Academic literature on the topic 'Soviet Union – Politics and government – 1936-1953'

Interference of esotericism and politics became apparent especially in the 19th century when the early socialists expected the coming of the Age of Spirit, and narratives about secret wisdom being kept in mysterious sacred places became all the more popular. Thus, the idea of the Age of Enlightenment underwent transformation: the world will be saved not by ordinary knowledge but by some special secret wisdom. In this context, Helena Blavatsky (1831–1891) developed the doctrine of Theosophy the ideas of which were overtaken by the next-generation theosophists including also the Russian painter Nicholas Roerich (1874–1947) and his spouse Helena Roerich (1879–1955) who developed a new form of Theosophy. The aim of this article is to analyse the interference between Theosophy and politics paying special attention to its historical roots, which, in the context of Roerich groups, are to be sought in the political activities of Nicholas Roerich, the founder of the movement. The following materials have been used in the analysis: first, writings of the founders of Agni Yoga or Teaching of Living Ethics; second, the latest studies in the history of Theosophy made in the available archives after the collapse of the soviet regime; third, materials obtained from the interviews of a field research (2006–2008). The author has made use of an interdisciplinary approach combining anthropological methods with the method of systematic analysis. The historical roots of the political activity of contemporary theosophists stretch into the political aspirations of Nicholas Roerich, the founder of Agni Yoga or Teaching of Living Ethics. Opening of the USSR secret archives and publication of several formerly inaccessible diaries and letters of theosophists offer an opportunity to study the “spiritual geopolitics” of the Roerichs. Setting off to his Central Asian expeditions (1925–1928; 1934–1935), Nicholas Roerich strived to implement the Great Plan, i.e. to found a New State that would stretch from Tibet to South Siberia comprising the territories governed by China, Mongolia, Tibet and the USSR. The new state was conceived as the kingdom of Shambhala on the earth, and in order to form this state, Nicholas Roerich aspired to acquire the support of various political systems. During the Tzarist Empire, the political world outlook of Nicholas Roerich was markedly monarchic. After the Bolshevik coup in Russia, the artist accepted the offer to work under the wing of the new power, but after his emigration to the West Roerich published extremely sharp articles against the Bolsheviks. In 1922, the Roerichs started to support Lenin considering him the messenger of Shambhala. Roerich’s efforts to acquire Bolshevik support culminated in 1926 when the Roerichs arrived in Moscow bringing a message by Mahatmas to the soviet government, a small case with earth for the Lenin Mausoleum from Burhan-Bulat and paintings in which Buddha Maitreya bore strong resemblance to Lenin. The plan of founding the Union of Eastern Republics, with Bolshevik support, failed, since about the year 1930 the soviet authorities changed their position concerning the politics of the Far East. Having ascertained that the Bolsheviks would not provide the anticipated support for the Great Plan, the Roerichs started to seek for contacts in the USA which provided funding for his second expedition (1934–1935). The Roerichs succeeded even in making correspondence (1934–1936) with President Roosevelt who paid much larger attention to Eastern states especially China than other presidents did. Their correspondence ceased when the Security Service of the USA grew suspicious about Roerich’s pro-Japanese disposition. Nicholas Roerich has sought for support to his political ambitions by all political regimes. In 1934, the Russian artist tried to ascertain whether German national socialists would support his efforts in Asia. It may seem that the plans of founding the Union of Oriental Republics have passed away along with Roerich; yet in 1991 his son Svyatoslav Roerich (1904–1993) pointed out once again that the Altai is a very important centre of the great future and Zvenigorod is still a great reality and a magnificent dream. Interference between esotericism and politics is observed also among Latvian theosophists: the soviet regime successfully made use of Roerich’s adherents propagating the communist ideology in the independent Republic of Latvia. In the 1920s and 1930s, the embassy of the USSR in Riga maintained close contacts with Roerich’s adherents in Latvia and made a strong pressure on the Latvian government not to ban the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society who actively propagated the success of soviet culture and economy. On 17 June 1940, the soviet army occupied the Republic of Latvia, and Haralds Lūkins, the son of the founder of the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society, was elected to the first government of the soviet Latvia. Nevertheless, involvement of theosophists in politics was unsuccessful, since after the official annexation of Latvia into the USSR, on 5 August 1940, all societies including the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society were closed. Since the members of the movement continued to meet regularly, in 1949, Haralds Lūkins was arrested as leader of an illegal organization. After the Second World War, theosophists were subjected to political repressions. Arrests of Roerich’s followers (1948–1951) badly impaired the movement. After rehabilitation in 1954, the repressed persons gradually returned from exile and kept on their illegal meetings in small groups. To regain their rights to act openly, Roerich’s followers started to praise Nicholas Roerich as a supporter of the soviet power. With the collapse of the soviet regime, Roerich’s followers in Latvia became legal in 1988 when the Latvian Roerich Society was restored which soon split up according to geopolitical orientation; therefore, presently in Latvia, there are the following organisations: Latvian Roerich Society, Latvian Department of the International Centre of the Roerichs, and Aivars Garda group or the Latvian National Front. A. Garda fused nationalistic ideas with Theosophy offering a special social reorganization – repatriation of the soviet-time immigrants and a social structure of Latvia that would be formed by at least 75% ethnic Latvians. Activity of A. Garda group, which is being criticized by other groups of theosophists, is a continuation of the interference between theosophical and political ideas practised by the Roerichs. Generally it is to be admitted that after the crush of the soviet regime, in theosophist groups, unclear political orientation between the rightists and leftists is observed, characterised by fairly radical ideas.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan clearly indicates the strategic implications of its location. The political instability in the region (rise of fundamentalism in Iran, Iran-Iraq War and so on) has added to this significance. Be that as it may, Afghanistan's situation can be expressed in terms of its susceptibility to external pressures and intense factionalism within the land-locked state's dynamic populations. This latter aspect had divided the country several times over. Afghan foreign policy, therefore, has been viewed in this perspective. The present article reviews the stated facts to highlight the geographical significance of the location and its impact on the foreign policy. Introduction of the armed forces in national politics (this formed an important element in the country's politics right from the beginning) has been the most conspicuous development; it determined the who's and what's of the government. Traditional pressure groups, despite retaining some of their old hold on the society, had given way to radical groups or factions, armed forces and insurgent elements. These penetrated various strata of the Afghan society. Since 1963, when political liberalisation and participation was introduced, disruptive tendencies gradually impinged on the state's activities. Generally, this was evident between 1963–73 and was particularly so after the 1973 coup, when the Monarchy was replaced by a republican regime under Daud. Both, the Armed Forces and the Communist Party were involved but were sidelined once power was secured. This change did not bring the expected transformations in the patterns of administration. The change was only in name and power was still concentrated with Daud who began to implement his own policies that emerged between 1953–63. The period of his first stint in power coincided wiih an aggravation of problems, political and economic, caused by a closure of transit facilities. However, this pause was fully exploited by the radical parties who gradually brought the dominant elements of the Armed Forces under their influence, so that, they were able to deliver a coup d'etat under the leadership of Tarakki in April 1978. The new regime was not able to maintain effective control over the political situation that for the next twenty months brought internal political instability to its height and compelled the Soviet Union to move (this was perhaps to protect its vulnerable southern underbelly). The period from April 1978 onwards, saw active non-cooperation, large scale desertions from the Armed Forces and a deterioration of the economy. In addition, open opposition by the religious groups and insurgent elements presented a political picture that has been so vividly illustrated by Afghan political history. Intense factionalism and infighting within the regime saw Amin replacing the moderate Tarakki in September 1979. This led to a worsening of the political situation with the state at war with itself. This compelled the Soviet Union to move into Afghanistan. In a short but bloody war, Amin was disposed and a government under Karmal was established with Soviet support1. These developments then, clearly suggest the need to review the background of the patterns and problems of the foreign policy of Afghanistan as determined and identified by its locational characteristics.

The life path, scientific-pedagogical and public activity of Volodymyr Sokurenko – a prominent Ukrainian jurist, doctor of law, professor, talented teacher of the Lviv Law School of Franko University are analyzed. It is found out that after graduating from a seven-year school in Zaporizhia, V. Sokurenko entered the Zaporizhia Aviation Technical School, where he studied two courses until 1937. 1/10/1937 he was enrolled as a cadet of the 2nd school of aircraft technicians named after All-Union Lenin Komsomol. In 1938, this school was renamed the Volga Military Aviation School, which he graduated on September 4, 1939 with the military rank of military technician of the 2nd category. As a junior aircraft technician, V. Sokurenko was sent to the military unit no. 8690 in Baku, and later to Maradnyany for further military service in the USSR Air Force. From September 4, 1939 to March 16, 1940, he was a junior aircraft technician of the 50th Fighter Regiment, 60th Air Brigade of the ZAK VO in Baku. The certificate issued by the Railway District Commissariat of Lviv on January 4, 1954 no. 3132 states that V. Sokurenko actually served in the staff of the Soviet Army from October 1937 to May 1946. The same certificate states that from 10/12/1941 to 20/09/1942 and from 12/07/1943 to 08/03/1945, he took part in the Soviet-German war, in particular in the second fighter aviation corps of the Reserve of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army. In 1943 he joined the CPSU. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree and the Order of the Red Star (1943) as well as 9 medals «For Merit in Battle» during the Soviet-German war. With the start of the Soviet-German war, the Sokurenko family, like many other families, was evacuated to the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in the Sverdlovsk region, where their father worked at a metallurgical plant. After the war, the Sokurenko family moved to Lviv. In 1946, V. Sokurenko entered the Faculty of Law of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University, graduating with honors in 1950, and entered the graduate school of the Lviv State University at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law. V. Sokurenko successfully passed the candidate examinations and on December 25, 1953 in Moscow at the Institute of Law of the USSR he defended his thesis on the topic: «Socialist legal consciousness and its relationship with Soviet law». The supervisor of V. Sokurenko's candidate's thesis was N. Karieva. The Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR, by its decision of March 31, 1954, awarded V. Sokurenko the degree of Candidate of Law. In addition, it is necessary to explain the place of defense of the candidate's thesis by V. Sokurenko. As it is known, the Institute of State and Law of the USSR has its history since 1925, when, in accordance with the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of March 25, 1925, the Institute of Soviet Construction was established at the Communist Academy. In 1936, the Institute became part of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1938 it was reorganized into the Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1941–1943 it was evacuated to Tashkent. In 1960-1991 it was called the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In Ukraine, there is the Institute of State and Law named after V. Koretsky of the NAS of Ukraine – a leading research institution in Ukraine of legal profile, founded in 1949. It is noted that, as a graduate student, V. Sokurenko read a course on the history of political doctrines, conducted special seminars on the theory of state and law. After graduating from graduate school and defending his thesis, from October 1, 1953 he was enrolled as a senior lecturer and then associate professor at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv State University named after Ivan Franko. By the decision of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR of December 18, 1957, V. Sokurenko was awarded the academic title of associate professor of the «Department of Theory and History of State and Law». V. Sokurenko took an active part in public life. During 1947-1951 he was a member of the party bureau of the party organization of LSU, worked as a chairman of the trade union committee of the university, from 1955 to 1957 he was a secretary of the party committee of the university. He delivered lectures for the population of Lviv region. Particularly, he lectured in Turka, Chervonohrad, and Yavoriv. He made reports to the party leaders, Soviet workers as well as business leaders. He led a philosophical seminar at the Faculty of Law. He was a deputy of the Lviv City Council of People's Deputies in 1955-1957 and 1975-1978. In December 1967, he defended his doctoral thesis on the topic: «Development of progressive political thought in Ukraine (until the early twentieth century)». The defense of the doctoral thesis was approved by the Higher Attestation Commission on June 14, 1968. During 1960-1990 he headed the Department of Theory and History of State and Law; in 1962-68 and 1972-77 he was the dean of the Law Faculty of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University. In connection with the criticism of the published literature, on September 10, 1977, V. Sokurenko wrote a statement requesting his dismissal from the post of Dean of the Faculty of Law due to deteriorating health. During 1955-1965 he was on research trips to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, and Bulgaria. From August 1966 to March 1967, in particular, he spent seven months in the United States, England and Canada as a UN Fellow in the Department of Human Rights. From April to May 1968, he was a member of the government delegation to the International Conference on Human Rights in Iran for one month. He spoke, in addition to Ukrainian, English, Polish and Russian. V. Sokurenko played an important role in initiating the study of an important discipline at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv University – History of Political and Legal Studies, which has been studying the history of the emergence and development of theoretical knowledge about politics, state, law, ie the process of cognition by people of the phenomena of politics, state and law at different stages of history in different nations, from early statehood and modernity. Professor V. Sokurenko actively researched the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of Ukrainian legal and political thought. He was one of the first legal scholars in the USSR to begin research on the basics of legal deontology. V. Sokurenko conducted extensive research on the development of basic requirements for the professional and legal responsibilities of a lawyer, similar to the requirements for a doctor. In further research, the scholar analyzed the legal responsibilities, prospects for the development of the basics of professional deontology. In addition, he considered medical deontology from the standpoint of a lawyer, law and morality, focusing on internal (spiritual) processes, calling them «the spirit of law.» The main direction of V. Sokurenko's research was the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of legal and political studies. The main scientific works of professor V. Sokurenko include: «The main directions in the development of progressive state and legal thought in Ukraine: 16th – 19th centuries» (1958) (Russian), «Democratic doctrines about the state and law in Ukraine in the second half of the 19th century (M. Drahomanov, S. Podolynskyi, A. Terletskyi)» (1966), «Law. Freedom. Equality» (1981, co-authored) (in Russian), «State and legal views of Ivan Franko» (1966), «Socio-political views of Taras Shevchenko (to the 170th anniversary of his birth)» (1984); «Political and legal views of Ivan Franko (to the 130th anniversary of his birth)» (1986) (in Russian) and others. V. Sokurenko died on November 22, 1994 and was buried in Holoskivskyi Cemetery in Lviv. Volodymyr Sokurenko left a bright memory in the hearts of a wide range of scholars, colleagues and grateful students. The 100th anniversary of the Scholar is a splendid opportunity to once again draw attention to the rich scientific heritage of the lawyer, which is an integral part of the golden fund of Ukrainian legal science and education. It needs to be studied, taken into account and further developed.

The journal Slavyane was created by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as an organ of internal and external political propaganda aimed at Russian-speaking Slavs. It reflected the pullback of Soviet foreign policy from proletarian internationalism. The policy of its editorial board towards Yugoslavia repeated the one of the Party, but sensitive subjects were avoided or covered with a delay on the pages of the journal. Josip Broz Tito as spokesman for the aspirations of Yugoslav peoples was extolle since 1943 while D. Mihajlović’s activities had not been covered until his condemnation in October 1943. The journal supported the government of the People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until early 1948, condemned it since late 1949 to early 1953, kept silence on Yugoslavia for several months in 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. Each time such deliberate silence had been caused by the aggravation or, on the contrary, by attempts to break ice in relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) / the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia / the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. The only exception from the rule seems to be Issue 5/1953 of the journal which contains anti-Tito insults but they may be due to struggle on top of the Soviet government. Overall, the policy of the editorial board was marked by more caution and desire to cover up problems than the policy of Party newspapers.

After Iosif Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union emerged from its isolation and began to show an interest in traditionally marginalized foreign societies. As the example of the Chilean-Soviet rapprochement under Eduardo Frei's administration (1964–1970) shows, Soviet leaders viewed state-to-state relations with “progressive” Latin American regimes as an appropriate means of undermining U.S. influence in the region without risking an armed confrontation with “imperialism.” The reformist project of the Chilean Christian Democratic government, which included a diplomatic opening to the Soviet bloc, provided a testing ground for the suitability of Moscow's new global approach. The surge of cultural and political exchanges indicate that the Soviet authorities were keenly interested in the Chilean experience. In addition, the considerable growth of travel and official missions beyond the Iron Curtain also demonstrates that Santiago wished to benefit by diversifying its international partners.

The article is devoted to the constitutional and legal issues of local government organizations. The main attention is paid to the Soviet model of local government, which, in the period of the industrialization of the country, focused on the further strengthening of the Soviet state apparatus, the deployment of the so-called “Soviet democracy” and the fight against bureaucratic defects. However, such a situation as a whole was not typical of the Soviet system. That is why the Bolsheviks attempts to attract the poor sections of the rural population. However, success in this direction was caused not so much by the strengthening of the Soviet economy as a whole, but by the opportunity for the rural poor to plunder wealthy peasants, which had developed because of the dictatorship of the proletariat existing in the USSR. Subsequently, the Bolshevik Party raised the issue of organizing special groups of poverty or factions for an open political struggle to attract the middle peoples to the proletariat and to isolate wealthy peasants (the so-called “kulaks”) during the elections to the Soviets, cooperatives, etc. With the onset of socialist reconstruction, there was a need to organize poverty, because it was an important element and the establishment of “Soviet democracy in the countryside.” The Stalin Constitution of 1936 transformed the Soviets. From 1918, they were called the Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’ and Red Army Deputies, and now, with the entry into force of the Stalin Constitution, the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. This transformation of the Soviets reflected the victory of the socialist system throughout the national economy, radical changes in the class composition of Soviet society, and a new triumph of “socialist democracy”. In addition, the “victory of socialism” in the USSR made possible the transition to universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. On December 24 and 29, 1939, citizens of the Soviet Union elected their representatives to the local Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. 99.21 % of the total number of voters took part in the vote. The election results are another testament to the growing influence of the Bolshevik Party on the population of the Soviet Union, which has largely replaced the activities of the Soviets themselves, including the local ones. Holding elections to the regional, regional, district, district, city, village and settlement councils of workers’ deputies completed the restructuring of all state bodies in accordance with the Stalin Constitution and on its basis. With the adoption in 1977 of the last Constitution of the USSR, the councils of workers’ deputies were renamed the councils of people’s deputies. In 1985, the last non-alternative elections were held for 52,041 local councils, and in 1988, their structure became more complicated: there were presidencies organizing the work of regional, regional, autonomous regions, autonomous districts, district, city and rayon in the cities of Soviets. People’s Deputies. Within the framework of the city (city subordination), village, and town councils, this work is carried out directly by the heads of the designated Councils. On December 26, 1990, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR introduced regular amendments to the Constitution of the USSR, which formally abolished the Presidencies, but did not prohibit their existence. On September 5, 1991, the Constitution of 1977 was effectively abolished. Finally, it happened after December 26, 1991, when the USSR actually ceased to exist. Thus, existing in the USSR during the period of socialist reconstruction and subsequent transformations that began with the processes of industrialization and ended as a result of the collapse of the USSR, the model of local government organization remained ineffective due to its actual replacement by the activities of the governing bodies of the ruling Communist Party. Keywords: Local Government; the system of Councils; local Councils; Council of Deputies of the working people; Council of People’s Deputies; Soviet local government.

In the middle of the XIX century, the territory of contemporary Kyrgyzstan was conquered by the Tsarist Russia. Later, in 1917, as a result of the October Revolution, the Tsarist regime was replaced by the Soviet rule. In the territory of Kyrgyzstan, it was established firstly in the southern and western regions of the country, such as Suluktu and Kyzyl-Kiya, Osh and Talas, where the largest industrial enterprises, mines, railway junctions and most of the workers and soldiers were concentrated. However, already by the mid 1918, the Soviet government managed to spread its power to the entire region of Kyrgyzstan. In 1924, the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, established on April 30, 1918, was reorganized into a new administrative division. As the part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), on October 24, 1924 the Kara Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was formed. On May 25, 1925 the Kara Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was renamed into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region. Then on February 01, 1926 it was restructured into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On December 05, 1936 it became a separate constituent republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) known as the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. Along with other 15 Soviet Socialist states, Kyrgyzstan had been the member of the USSR for about 70 years, from 1919 till 1991. The current paper focuses on the processes of social transformation under the Soviet regime, especially the implementation of class struggle policy and its impact on Kyrgyzstan. In comparison with the interventions from the Tsarist Russia, the social transformation process undertaken under the Soviet system was quite different. In the territory of the Kyrgyz traditional society, the Tsarist Russia made only some social reorganization, but the Soviets brought radical changes in to the socio-political organizations of the Kyrgyz people. The paper seeks to understand how the Soviet Union tried to reconstruct the Kyrgyz society during the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, the paper will analyze the methods and mechanisms of the social transformation processes and the measures used by the Soviet government in their socio-political ‘battles’ against the local elites, and the influence of the new system on the existing socio-economic stratification in the context of the Kyrgyz society. During the Soviet period the prevalent scientific vision about the major historical events of the time was based on the Communist ideology. Therefore, the main aim of the paper is to analyze and describe an objective overview of the history of Soviet class struggle policy. The paper is based on the research of local archival documents, published sources and oral materials.

The article is devoted to the study of one of the urgent problems of childhood - neglect and homelessness. The object of the study is the social policy of the USSR in 1930-1950, within the framework of which the Soviet authorities had to solve this problem and ensure the preservation of the younger generation. The subject of the study is the process of implementing social politics in the Baikal region. In particular, the author touches upon the issues of regulatory and legal support for the fight against homelessness and childhood neglect, highlights the features and difficulties of fighting in wartime. The statistical data on the region in comparison with the all-Union indicators are given, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the activities carried out. The article emphasizes the importance of measures of the social policy of the USSR in relation to the problems of neglect and homelessness, however, the lack of consistency in the implementation of these measures, as well as the existence of problems related to the financing of children's institutions, is noted. The novelty of the research lies in bringing as a source base a wide range of unpublished materials, including archival documents, sources of personal origin, periodicals and statistics. The author comes to the conclusion that social policy in relation to childhood was not implemented effectively enough, despite the fact that it was based on ideological principles that united the population in the fight against common problems.

The Comintern represented in the international relations of the inter-war period a transnational global force. It has been rightly described as an organisation with political program ambitions extending beyond national boundaries. Its sections were active in most countries of the globe. The involvement of the Comintern with the Baltic states and the activities of Baltic communists in the transnational framework of the organisation has remained almost unexplored. This article deals with the period from 1918 to 1935 and looks at the Baltic communists’ activities in the Comintern before the Great Purges in the USSR.Estonian and Latvian Communism grew out of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, Lithuanian Communism out of Polish Social Democracy and the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party. At the time of the Comintern’s I Congress, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Bolsheviks had congregated into the national sections subject to RKP(b). The Soviet Balticum Project and the founding of the Comintern were reasons for a part of the Baltic bolsheviks belonging to the national sections of RKP(b) to declare that they had formed independent communist parties. The annulment of the Brest peace treaty in November of 1918 and the subsequent emergence of the Estonian Workers’ Commune, Soviet Latvia and Soviet Lithuania-Belarus Republic, or in other words, the soviet project’s duration in the Baltic provinces of the former Russian empire proved to be short-lived. The peace treaties between Soviet Russia and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed in 1920 which became the foundation for the emergence of three independent states evoked sharp disagreements and demoralization in the ranks of the Baltic Bolsheviks. One part of them saw the Soviet Russia’s agreement to the peace treaty as treason, while the other justified the act with a comparison to the Brest peace treaty: Considering the existing power relationships and the Comintern-led international revolutionary movement, the peace agreements reached by the Soviet government are temporary and they will certainly encounter the same fate as the Brest peace treaty. The Stalin-led Peoples’ Commissariat of Nationalities played a decisive role in making it possible that bolsheviks of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian extraction were among the founders and afterwards in the leadership of the Comintern as a transnational organization. A similar role played the Zinoviev-led Peoples’ Commissariat of Nationalities of the Union of the Commune of the Nordic Region. In the first of these Commissariats worked Mickevičius-Kapsukas, Alexa-Angaretis, Gailis and Pöögelmamm, in the latter Anvelt and Giedrys. The Latvian bolshevik/communist Stučka was a part of Lenin’s retinue, while his countryman, one of the most transnational Balts in the Comintern and the top level of AUCP(b), Knoriņš, was allied with Stalin. Becoming members of the Comintern, the Baltic communists declared that the leadership of the revolutionary movement in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would belong wholly to the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian communist parties. Ties to the Comintern were justified as follows: the communist party as an independent organization forms a direct tie with the Comintern; having gained the recognition of the Comintern, the communist party joins as an independent member the transnational union of communist parties and starts with the internationalism of the working class, which allows the globalization, together with Soviet Russia/Soviet Union, of the results of the October Revolution. The question of what were the Baltic communists’ relations with the RKP(b) received this declaration as answer: the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian proletariat can proudly point to traditions and cooperation that has connected them to the Russian proletariat. Having joined the Comintern and directing from Soviet Russia / Soviet Union illegal communist activity in their homelands, the Baltic communist leaders remained members of RCP(b)/AUCP(b) and were in their actions subject to the direction of both that organization and of Comintern. They declared that they did not recognize the bourgeois Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and would greet the day when the bourgeois order was ended in these countries and union with Soviet Union took place. A role played here also the rhetoric about the internationalism of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The latter was to be achieved by taking part in the Comintern’s transnational campaigns. Among such campaigns were the peace movement, the fight against social democracy, the creation of joint and peoples’ fronts etc. The varied ideas and wishful thinking of the Baltic Bolsheviks came to an end with the start of repressions in 1936—1937 or the Great Purge.

This thesis had two related purposes: to compare, contrast and critique three scholars' views of the Soviet domestic reform process, and to use these analyses as the means by which to examine the emerging Soviet domestic reform program. The arguments of Stephen F. Cohen, Timothy J. Colton and Richard Pipes served as the primary subject matter of this thesis, with their individual views determined by a critical analysis of the writing which each has recently done on this subject. Investigated in particular was each individuals' interpretation of the reform process, its component parts and the kind of change that was expected to be involved in any new domestic reforms. The final chapter dealing with the contemporary Soviet situation relied upon as much primary source material as possible in an attempt to provide an accurate picture of the state of affairs within the country at this time. The results of my analysis indicate that Richard Pipes' interpretations and conclusions do not receive much support from either Soviet history or the contemporary situation within the country. His one dimensional view of Soviet elite interests and his "crisis/reform" theory of Soviet reform were found to be generally unsubstantiated. Stephen Cohen's arguments, on the other hand, received a good deal of support, especially with regards to his emphasis on the probability of moderate change and the existence of reformist and conservative constituencies within the Soviet Union, constituencies which do appear to have been involved in the domestic reform process. At the same time, however, the terminology which he employed to describe the reform process was found to be somewhat problematic. Timothy Colton's arguments, finally, were also found to have a good deal of efficacy, especially with respect to his view of the country's new generation of political leadership and the role that it would play in the reform process. In conclusion, the new domestic reform program itself was found to be indicative of generally moderate economic and political change, change that was embraced for the moat part by a good segment of the new leadership, but which had found significant resistance at the lower levels of the bureaucracy and among the working class.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate

After having reached a level of influence unmatched by any other element of Soviet government under Stalin and Beria, the security organs of the Soviet Union proved difficult to tame. While it has been argued that the KGB was made subservient to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after the ascent of Khrushchev in the late 1950's, this essay will attempt to show that the security police apparatus was able to maintain a high level of prominence and even autonomy throughout the history of the Soviet Union and beyond. While it may have appeared that the organs were under constraints during periods of unchallenged leadership, the lack of a legislative definition of the KGB's role made the possibility of a coup or putsch a constant threat. During periods of instability, particularly those surrounding the succession struggles, the KGB was able to act independently and was highly influential as to the outcome of these contests. In the latter years of the Soviet era, efforts to alter the system in order to avoid the excesses of previous years revealed the organs to be highly adaptable and cognizant of the need to change to avoid being excluded from the political decision-making process. Through an assessment of the various succession struggles and efforts to place the organs within the confines of legality, the political power of the KGB may be better understood, and placed in a historical perspective side by side with its post-Soviet counterpart, which too is shown to have survived recent upheavals.

Das Wort was a literary journal published by German Communist writers and fellow-travelers exiled in Moscow from 1936 to 1939. It was to be a mouthpiece for German literature in exile and to promote the Popular Front policy, which sought to unite disparate elements in non-Fascist Europe in opposition to the Nazis. Das Wort, under the editorship of German Communist writers whose close association with the Soviet Union had been well established in the previous decade, tried to provide a forum for exiled writers of various political persuasions, but was unwavering in its positive portrayal of Stalin's Soviet Union and the policies of that country. As the level of hysteria grew with the successive purges and public show trials in the Soviet Union, the journal adopted an even more eulogistic and militant attitude: any criticism or expression of doubt about Soviet policy was equated with support for Fascism. Thus the ability of the journal to contribute to the formation of a true common front in Europe to oppose Fascism was compromised from the outset by its total support for the Soviet Union. The Popular Front policy foundered on this issue, and that portion of German literature in exile which was to form the first generation of East German literature was inextricably bound to the Soviet Union well before the German Democratic Republic came in to existence.

This thesis examines the impact of Soviet anti-religious policies on the Muslims of Central Asia from 1917 to 1938. The long struggle of the Bolsheviks to come to the power, their attempts to perpetuate the Russian hegemony in Central Asia, and the reactions of the Central Asian people towards the new regime will all form part of this thesis. Having successfully brought about the revolution, the Bolsheviks faced many challenges. One the famous slogans of the revolution, recognition of each nationality's right of self determination, boomeranged on the Bolsheviks, with the European proletariat deserting from the path of the revolution and proclaiming their own independence. In this situation, the Bolsheviks endeavored to gain the support of the Muslims. The government made many promises to the Muslims but, at the same time, dissolved the Kokand government established by the Muslims, causing Muslium revolts throughout the Central Asian region. The Muslim threat was met with measures of appeasement. The government's promises succeeded in attracting the modernist Muslims to cooperate with the regime. A strategy of "divide and rule" and of indirect attacks on Islam was employed, aiming at the annihilation of Islam. Conservative Muslims continued to vehemently oppose the Soviet regime and its policies. But, given the success of the regime in the civil war, and the lack of unity and the strength among Muslims, the Soviet anti-religious policies in Central Asia succeeded at the institutional level, to do great damage to Islam. However, these policies proved ineffectual in destroying the influence of Islamic teachings on the Muslims of Central Asia.

M.A. (History)
In 1985 the world took renewed interest in the Soviet Union with the ascendency of its dynamic new leader Mikhail Gorbachev. His policies of glasnost and perestroika made an unprecedented impact within the Soviet Union and the Western world. As a result of all the attention Gorbachev's restructuring received, and the subsequent drama and disintegration of the Yeltsin "take-over", interest in the two leaders who preceded Gorbachev, i.e. Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, waned considerably. Andropov and Chernenko, together with Brezhnev, were often perceived as a trio of ineffectual old men, endeavouring to keep together a tottering Soviet system. While this perception may be appropriate to Brezhnev in the latter decade of his rule, and to a lesser extent to Chernenko, it is not a justified evaluation of Yuri Andropov's leadership. While he came from the same dispensation and was a contemporary of theirs, he set out with determination and dedication to bring new life into the fossilized system he inherited from Brezhnev. Andropov was a highly intelligent and competent person who had a long and varied political career behind him when he became Secretary General. He had been a member of the CPSU for more than four decades and during this time he served as Komosomol leader, Ambassador, Secretary, Chief Ideologist and headed the KGB for 15 years. In each of these capacities he strived for excellence and conducted himself with integrity. (Dissidents who had dealings with him during his period in the KGB may be of a different opinion, however.) When Andropov took over from Brezhnev, the Soviet system did not correspond to his ideals of Socialism. Over the decades and especially during the last stagnant years of Brezhnev's rule, corruption had become rife in the Soviet Union and it appeared to be entrenched in every aspect of Soviet life. The situation was aggravated by the gigantic bureaucracy which was not in favour of change as it was well-entrenched and elitist. Resistance to change had had a paralyzing effect on all previous endeavours. However daunting the task seemed to be, Andropov set about fighting corruption on every level. Corruption went against the grain of his puritan personality and even more importantly, against his perception of the ideal Socialist system. It was often alleged that Andropov's anti-corruption campaign was merely a mechanism with which to eliminate opponents and attain power. There is some truth in this, but it was not his primary reason for trying to eradicate corruption. He did achieve power through eliminating corrupt officials, but even when he had reached the ultimate position, a sound administration remained a priority for him. Indeed, the fact that he was not selective in this process reflects his determination in this regard. Even very high officials, persons within the Kremlin and members of the Brezhnev family itself were not spared. He not only fought corruption but strived to upgrade social, and labour discipline in the Soviet system. A strict disciplinarian himself, he saw many of the negative aspects within the system reflected in the lives and attitudes of the Soviet citizens. This led him to try to install discipline as a way of life and he stressed a high work ethic. However,Andropov must not be perceived one-dimensionally as the ex-KGB chief using police methods on a civilian population. His chief priority in his internal policy was to rectify and improve the declining Soviet economy. The gross corruption that existed had a negative effect on the economy, so eradicating corruption was a prerequisite for economic recovery. As a staunch Marxist-Leninist, he believed that any economic reforms had to be brought about within the strict framework of Socialist principles. He never queried the validity or superiority of the Socialist system and he ascribed the economic ills not to the system itself but to the way it was functioning. He never deviated from Socialist principles and indeed repeatedly warned against the dangers of bringing about changes alien to the nature of Socialism. He was in favour of the centrally planned system but not of the rigidity and corruption that had become part of it. His ideal was for greater flexibility and greater participation with more input from worker, manager and minister. He believed each individual should take full responsibility for the aspect of production or service he was involved in. Only if the total creative force of the masses could be released could the system function as it was originally intended to. The pillars on which this could be achieved were greater democratization and decentralization.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
The collapse of communism and the fall of the Soviet Union offered an unprecedented opportunity for the international community to support transitions to democracy in a region that had long known only totalitarian rule. Among the key players engaged in supporting efforts were U.S. grantmaking institutions, including both non-state and quasi-state aid providers. This thesis explores the motivations and evolving strategies of three different types of grantmaking institutions in a single country, Russia, with a particular focus on democracy aid provision from 1988-2002. The three types of grantmaking organizations examined through case studies include: the Ford Foundation, a private foundation with a history of international grantmaking spanning several decades; the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, a private foundation known primarily for its domestic focus with a much shorter history of international grantmaking; and, finally, the National Endowment for Democracy, a U.S. government-created and heavily taxpayer-funded organization established as a private nonprofit organization to make grants specifically for democracy promotion. Motivating factors for initiating or expanding grantmaking in Russia in the late 1980s included a previous history of grantmaking in the region, a previously established institutional commitment to democracy promotion, international peace and security concerns, and interest from a top institutional leader. Over the course of the fourteen year period studied, five grantmaking features are identified as influencing the development of grantmaking strategies: professional grantmaking staff; organizational habit; global political, social, and economic environments; market and other funding source influences; and physical presence. Though subject to constraints, the non-state and quasi-state grantmaking institutions included in this study were able to avoid weaknesses identified with private philanthropy in other research and demonstrated a willingness to experiment and take risks, an ability to operate at the non-governmental level, and a commitment to long-term grantmaking, informed by expertise.

Abstract This chapter considers the important relations of both German states with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Cold War years. Once victory over Nazi Germany had been achieved, Stalin wanted to ensure that it would be impossible for Germany to launch yet another war against the Soviet Union. One means of weakening Germany were large territorial cessions. Another way was to turn Germany into a communist country. But it became clear that communism could be implemented only with the help of the Soviet Army. This chapter traces the conflicts among the great powers regarding Germany which led to the Cold War and the division of Germany. The Soviet occupation zone was soon turned into the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which became a cornerstone of the Soviet Empire. The suppression of the popular East German uprising in 1953 revealed that Stalin’s successors would continue to insist on upholding Soviet interests in Germany with all their might. Only the construction of a wall and the complete sealing off of West Berlin could stop the enormous population drain from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In 1961, the status quo was thus cemented in the truest sense of the word; yet legally, the German question remained open throughout the Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policy laid the foundation for the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Chancellor Kohl decisively pushed the reunification process—yet, against the will of most European governments.