Academic literature on the topic 'Southern Zhejiang immigrants in France'

Abstract: Not only the indigenous aristocratic families but also northern immigrant families living in east Zhejiang were involved in the debates on monetary theory and policy thought in the Eastern Jin and Southern Dynasties. The debates were often focused on the commodity prices and forced labor in east Zhejiang. This special historical phenomenon reflects two questions. On the one hand, the chaos caused by the war in the north and scholar families migrating southward greatly promoted the development of southern China, which made the five counties in east Zhejiang the most important and active areas of economy. On the other hand, it reflects the relationship changes between immigrants and indigenous gentries. Namely, the indigenous aristocratic families and northern immigrant families cooperated in economy so as to enhance the prosperity and development of the east Zhejiang region. Later, with the rise of “common people (寒人)”, the scholars’ economic status was increasingly impacted, which resulted in the gentries’ anxiety and crisis consciousness.

The article devoted to the problem of Muslim immigration in France in the 20th century. The focus is on the causes of Muslim immigration, its cycles, specificity and consequences for modern French society. Based on a comparison of various statistical data, it stated that Muslim immigration is an integral part of three large waves of immigration flows that took place from the end of the 19th to the end of the 20th centuries. The article notes the correlation of the number of Muslim immigrants in France with the global numbers of immigrant arrivals to the country. However, if in the first two waves their number depended on the economic needs of the French economy (Muslims came to earn money), then during the third wave other factors came into play — the creation of stable communities, family reunification, going on stage second and third generations of immigrants, social problems of their arrangement and adaptation to French legal norms and customs. The article notes the specificity of the geographical concentration of the Muslim population, which takes place either near large industrial centers and cities (which makes it easier to find work and social protection), or in places of proximity to their native countries (southern France). Special attention paid to the problem of the evolution of state policy in the admission and integration of immigrants, when various methods tired from assimilation, the adoption of quotas to the policy of flexible regulation of immigration and expulsion of illegal immigrants from the country. The article analyzes the position of the Muslim community in France, the role of Muslim associations in its life, the impact on the socio-cultural life of the French. It can stated that Islam has become the second religion in France, which determines its position — a stable presence in socio-economic life (employment, the spread of the social protection system to immigrants), political (the right to vote, the possibility of creating associations, manifestations), religious (the possibility of worship), cultural (the formation of a specific immigrant subculture).

IntroductionIn 2006, prior to the worldwide economic crisis which especially affected Western countries, Southern Spain was one of the illegal immigrant gateways from Africa into Europe. The aim of this study is to establish the rate of homeless immigrants in a cohort of 2006 and carry out a follow up until 2015 in order to explore the chronicity associated to the territory.MethodsSample: 949 persons experiencing homelessness in Girona, according to official records. Procedure: prospective longitudinal study of the total population of homeless people in Girona. In 2006, a list was made of all the homeless people detected by both specialised and nonspecialised teams, which have been followed until the present day. Instruments: data bases of different official teams. Statistical analysis: measures of central tendency and dispersion and contingency tables were used for the comparison of qualitative variables.ResultsOverall, 64.8% of the population of Girona are immigrants (n = 614), principally from the Maghreb, (χ2 = 36.9, df = 4, P < .001) and 333 (36.3%) are autochthonous. The percentage of homeless immigrants in relation to the total immigrant population was 4.4%. Comparing the homeless autochthonous population with the total of the autochthonous population, homelessness among autochthonous population was 0.4%.ConclusionsThe results suggest that homelessness was more incidental in the immigrant group than in the autochthonous group. The percentage of immigrants who still live in homeless conditions suggests that immigration is a risk factor in the chronicity of the problem.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

This paper will describe the historical development of Islam in France, including its existence and problems as a minority. The process of Islamization has long been rising in France, because the French people themselves have long been in contact with Islam, precisely since Islam entered in the 8th century, for about 40 years in the southern part of France, namely the transition period of power from the Umayyad Dynasty to the Dynasty Abbāsiyah. Furthermore, though hampered by the Crusades and expansion, the Islamization process in France explicitly began in 1830, when Muslim immigrants came to bring their commodity to France, when the era of North African colonization began. Since that time the population of Muslims in France experienced significant developments. The number of Muslims in France in 2005 has reached 5,000,000 people and there are about 2,500 mosques; the majority of them are from North Africa Sunni. However, the problems faced by French Muslims today are the marginalization of such regulations as the ban on jilbab (hijab), the existence of negative prejudices and fear of terrorism and radicalism

This paper will describe the historical development of Islam in France, including its existence and problems as a minority. The process of Islamization has long been rising in France, because the French people themselves have long been in contact with Islam, precisely since Islam entered in the 8th century, for about 40 years in the southern part of France, namely the transition period of power from the Umayyad Dynasty to the Dynasty Abbāsiyah. Furthermore, though hampered by the Crusades and expansion, the Islamization process in France explicitly began in 1830, when Muslim immigrants came to bring their commodity to France, when the era of North African colonization began. Since that time the population of Muslims in France experienced significant developments. The number of Muslims in France in 2005 has reached 5,000,000 people and there are about 2,500 mosques; the majority of them are from North Africa Sunni. However, the problems faced by French Muslims today are the marginalization of such regulations as the ban on jilbab (hijab), the existence of negative prejudices and fear of terrorism and radicalism.

The article examines specifics of integration of the Chinese diaspora into French society. The author identifies several Chinese communities, differing by the place of origin, such as «Indo-Chinese community» (from Southern Vietnam), «Wenzhou» (county in Zhejiang province), «Dongbei» (from the region of the same name of the PRC). The study reveals the influence of «push» («exodus» from Vietnam) and «pull» to the country of immigration («Wenzhou» and «Dongbei» communities) factors. The paper investigates social heterogeneity of the diaspora, from the «artisan proletariat» and small merchants to wholesalers and financiers. The author analyzes common features originating in cultural identity. The importance of ethno-cultural characteristics in the integration of the Chinese and their success (as a «model minority») is emphasized. The paper discusses the nature of anti-Chinese sentiments in French society (ressentiment). Using the case study of the Chinese diaspora, the author raises the question of the possibility of multicultural integration in contemporary France.

Background: to date, little attention has been given to gender differences in the health of migrants relative to native-born. In this study, we examine the health profile of the largest immigrant groups in metropolitan France, considering several health indicators and with a special interest in the gendered patterns. Methods: The data originate from the 2017 Health Barometer survey representative of metropolitan France. A subsample of 19,857 individuals aged 18–70 years was analysed using modified Poisson regression, and risk ratio estimates (RR) were provided for the different migrant groups regarding alcohol use, current smoking, obesity and less-than-good self-reported health, adjusting for age and educational level. Results: None of the groups of male migrants differs from the native-born in terms of self-reported health, and they have healthier behaviours for alcohol (men from sub-Saharan Africa: 0.42 (0.29–0.61)) and from the Maghreb: 0.30 (0.1–0.54)) and smoking (men from sub-Saharan Africa: 0.64 (0.4–0.84)), with less frequent obesity (men from the Maghreb: 0.61 (0.3–0.95)). The latter, however, more frequently report current smoking (1.21 (1.0–1.46)). For women, less-than-good health is more frequently reported by the groups from sub-Saharan Africa (1.42 (1.1–1.75)) and from the Maghreb (1.55 (1.3–1.84)). Healthier behaviours were found for alcohol (women from overseas départements: 0.38 (0.1–0.85)) and from the Maghreb: (0.18 (0.0–0.57)) and current smoking (women from southern Europe: 0.68 (0.4–0.97), from sub-Saharan Africa: 0.23 (0.1–0.38) and from the Maghreb: 0.42 (0.2–0.61)). Conversely, some were more frequently obese (women from overseas départements: 1.79 (1.2–2.56) and from sub-Saharan Africa: 1.67 (1.2–2.23)). In the latter two groups from Africa, there is a larger relative male excess for tobacco than in the native-born (male-to-female ratios of respectively 2.87 (1.6–5.09) and 3.1 (2.0–4.65) vs 1.13 (1.0–1.20)) and there is a female excess for obesity (0.51 (0.2–0.89) and 0.41 (0.2–0.67)) in contrast with the native-born (1.07 (0.9–1.16)). The female disadvantage in terms of less-than-good self-reported health is more pronounced among migrants from the Maghreb than among the natives (0.56(0.4–0.46) vs. 0.86 (0.8–0.91)). Conclusion: Considering a set of four health indicators, we provide evidence for distinctive gender patterns among immigrants in France. Male immigrants have a healthy behavioural profile in comparison with the natives and no health disadvantage. Female immigrants have a more mixed profile, with a health disadvantage for the non-Western groups from Africa. The contribution to this discordance of socioeconomic factors and gender relations needs to be investigated.

The author was raised in rural Southern France. His passion for geography was revealed very early listening to his grandfathers African adventures or exploring the gorgeous surrounding nature. After graduating (maîtrise) in geography from the University of Montpellier-lll, and before teaching briefly in High School, a year of study abroad (USA) changed his life as he started to explore a different culture than his own and ended up writing his Ph. D (University of Paris-Sorbonne) on the new Asian immigrants in North America, living and experiencing both the Far West (Vancouver) and the Far East (Hong Kong). Therefore, analyzing different ways of life and of thinking through complete immersion has became a real passion for him and, after having recently discovered South America, he is willing to keep on interacting with the Other to fully understand the world on a global and multicultural level.

Melon (Cucumis melo L.) plants in commercial fields in Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang exhibited stunting, deformation, interveinal chlorosis, and leaf mottling in the spring of 2008. In addition, adult and immature whiteflies (Bemisia tabaci biotype B) were present in these melon fields. Thirty-two symptomatic leaf samples were collected from these fields for further analysis (9 from Nanhui County in Shanghai, 11 from Fengxian County in Shanghai, 6 from Kunshan County of Jiangsu, and 6 from Jiashan County of Zhejiang). Total RNA was extracted from these samples along with asymptomatic control plants and screened for the presence of Cucurbit yellow stunting disorder virus (CYSDV) by using primers specific to genes encoding coat protein (2) and HSP70h (1) of CYSDV through reverse transcription (RT)-PCR methods. RNA was successfully extracted from 31 of 32 symptomatic samples. All 31 symptomatic leaf samples tested with coat protein primers were positive for CYSDV and yielded the expected fragment length of 394 bp. The RT-PCR products of the coat protein gene from all 31 isolates were cloned and found to be identical in sequence. Thus, only one was deposited in GenBank (No. GU189240). The submitted sequence of the amplified part of the coat protein gene was 99% identical to the sequence of coat protein gene of CYSDV from Jordan, France, and Florida (GenBank Accession Nos. DQ903107, AY204220, and EU596528, respectively) and 98% identical to that of an isolate from Spain (GenBank Accession No. AJ243000). Similarly, all 31 samples were also positive for CYSDV with the primers specific to HSP70h and yielded the expected fragment length of 175 bp. The RT-PCR products of the HSP70h gene from these isolates were also cloned and found to be identical in sequence. The sequence of the amplified portion of the HSP70h gene was found to be identical to the sequence of HSP70h of CYSDV deposited in GenBank (No. AJ439690.2). CYSDV was noticed in all three surveyed regions and the percentage of disease incidence was approximately 68% in all these regions. The occurrence of CYSDV has been previously reported in Europe (Spain and France), southern Asia (Iran and Jordan), North America (United States and Mexico), and other countries (1). To our knowledge, this is first report of CYSDV in China. References: (1) Y.-W. Kuo et al. Plant Dis. 91:330, 2007. (2) J. E. Polston et al. Plant Dis. 92:1251, 2008.

Substantial research has addressed the association between economic factors (e.g., employment rate) and perception of immigrants among the general public in the host societies. This study used the Transatlantic Trends Survey 2014 to examine whether the characterization of immigrants as social benefits seekers is related to one´s family financial situation being greatly affected by the Great Recession. We conducted a series of ordinal logistic regressions to compare three different geopolitical contexts, namely the United States, the Southern Europe region, and the triad France-Germany-United Kingdom. Our results confirmed that framing immigrants as social benefits seekers is indeed related to one´s family being greatly impacted by the Great Recession. Significantly, the direction of such association varies among contexts, as those greatly impacted by the crisis in Southern Europe showed lower odds of framing immigrants as social benefits seekers, while the opposite happening in both the United States and the triad France-Germany-United Kingdom. Recommendations for practice and research are discussed.

Depuis la fondation de la République populaire de Chine en 1949 jusqu'à la période postérieure à 1990 suivant la Réforme et l'Ouverture, la Chine a connu des transformations politiques, économiques et culturelles significatives. En tant que groupe spécial, les Chinois d'outre-mer ont été profondément affectés par ce processus. Cette thèse, basée sur des perspectives politiques et des documents gouvernementaux déclassifiés, étudie l'histoire des immigrants chinois du sud du Zhejiang en France (principalement de Wenzhou et Qingtian), tentant de révéler les politiques chinoises à l'égard des Chinois d'outre-mer et les conditions sociales auxquelles ces immigrants ont été confrontés au cours de différentes périodes historiques.La communauté des immigrants chinois du sud du Zhejiang en France a commencé à se former à la fin du XIXe siècle, restant relativement petite et maintenant des liens étroits avec leurs villes natales. Après la fondation de la République populaire de Chine, le refroidissement des relations sino-françaises a rendu difficile le retour de ces immigrants chez eux, beaucoup étant dissuadés par la propagande et les obstructions du Kuomintang. Les mouvements politiques internes tels que la Réforme agraire et le Grand Bond en avant ont davantage porté atteinte aux droits des Chinois d'outre-mer, entravant leur retour.Cependant, l'atteinte aux droits des Chinois d'outre-mer n'était pas constante tout au long de ces mouvements politiques. Dans les premières années de la République populaire, les politiques chinoises oscillaient entre « gauche » et « droite ». Les Chinois d'outre-mer, en raison de leur statut économique spécial, étaient souvent vus comme un remède aux récessions économiques causées par des mouvements politiques extrémistes de gauche. Des institutions telles que le Conseil des Affaires d'État et la Commission des Affaires des Chinois d'Outre-mer ont saisi ces occasions pour mettre en œuvre des politiques protégeant les droits des Chinois d'outre-mer, attirant certains immigrants chinois du sud du Zhejiang en France à rentrer chez eux pour rendre visite à leurs proches. Ils ont également mené une série de travaux de front uni à travers les médias et les associations chinoises en France, engageant des luttes fréquentes et intenses avec le Kuomintang, soulignant le lien indissociable entre les immigrants chinois du sud du Zhejiang en France et les tendances politiques plus larges de la Chine. Avec le réchauffement des relations diplomatiques sino-françaises et l'établissement de relations diplomatiques en 1964, la tendance des immigrants chinois en France à rentrer chez eux pour rendre visite a augmenté, et l'influence du Kuomintang dans la communauté chinoise française a diminué. Pendant la Révolution culturelle, les droits des Chinois d'outre-mer ont de nouveau été gravement violés. Cependant, il convient de noter qu'après 1970, sous la direction de Zhou Enlai et l'incident de Lin Biao, l'impact sur les immigrants chinois du sud du Zhejiang en France a progressivement diminué à mesure que la situation politique en Chine s'apaisait, et leurs droits ont été restaurés plus tôt que ce que suggèrent les conclusions universitaires existantes.Après la Réforme et l'Ouverture, le gouvernement chinois a mis l'accent sur le rôle des Chinois d'outre-mer dans le développement économique, assouplissant progressivement les politiques d'entrée et de sortie et encourageant les investissements des Chinois d'outre-mer. Cependant, la mise en œuvre de ces politiques n'a pas été sans heurts, connaissant des revers avec les directives du gouvernement central souvent confrontées à la résistance au niveau local. Des changements significatifs à Wenzhou n'ont eu lieu qu'après 1984. Le grand flux de personnes a également conduit naturellement à des problèmes d'immigration illégale. [...]
From the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the post-1990 period following the Reform and Opening-up, China underwent significant political, economic, and cultural transformations. As a special group, overseas Chinese were deeply affected during this process. This thesis, based on policy perspectives and declassified government documents, studies the history of Southern Zhejiang Chinese immigrants in France (primarily from Wenzhou and Qingtian), attempting to reveal the Chinese overseas Chinese policies and social conditions faced by these immigrants during different historical periods. The Zhejiang Southern Chinese immigrant community in France began to form at the end of the 19th century, remaining relatively small and maintaining close ties with their hometowns. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the cooling of Sino-French relations made it difficult for these immigrants to return home, with many deterred by the propaganda and obstructions from the Kuomintang. Domestic political movements such as Land Reform and the Great Leap Forward further infringed on the rights of overseas Chinese, impeding their return. However, the infringement on overseas Chinese rights was not constant throughout these political movements. In the early years of the People’s Republic, China’s policies oscillated between “left” and “right.” Overseas Chinese, due to their special economic status, were often seen as a remedy for economic downturns caused by extreme leftist political movements. Institutions like the State Council and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission took these opportunities to implement policies protecting the rights of overseas Chinese, attracting some Zhejiang Southern Chinese immigrants in France to return home to visit relatives. They also carried out a series of united front work through media and Chinese associations in France, engaging in frequent and intense struggles with the Kuomintang, highlighting the inseparable link between the Zhejiang Southern Chinese immigrants in France and China’s broader political trends. With the warming of Sino-French diplomatic relations and the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1964, the trend of Chinese immigrants in France returning home to visit increased, and the influence of the Kuomintang in the French Chinese community diminished. During the Cultural Revolution, the rights of overseas Chinese were again severely violated. However, it is worth noting that after 1970, with Zhou Enlai’s leadership and the Lin Biao incident, the impact on Zhejiang Southern Chinese immigrants in France gradually diminished as the political situation in China eased, and their rights were restored earlier than existing scholarly conclusions suggest. After the Reform and Opening-up, the Chinese government emphasised the role of overseas Chinese in economic development, gradually relaxing entry and exit policies and encouraging investment from overseas Chinese. However, the implementation of these policies was not smooth, experiencing setbacks with central government directives often facing resistance at the local level. Significant changes in Wenzhou only occurred after 1984. The large outflow of people also naturally led to issues of illegal immigration. Today, the hundreds of thousands of Chinese living in France maintain close ties with their hometowns, a connection deeply rooted in the historical and demographic characteristics of Zhejiang Southern Chinese immigrants. This thesis highlights their experiences during different historical periods, revealing their significant and complex role in China’s modernization process. The study aims to use this group with “overseas relations” as a mirror to reflect on China’s historical progress from 1949 to the post-Reform and Opening-up era

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

AbstractIrregular migration from the southern shore of the Mediterranean to the northern shore is on the rise since 2011. This chapter concerns itself with how the media and the public in Northern Mediterranean countries reacted to this movement and how such reaction is concurrent with the policy debate. Focusing on France as a case study of a Northern Mediterranean country, the chapter reviews media coverage, public opinion surveys as well as the parliamentary debates in France between 2013–2016 which signified the peak of the movement. The review indicates that the policy debate as well as the legislation adopted were concurrent with public opinion. The chapter also concludes that the media and public’s perception of immigrants from Southern Mediterranean countries is mostly negative. Such negative perception and the associated policy that restrict migratory movement reflect the asymmetrical power relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean and France’ collective memory of migration. The French public perception of irregular migration is directly linked to the failure of earlier immigration and integration policies. The chapter concludes by pinpointing to the importance of approaching migration in the Mediterranean from a historical perspective.

Abstract Mary Juma arrived in Ross, North Dakota, in 1902. Like most immigrants who traveled to the United States during the first decade of the twentieth century, she did not come from a country in northern or western Europe. In this period, the majority of immigrants hailed from eastern and southern Europe. But Mary Juma and her husband, Hassin, were not from Italy or Russia. They were from Syria, then a part of the Ottoman Empire. Following the lead of other immigrants who sought riches in America, they sold all of their possessions, asked relatives to take care of their two daughters, and pledged their small farm as collateral for the loan they needed to pay for their travel from Lebanon to France and then to Montreal, Canada. Though many European and Middle Eastern immigrants in this era entered the United States through Ellis Island in New York, others came via Canada. After arriving in Montreal, the Jumas went first to Nebraska and then settled in North Dakota.

This chapter retraces the trajectories of foreign-born men, women, and children driven out of their homelands and directed into French factories and fields by employers and labor recruitment organizations before, during, and after the Great War. It follows immigrants to the two lively melting-pot neighborhoods in Paris where they settled in greatest numbers between the wars and into the Occupation. It also looks at the lived experience of immigrants that observed how gender, marriage, and family that shaped the ways migrants moved through provincial France in search of work. The chapter discusses France's northern, eastern, and southern departments that drew large numbers of seasonal border migrants from Belgium, Italy, and Spain. It refers to migrant laborers that concentrated in mining areas of the Pas-de-Calais region after the war, as well as large city centers like Marseille or Lyon and its industrial peripheries.

By about 3700 BC every region of the study area had been settled by farmers (Fig. 3.1), although there must have been local differences between the areas that were colonized by immigrants and those where the indigenous population had changed its way of life. The expansion of agriculture would extend little further and, when it did so, it would be mainly a feature of Fennoscandia. In some of the regions discussed here farming had already been practiced for between a thousand and fifteen hundred years. That was certainly true in the Rhineland, the southern Netherlands, and parts of France, but in other areas it had been adopted only recently. Such was the case in the northern Netherlands, Jutland, Britain, and Ireland, but by the period considered in this chapter the process was virtually complete. Not only did these parts of the study area have different histories, there were significant contrasts in the roles played by local monuments. For the most part such structures were not a feature of the earliest Neolithic period, although even here there were significant contrasts. In the Rhineland, the earthwork enclosures of the LBK were associated with the last settlements in that tradition, and in certain cases may even have taken the place of houses that had been abandoned. In Brittany, on the other hand, the first stone monuments seem to be closely related to the oldest evidence of farming. There was a significant difference between developments in those two regions. From the beginning, the LBK had been associated with enormous longhouses, but on the Atlantic coast of France early settlers may not have occupied such impressive structures. Here stone monuments, especially menhirs, could have been erected from the outset. A similar contrast was found in other regions studied in Chapter 2, but it is even more apparent in the phase considered now, for this was a time when enclosures and mounds were built at an increasing pace. There is little evidence of houses except in Scandinavia, Ireland, and the Northern Isles of Scotland.