Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Southeast Asia Foreign relations Australia'

This thesis set out to ascertain the position of recent Australian Governments on the latest instalments of Asian regionalism in the context of an assessment of whether there has been a redefinition of Asia and thus a redefinition of Australia???s engagement with Asia. It will concentrate on the broad themes of politico-strategic and economic engagement. Whilst there has been extensive research and documentation on the Asian economic crisis there has been less work on the issue of a new Asian regionalism and the implications for Australia???s complex and variable engagement with the region. This is the basis for the claim to originality of this thesis, a claim supported by its focus on the practical and policy implications of Australia???s engagement, or lack of it, with regional institutions. The process of regional integration has been extremely slow, thus supporting the conclusion that there is no evidence of a major redefinition of Asia. Efforts at Asian regionalism are meeting obstacles that pose immense challenges. Asian regionalism remains nascent and poorly defined. This reflects the diversity and enormous disparities in cultures, political systems and the levels of economic development and differences over economic philosophies within East Asia. What is discernible is that the regionalism is proceeding more rapidly on financial issues than on trade, and in the security area it is conspicuously absent. This research highlights the fact that the question of Asian engagement remains a sensitive issue in Australia and continues to grow more complex. Australia???s engagement with Asia since 1996 has been variable because of the Howard Government???s broader balance of priorities between global and regional issues, and because of the changing nature of the Asian region. The perception gleaned from sources is that, for the Australian Government, regionalism initiatives are characterised by much discussion but lack substance. Consequently, this appears to have led the Government to the position that exclusion from some manifestations of regionalism is not so important. Australia is excluded from some of the regional architectures being constructed. In its efforts to seek inclusion in ASEAN + 3 and ASEM, Australia is facing the same barriers that have stood in the way of an AFTA-CER agreement. Exclusion would be important if the performance of regional groupings was not so indifferent. Exclusion from ASEAN + 3 and ASEM, however, does not equate to Australia???s exclusion from the region.

One of the constant features of the United States foreign policy is the maintenance of an international environment in which the United States can survive and prosper. This is based on an economic-strategic nexus. This has been emphasised since the time of the Truman administration after the second World War. For instance Truman stated during the height of the Korean War and other communist rebellions in the Southeast Asian region that the loss of any one of those countries would mean the loss of freedom for millions of people, the loss of vital raw materials,and the loss of points of critical strategic importance to the free world. This perception was crystallised into the containment policy to halt the spread of communism. This policy was also emphasised in the Southeast Asian region. However with the achievement of detente with China and the Soviet Union in 1972, the containment policy transformed to maintenance of a balance of power policy in the region.

This thesis examines the diplomatic strategy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in response to the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent shift in the regional distribution of power with regard to the security of the ASEAN nations. I argue that ASEAN has demonstrated considerable success in preventing a collapse of regional order in Southeast Asia. It is important to understand that ASEAN is a product and tool of its members' foreign policy and should therefore be assessed in the foreign policy, rather than in the regional integrationist, context. This will be examined from the point of view of a group of relatively weak, insignificant states within the international arena, historically plagued by conflict and intervention by external powers, exacerbated by a history of intra-regional enmity rather than cooperation, military weakness, and no collective tradition of diplomatic expertise. Yet, despite these shortcomings and ASEAN's previous inability to come together on issues of economic integration, ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina conflict has allowed its member nations to maintain their independence, preserve their freedom of action, rally international support, and confront the great powers involved in this issue through the use of a regional organization. This thesis will also counter the prevailing view that existing intra-ASEAN differences regarding the primary external threat in the issue (namely Vietnam, China or the Soviet Union) have seriously divided its members to the point of potentially threatening the organization's existence. Instead, I will argue that the combination of ASEAN's curious mode of "conflict resolution" through "conflict avoidance", as well as its diplomatic "division of labour," have effectively incorporated existing intra-ASEAN differences as bargaining assets for the organization's political viability. These internal cleavages have been far from resolved or reconciled, but rather skirted over by a web of unwritten laws, implicit rules and mutual understandings regarding one another's accepted role within the organization. This implicit "regime" has served several purposes: it has allowed ASEAN to sustain its image of unity, boosted its political visability in the international forum, and prevented the "loss of face" of fellow members on points of contention. Research for this thesis was conducted in part at the ASEAN Secretariat and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate

This thesis has explored two basic themes in post-Cold War international relations. The first is the transformation of the global and regional security environments leading to a projected decline in the importance of traditional realist-style security problems. The second is the supposed shift in state behavior with conflictual strategies giving way to accommodation. These presumed trends are explored in the context of Southeast Asia and, more specifically, China's security strategies and relations in the region. This study argues that conventional security problems have declined in Southeast Asia in the short term but still remain prominent. In terms of policies, while China's goals remained partly revisionist with regard to territorial issues and status/power relationships, its approaches became more accommodative in coping with disputed issues in the region. This was manifested above all in its gradual acceptance of a multilateral framework for dialogue on regional security issues and in its willingness to undertake some confidence building measures in the military area. This shift can be explained partly in terms of China's external political concerns at both the global and regional levels. The more fundamental explanation, however, lies in China's drive for economic modernization with an accommodative regional strategy intended to ensure the flow of external resources required for this purpose.

In recent years, many of South East Asian countries have experienced high levels of economic growth. Coupled with their sheer population, this has led to a huge demand for the improvement of infrastructure. The construction market is growing rapidly in these countries, with governments encouraging multinational companies to set up joint ventures with the local companies to bring in advanced construction technology. International Joint Venture (IJV) as a unique formation of project structure has become one of the most widely used methods for multinational construction companies to enter into the Asian market. Australia is building closer relationships with Asian countries and is playing an active role in the economy development of Asia Pacific region. Australian contractors are also trying to gain a foothold in the international construction market. They have the geographical advantage over their US or European competitors to target the Asian market. Despite all this, the Australian construction industry has been slow in accessing the Asian market, and has experienced many difficulties. As a result of the increasing interest in joint ventures in the business environment and the high failure rate of the IJV, the study of IJV is gaining increasing popularity among researchers. Most of the research has focused on the motivations to joint venture. For example, past studies have investigated joint ventures as means of coping with resource limitations and uncertainty, reduction of risk and/or uncertainty, and expediting entry into a new geographic or technological market. Another focus of joint venture research has been on joint venture performance and control. However, little literature is available on how to manage the IJV between Australia and Asian countries. As more and more Australian companies are forming joint ventures in Asian developing countries, it is important to investigate the performance of these joint ventures. This research project aims at the Australian IJV in Asia. After the analysis of existing joint venture problems, four areas of joint venture management - joint venture formation, joint venture partnership and negotiation, joint venture organisational management and joint venture project management have been identified as the research concentration. Industry interviews and a questionnaire survey has been used to collect data. Research findings are further developed into a theoretical model for Australian IJV management.

The main objective of this study was to examine the prospects and challenges facing ACFTA (Asean-China free trade area). It examined what ought to be done by the ASEAN member nations to match China's competitive ability having recently joined the World Trade Organization. The study also examined the compatibility of the ACFTA with the World Trade Organization rules and mode of dispute settlement under ASEAN and NAFTA as well as profound issues relating to ACFTA.

Despite the role played by the South East Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in the defence of Western interests in that region during the Cold War, there has to date been no scholarly attempt to examine the development and performance of the organisation as a military alliance. This thesis is thus the first attempt to do so and as such seeks to take advantage of the recent release of much SEATO-related official material into the public domain by Western governments. This material throws new light upon SEATO???s aims and achievements, particularly in regard to the first ten years of its existence. Because SEATO was eventually rendered irrelevant by the events of the Second Indochina War (1965-1975) a popular perception has arisen that it was always a ???Paper Tiger??? lacking in substance, and thus easily dismissed. This thesis challenges this assumption by examining SEATO???s development in the decade before that conflict. The thesis analyses SEATO???s place in the wider Cold War and finds that it was part of a rational and consistent response within the broader Western strategy of containment to deter, and if need be, defeat, the threat of communist aggression. That threat was a very real one for Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the First Indochina War and one that was initially perceived in terms of the conventional military balance of power. This focus dominated SEATO???s strategic concepts and early contingency planning and rightly so, as an examination of the strength and development of the PLA and PAVN during this period demonstrates. SEATO developed a dedicated military apparatus, principally the Military Planning Office (MPO), that proved itself to be perfectly capable of providing the level of co-ordination and planning needed to produce a credible SEATO deterrent in this regard. SEATO enjoyed less success with its attempts to respond to the emergence of a significant communist insurgent threat, first in Laos then in South Vietnam, but the alliance did nonetheless recognise this threat and the failure of SEATO in this regard was one of political will rather than military doctrine. Indeed this thesis confirms that it was the increasingly disparate political agendas of a number of SEATO???s members that ultimately paralysed its ability to act and thus ensured its failure to meet its aims, at least insofar as the so-called ???Protocol States??? were concerned. But this failure should not be allowed to completely overshadow SEATO???s earlier achievements in providing a modicum of Western-backed stability and security to the region from 1955-1965.

In October 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed the establishment of a security, economic and socio-cultural community by the year 2020. Given that initiators of the ASEAN proposal were informed by the scholarly literature on the concept of a 'security community', this dissertation develops and then tests the concept in relation to the ASEAN states. Here, the concept of a 'security community' is understood as 'a transnational grouping of two or more states whose sovereignty is increasingly amalgamated and whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change'. The application of the 'security community framework' developed in this study is necessary to provide a conceptual basis for critically assessing the major factors that could potentially impede ASEAN's evolution towards a security community. For the purpose of such an assessment, the study provides a detailed investigation of the most significant historical issues and contemporary security challenges that inform the nature of inter-state relations in Southeast Asia. As a complement to this approach, the dissertation incorporates the analysis of data obtained from extensive fieldwork in all ten of the ASEAN states involving over 100 in-depth interviews and two survey designs (one at the elite level and another at the communal level) involving 919 participants. While the survey work, especially at the communal level, is best considered a pilot study and the results are therefore to be considered as indicative, the research nevertheless represents the first empirical assessment of regional perceptions of trust, intra-mural relations, security, economic integration, and liberalisation and of a broad range of other factors relevant to the analysis. The interview data has also been invaluable in uncovering previously unpublished information and in contextualising the analysis. Despite a considerable strengthening of the region's security architecture since ASEAN's formation, the ten chapters in the study reveal that the Association has a long way to travel before it will satisfy the defining criteria of a security community. The region lacks a common sense of community and consequently the level of trust between the Southeast Asian states remains problematic. The political elite continue to engage in episodes of competitive behaviour, have been unable to resolve territorial disputes, and thus the continued potential for armed conflict undermines the prospect for 'dependable expectations of peaceful change'. Therefore, ASEAN's evolution towards the status of a security community, if it proceeds further, will likely occur over the course of many decades rather than by ASEAN's current goal of 2015.

Since the end of World War II, the Philippines has shared a unique relationship with the U.S.; it has been a relationship based on unequal mutual interests but it has, nevertheless, been beneficial to both sides. For the Philippines, the importance of the U.S. stems from several factors: the U.S. has been a major trading partner, a main source of foreign investment, a strong military ally, origin of a large part of her political tradition, and cultural model for many of her people. For the U.S., the importance of the Philippines has been the strategic location for military bases, a source of primary goods for the U.S. economy, and a military and political ally in a region noted for its historical background of domestic unrest and hostile foreign relations. Specifically, U.S. policy towards the Philippine Islands since 1945 has been mainly concerned with three issues: removal of the vestiges of American sovereignty, economic rehabilitation and stability, and defence against external aggression. After nearly fifty years of colonial-style rule, the U.S. assisted the Philippines in making the transition from a colony to an independent state, and in 1946 the islands received the status of an independent republic. The U.S. maintained close relations, however, and even agreed to assist in the restoration of the national economy coming as a result of the war and three years of Japanese occupation. Defence agreements with the Philippines were signed permitting the continuation of American military bases and guaranteeing the defence of the Philippines from outside aggression. The U.S. also gave large amounts of military aid and assisted the fledgling Philippine government in resisting the Huk rebellion. In recent years, however, a long smouldering rift has ignited U.S. and Filipino policy makers over the dependency and lack of a national identity the Filipino people feel they have incurred as a direct result of the relationship with the U.S. One of the major conflicts has been over the degree of American presence in the Philippines as manifested by the U.S. military bases. Another has concerned economic development and the amount of economic aid and investment promised by the U.S. A third and more recent conflict has been over U.S. support for the now deposed despot Philippine ruler, Ferdinand Marcos, before his ouster from government in 1986. Throughout the post-war alliance, the extent of U.S. security and economic interests in the Philippines dictated to a large degree U.S. policy towards the Filipino government. As a result, U.S. concern for its own interests, in the minds of some Filipinos, took precedence over the best interests of the Filipinos as a whole. They point out that even when it was clear that President Marcos was suffocating the democratic ideal, the U.S. actually increased aid to the Marcos regime. This was done to assure U.S. interests remained intact, at the expense of the Filipino people living under the Marco government. In the transition to the Aquino government, the Filipino people have not forgotten U.S. support for Marcos, who brought suppression and authoritarianism to the Philippines.Consequently, in the early post-war years of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, there was enough mutuality of interests between the two countries, in spite of the economic disagreements, that the Philippine government could still be counted upon to support U.S. objectives and policy in Southeast Asia. In more current times, however, the growing Filipino resentment of ties with the U.S., coupled with the recent political developments within the Philippines, namely the ousting of President Marcos and the continuing domestic unrest under the Aquino government, has cast a shadow over future U.S. relations with the Philippines. This, in turn, has cast U.S. strategic security interests in relation to the Philippines and Southeast Asia in an uncertain light as well. The purpose of this study, therefore, will be to examine how American policy towards the Philippines has affected U.S. security interests in the past, both in Southeast Asia and in the Philippines, and what the future holds for U.S. security interests in the region, especially in regard to the continuing unrest in the Philippine domestic political scene. I will pursue essentially three primary questions in the course of the study: 1) exactly what were the factors that influenced and/or enhanced security relations between the Philippines and the U.S. during the immediate post-war period, and, more specifically, what this relationship entailed in relation to U.S. defence and strategic doctrine; 2) what internal and external factors within both countries upset this previously harmonious relationship; and 3) what the shift in U.S. support from Marcos to Aquino, and also the political shift in the Philippines itself from dictatorship to factionalized "democratic" rule under Aquino, means for U.S. security interests both in the Philippines and the surrounding region. The first chapter will begin with a brief historical overview of the U.S.-Philippine alliance beginning with the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines from Spain in 1898. Vestiges of the great-power rivalry played a determinant role in U.S.-Philippine relations, as did the indigenous situation with the Philippines itself, and these factors will continue to influence future relations. Therefore, a clear understanding of the treaties and defence agreements between the two countries, and the place of the Philippines in U.S. defence doctrine in a historical perspective will allow for a clearer contrast with the current political relationship. The second chapter will deal specifically with U.S.-Philippine security relations during the Marcos regime. Sovereignty and jurisdiction over the U.S military bases first became a major point of conflict under Marcos and remains a prominent issue in the Aquino government. During Marcos’s tenure as President, internal factors within the Philippines such as the domestic political turmoil involving the communist rebellion and the disintegration of centralized political authority affected the U.S.-Philippine security relationship. External factors such as U.S. trade and investment in the Philippines and new relations with other countries, most notably the Soviet Union, have also affected this relationship and have set in motion feelings and demands concerning the U.S. presence in the Philippines that have carried over to the Aquino government. The third chapter will discuss current U.S. and Philippine security interests. These security interests include the naval and air installations on the Philippine Islands themselves (as well as the upcoming lease re-negotiations), the stability of Southeast Asia and U.S. defence agreements, the ASEAN countries and their security concerns, and the containment of a growing Soviet presence in the region, especially in light of the Soviet military bases in Vietnam. The concluding chapter will deal with the consequences of past U.S. policies and how those will influence future relations, especially the upcoming military base lease negotiations. It will assess the U.S. position in the Philippines, in the light of its past relationship, in an attempt to determine the implications for future U.S. strategic interests. I will also attempt to discern, based on the past U.S.-Philippine relationship, whether the current and future relationship will remain beneficial to U.S. security interests, or, conversely, if the Philippines in its current state of political and domestic unrest, poses a "Central American Dilemma" for U.S. policy decisions.

In 1898 the Philippines became a colony of the United States, the result of American economic expansion throughout the nineteenth century. Having been granted independence in 1946, the nominally sovereign Republic of the Philippines remained inextricably linked to the US through restrictive legislation, military bases, and decades of political and socio-economic patronage. In America’s closest developing world ally, and showcase of democratic values, Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos installed a brutal dictatorship in 1972, dramatically marking the end of democracy there. US foreign policy, from the inception of the US-Philippine partnership, failed to substantially resolve endemic poverty and elite political domination. During the Cold War, the discourse through which State Department policy was conceived helped perpetuate these unequal conditions, whilst also at times explicitly encouraging authoritarian solutions to domestic problems. As the Cold War escalated through the 1960s, especially in Vietnam, US officials insisted the Philippines provide military and ideological solidarity with US Cold War objectives at the expense of effectively addressing the roots of domestic instability. The Philippine example serves as the clearest case of the outcomes and impact of US foreign policy across the developing world, and thus must be considered an essential starting point when considering the United States’ Cold War experience. Based on extensive primary research from across the United Kingdom and the United States, this thesis re-examines and re-connects the historiography of colonialism, neo-colonialism, Southeast Asia, and Cold War studies. Nowhere did the US have such a long and intimate history of influence and partnerships than in the Philippines, and yet Marcos’s regime emerged there; this dissertation presents an analytical lens through which to measure the role of US foreign policy in creating a dictatorship.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003.
Thesis advisor(s): Edward A. Olsen, Jeffrey Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 141-148). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, March, 2009.
Title from PDF t.p. Release of full electronic text on OhioLINK has been delayed until April 1, 2014. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108)

In the age of globalisation dominated by mass communication, the flow of information contributes to a big extent to the worldviews of its "global citizens". From this point of view the mass media can be seen as one of the most salient sources of cross-cultural communication. This study investigates mass communication across cultures, focusing on South East Asia (Malaysia and Singapore), Australia and Germany. The centre of attention is the Western media coverage of South East Asia and vice versa. In this context a content analysis of newspapers of the three regions has been conducted. In addition, working practices and conditions of Western foreign correspondents in South East Asia have been examined. Apart from the investigation of inter-cultural media coverage, another focus of attention will be the examination of two levels of communication: The business level, concentrating on issues like e.g. the Asian business etiquette; and the private level, looking into the transition to a different culture from the perspective of Australian and German expatriates. Apart from investigating mass communication across cultures and to provide a written analysis of the findings, a series of radio documentaries in English and in German has been produced. They cover the following issues: Foreign correspondents in South East Asia, the expatriate-lifestyle of Australians and Germans in South East Asia, business etiquette in Asia, student exchange Germany-Asia, image and prejudices East-West and Tourism.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

The inauguration of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Bangkok in 1996 was celebrated with enthusiasm and hopes in the two regions because this region-to-region forum represented a breakthrough in Asia-Europe relations and a unique arrangement: it did not include the United States (US) and was the first forum to which Asian countries have been summoned as a group to sit vis-a-vis their Europeans counterparts. However, the enthusiasm soon shifted toward pessimism and criticism after the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 and following the war against terrorism after 9/11. ASEM, however, has survived despite the many criticisms about its ineffectiveness. Why have Southeast Asian countries maintained the ASEM process? How do the participants in the ASEM process perceive this inter-regional institution? This thesis addresses the question 'What has ASEM delivered to Southeast Asian countries?' It aims not only to investigate the insights into ASEM from state and non-state actors in Southeast Asia but also to examine the reasons for the longevity of ASEM from Southeast Asian perspectives. The main data for this research were collected through 82 in-depth interviews in six countries with interviewees comprised of state and non-state actors from ASEAN as well as non-ASEAN countries. The results of the research contribute to the study of ASEM and ASEAN, and to an understanding of wider regional institutions in Asia. The thesis finds that ASEM has delivered significant outcomes for Southeast Asian countries due to the functions of the ASEM forums in facilitating regional identity-building and in pursuing foreign policy advantages for ASEAN countries. The interactions in the ASEM region-to-region forums helped facilitate the development of Asian identity or identities through the frequent social interaction among leaders and elites. A sense of regional awareness resulted from the cognitive process and collective experience in the ASEM process, which in turn, has been used by ASEAN and other East Asian countries for other forums. The case study on Myanmar's accession to ASEM highlights the success of the Asian countries in extracting foreign policy benefits from ASEM by taking advantage of its inter-regional meeting format. Despite its neglected position in regional affairs, ASEM has delivered strategic advantages for ASEAN countries. In addition, the findings reveal that ASEM's informal institutional arrangements are shaped by Southeast Asian countries. The informality has helped circumvent complexities in the inter-regional relations, thus, not only contributing to the longevity of the inter-regional relations between Asian and European countries but also accommodating the need of Southeast Asian countries for informal and non-binding cooperative institutions. In general, the ASEM process and institution have been conducted in line with'ASEAN way'. Maintaining ASEM by continuing to attend the summits and joining relevant initiatives seems to be more useful than killing it off. ASEM can be considered as a low-cost form of diplomacy that can be useful in times of crisis.

Sovereignty is commonly regarded as the quintessential principle of pluralism within international society, allowing states to co-exist despite their different domestic political systems. Thus, the institution of sovereignty is central to explanations of non-Western states' membership of an expanding international society that originated among European states with a shared history and culture. A precondition for membership of international society, the institutionalisation of sovereignty displaced existing political structures and transformed local conceptions of the polity. Therefore, even as a 'pluralist' institution, sovereignty has had far reaching normative implications for the development of these 'new' states. Yet research on non-Western approaches to sovereignty is usually confined to a survey of post{u00AD}colonial states' enthusiastic embrace of this institution. There is little discussion of either how sovereignty was institutionalised within these states or how non-Western actors may have contributed to the development of understandings of sovereignty within international society. In light of these lacunae, I investigate the institutionalisation of sovereignty within a specific non-Western region, namely Southeast Asia, and explore sovereignty as an institution constitutive of, and yet also constituted by, Southeast Asian polities as they entered international society. In doing so, I ask the following research questions: How is sovereignty understood in Southeast Asia? How did processes of international socialisation and local conceptions of political authority interact to condition the construction of postcolonial understandings and practices of sovereignty in Southeast Asia? I argue that sovereignty has formed an institutional nexus between Southeast Asian polities and the contemporary international society of states. In case studies of Burma, Malaysia and Thailand, I illustrate how sovereignty has continuously structured regional polities' international relations, from the height of imperialism in the 19th Century through to the present day post-colonial period. The institutionalisation of sovereignty in Southeast Asia commenced in the19th Century with European states' recognition of regional rulers as sovereigns, who incurred obligations, as well as rights, on behalf of their respective realms. The process proved reconstitutive of Southeast Asian polities, recasting their identities as well as regulating their interactions within international society. Regional elites not only advanced sovereignty claims in their international diplomacy, but they also began to modify their understandings of local political authority in response to these European expectations. However, European states often regarded Southeast Asian rulers as failing to meet their sovereign obligations. Consequently, European states undertook varying degrees of intervention, on the premise that while sovereignty constituted a universal principle by which territory ought to be governed, the bearer of sovereignty need not be coterminous with the territory in which sovereignty was exercised. The emergence of the principle of self-determination in the 20th Century shifted states' conceptions of sovereignty within international society, such that the state was to be representative of the political community over which it exercised sovereignty. While the growth of claims to self-determination in Southeast Asia delegitimised European empires in the region, the shape that regional political communities would take was by no means self-evident. Different groups presented competing visions of the political community after independence and post-colonial states in the region faced the challenge of reconciling their sovereignty with different, pre-existing conceptions of legitimate political authority. Therefore, rather than simply transplanting this 'Western' institution into the region, Southeast Asian elites have localised their sovereignty claims in response to existing understandings of political authority. The resulting differences in the scope of states' sovereignty illustrate how regional elites have reinterpreted this institution in light of local understandings of legitimacy, thereby 'adding' their own normative content to this institution.

The thesis is a study of Richard Casey and the Department of External Affairs in the 1950s, and the policies proposed or adopted by the Department in relation to three Asian nations: China, Indochina and Indonesia. This will illuminate the workings of a key government department that was at the front line of the early Cold War. The 1950s was a crucial decade in fostering relationships with Australia’s northern neighbours, many either emerging from, or fighting against, colonial rule. The actions of the Minister for External Affairs and his Department, whether positive or negative, would lay the foundations of Australian foreign policy for future decades. The thesis explores the ways in which Casey approached different regions in Asia in order to provide an analytical framework of how his policies toward Asia developed over time. The thesis examines whether Casey’s ideas about Asia were influenced by the particular circumstances of each country or whether other imperatives determined his approach to Asia. A study of Casey’s tenure in External Affairs will also involve an analysis of the level of support for Casey and his department both within Federal Cabinet and from Prime Minister Menzies.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been in existence for twenty years. It was formed in Bangkok, Thailand in August 1967. ASEAN now comprises six countries, namely, the five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; and A SEA N ’s newest member, Brunei Darussalam, which joined in January 1984.

The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development of South and Southeast Asia developed out of a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon, January 1950. To date, few scholars have examined the Colombo Plan in any significant detail and most assessments focus on the development of educational links between Australia and Asia, largely because of the significant numbers of scholars who came to Australia under the scheme. This thesis explores the Colombo Plan from a variety of perspectives, focusing on the economic, political, social and strategic context surrounding the emergence and implementation of the program between 1950 and 1965. This thesis argues that the Colombo Plan had a much broader political and cultural agenda, and cannot be understood from a humanitarian perspective alone. The Colombo Plan was an attempt to counter communist expansion in the newly independent nations of Southeast Asia by raising living standards and thus removing the conditions considered likely to create popular sympathy for communist forces. More significantly, the Colombo Plan, with its modernist assumptions about the importance of development, technology and social progress, was to be a vehicle for the transmission of Western values. By exploring the cultural, ideological and political underpinnings of the Colombo Plan, this thesis illustrates that the plan was an important part of Australian foreign policy, and was motivated by international security priorities and the need to allay domestic cultural concerns. One of the important ways Australia expressed and promoted its political and economic interests in the Asian region was through the Colombo Plan. This scheme functioned as a humanitarian program intended to improve the living conditions in Asian countries, however, it also operated as ‘unspoken propaganda’ designed to improve trade relations, establish diplomatic and cultural contacts, and help deflect criticism of the White Australia Policy. This examination of the Colombo Plan reveals the changing nature of Australia’s regional identity and the nature of its engagement with Asia during the 1950s and early 1960s.

The thesis is a study of Richard Casey and the Department of External Affairs in the 1950s, and the policies proposed or adopted by the Department in relation to three Asian nations: China, Indochina and Indonesia. This will illuminate the workings of a key government department that was at the front line of the early Cold War. The 1950s was a crucial decade in fostering relationships with Australia’s northern neighbours, many either emerging from, or fighting against, colonial rule. The actions of the Minister for External Affairs and his Department, whether positive or negative, would lay the foundations of Australian foreign policy for future decades. The thesis explores the ways in which Casey approached different regions in Asia in order to provide an analytical framework of how his policies toward Asia developed over time. The thesis examines whether Casey’s ideas about Asia were influenced by the particular circumstances of each country or whether other imperatives determined his approach to Asia. A study of Casey’s tenure in External Affairs will also involve an analysis of the level of support for Casey and his department both within Federal Cabinet and from Prime Minister Menzies.

From 1975 to 1981 the governments of the ASEAN states claimed that changes in their regional strategic environment, resulting from thee seizure of power by communist regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and from Vietnam's subsequent invasion and occupation of Cambodia, seriously threatened the security of their countries. Objectively, the most serious threat that the ASEAN states faced as a result of the 1975 communist victories in Indochina was the implicit challenge posed to the somewhat fragile political, social, and economic status quo in non-communist Southeast Asia by the emergence of this radical new political order and, potentially an alternative developmental model, in Indochina. But the ASEAN governments did not wish to highlight their own countries' political, social and economic weaknesses, and for this reason did not emphasize this type of threat. They did, however, claim that Vietnam presented a direct military threat to the region, especially after the 1978 invasion of Cambodia. After 1978, the ASEAN governments also expressed concern about the implications for their countries' security of Hanoi's increasingly close military relationship with the Soviet Union. Successive administrations in Bangkok accused the Indochinese communist regimes of supporting revolutionary movements in Thailand, particularly in the northeast. All ASEAN governments claimed that the flow of refugees from Indochina after the 1975 communist victories, and particularly in 1978-79, threatened security, especially in terms off the possible impact on socioeconomic stability in countries granting 'first asylum'. The ASEAN governments' declarations regarding their security concerns did not always reflect objective threat assessments, often exaggerating and misrepresenting the dangers posed by developments in Indochina. To some extent this may be explained by the distorting influence on policy-makers' perceptions of an array of 'background factors', including the region's internal and external historical international relationships, the foreign policies of the Indochinese States after 1975, the policies of major extra-regional powers, and domestic political and socioeconomic problems in the ASEAN states. But there is also substantial evidence that some of the ASEAN governments - - or at least factions within them - - purposely manipulated various security threats related to Indochina, to fulfil their own domestic and international political objectives. From 1975 to 1978, the ASEAN governments were broadly successful in containing and managing their security concerns with Indochina, although this success was not due only to their skilful diplomacy. Despite frequently declared hostility towards ASEAN and its members, the communist Indochinese regimes displayed willingness to cooperate with non-communist Southeast Asia in order to facilitate post-war reconstruction. The ASEAN states' 'success' in managing their security concerns with Indochina was reinforced by the willingness of all parties to the intra-communist dispute, which broke out in Indochina in 1977-78, to seek more harmonious relationships with non-communist Southeast Asia. Moreover, it became increasingly clear that Indochinese communism would not, in the foreseeable future, present citizens of the ASEAN states with an attractive alternative political and developmental model.However, the higher profile which the ASEAN governments adopted in managing their security concerns with Indochina after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia may have been, on balance, counter-productive in terms of their countries' security, both in relaxation to Indochina and more generally. In particular, the Cambodian stalemate, to which ASEAN's policy contributed, was detrimental to the security of the Association's members in a number of ways, as the involvement of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia intensified, the division between communist and non-communist Southeast Asia hardened, ASEAN's cohesion was strained, and the ASEAN governments' increased their defence expenditures in contrast with their earlier emphasis on achieving security through economic and social development.

Singapore became an independent state on 9 August 1965, six months after United States forces landed in Vietnam in March 1965. As part of an effort to contain the influence of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in Southeast Asia, Washington deployed a strategy that encompassed political, economic and defence engagements with non-communist countries in the region. Because of its strategic location and significant population of overseas Chinese, Singapore became a key country in Washington’s policy towards Southeast Asia. Between 1965 and 1975, Washington aimed to maintain its access to Singapore’s naval dockyards and to keep the island state’s economy viable, so as to limit the risk of communist subversion in Singapore. The Singapore government’s objectives were to preserve its legitimacy to govern by developing Singapore’s economy and boosting its security during the Cold War. In order to gain international recognition of its independence after separation from Malaysia, the Singapore government decided to join the Non-aligned Movement and maintained an image of neutralism in the bipolar conflict between the US and the USSR. After a rocky start in the US-Singapore relationship in late 1965, America’s relations with Singapore improved in 1966. Nevertheless, the Singapore government seemed to distance itself from the US while drawing nearer to the Soviet Union between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Drawing from archival documents from the United States, Britain and Australia, this dissertation presents a history of US-Singapore foreign relations during the period of the Vietnam War, and argues that relations between the two countries were determined by the interplay of America’s policy of containment and Singapore’s attempt at projecting a non-aligned foreign policy stance. Although the first decade of Singapore’s independence established the United States as an indispensable contributor to Singapore’s economic growth and security during the Cold War, the process was not always smooth because the leaders in both countries recognised that their interests were best met when Singapore and the US maintained political distance from each other. This study adds to a current trend in Cold War historiography in Southeast Asia by demonstrating how American strategy was influenced by smaller states such as Singapore. The Singapore government attempted to sway US strategy in the region and was able to achieve its goals when it played the Soviet card. Non-communist Southeast Asian leaders, including Lee Kuan Yew, exerted pressure on the US government to maintain troops in Vietnam and prolonged the Vietnam war. This study establishes a link between a prosperous Southeast Asia and a Vietnam that became a war zone and proposes that Singapore was able to prosper not only due to good governance, but also because of America’s interest in keeping Singapore economically viable.

This thesis studies China’s policy towards ASEAN in Deng Xiaoping’s era by examining its general trends, and examining China’s policies and actions in the issues of Soviet/Vietnam “hegemonism” (1978- 82), the expanding ASEAN-Taiwan de facto official relations, the Western human rights campaign in Asia, the Spratly dispute, and China’s relations with the ASEAN-based communist insurgencies. By examining those general trends, as well as specific policies and actions in those issues, the thesis demonstrates that because of developments in the domestic, regional and international situations, Deng’s China has five main objectives in its ASEAN policy. These objectives are: to create and secure a tranquil regional environment in which China can concentrate on its modernisation; to maintain the legitimacy of the Chinese government and political system, both at home and in the changing world order; to protect China’s sovereignty; to shore up China’s international and regional influence; and to increase economic benefit from trading with, and attracting investment from, the ASEAN countries, and from making some ASEAN countries give up their attempts to slow down Western economic and technological assistance to China.

This thesis examines the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) sent to French Indochina, from 1950 to 1956, when the United States provided major monetary and material aid to the French in their war against the communist Viet Minh. MAAG observed French units in the field and monitored the flow of American materiel into the region. Relying upon primary research in the National Archives, the thesis departs from previous interpretations by showing that MAAG held generally positive assessments of France‟s performance in Indochina. The thesis also argues that MAAG personnel were more interested in getting material support to the French, than in how that material was used, to the point of making unrealistic assessments of French combat abilities. By connecting primary research with the greater history of Cold War American military assistance, the thesis contributes to the scholarship on American involvement in Vietnam.