by contemporary Russian scholars. Persian demonstrates that political factors played an important role in how the Australian government granted immigration permission. Quite frequently, Australia preferred people who shared anti-communist positions. Therefore, many former collaborators of the World War II era came to Australia; this hindered cooperation between the USSR and Australia. Persian shows that “new Australians” had difficulty integrating into society. The government tried to assimilate them, which pushed the immigrants to seek isolation in their communities. This book helps us understand the controversial character of the state policy of historical memory, a problem that is also very important for contemporary Russia.

For the development and implementation of a rational demographic policy, it is of great importance to reveal the regularities of the transformation of the number and structure of the population of Georgia. The object of our research is the population of the Kakheti region, which has undergone significant changes over the past centuries. The article discusses the main trends of population size and ethno-structural changes – issues of the ratio of the Georgian population and diasporas of Georgia, annexed by the Russian Empire, the Soviet Republic and the post-Soviet Kakheti region. During the considered period, the specific weight of the diasporas in the entire population continuously increased due to the permanent implementation of the intensive immigration policy in Georgia, which was under imperial rule. The same situation was in the population of the Kakheti region, where the contingent of national minorities increased. With active immigration policy, the number of Russian population increased rapidly. In 1926-1939 it became 7.2% of the population of Kakheti. A relatively fast numerical increase of the Armenian diaspora was noted in the 19th century, of the Ossetians - at the beginning of the 20th century. The most stable increase is characterized by the Muslim population. Thanks to its traditions of high natural increase, the number of Azerbaijanis and Kists increased from 6.4 thousand to 37.5 thousand in 1884-1989, by 2014 their share in the population of Kakheti region became 11.8%. In the post-Soviet period, significant changes took place in the number and ethnic structure of the population of the Kakheti region. In the period between the population censuses of 1989-2014, it decreased significantly. Both the number of the entire population and diasporas: Armenians 3 times, Russians - 7 times, Ossetians - 4.9 times, Ukrainians - 9.4 times. Diasporas of Muslim Azeris and Kists remained relative stability. In the conditions of a rapid decrease in the number of the population, the tendency of the transition from a poly-ethnic to a bi-ethnic structure was evident in the Kakheti region. The main reason for the decrease in the number of diasporas is the intensification of emigration processes. It was caused by the collapse of the Georgian economy in the post-Soviet period, ethno-political conflicts and the unprecedented deterioration of living conditions, unemployment, and the deepening of poverty. In addition to this, the intensity of emigration of national minorities was influenced by the fact that a significant part of the diaspora did not know the state language – Georgian and chose to return to their historical and cultural environment, to their homeland. Some emigrated to countries where the standard of living was much higher than in Georgia. The reduction of diasporas was partly caused by their integration into the Georgian population. In the conditions of long-term coexistence, nationalities culturally close to Georgians: Ossetians, Armenians integrated into the Georgian ethnos. Among them, inter-ethnic marriages were common. There were no inter-ethnic confrontations and ethnic conflicts in the Kakheti region. According to the 2014 census in the Kakheti region, it was revealed that in terms of religious confession, Christian Orthodoxy (85.7%) and Muslims (12.1%) dominate. The absolute majority of Muslims are Azerbaijanis, Kists, Hundzis and representatives of the older generation of eco-immigrant Georgian Adjarians. An important task of the government is to ensure decent socio-cultural development of national minorities in the region of Kakheti, characterized by tolerance; to establish an exemplary respect of the population for their customs; in Case of desire to help them in their civic integration, to create an exemplary environment for humane coexistence of nations. Keywords: Georgia, diaspora, Kakheti, national minority, ethnic structure, population. JEL Codes: Q56, R20, R23

Abstract Issue With increasing of numbers of people moving in Europe and around the world, the health of migrants has become a key global public-health issue. Migrants in an irregular situation (MIS) represent an important part of the migration phenomenon, whether they have become irregular by entering a country without authorisation or by overstaying a visa, including whose applied unsuccessfully for asylum. Description of the problem Overstaying of visas is not unusual in EU countries and during 2015 and 2016 in particular, many countries experienced a large number of unauthorised entrants. Health policies for MIS are increasingly a matter of concern. Using the 2015 Migrant Integration Policy Index Health strand (MIPEX HS) it is possible to conduct an analysis of health policies, focusing on access to health services by MIS. Results Among the 34 European countries covered by the MIPEX HS, Italy’s overall score of 65 is exceeded only by Switzerland (70) and Norway (67). Averaging the indicators of access for MIS, Italy obtains the highest score (83), followed by Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland with 67. Its score for legal entitlements to health care is 75 (the same as Sweden), while reporting of MIS to the immigration authorities is prohibited and there are no sanctions against helping them. However, legislation introduced by the new government in 2018 has restricted some of their rights. Lessons Current migration to Europe requires dealing with short-term health needs as well as strengthening public health and health systems in the long term. This presentation will discuss the lessons that can be learned from the comparative analysis of health policies for MIS using the MIPEX HS. Key messages Affordable health care is a human right, which should not be denied to any migrant. Policy analysis plays a key role in identifying interventions for promoting health equity.

IllegitimacyBack in 1987, Gregory Bateson argued that:Kurt Vonnegut gives us wary advice – that we should be careful what we pretend because we become what we pretend. And something like that, some sort of self-fulfilment, occurs in all organisations and human cultures. What people presume to be ‘human’ is what they will build in as premises of their social arrangements, and what they build in is sure to be learned, is sure to become a part of the character of those who participate. (178)The human capacity to marginalise and discriminate against others on the basis of innate and constructed characteristics is evident from the long history of discrimination against people whose existence is ‘illegitimate’, defined as being outside the law. What is inside or outside the law depends upon the context under consideration. For example, in societies such as ancient Greece and the antebellum United States, where slavery was legal, people who were constructed as ‘slaves’ could legitimately be treated very differently from ‘citizens’: free people who benefit from a range of human rights (Northup). The discernment of what is legitimate from that which is illegitimate is thus implicated within the law but extends into the wider experience of community life and is evident within the civil structures through which society is organised and regulated.The division between the legitimate and illegitimate is an arbitrary one, susceptible to changing circumstances. Within recent memory a romantic/sexual relationship between two people of the same sex was constructed as illegitimate and actively persecuted. This was particularly the case for same-sex attracted men, since the societies regulating these relationships generally permitted women a wider repertoire of emotional response than men were allowed. Even when lesbian and gay relationships were legalised, they were constructed as less legitimate in the sense that they often had different rules around the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual couples. In Australia, the refusal to allow same sex couples to marry perpetuates ways in which these relationships are constructed as illegitimate – beyond the remit of the legislation concerning marriage.The archetypal incidence of illegitimacy has historically referred to people born out of wedlock. The circumstances of birth, for example whether a person was born as a result of a legally-sanctioned marital relationship or not, could have ramifications throughout an individual’s life. Stories abound (for example, Cookson) of the implications of being illegitimate. In some social stings, such as Catherine Cookson’s north-eastern England at the turn of the twentieth century, illegitimate children were often shunned. Parents frequently refused permission for their (legitimate) children to play with illegitimate classmates, as if these children born out of wedlock embodied a contaminating variety of evil. Illegitimate children were treated differently in the law in matters of inheritance, for example, and may still be. They frequently lived in fear of needing to show a birth certificate to gain a passport, for example, or to marry. Sometimes, it was at this point in adult life, that a person first discovered their illegitimacy, changing their entire understanding of their family and their place in the world. It might be possible to argue that the emphasis upon the legitimacy of a birth has lessened in proportion to an acceptance of genetic markers as an indicator of biological paternity, but that is not the endeavour here.Given the arbitrariness and mutability of the division between legitimacy and illegitimacy as a constructed boundary, it is policed by social and legal sanctions. Boundaries, such as the differentiation between the raw and the cooked (Lévi-Strauss), or S/Z (Barthes), or purity and danger (Douglas), serve important cultural functions and also convey critical information about the societies that enforce them. Categories of person, place or thing which are closest to boundaries between the legitimate and the illegitimate can prompt existential anxiety since the capacity to discern between these categories is most challenged at the margins. The legal shenanigans which can result speak volumes for which aspects of life have the potential to unsettle a culture. One example of this which is writ large in the recent history of Australia is our treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and the impact of this upon Australia’s multicultural project.Foreshadowing the sexual connotations of the illegitimate, one of us has written elsewhere (Green, ‘Bordering on the Inconceivable’) about the inconceivability of the Howard administration’s ‘Pacific solution’. This used legal devices to rewrite Australia’s borders to limit access to the rights accruing to refugees upon landing in a safe haven entitling them to seek asylum. Internationally condemned as an illegitimate construction of an artificial ‘migration zone’, this policy has been revisited and made more brutal under the Abbot regime with at least two people – Reza Barati and Hamid Khazaei – dying in the past year in what is supposed to be a place of safety provided by Australian authorities under their legal obligations to those fleeing from persecution. Crock points out, echoing the discourse of illegitimacy, that it is and always has been inappropriate to label “undocumented asylum seekers” as “‘illegal’” because: “until such people cross the border onto Australian territory, the language of illegality is nonsense. People who have no visas to enter Australia can hardly be ‘illegals’ until they enter Australia” (77). For Australians who identify in some ways – religion, culture, fellow feeling – with the detainees incarcerated on Nauru and Manus Island, it is hard to ignore the disparity between the government’s treatment of visa overstayers and “illegals” who arrive by boat (Wilson). It is a comparatively short step to construct this disparity as reflecting upon the legitimacy within Australia of communities who share salient characteristics with detained asylum seekers: “The overwhelmingly negative discourse which links asylum seekers, Islam and terrorism” (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 129). Some communities feel themselves constructed in the public and political spheres as less legitimately Australian than others. This is particularly true of communities where members can be identified via markers of visible difference, including indicators of ethnic, cultural and religious identities: “a group who [some 585 respondent Australians …] perceived would maintain their own languages, customs and traditions […] this cultural diversity posed an extreme threat to Australian national identity” (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 129). Where a community shares salient characteristics such as ethnicity or religion with many detained asylum seekers they can become fearful of the discourses around keeping borders strong and protecting Australia from illegitimate entrants. MethodologyThe qualitative fieldwork upon which this paper is based took place some 6-8 years ago (2006-2008), but the project remains one of the most recent and extensive studies of its kind. There are no grounds for believing that any of the findings are less valid than previously. On the contrary, if political actions are constructed as a proxy for mainstream public consent, opinions have become more polarised and have hardened. Ten focus groups were held involving 86 participants with a variety of backgrounds including differences in age, gender, religious observance, religious identification and ethnicity. Four focus groups involved solely Muslim participants; six drew from the wider Australian community. The aim was to examine the response of different communities to mainstream Australian media representations of Islam, Muslims, and terrorism. Research questions included: “Are there differences in the ways in which Australian Muslims respond to messages about ‘fear’ and ‘terror’ compared with broader community Australians’ responses to the same messages?” and “How do Australian Muslims construct the perceptions and attitudes of the broader Australian community based on the messages that circulate in the media?” Recent examples of kinds of messages investigated include media coverage of Islamic State’s (ISIS’s) activities (Karam & Salama), and the fear-provoking coverage around the possible recruitment of Australians to join the fighting in Syria and Iraq (Cox). The ten focus groups were augmented by 60 interviews, 30 with respondents who identified as Muslim (15 males, 15 female) and 30 respondents from the broader community (same gender divisions). Finally, a market research company was commissioned to conduct a ‘fear survey’, based on an established ‘fear of rape’ inventory (Aly and Balnaves), delivered by telephone to a random sample of 750 over-18 y.o. Australians in which Muslims formed a deliberative sub-group, to ensure they were over-sampled and constituted at least 150 respondents. The face-to-face surveys and focus groups were conducted by co-author, Dr Anne Aly. General FindingsMuslim respondents indicate a heightened intensity of reaction to media messages around fear and terror. In addition to a generalised fear of the potential impact of terrorism upon Australian society and culture, Muslim respondents experienced a specific fear that any terrorist-related media coverage might trigger hostility towards Muslim Australian communities and their own family members. According to the ‘fear survey’ scale, Muslim Australians at the time of the research experienced approximately twice the fear level of mainstream Australian respondents. Broader Australian community Australian Muslim communityFear of a terrorist attackFear of a terrorist attack combines with the fear of a community backlashSpecific victims: dead, injured, bereavedCommunity is full of general victims in addition to any specific victimsShort-term; intense impactsProtracted, diffuse impactsSociety-wide sympathy and support for specific victims and all those involved in dealing with the trauma and aftermathSociety-wide suspicion and a marginalisation of those affected by the backlashVictims of a terrorist attack are embraced by broader communityVictims of backlash experience hostility from the broader communityFour main fears were identified by Australian Muslims as a component of the fear of terrorism:Fear of physical harm. In addition to the fear of actual terrorist acts, Australian Muslims fear backlash reprisals such as those experienced after such events as 9/11, the Bali bombings, and attacks upon public transport passengers in Spain and the UK. These and similar events were constructed as precipitating increased aggression against identifiable Australian Muslims, along with shunning of Muslims and avoidance of their company.The construction of politically-motivated fear. Although fear is an understandable response to concerns around terrorism, many respondents perceived fears as being deliberately exacerbated for political motives. Such strategies as “Be alert, not alarmed” (Bassio), labelling asylum seekers as potential terrorists, and talk about home-grown terrorists, are among the kinds of fears which were identified as politically motivated. The political motivation behind such actions might include presenting a particular party as strong, resolute and effective. Some Muslim Australians construct such approaches as indicating that their government is more interested in political advantage than social harmony.Fear of losing civil liberties. As well as sharing the alarm of the broader Australian community at the dozens of legislative changes banning people, organisations and materials, and increasing surveillance and security checks, Muslim Australians fear for the human rights implications across their community, up to and including the lives of their young people. This fear is heightened when community members may look visibly different from the mainstream. Examples of the events fuelling such fears include the London police killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian Catholic working as an electrician in the UK and shot in the month following the 7/7 attacks on the London Underground system (Pugliese). In Australia, the case of Mohamed Hannef indicated that innocent people could easily be unjustly accused and wrongly targeted, and even when this was evident the political agenda made it almost impossible for authorities to admit their error (Rix).Feeling insecure. Australian Muslims argue that personal insecurity has become “the new normal” (Massumi), disproportionately affecting Muslim communities in both physical and psychological ways. Physical insecurity is triggered by the routine avoidance, shunning and animosity experienced by many community members in public places. Psychological insecurity includes fear for the safety of younger members of the community compounded by concern that young people may become ‘radicalised’ as a result of the discrimination they experience. Australian Muslims fear the backlash following any possible terrorist attack on Australian soil and describe the possible impact as ‘unimaginable’ (Aly and Green, ‘Moderate Islam’).In addition to this range of fears expressed by Australian Muslims and constructed in response to wider societal reactions to increased concerns over radical Islam and the threat of terrorist activity, an analysis of respondents’ statements indicate that Muslim Australians construct the broader community as exhibiting:Fear of religious conviction (without recognising the role of their own secular/religious convictions underpinning this fear);Fear of extremism (expressed in various extreme ways);Fear of powerlessness (responded to by disempowering others); andFear of political action overseas having political effects at home (without acknowledging that it is the broader community’s response to such overseas events, such as 9/11 [Green ‘Did the world really change?’], which has also had impacts at home).These constructions, extrapolations and understandings by Australian Muslims of the fears of the broader community underpinning the responses to the threat of terror have been addressed elsewhere (Green and Aly). Legitimate Australian MuslimsOne frustration identified by many Muslim respondents centres upon a perceived ‘acceptable’ way to be an Australian Muslim. Arguing that the broader community construct Muslims as a homogenous group defined by their religious affiliation, these interviewees felt that the many differences within and between the twenty-plus national, linguistic, ethnic, cultural and faith-based groupings that constitute WA’s Muslim population were being ignored. Being treated as a homogenised group on a basis of faith appears to have the effect of putting that religious identity under pressure, paradoxically strengthening and reinforcing it (Aly, ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism’). The appeal to Australian Muslims to embrace membership in a secular society and treat religion as a private matter also led some respondents to suggest they were expected to deny their own view of their faith, in which they express their religious identity across their social spheres and in public and private contexts. Such expression is common in observant Judaism, Hinduism and some forms of Christianity, as well as in some expressions of Islam (Aly and Green, ‘Less than equal’). Massumi argues that even the ways in which some Muslims dress, indicating faith-based behaviour, can lead to what he terms as ‘affective modulation’ (Massumi), repeating and amplifying the fear affect as a result of experiencing the wider community’s fear response to such triggers as water bottles (from airport travel) and backpacks, on the basis of perceived physical difference and a supposed identification with Muslim communities, regardless of the situation. Such respondents constructed this (implied) injunction to suppress their religious and cultural affiliation as akin to constructing the expression of their identity as illegitimate and somehow shameful. Parallels can be drawn with previous social responses to a person born out of wedlock, and to people in same-sex relationships: a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ kind of denial.Australian Muslims who see their faith as denied or marginalised may respond by identifying more strongly with other Muslims in their community, since the community-based context is one in which they feel welcomed and understood. The faith-based community also allows and encourages a wider repertoire of acceptable beliefs and actions entailed in the performance of ‘being Muslim’. Hand in hand with a perception of being required to express their religious identity in ways that were acceptable to the majority community, these respondents provided a range of examples of self-protective behaviours to defend themselves and others from the impacts of perceived marginalisation. Such behaviours included: changing their surnames to deflect discrimination based solely on a name (Aly and Green, ‘Fear, Anxiety and the State of Terror’); keeping their opinions private, even when they were in line with those being expressed by the majority community (Aly and Green, ‘Moderate Islam’); the identification of ‘less safe’ and ‘safe’ activities and areas; concerns about visibly different young men in the Muslim community and discussions with them about their public behaviour and demeanour; and women who chose not to leave their homes for fear of being targeted in public places (all discussed in Aly, ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism’). Many of these behaviours, including changing surnames, restricting socialisation to people who know a person well, and the identification of safe and less safe activities in relation to the risk of self-revelation, were common strategies used by people who were stigmatised in previous times as a result of their illegitimacy.ConclusionConstructions of the legitimate and illegitimate provide one means through which we can investigate complex negotiations around Australianness and citizenship, thrown into sharp relief by the Australian government’s treatment of asylum seekers, also deemed “illegals”. Because they arrive in Australia (or, as the government would prefer, on Australia’s doorstep) by illegitimate channels these would-be citizens are treated very differently from people who arrive at an airport and overstay their visa. The impetus to exclude aspects of geographical Australia from the migration zone, and to house asylum seekers offshore, reveals an anxiety about borders which physically reflects the anxiety of western nations in the post-9/11 world. Asylum seekers who arrive by boat have rarely had safe opportunity to secure passports or visas, or to purchase tickets from commercial airlines or shipping companies. They represent those ethnicities and cultures which are currently in turmoil: a turmoil frequently exacerbated by western intervention, variously constructed as an il/legitimate expression of western power and interests.What this paper has demonstrated is that the boundary between Australia and the rest, the legitimate and the illegitimate, is failing in its aim of creating a stronger Australia. The means through which this project is pursued is making visible a range of motivations and concerns which are variously interpreted depending upon the position of the interpreter. The United Nations, for example, has expressed strong concern over Australia’s reneging upon its treaty obligations to refugees (Gordon). Less vocal, and more fearful, are those communities within Australia which identify as community members with the excluded illegals. The Australian government’s treatment of detainees on Manus Island and Nauru, who generally exhibit markers of visible difference as a result of ethnicity or culture, is one aspect of a raft of government policies which serve to make some people feel that their Australianness is somehow less legitimate than that of the broader community. AcknowledgementsThis paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP0559707), 2005-7, “Australian responses to the images and discourses of terrorism and the other: establishing a metric of fear”, awarded to Professors Lelia Green and Mark Balnaves. 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