Journal articles: 'Sociology, Military Indonesia'

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Ginting, Jamin, and Axel Victor Christian. "Indonesian Military Court Law Absolute Competence through Equality before the Law Principle." International Journal of Criminology and Sociology 10 (October 28, 2021): 1422–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.163.

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Law Number 31 Year 1997 regulates the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Military Court to handle military members who commit a general crime and military crime based on the Indonesian Penal Code and Indonesian Military Code respectively. However, the General Court also retains jurisdiction over the military members who commit a general crime based on the Indonesian Penal Code. In comparison, Indonesian Civilians who commit a general crime based on the Indonesian Penal Code are only under the General Court. This condition is against the principle of equality before the law as stated in Article 28D.1 of the 1945 Constitution. Indonesia as a state of law must hold this principle. Authors use normative legal research to solve the law issues by reviewing the related laws and the law principles in Indonesia.

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Sluimers, László. "The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 19–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400010651.

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The article deals with the question of whether during the Pacific War there was a community of interest between the Japanese military and Indonesian nationalists. This point is mainly denied. Nationalists did want to use the Japanese to oust Dutch rule, but as soon as this was effected relations soured. The Japanese military wanted to use Indonesia as a source of the raw materials essential for war, and as a reservoir of labour. The Indonesians wished to settle their own affairs without any outside interference. These objectives were incompatible.

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Beeson, Mark. "Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines." Armed Forces & Society 34, no. 3 (February 13, 2008): 474–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x07303607.

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Aminuddin, M. Faishal. "The Purnawirawan and Party Development in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, 1998–2014." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 36, no. 2 (August 2017): 3–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341703600201.

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This study examines the role played by purnawirawan (retired military officers) in political party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The role of purnawirawan remains a critical research gap in the literature on democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia, particularly in studies which focus on civilian–military relations. The article finds that purnawirawan have had a significant impact on the creation of a new type of party – one which combines military-centred leadership and civilian-controlled management. This new arrangement has enabled these former military officers to protect their interests. This study contributes to the existing literature on the impact of military reform on the increasing numbers of purnawirawan turning to civilian politics in order to maintain influence via electoral political contestation in the context of democratic transition.

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Haripin, Muhamad, and Natalie Sambhi. "Civil-military Relations in Indonesia: The Politics of Military Operations Other Than War." Contemporary Southeast Asia 42, no. 3 (December 10, 2020): 446. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/cs42-3k.

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Kipp, Rita Smith. "INDONESIA IN 2003: Terror's Aftermath." Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (January 2004): 62–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.1.62.

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Abstract Several bombings that targeted international capital or the Indonesian government put a chill on tourism and foreign investment, but despite high-profile investigations and trials, doubts that these were home-grown acts of Islamic terrorism remain pervasive. Military action in Aceh, continuing corruption, and lack of progress on legal reform suggest to many that post-New Order reformasi has stalled.

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Bilveer, Singh. "Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Change amidst Continuity." Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 4 (July 2000): 607–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x0002600406.

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Chandra, Siddharth, and Douglas Kammen. "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation." World Politics 55, no. 1 (October 2002): 96–136. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0001.

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This article examines the importance of the internal structural dynamics of the military in the analysis of transitions from nondemocratic rule and in democratic consolidation. The authors argues that factors endogenous to the military—including variations in the size of the officer corps, solidarity among graduating classes from the military academy, and promotional prospects—are important determinants of the political behavior of militaries. As a case study, military structure and politics during Indonesia's recent transition from nondemocratic rule and current consolidation of democracy are explored in detail. While the ongoing interaction between civilians and the military is acknowledged, systematic structural features are identified as being important for understanding the behavior of the Indonesian military between 1998 and 2001. The authors compare and contrast the study of Indonesia with other cases in the literature on transitions—including Ghana, Nigeria, Portugal, and Thailand—and discuss resulting implications for the study of transitions and consolidations.

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Wangge, Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi. "Civil–Military Relations during Transition and Post-Democratisation Periods: A View from Southeast Asia." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 36, no. 2 (August 2017): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341703600205.

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The civil–military dynamic in Southeast Asia has been a contested issue for years. Although most countries in the region have been undertaken democratic governance, the military role in politics remains relatively unresolved. After having relatively stable civilian governments for over a decade, the Thai military launched another coup in 2014 to topple a democratically elected government. In Indonesia and the Philippines, the military has been moderately controlled by the democratically elected civilian governments, but their professional roles in sustaining democratic principles and values are also questionable. Accordingly, the crucial issues are the role that the military plays in the transition period, such as in Thailand, and the degree to which the military is institutionalised under civilian control in nascent democracies, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. These issues are addressed in the books discussed herein.

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10

Lee, Terence. "The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia." Asian Survey 40, no. 4 (July 1, 2000): 692–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3021189.

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Lee, Terence. "The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia." Asian Survey 40, no. 4 (July 2000): 692–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2000.40.4.01p0094f.

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12

Crouch, Harold. "Military‐civilian relations in Indonesia in the late Soeharto era." Pacific Review 1, no. 4 (January 1988): 353–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748808718785.

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Widiasari, Natalia. "Submarine sinking renews calls for military hardware modernization in Indonesia." Asian Politics & Policy 13, no. 4 (October 2021): 631–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12609.

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Liddle, R. William, and Saiful Mujani. "Indonesia in 2005: A New Multiparty Presidential Democracy." Asian Survey 46, no. 1 (January 2006): 132–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.1.132.

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Newly elected President Yudhoyono and Vice President Kalla scored successes despite initial lack of parliamentary support. Kalla took control of Golkar, the largest party, and a tentative peace was achieved in Aceh. Economic policy was entrusted to a strong team of technocrats. Military relations with the United States were fully restored.

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15

Tajima, Yuhki. "Explaining Ethnic Violence in Indonesia: Demilitarizing Domestic Security." Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 3 (December 2008): 451–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800006500.

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Recent scholarship on communal violence in Indonesia since the late New Order has focused on identifying causal mechanisms of particular subtypes of communal violence such as large-scale communal violence, town-level communal rioting, intervillage violence, and lynching. While such analyses are useful in understanding aspects specific to each subtype of violence, analyzing each subtype separately risks the analytical problem of selection on the dependent variable if there are important similarities across subtypes. Drawing on the observation that each of these subtypes appeared to rise and fall together since the late New Order, I propose a common factor that can explain the broad temporal patterns of communal violence. In particular, I point to increasing restraints on the military that arose from intraregime infighting, greater scrutiny of military actions during theketerbukaan(political openness) period, and the withdrawal of the military from police duties during Reformasi. I examine four cases of communal conflict: (1) a case in which intravillage violence was averted, (2) a case of lynching, (3) a case of lynching and subsequent intervillage reprisals, and (4) a case of large-scale communal violence. The first three cases are from Lampung province, and the fourth is the case of Poso district, Central Sulawesi.

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16

Zakharov, Anton. "Campaign Medals of Indonesia." ISTORIYA 12, no. 12-2 (110) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840009506-5.

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The orders, decorations and medals of Indonesia are bit a mystery for scholars and even collectors. Indonesia proclaimed its Independence on August 17, 1945. Since that date, the Indonesian government has elaborated a full-fledged awards system. The last important amendments took place in 2009 when the Law No. 20 “About the titles, medals and decorations” was signed by the then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 20 Tahun 2009 tentang Gelar, Tanda Jasa, dan Tanda Kehormatan). Currently there are fourteen orders (bintang) and over thirty medals (satyalancana) in the Indonesian awards system. Several orders and medals became obsolete. In total, there are about fifty governmental medals in the history of Indonesia since Independence. But if one adds classes of several service medals, the count ever increases. My paper examines the campaign medals of the Republic of Indonesia. Those are The Seven Paths or Faithful Warrior Medal (Satyalancana Saptamarga), The First and Second Independence Wars Medals (Satyalancana-Satyalancana Peristiwa/ Satyalancana Perang Kemerdekaan kesatu dan kedua), The Campaign Medals I—VII (Satyalancana-Satyalancana Gerakan Operasi MiliterI—VII), The Pioneer of the Independence Movement Medal (Satyalancana Perintis Pergerakan Kemerdekaan), The Faithful Service or Satya Dharma Medal (Satyalancana Satya Dharma), The Courage or Wira Dharma Medal (Satyalancana Wira Dharma), The Defender Medal or Medal for Combatting Communism (Satyalancana Penegak), The Eighth Campaign Medal “The Defender of the Law” (Satyalancana Gerakan Operasi MiliterVIII “ Dharma Phala”), The Ninth Campaign Medal “The Giant of Duties” (Satyalancana Gerakan Operasi MiliterIX “Raksaka Dharma”), and The Lotus or Timor Military Campaign Medal (Satyalancana Seroja). There are two basic types of Indonesian campaign medals. The first type has the round form with a wavy edge. The second type is the pentagonal star with concave sides and with balls on the vertexes of all the angles. The latter type reflects the State ideology of the Five Principles (Pancasila) proclaimed by Sukarno in 1945. The first type of campaign medals seemingly reflects the connections between fire, virility, masculinity and military actions in the traditional Javanese culture; at least, the traditional Javanese dagger Kris often has a wavy blade.

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17

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Analyzing Collective Violence in Indonesia: An Overview." Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 3 (December 2008): 341–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800006469.

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In 2001, using violent junctures in the life of a seventy-year-old Indonesian as a metaphor for the whole nation, Benedict Anderson summarized the history of violence in Indonesia in a poignant manner:A seventy year old Indonesian woman or man today will have observed and/or directly experienced the following: as a primary school age child, the police-state authoritarianism of … Dutch colonial rule …; as a young teenager, the wartime Japanese military regime, which regularly practiced torture in private and executions in public …; on the eve of adulthood, four years (1945–49) of popular struggle for national liberation … at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives; as a young mother or father … the cataclysm of 1965–66, when at least 600,000 and perhaps as many as two million people … were slaughtered by the military; in the middle age, the New Order police-state, and its bloody attempt to annex East Timor, which cost over 200,000 East Timorese lives …; in old age, the spread of armed resistance in … Aceh and West Papua, the savage riots of May 1998 … and … the outbreak of ruthless internecine confessional warfare in the long peaceful Moluccas. (Anderson 2001, 9–10)

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18

Crouch, Melissa. "The Expansion of Emergency Powers: Social Conflict and the Military in Indonesia." Asian Studies Review 41, no. 3 (June 15, 2017): 459–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2017.1332005.

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19

Kosandi, Meidi, and Subur Wahono. "Military Reform in the Post‐New Order Indonesia: A Transitional or a New Subtle Role in Indonesian Democracy?" Asian Politics & Policy 12, no. 2 (April 2020): 224–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12534.

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20

Himawan, Eunike Mutiara, Winnifred Louis, and Annie Pohlman. "Indonesian civilians’ attributions for anti-Chinese violence during the May 1998 riots in Indonesia." Journal of Social and Political Psychology 10, no. 2 (October 12, 2022): 536–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.5489.

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The present research examines the perceptions of Indonesian civilians regarding the May 1998 riots, which occurred at the end of the period of military dictatorship in Indonesia and included looting, rapes, and murders, disproportionately targeting Chinese Indonesians. Using a mixed methods approach, the research explores the intersectionality of ethnicity and gender as factors associated with perceptions of the extent and causes of the riots. It aims to contribute to the literature concerning the Ultimate Attribution Error, and to the psychology of intergroup relations in non-WEIRD contexts more broadly. An online survey with qualitative and quantitative components was administered to 235 participants (134 Pribumi and 101 Chinese Indonesian participants). The present research provides what may be the first documentation of civilian perceptions of the May 1998 riots. Significant differences consistent with the Ultimate Attribution Error were found between perpetrator and victim groups’ accounts. Participants who are Pribumi (the group involved in perpetrating the violence) attributed the causes of the violence to external factors more strongly, while participants who are Chinese Indonesians (the victim group) attributed the causes of the mass violence more strongly to the internal factors of perpetrators. There was no evidence, however, that gender affected perceptions, despite the gendered nature of the violence.

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Tun, Sai Khaing Myo. "A Comparative Study of State-Led Development in Myanmar (1988–2010) and Suharto's Indonesia: An Approach from the Developmental State Theory." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 69–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341103000103.

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This article explores the institutionalization of state-led development in Myanmar after 1988 in comparison with Suharto's Indonesia. The analysis centres on the characteristics and theory of developmental states that emerged from the studies of East Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In Southeast Asia, Suharto's Indonesia was perceived as a successful case and was studied by scholars in line with the characteristics of the developmental state. The Tatmadaw (military) government in Myanmar was believed to follow the model of state-led development in Indonesia under Suharto where the military took the role of establishing economic and political development. However, Myanmar has yet to achieve its goal of building a successful state-led development. Therefore, this paper argues that implementing an efficient and effective institutionalization is essential for a successful state-led development (developmental state) in Myanmar.

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22

George, Kenneth M. "Some Things That Have Happened toThe Sun After September 1965: Politics and the Interpretation of an Indonesian Painting." Comparative Studies in Society and History 39, no. 4 (October 1997): 603–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001041750002082x.

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As most tell the story, the mysterious and fearful twilight of Sukarno's Indonesia began in Jakarta sometime after sundown on the last day of September 1965. That night and in the early hours of October 1, a group led by leftist, middle-ranking military officers calling themselves the September Thirtieth Movement kidnapped and killed six generals in an attempted putsch. In its radio broadcasts the following morning, the movement announced its loyalty to President Sukarno and claimed that it had acted in order to thwart a coup planned by a ‘Council of Generals.’ In the year leading up to the putsch, the president's hold on power had been strained by the increasing polarization between the army and disaffected Muslims on the one hand, and Sukarno and the PKI—the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Kommunis Indonesia)— on the other. Sukarno's ill health, factionalism within military ranks, and the shadow of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) only added to the anxiety and uncertainty. It is unclear whether this Council of Generals had anything more than a phantom existence. What is clear is that the head of the strategic reserve command in Jakarta, Major General Soeharto, was quick to manipulate the situation and bring the movement to a halt within hours. In an evening radio broadcast on October 1, Soeharto described the putsch as a counter-revolutionary movement and told listeners that the army and police under his leadership had regained control.

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23

Slater, Dan. "Violent Origins of Authoritarian Variation: Rebellion Type and Regime Type in Cold War Southeast Asia." Government and Opposition 55, no. 1 (May 16, 2018): 21–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.4.

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AbstractDictatorships are every bit as institutionally diverse as democracies, but where does this variation come from? This article argues that different types of internal rebellion influence the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes. The critical question is whether rebel forces primarily seek to seize state power or to escape it. Regional rebellions seeking toescapethe state raise the probability of a military-dominated authoritarian regime, since they are especially likely to unify the military while heightening friction between civilian and military elites. Leftist rebellions seeking toseizethe state are more likely to give rise to civilian-dominated dictatorships by inspiring ‘joint projects’ in which military elites willingly support party-led authoritarian rule. Historical case studies of Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam illustrate the theory, elaborating how different types of violent conflict helped produce different types of dictatorships across the breadth of mainland and island Southeast Asia during the Cold War era.

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Lundry, Chris. "Victimhood and Denial: Recent Scholarship on the Legacy of the Indonesian Mass Murders of 1965-66." Estudios de Asia y África 58, no. 1 (December 22, 2022): 177–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.24201/eaa.v58i1.2864.

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Recent scholarship continues to shed light on the 1965-66 anti-communist massacres in Indonesia, as well as its effect on Cold War politics around the globe. John Roosa’s Buried Histories: The Anti-Communist Massacres of 1965-66 in Indonesia (2020) is his third book on the subject, and explains, through rigorous case studies, some of the variation in the scope of the killings due to the role of the military and militias. Vincent Bevins’ The Jakarta Method: Washington’s Anticommunist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World (2020) argues that the Indonesian case became a “playbook” for other right-leaning forces to crush communism in Latin America and elsewhere, and has left a legacy of legitimized violence from which many have not yet recovered.

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Lachica, Eduardo. "Book Review: Said, S. (2006). Legitimizing Military Rule: Indonesian Armed Forces Ideology, 1958-2000. Foreword by Juwono Sudarsono. Jakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Sinar Harapan in cooperation with the Southeast Asian Centre, Hong Kong, and Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia. Said, S. (2006). Soeharto's Armed Forces: Problems of Civil Military Relations in Indonesia. Foreword by Harold Crouch. Jakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Sinar Harapan." Armed Forces & Society 35, no. 2 (January 2009): 405–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x07313634.

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Rahman, Bambang Arif. "Islamic revival and cultural diversity; pesantren’s configuration in contemporary Aceh, Indonesia." Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 12, no. 1 (June 4, 2022): 201–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i1.201-229.

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This study aims at investigating the extent to which pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Aceh, Indonesia have flourished in encountering multicultural situations in the post-disaster of a massive tsunami and post-separatist-military conflict through the lens of Islamic revivalism. A decade and a half after the gigantic natural disaster in 2004 and the protracted bloody conflict, Aceh underwent various changes in social, economic, political, educational, and religious areas. In the educational and religious sectors, a pivotal metamorphose took place in pesantren as a means of Islamic revival, where this Islamic boarding school has transformed into multicultural institutions. Using a qualitative design, this study observed a small number of pesantren in Aceh, interviewed their key stakeholders, and analyzed pesantren documents. The findings show that pesantren cultures in contemporary Aceh differ from previous monolithic traditional Islamic schools in curriculum, characteristics, typology, and affiliation. This change is a unique mark of an Islamic revival following the influx of the plural Indonesian and of the world communities to Aceh after the catastrophe and violence with their heterogeneous aids and cultural settings. In addition, the implementation of shari’a (Islamic) law in this special province after both tragedies confirmed the work of the Islamic revival, though many nationalists sharply criticize this sectarian and exclusive law within multicultural countries like Indonesia. However, in this situation, pesantren in Aceh expressed a positive commitment to celebrating cultural diversity through ethnicity respect, religious tolerance, and Indonesian unity rather than endorsing the idea of an Islamic state.

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Mietzner, Marcus. "Overcoming Path Dependence: The Quality of Civilian Control of the Military in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia." Asian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (December 2011): 270–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.628148.

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Hoesterey, James B. "Is Indonesia a Model for the Arab Spring? Islam, Democracy, and Diplomacy." Review of Middle East Studies 47, no. 1 (2013): 56–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2151348100056330.

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As protestors filled Tahrir Square in Cairo in January 2011, Western diplomats, academics, and political pundits were searching for the best political analogy for the promise—and problems—of the Arab Uprising. Whereas neoconservative skeptics fretted that Egypt and Tunisia might go the way of post-revolutionary Iran, Hillary Clinton and Madeleine Albright praised Indonesia’s democratization as the ideal model for the Arab Spring. During her 2009 visit to Indonesia, Clinton proclaimed: “If you want to know whether Islam, democracy, modernity, and women’s rights can coexist, go to Indonesia.” Certainly Indonesia of May 1998 is not Egypt of January 2011, yet some comparisons are instructive. Still reeling from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, middle class Indonesians were fed up with corruption, cronyism, and a military that operated with impunity. On 21 May 1998 Soeharto resigned after three decades of authoritarian rule. Despite fits of starts and stops, the democratic transition has brought political and economic stability. Whereas academics and pundits have debated the merits of the Indonesia model for democratic transition, in this article I consider how the notion of Indonesia as a model for the Arab Spring has reconfigured transnational Muslim networks and recalibrated claims to authority and authenticity within the global umma.An increasing body of scholarship devoted to global Muslim networks offers important insights into the longue durée of merchant traders and itinerant preachers connecting the Middle East with Southeast Asia. In his critique of Benedict Anderson’s famous explanation of “imagined communities” as the result of print capitalism within national borders, historian Michael Laffan argued that Indonesian nationalism had important roots in global Muslim networks connecting the Dutch East Indies with Cairo’s famous al-Azhar University.

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Chairil, Tangguh. "Indonesian Government’s COVID-19 Measures, January–May 2020: Late Response and Public Health Securitization." Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik 24, no. 2 (March 26, 2021): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jsp.55863.

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The Indonesian government’s measures to control the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic can be characterized by late response due to initial de-securitization of the issue, and later securitization that limits its very efficacy in restricting the spread of the pandemic. This article uses securitization theory to analyze the government’s measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic and discusses how the government’s increasing reliance on military figures and national security agencies influences the measures used to control the COVID-19 pandemic. This study finds that initially, the government seemed to be trying to de-securitize the issue, denying warnings that the virus might have existed undetected in Indonesia. Then, after the first cases were confirmed in March 2020, the government responded by securitizing the issue. The delay in the government’s response to COVID-19 caused the audience to not fully accept the government’s securitization efforts because public trust in the government’s measures was already low, while the means of emergency action taken by the government against the threat of COVID-19 are also limited. The government has also been overly reliant on influential military figures and national security agencies. The government also tended to downgrade the threats, lack transparency, and even use the pandemic to crack down on anti-government smears. This article concludes that the government needs to change their approach to COVID-19 measures and prioritize the human security dimension by not downgrading the threats and upholding transparency.

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Lieberman, Victor. "SOME COMPARATIVE THOUGHTS ON PREMODERN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WARFARE." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 46, no. 2 (2003): 215–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852003321675754.

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AbstractBetween c. 1550 and 1650 discrepant political and economic contexts in the central Philippines, northeast Indonesia, and Burma produced distinctive military logics. In the pre-literate, localized societies of the Philippines and the interior of Indonesian islands, raiders sought heads for spiritual power and captives for ransom or labor, but along the coasts of northeast Indonesia wider religious and trade contacts and European-style guns bred a novel interplay between state formation and warfare. In Burma yet larger populations and more complex administrations supported sustained, massive military expeditions. Chronicle accounts of Burmese armies are exaggerated, but it is difficult to quantify those exaggerations or to isolate the cultural imperatives governing chronicle composition.Entre c. 1550 et 1650, les divers contextes politiques et économiques aux Philippines centrales, dans le nord-est de l'Indonésie et en Birmanie ont produit des logiques militaires distinctes. Dans les sociétés illettrées et limitées des Philippines et de l'intérieur des îles indonésiennes, des pillards chassaient des têtes pour gagner le pouvoir spirituel et des captifs pour en tirer rançon ou pour les faire travailler. Mais le long des côtes du nord-est de l'Indonésie, les contacts religieux et commerciaux plus diversifiés, et l'utilisation d'armes à feu de style européen ont engendré un effet réciproque nouveau entre la formation de l'état et la guerre. En Birmanie, les populations plus importantes et les administrations plus complexes ont soutenu des expéditions militaires prolongées et massives. Les rapports dans les chroniques sur les armées birmanes sont exagérés, mais il est difficile de mesurer ces exagérations ou d'isoler les impératifs culturels qui régissaient la composition de ces chroniques.

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Laffan, Michael. "The Forgotten Jihad under Japan: Muslim Reformism and the Promise of Indonesian Independence." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 64, no. 1-2 (March 16, 2021): 125–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341532.

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Abstract In this article I seek to make sense of the apparent contradiction of a call for jihad made under the auspices of the Japanese empire during its occupation of Java from March 1942 to September 1945. Why was Mas Mansur (1896–1946), the Indonesian religious figure and national hero who made the call, so supportive of the Japanese military administration? And why is this act so seldom remembered? As I hope to explain, Japan had already figured in the reformist Muslim imagination as a patriotic anti-western model for decades, creating a constituency that was initially open to Japanese overtures framed around mobilising national sentiment. Equally some Japanese advocates of southern expansion had thought about such framings while downplaying their preferred vision for a Greater East Asia that would not include an independent Indonesia. How this collaboration played out, with the Japanese eventually conceding ground on Islamic terms to gain national bodies, is a story worth retelling. In so doing I stress that Indonesia – lying at the intersection of pan-Islamic and pan-Asian imaginaries – should figure more prominently in global studies of Japanese policies regarding Islam in Asia or yet anti-Westernism in general.

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Arcala Hall, Rosalie. "Civil-military cooperation in international disaster response: the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ deployment in Aceh, Indonesia." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, no. 4 (December 2008): 383–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163270802507310.

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Van Der Eng, Pierre. "Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1947–49." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19, no. 2 (September 1988): 335–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002246340000059x.

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The United States did not give Marshall aid to Western Europe for purely humanitarian reasons. Aid was also, perhaps even mainly, provided to serve the economic and political purposes of the United States. In studies dealing with the Marshall aid programme, the suspension of aid to the Dutch colony of Indonesia, and the seeming threat to halt the stream of dollars to the Netherlands, has been used as an example to prove that the programme was an American instrument of political power. In studies dealing with the decolonization of Indonesia, it is also alleged that the menace of adjournment of Marshall aid forced the Dutch to retreat from their colony in December 1949. However, primary sources show that neither the offer of Marshall aid in June 1947, nor the seeming threat to halt aid to the Netherlands in December 1948, prevented the Dutch government from pursuing its own way in the process leading to the independence of Indonesia. The Dutch cabinet was not sufficiently impressed by both the offer and the threat to keep it from engaging in military “police actions” in July 1947 and December 1948 against the nationalist Republic of Indonesia.

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Morfit, Michael. "The Road To Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia's Democratic Development." International Negotiation 12, no. 1 (2007): 111–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/138234007x191939.

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AbstractDespite considerable skepticism, the August 2005 Helsinki agreement between the Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement were largely successful in resolving nearly 30 years of armed conflict. The December 2006 local elections are now widely recognized as marking the consolidation of that peace agreement. Conventional accounts of the Helsinki negotiations do not capture the complexity and richness of the various political, military, institutional and personal forces at play. A closer examination reveals the extent to which the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding was a key milestone in Indonesia's continuing democratic development.

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Henley, David. "Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere." Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (February 2004): 85–144. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x04001039.

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Historians of Indonesia often think of states, and especially colonial states, as predatory institutions encroaching aggressively on the territory and autonomy of freedom-loving stateless peoples. For Barbara and Leonard Andaya, early European expansion in Sumatra and the Moluccas was synonymous with the distortion or destruction of decentralized indigenous political systems based on cooperation, alliance, economic complementarity, and myths of common ancestry (B. W. Andaya 1993; L. Y. Andaya 1993). Anthony Reid (1997: 81) has described tribal societies like those of the Batak and Minangkabau in highland Sumatra as ‘miracles of statelessness’ which ‘defended their autonomy by a mixture of guerilla warfare, diplomatic flexibility, and deliberate exaggeration of myths about their savagery’ until ultimately overwhelmed by Dutch military power. Before colonialism, in this view, most Indonesians relied for security not on the protection of a powerful king, but on a ‘complex web of contractual mutualities’ embodying a ‘robust pluralism’ (Reid 1998: 29, 32). ‘So persistently’, concludes Reid (1997: 80-1), ‘has each step towards stronger states in the archipelago arisen from trading ports, with external aid and inspiration, that one is inclined to seek the indigenous political dynamic in a genius for managing without states’. Henk Schulte Nordholt (2002: 54), for his part, cautions against any tendency to downplay the violent, repressive aspects of colonial and post-colonial government in Indonesia, expressing the hope that ‘a new Indonesian historiography will succeed in liberating itself from the interests, perspective, and conceptual framework of the state’. An even more systematic attempt to demonize the (modern) state in Indonesia and elsewhere can be found in the work of James Scott (1998a, 1998b).

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henley, david. "population and the means of subsistence: explaining the historical demography of island southeast asia, with particular reference to sulawesi." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (September 8, 2005): 337–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463405000202.

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the phenomenon of low population growth in pre-colonial southeast asia is often interpreted in terms of epidemic disease, internecine warfare or cultural idiosyncracies affecting the birth rate. the modern population boom, in these analyses, results from medical and public health improvements, military pacification or foreign cultural influences. this article, by contrast, argues that in indonesia and the philippines population growth has typically been a result of economic growth, and that the general sparsity of the population in early historical times reflected the low ‘carrying capacity’ of the environments in question under the prevailing economic conditions.

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Singh, Bilveer. "Indonesia History in uniform: Military ideology and the construction of Indonesia's past, By Katharine E. Mcgregor, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007. Pp. 330. ISBN Glossary, Notes, Bibliography, Index." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 38, no. 3 (October 2007): 587–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463407000318.

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Bouwman, Bastiaan. "From religious freedom to social justice: the human rights engagement of the ecumenical movement from the 1940s to the 1970s." Journal of Global History 13, no. 2 (June 21, 2018): 252–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1740022818000074.

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AbstractThis article contributes to the historiography on human rights and (religious) internationalism by tracing how the ecumenical movement in the post-war decades sought to protect the religious freedom of its co-religionists in Catholic and Muslim countries, specifically Italy, Nigeria, and Indonesia. In cooperation with local actors, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs worked to anchor international human rights in the domestic sphere through constitutional provisions. These activities constituted a significant strand of Christian human rights engagement from the 1940s to the 1960s, which intersected with the Cold War and decolonization. The article then contrasts this with the turn to a more pluralistic and communitarian conception of human rights in the 1970s, animated by liberation theologies. As the World Council of Churches embraced a ‘revolutionary’ tradition and worked to resist military dictatorships in Latin America, racism, and global inequality, it gravitated towards Marxism-inflected and anti-colonial strands of human rights discourse.

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Heiduk, Felix. "From guardians to democrats? Attempts to explain change and continuity in the civil–military relations of post-authoritarian Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines." Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (May 2011): 249–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.560959.

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Knaap, Gerrit. "HEADHUNTING, CARNAGE AND ARMED PEACE IN AMBOINA, 1500-1700." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 46, no. 2 (2003): 165–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852003321675736.

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AbstractDespite a corpus of sources, historians of the Moluccas (Indonesia) have given little attention to military history. While land warfare consisted mainly of headhunting raids, maritime warfare was essentially amphibious, with a fleet (hongi) sailing to an enemy beach where a village would be stormed. The European intrusion brought changes to this general pattern. The Dutch East India Company developed its own hongi, consisting of local vessels and a few European ones. However, these were ineffective by the final stages of the wars of conquest and ultimately it was European expeditionary forces that eliminated the last opposition to Dutch rule. Once the 'Pax Neerlandica' was established, the Company could rely on the hongi once again.Malgré le nombre de sources historiques à leur disposition, les historiens des Moluques (Indonésie) n'ont guère prêté attention à l'histoire militaire. La guerre sur terre, c'était surtout faire la chasse aux têtes. La guerre par mer, en revanche, consistait surtout en opérations amphibies, à l'aide d'une flotte (hongi) qui faisait voile vers une côte ennemie pour monter à l'assaut d'un village. La pénétration européenne a changé cette situation. La Compagnie Unie des Indes Orientales a développé sa propre hongi, composée d'embarcations locales et de quelques navires européens. Pourtant, ces hongi ne furent pas efficaces dans les dernières étapes des guerres de conquête et, finalement, ce fut la marine européenne qui élimina la résistance à la domination hollandaise. Lorsque la 'Pax Neerlandica' fut établie, la Compagnie put de nouveau compter sur les hongi.

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Goscha, Christopher. "Wiring Decolonization: Turning Technology against the Colonizer during the Indochina War, 1945–1954." Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 4 (September 20, 2012): 798–831. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417512000424.

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AbstractTwentieth-century wars of decolonization were more than simple diplomatic and military affairs. This article examines how the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) relied upon technology to drive state-making and to make war during the struggle against the French (1945–1954). Wireless radios, in particular, provided embattled nationalists a means by which they could communicate orders and information across wide expanses of contested space in real time. Printing presses, newspapers, stationary, and stamps not only circulated information, but they also served as the bureaucratic markers of national sovereignty. Radios and telephones were essential to the DRV's ability to develop, field, and run a professional army engaged in modern—not guerilla—battles. The Vietnamese were victorious at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in part because they successfully executed a highly complex battle via the airwaves. Neither the Front de libération nationale (FLN) fighting the French for Algeria nor the Republicans battling the Dutch for Indonesia ever used communications so intensely to drive state-making or take the fight to the colonizer on the battlefield. Scholars of Western states and warfare have long recognized the importance of information gathering for understanding such matters. This article argues that it is time to consider how postcolonial states gathered and used information, even in times of war.

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Wicaksana, I. Gede Wahyu. "Militarising Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia." European Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 2 (December 12, 2019): 205–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01802005.

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AbstractThe occupation of the city of Marawi in the southern Philippines and a series of terrorist attacks in Indonesia which followed it demonstrate that terrorism is a persistent and enduring threat to Southeast Asian security, despite the governments’ concerted efforts on countering terrorism since 9/11 and the Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005. Security specialists and defence officials in the region believe that ASEAN has to intensify its cooperation to address the challenge of terrorism through the use of military forces. This article, however, claims that the militarised counterterrorism has no institutional, normative and practical basis within ASEAN’s main security structure, the APSC. This is followed by dual implications for the broader security agendas, affecting democratisation and sharpening mistrust among ASEAN states which challenges ASEAN centrality in regional security affairs.

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Hayes, Jarrod, and Katja Weber. "Globalization, deglobalization and human security: the case of Myanmar." International Affairs 97, no. 5 (September 2021): 1469–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab110.

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Abstract Increased nationalism, greater protectionism and a gradual move away from a rules-based international order by some members of the international community do not bode well for vulnerable populations around the globe. Human security is threatened by a host of non-traditional security challenges catalysed by the growth of physical technologies and require multifaceted responses from a variety of actors. Many of those actors look to transnational networks built on globalized liberal order's social norms—what we call social technologies—for protection. The dwindling interconnectedness of deglobalization is likely to further empower corrupt governments at the expense of vulnerable citizens. This results from a decreased willingness by states and international institutions to defend human security. Whether one looks at the plight of persecuted citizens during Burma's military junta, human slaves in the fisheries off the coast of Indonesia, or farmers uprooted from their land by palm oil plantations, without social technologies to counterbalance the negative implications of physical technology the international community will lack the political capacity (sanctions, arms embargoes, travel restrictions, etc.), to aid those most in need. Ultimately, the effects of deglobalization on human security will depend largely on the trajectory of social technology developing alongside advances in physical technology.

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Carey, Peter. "Waiting for the ‘Just King’: The Agrarian World of South-Central Java from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War (1825–30)." Modern Asian Studies 20, no. 1 (February 1986): 59–137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00013603.

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Students of Javanese society have long recognized that the Java War (1825–30), the bitter five-year struggle against European colonial rule in Java, constituted a watershed in the history of modern Indonesia. In his recent textbook, Professor Ricklefs has characterized the year 1830 as ‘the beginning of the truly colonial period in Java’, arguing that the Java War marked the transition point between the ‘trading’ era of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the years of ‘colonial’ exploitation ushered in by Johannes van den Bosch's well known ‘cultivation systems’. In military and political terms, the costly Dutch victory over the javanese made them, for the first time in their three and a half centuries of involvement in the archipelago, the undisputed masters of Java. At the same time, scholars of Javanese Islam have suggested that the defeat of the Javanese leader, Dipanagara (1785–1855), and the religious ideals for which he fought (most notably his goal of strengthening the institutional position of Islam in Javanese society), temporarily undermined the morale and self-confidence of the Islamic communities in Java. Specialists in the history of the central Javanese principalities (vorstenlanden), especially those interested in cultural developments, have also seen the Javanese failure in 1825–30 as a setback to the vitality and independence of the Javanese cultural tradition, a time when Javanese society began to turn in on itself and lose something of its strength and flexibility.

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Hartoyo, Hartoyo, Haryanto Sindung, Fahmi Teuku, and Sunarto Sunarto. "The role of local communities in peacebuilding in post-ethnic conflict in a multi-cultural society." Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research 12, no. 1 (January 31, 2020): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jacpr-06-2019-0419.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of socio-demographic factors on ethnic tolerance (ET) and religious tolerance (RT) as well as the participation of the local community in peacebuilding in post-ethnic violent conflicts in a multi-cultural society. Design/methodology/approach This research was conducted in the rural areas of Indonesia, on the basis of an empirical study that was performed in Lampung, a province at the southern tip of Sumatra. Data were collected through a survey of 500 respondents from five districts susceptible to ethnic conflicts. From each district, two villages that experienced ethnic conflicts were chosen and from each village, 50 respondents were randomly selected. To strengthen the explanation of quantitative data, in-depth interviews were also conducted with another 50 residents, five informants from each of ten villages. Informants comprised community leaders or traditional leaders, local police officers, local military officers and district government officials. Findings First, the degree of tolerance is not specifically concentrated in the socio-demographic characteristics. Second, ET affects RT. Third, local community participation in peacebuilding in post-ethnic violent conflicts is not influenced by the socio-demographic characteristics but is influenced by ET and RT. The socio-cultural approach is the main strategy for peacebuilding in post-ethnic (and religious) conflicts in multi-cultural societies. The weakness of inter-ethnic relations soon improves in the post-peace period through the reconstruction of social and cultural factors to strengthen social cohesion and social capital at the local community level by involving various stakeholders Originality/value This paper is a valuable source of information regarding current research on the role of local communities in strengthening and building peace in post-ethnic violent conflicts in multi-cultural societies.

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Quijano, Anibal. "Más temprano que tarde." Íconos - Revista de Ciencias Sociales, no. 6 (September 6, 2013): 93–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.17141/iconos.6.1999.652.

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El golpe militar encabezado por Pinochet el 11 de septiembre de 1973, no fue el primero de su carácter, ni el más duradero. Ya desde 1964 los militares brasileños impusieron una dictadura represiva durante 20 años. Ni el más bestial: en 1966, los militares de Indonesia comandados por el General Suharto asesinaron a más de medio millón de gentes apenas en los tres primeros meses de una larga y sangrienta dictadura que aún no termina. Y los militares argentinos, tras el golpe de 1976, practicaron contra su pueblo actos aún mas despiadados que sus pares chilenos.

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Menchik, Jeremy. "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia." Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 3 (July 2014): 591–621. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417514000267.

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AbstractSince democratization, Indonesia has played host to a curious form of ethnic conflict: militant vigilante groups attacking a small, socially marginal religious sect called Ahmadiyah. While most scholars attribute the violence to intolerance by radicals on the periphery of society, this article proposes a different reading based on an intertwined reconfiguration of Indonesian nationalism and religion. I suggest that Indonesia contains a common but overlooked example of “godly nationalism,” an imagined community bound by a shared theism and mobilized through the state in cooperation with religious organizations. This model for nationalism is modern, plural, and predicated on the exclusion of religious heterodoxy. Newly collected archival and ethnographic material reveal how the state's and Muslim civil society's long-standing exclusion of Ahmadiyah and other heterodox groups has helped produce the “we-feeling” that helps constitute contemporary Indonesian nationalism. I conclude by intervening in a recent debate about religious freedom to suggest that conflicts over blasphemy reflect Muslim civil society's effort to delineate an incipient model of nationalism and tolerance while avoiding the templates of liberal secularism or theocracy.

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Liddle, R. William, and David Jenkins. "Suharto and His Generals. Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983." Pacific Affairs 59, no. 1 (1986): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2759054.

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Kammen, Douglas. "Legitimizing Military Rule: Indonesian Armed Forces Ideology, 1958– 2000." Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 3 (December 2007): 538–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/cs29-3l.

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Rogers, Marvin L. "Depoliticization of Indonesia's Political Parties: Attaining Military Stability." Armed Forces & Society 14, no. 2 (January 1988): 247–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x8801400206.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Sociology, Military Indonesia'

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