Journal articles on the topic 'Socialismo liberale'

Este ensayo propone una interpretación de las posiciones políticas de Octavio Paz, con el propósito de identificar su legado político. Para tal efecto, pone a discusión la idea de que Octavio Paz era un intelectual de izquierda socialista, a partir de la relectura de sus principales ensayos políticos. En esta lógica, lo conceptúa como poeta con posiciones políticas, que discursivamente defendía un tipo de socialismo democrático desde una posición nacional-revolucionaria.En la búsqueda de las reglas y estrategias discursivas utilizadas por Paz para hablar de la violencia, la izquierda, la democracia y el socialismo, es posible identificar su crítica teórica desde el campo literario, con claras intervenciones en los campos político e intelectual. Octavio Paz deseaba, evidentemente, ilustrar a la izquierda mexicana con la advertencia de lo acontecido en los regímenes socialista-burocráticos. El programa democrático de Paz, a mano para la izquierda de su tiempo y las actuales izquierdas, constituye una recuperación de la democracia liberal, un andamiaje para la sociedad mexicana, un proyecto de modernización no ensayado por el régimen priista y destruido, en su tiempo, por las burocracias socialistas del país.Palabras clave: Crítica, Izquierda, Democracia, Violencia Octavio's LabyrinthSummaryThis essay proposes an interpretation of Octavio Paz's political positions, with the purpose of identifying his political legacy. For this purpose, the idea that Octavio Paz was an intellectual of the socialist left, based on the rereading of his main political essays, is put into discussion. In this logic, he is conceptualized as a poet with political positions, who discursively defended a type of democratic socialism from a national-revolutionary position.In the search for the discursive rules and strategies used by Paz to talk about violence, the left, democracy and socialism, it is possible to identify his theoretical criticism from the literary field, with clear interventions in the political and intellectual fields. Octavio Paz, wanted, evidently, to enlighten the Mexican left with the warning of what happened in the socialist-bureaucratic regimes. Paz's democratic program, at hand for the left of his time and the current left, constitutes a recovery of liberal democracy, a scaffolding for Mexican society, a modernization project not tested by the PRI regime and destroyed, in its time, by the socialist bureaucracies of the country.Keywords: Criticism, Left, Democracy, Violence Le labyrinthe d’OctavioRésuméeCet essai propose une interprétation des positions politiques d’Octavio Paz, afin d’identifier son héritage politique. Pour ce faire, on met en discussion l’idée qu’Octavio Paz était un intellectuel de gauche socialiste, à partir de la relecture se ses principaux essais politiques. Dans cette logique, on se fait une conception de lui comme un poète d’idées et postures politiques qui défendait discursivement un type de socialisme démocratique à partir d’une position nationale-révolutionnaire.Dans la recherche des règles et stratégies discursives utilisées par Paz pour parler de la violence, la gauche, la démocratie et le socialisme, il est possible d’identifier sa critique théorique à partir du champ littéraire, avec des claires interventions dans les champs politiques et intellectuels. Octavio Paz désirait évidement, illustrer la gauche mexicaine avec l’avertissement ce qui est arrivé dans les régimes socio-bureaucratiques. Le programme démocratique de Paz, de la main de la gauche de son époque et des gauches actuelles, constitue une récupération de la démocratie libérale, une structure pour la société mexicaine, un projet de modernisation pas essayé par le régime du PRI, et détruit dans son époque par les bureaucraties socialistes du pays.Mots clés : Critique, Gauche, Démocratie, Violence

ABSTRACTIt is often suggested that the earliest theorists of neo-liberalism first entered public controversy in the 1930s and 1940s to dispel the illusion that the welfare state represented a stable middle way between capitalism and socialism. This article argues that this is an anachronistic account of the origins of neo-liberalism, since the earliest exponents of neo-liberal doctrine focused on socialist central planning rather than the welfare state as their chief adversary and even sought to accommodate certain elements of the welfare state agenda within their market liberalism. In their early work, neo-liberal theorists were suspicious of nineteenth-century liberalism and capitalism; emphasized the value commitments that they shared with progressive liberals and socialists; and endorsed significant state regulation and redistribution as essential to the maintenance of a free society. Neo-liberals of the 1930s and 1940s therefore believed that the legitimation of the market, and the individual liberty best secured by the market, had to be accomplished via an expansion of state capacity and a clear admission that earlier market liberals had been wrong to advocate laissez-faire.

If socialism and liberalism are rivals, one ambition these rivals have shared is that of being a transnational, even universal doctrine. Socialists and liberals have each thought of their own view as being well designed to expand, to reach out and be taken up in an ever-growing number and variety of societies. I do not know whether now is the time to write the final obituary for the socialist version of this dream. But the universalizing dream most vivid before the minds of the inhabitants of the world today clearly is not the socialist one, but the liberal one. “Globalization,” in our day, has come to mean something very close to “liberalization.” For some this is a cause of celebration; for others, it is a cause of protest and despair.

Are socialists best regarded as those who are most truly and consistently committed to democracy, under modern industrial conditions? Is the underlying issue that divides liberals from socialists the degree of their wholeheartedness in affirming the ideal of a democratic society? On the liberal side, Friedrich Hayek has remarked: “It is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible that a democracy governs with a total lack of liberalism. My personal preference is for a liberal dictator and not for a democratic government lacking in liberalism.” No doubt many socialists would wish to quibble with Hayek's free-market oriented conception of liberalism. But I am wondering whether the conceptual map implicit in Hayek's remark is apt. Hayek appears to assume that there are two independent lines of division, one marking greater and lesser commitment to liberal values, the other marking greater and lesser commitment to democratic procedures. According to the conception of socialism as democracy that I wish to examine, a better picture of the political landscape would show one line of division with gradations indicating greater and lesser commitment to democracy. On this continuum, socialists are located at the extreme pro-democratic end, those who favor autocracy at the other end, and liberals somewhere in the middle. The analyst who finds this latter conceptual picture the more illuminating of the two will say that Hayek reveals his rejection of socialism by being less than wholehearted in his support of democracy.

Se analizan los orígenes y fundamentos del liberalismo clásico y se discuten las principales ideas de anclaje del proyecto ideológico socialista marxista y su crítica al estado liberal, en tanto forma de estado y de gobierno que debía ser superada para beneficio de las mayorías proletarias. De esta manera, el artículo incursiona en las características generales del debate ideológico suscitado entre socialistas y liberales en los siglos XIX y XX. La metodología empleada se basa en el análisis de fuentes bibliográficas y hemerográficas. Se concluye que el pensamiento socialista tiene su origen en el ala izquierda del liberalismo clásico que fue mutando gradualmente al utilitarismo, asociacionismo y de ahí al socialismo utópico, al socialismo de transición, hasta llegar a las posturas radicales del marxismo y el anarquismo.

En el presente ensayo se parte de la igualdad biológica (genética), según la cual todos los humanos pertenecemos a la misma especie animal, de manera que en esa afirmación se encuentra implícita la igualdad esencial (filosófica), a pesar de que también haya diversidad entre los humanos en otros sentidos. Luego, se aborda la noción de igualdad política en el pensamiento liberal, que puede resumirse en que humanos diferentes tenemos iguales derechos o somos iguales ante la ley. Aquí encontramos implícito el tratamiento abstracto que se da a los humanos en el pensamiento moderno, pues en la igualdad ante la ley se hace abstracción de todas las cualidades concretas. Así, el ensayo propone que hay continuidad teórica entre el pensamiento liberal y el socialista, de tal manera que este último se caracteriza por tratar de que las sociedades proporcionen a los ciudadanos las condiciones concretas (económicas, sociales, políticas) que garanticen una vida realmente igualitaria. Por eso, se dan ejemplos modernos pre-liberales y liberales que muestran la continuidad teórica con el pensamiento socialista. Así se pueden entender los desarrollos ideológico-políticos, como la social-democracia, y más recientemente, en América Latina, el socialismo del siglo XXI. No es incoherente que el socialismo político se realice en el marco del capitalismo y actualizando los principios de la democracia liberal.

This article reviews the neo-liberal case for economic limits to democracy, assesses the counterposed argument of socialists and social democrats and considers why the latters' practical experience in ‘democratizing economic life’ has been so unsatisfactory. The second half of the paper considers the claim that some form of market socialism can overcome these limitations. While the market socialists have some success in undermining the claims of the neo-liberals, there are acute difficulties in transforming their agenda for economic democracy into a practicable politics. At the same time, it is suggested that while there may indeed be some economic limits to democracy, we are still very far from reaching them.

This paper examines the relationship between race, socialism, and democracy in America. It is organized into five sections and a conclusion. The first section explores how socialism has been viewed by many black leaders and intellectuals as necessary, imperative perhaps, in the black struggle for material equality, and further investigates the relationship of this black perspective on socialism to white opposition. The second section uses the most recent historical work to identify the factors that have the stalled the development of socialism in America. I also assess how these factors have changed or not in terms of making the socialist project more likely. In the third section, I analyze available poll data on American opinion about socialism from the 1930s to the present. While the data show unambiguously increased support for socialism since the 1930s, socialism does not today command the support of a majority of the American people. In the fourth section I examine the paradigmatic Franklin Roosevelt presidency on how liberal Democratic presidents have avoided the socialist label while embracing socialist programs. The fifth section is a brief examination of what socialism—really existing socialism—means in the early twenty-first century, and the idea of “socialist smuggling” as manifested in the presidencies of FDR and Lyndon Johnson. The speculative conclusion asks what are the prospects for the socialist project, and whether the white liberal cosmopolitan bourgeoisie rather than the white working class might become a mass base for the socialist project.

This essay provides an internal critique of John Rawls’s case for liberal socialism. A liberal socialist regime combines liberal rights with public ownership of the means of production. The state deliberately manages capital to promote both economic and moral ends. I argue that liberal socialism cannot satisfy Rawls’s own criterion for a well-ordered and legitimate regime: stability for the right reasons. Liberal socialism cannot be stable much as reasonable comprehensive doctrines cannot. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines impose detailed patterns of conduct on citizens in ways they can reasonably reject. Liberal socialism imposes similarly invasive and complex directives through what I shall call reasonable economic plans: multifaceted directives for the ownership and operation of capital that satisfy Rawls’s justice as fairness. Consequently, imposing any reasonable economic plan will destabilize the regime. For this reason, liberal socialism cannot serve as an ideal regime type for Rawlsian egalitarians.

Durante la década de 1920 apareció en Latinoamérica una serie de vanguardias culturales que cuestionaron la realidad nacional de sus países buscando cambios en la estructura social y política. Los políticos liberales colombianos, en su intento por llegar al poder, reconocieron en ellas diferentes ideas que influyeron en su desarrollo político. Con las reformas de Alfonso López Pumarejo se buscó un acercamiento con los artistas para que estos desarrollaran una tipología de arte en la que se involucrara a la sociedad y así ésta tomara conciencia de su historia e idiosincrasia. Bajo estos lineamientos Pedro Nel Gómez fue contratado para decorar el Palacio Municipal de Medellín con diferentes murales al fresco que cumplieran este propósito. El artista presentó nueve frescos que despertaron polémica debido al llamado de conciencia social que realizó al retratar los principales problemas de su país, situación que no solo le ganó el apelativo de socialista sino que años más tarde lo llevó a la censura. Con este texto se pretende interpretar esos murales como fuente de conocimiento histórico y ver en ellos los problemas sociales de la Colombia de los años treinta expresados por el artista desde su pensamiento socialista e influencia marxista.Palabras clave: Muralismo, denuncia social, Palacio Municipal de Medellín, socialismo, política colombiana.In the Palace Walls: Pedro Nel Gómez in the Social Imaginary of Medellín, 1930-1950Abstract The 1920s was a decade that witnessed in Latin American the appearance of a number of cultural vanguards that questioned the reality of their countries seeking changes in the social and political structure of their nations. The Colombian Liberal politicians, in their desire for to govern to Colombia, recognized in them a number of ideas that influenced his political development. The reforms of Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo sought a rapprochement with the artists looking a series of artistic proposals that involved the society for to aware of its history and identity. Under these guidelines Pedro Nel Gómez was contracted to decorate the town hall of Medellin with a series of murals for to meet this purpose. The artist presented nine frescoes arousing controversy for of the call of social consciousness that did painting the main problems of the country. This not only earned him the nickname socialist but that years later led to censorship. This text tries to interpret these murals as a source of historical knowledge and see in them the social problems of the thirties Colombian expressed by the artist from his Marxist socialist thought and influence. Keywords: Muralism, social criticism, City Hall Medellín, socialism, Colombian politics.

LA BATTAGLIA PER LA LIBERTÀ — THE ANTI-FASCIST OPPOSITION OF THE BROTHERS CARLO AND NELLO ROSSELLI IN 1926–1937 The opposition activities of the Rosselli brothers, brutally killed on 9 June 1937 in Bagnoles­-de-l’Orne, France, by the French cagoualards, were rooted in their deep conviction concerning the necessity of fighting for freedom in fascist Italy, fighting that brought together Italian, Jewish and French anti-fascist circles. This was manifested in numerous initiatives and various kinds of oppo­sition activities undertaken by Carlo Rosselli b. 1899 — a writer, economist and politician — and his younger brother Sabatino Enrico b. 1900, known as Nello — a historian and journalist. Their collaboration with the opposition periodicals Noi giovani and Non Mollare, their work in the “L’Italia Libera” society, and, above all, in the social-liberal movement “Giustizia e Libertà”, fo­unded by the Rosellis in August 1929, the political programme of which was based on ideas included in Socialismo liberale published by Carlo, were an attempt to unite all non-communist forces that wo­uld be willing to fight together to put an end to the fascist regime. “Giustizia e Libertà” played an im­portant role in sensitising the public, especially outside Italy, to and informing it about the true fascist reality, the image of which was usually distorted by the regime’s propaganda or simply created by it. In Carlo Rosselli’s interpretation, fascism appeared as an anti-freedom and anti-liberal move­ment, “the most passive product of Italian history”, a manifestation of reaction and not revolution. In an article entitled La lotta per la libertà C. Rosselli concluded that fascism was, in a way, an “autobiography of the nation”. It took root in Italy thanks to some favourable circumstances, among which C. Rosselli listed a lack of moral formation of Italian society and conviction of the masses that they should become involved in political life, but also bias, romantic tastes, petit bourgeois idealism, nationalistic rhetoric, sentimental post-war reaction, and restless desire for “novelty” regardless of what was behind it. Carlo Rosselli saw one of the causes of the “triumph of fascism” in a degeneration of parliamentarism” and “inability to rally society around a constructive programme and create a uniform force” that would be capable of standing up to Mussolini. The contribution of the Rosselli brothers to the fight for freedom — encouragements to be­come involved, attempts to make people aware of the real problems exposed by fascism in Italian society — is unquestionable. Their intellectual legacy, political engagement and commitment, and anti-fascist opposition certainly deserve to be reflected upon by generations for whom the idea of freedom still remains invaluable.

Neste artigo, Hayek investiga o “mercado de segunda mão de ideias”, examinando os incentivos existentes e as características dos ofertantes da atividade intelectual. Além de fornecer explicação porque os intelectuais tendem ao socialismo, o autor sugere que intelectuais liberais deveriam emular a busca desses intelectuais por regras desejáveis, diferentes do status quo, para a construção de uma alternativa liberal que cative os demandantes no mercado das ideias políticas.

Tot vlak voor 1914 stond de liberale arbeidersbeweging, mee opgebouwd door vader Augusteyns, in Antwerpen sterker dan zijn socialistische en christendemocratische concurrenten. Toen het ziekenfonds Help U Zelve zich onder de naam Liberale Volkspartij als politieke deelgroep organiseerde en in 1906 binnen de liberale partij het recht op een volksvertegenwoordiger afdwong, schoof zij Leo Augusteyns naar voren. Hij zou zich als radicaal liberaal, republikein en flamingant doen gelden, wat tot grote spanningen met de Antwerpse liberale boegbeelden leidde. De Eerste Wereldoorlog betekende een keerpunt. Augusteyns zou blijk geven van een gematigd activisme. In 1919 werd hij veroordeeld en verloor hij zijn politieke rechten. Hij werd in eerste instantie Vlaams-nationalist. Maar ook binnen die beweging nam hij een aparte positie in, want hij zou de fascistische wending ervan tot op het laatst fel bekampen. Tevergeefs en zijn politieke relevantie werd steeds kleiner. Zijn houding tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog had overigens de Liberale Volkspartij zwaar verdeeld. Binnen het Antwerpse liberalisme verloor ze veel van haar voordien contesterende en rebelse houding.________The tumultuous political life of Leo Augusteyns: radical-Liberal and Pro-Flemish Member of Parliament (1906-1919), activist, Flemish-nationalist, antifascistUntil just before 1914 the liberal workers' movement, which father Augusteyns helped to develop, was stronger in Antwerp than its Socialist and Christian-Democrat competitors. When the health insurance 'Help U Zelve' ('Help yourself') organised itself into a political subgroup named the Liberal People's Party and enforced its entitlement to a Parliamentary representative within the Liberal Party, they put forward Leo Augusteyns. He was to assert himself as a radical liberal, a Republican and Pro-Flemish, which was to create major tensions with the Antwerp liberal standard bearers. The First World War signified a turning point. Augusteyns was to display a moderate activism. In 1919 he was convicted and he lost his political rights. At first he became a Flemish-Nationalist. But even in that movement he occupied a separate position, for he was to fight against the fascist turn of the party until the end. It was in vain and his political relevance continued to diminish. In fact, his attitude during the First World War had caused great divisions within the Liberal People's Party. Within the Antwerp Liberal Group it lost much of its previously contesting and rebellious attitude.

In de historiografie werd het aandeel van het Vlaamse socialisme in de Vlaamse beweging lang miskend. Rond 1970 toonde onderzoek aan hoe het Vlaamse socialisme, ondanks een beperkt aantal volksvertegenwoordigers (drie in 1900 ten opzichte van 23 Waalse en 5 Brusselse) de taalwetten verdedigden. Na een frontale botsing met Waalse partijgenoten werd de taalkwestie in de unitaire Belgische Werkliedenpartij (°1885) in 1909 een vrije kwestie. Intussen vorderde het onderzoek. Dat maakte een nieuwe synthese mogelijk. Het opzet werd breder. In een eerste deel werd de partij doorgelicht als vertrekpunt naar communautaire tegenstellingen: een socialistisch reformisme en attentisme, het besluitvormingsproces, de interactie tussen centraal bestuur/federaties/ parlementsfractie, de ongelijkmatige economische ontwikkeling en de politieke vertaling ervan, het interne taalgebruik. Zoals elders vereenzelvigde de BWP zich steeds meer met het nationale vaderland. Brusselse, Vlaamse en Waalse socialisten vulden dit echter anders in.In een tweede deel staan de communautaire spanningen zelf centraal. Aanvankelijk leek het er op dat Vlamingen en Walen als Belgen taalkundig naar elkaar konden groeien. Dat veronderstelde gelijkheid en wederkerigheid. Het streefdoel werd dan ofwel een veralgemeende tweetaligheid ofwel een officiële eentaligheid van beide taalgebieden. Dat gebeurde niet. Na 1900 ging het Vlaamse socialisme tot de voorhoede van de Vlaamse beweging behoren, terwijl het Waalse socialisme de leiding van de Waalse beweging overnam. Dat was een complex proces. Voor de analyse ervan werd vertrokken van de argumenten die de Gentse leider Anseele in 1911 gebruikte om zijn afwachtend standpunt te verduidelijken: de Vlaamse kwestie als hoofd- of bijzaak, de toegenomen sterkte van de Vlaamse beweging, het beginselprogramma van de partij, het gevaar voor de eenheid van het Vlaamse socialisme én voor de eenheid van het Belgische socialisme.Wat alle partijgenoten bond, was een emotionele en rationele identificatie, gericht op de strijd voor politieke gelijkheid via het afdwingen van algemeen enkelvoudig stemrecht. Maar secundair botsten toenemende regionalismen. Het Vlaamse socialisme verscherpte de taalstrijd als aspect van de klassenstrijd tegen de francofone dominantie, die de emancipatie van de arbeiders bemoeilijkte. De eis tot ‘culturele autonomie’ (Otto Bauer!) vond ingang: zelfbeschikking over een Nederlandstalig onderwijs van laag tot hoog. Het Waalse socialisme duldde steeds minder de negatie van het programma door voortdurend aan de macht blijvende katholieke regeringen sinds 1884. Die steunden op Vlaanderen, terwijl in Wallonië een antiklerikale meerderheid van liberalen en socialisten bestond. De superioriteit van het Frans in België in vraag stellen of de kennis van het Nederlands aan Walen opleggen, werd geïnterpreteerd als een bijkomende discriminatie. Desnoods werd met bestuurlijke scheiding gedreigd. Toch werden in de partij mogelijkheden tot een vergelijk gezocht. België bestond uit twee volken met eigen culturele rechten. Breekpunt bleef hoe men wilde omgaan met ‘taalminderheden’ in beide landsgedeelten en hoe men die wilde definiëren.________‘Frenemies’? Communitarian tensions in the Socialist Party until 1914The contribution of Flemish socialism to the Flemish Movement has long been misunderstood in the historiography. Around 1970, research demonstrated how Flemish socialism, despite a limited number of representatives in parliament (three in 1900, in contrast to 23 from Wallonia and 5 from Brussels) defended the language laws. After a major clash with Walloon fellow party members, the language question became a free question within the Belgian Workers’ Party (*1885). In the meantime, the research kept advancing. This made a new synthesis possible. The framework became broader. In the first wave, the party was studied as a point of departure toward communitarian oppositions: a socialist reformism and ‘wait-andsee’ attitude, the decision-making process, the interaction between the central committee, federations, and the parliamentary group, uneven economic development and the political consequences thereof, internal language use. As elsewhere, the BWP identified more and more with the national fath-erland. Brussels, Flemish and Walloon socialists each understood this very differently.In the second wave, the communitarian tensions themselves take center stage. Originally, it seemed that Flemings and Walloons could grow toward one another linguistically as Belgians. This presupposed equality and reciprocity. The goal of struggle became either a general bilingualism or an official monolingualism for both language regions. That did not happen. After 1900, Flemish socialism belonged to the vanguard of the Flemish Movement, while Walloon socialism took over the leadership of the Walloon Movement. This was a complex process. The analysis of it took as a starting point the arguments that the Ghent leader Anseele used in 1911 in order to clarify his ‘wait-and-see’ point of view: the Flemish question as main or side question, the increasing strength of the Flemish Movement, the party manifesto, the concern for the unity of Flemish social-ism and for the unity of Belgian socialism.What bound all party members together was an emotional and rational identification with each other, built on the struggle for political equality through the demand for single universal suffrage. But growing regionalisms clashed under the surface. Flemish socialism increasingly emphasized the language struggle as an aspect of the class struggle against French-speaking domination, which hindered the emancipation of the workers. The demand for ‘cultural autonomy’ (Otto Bauer!) found purchase: self-determination of a Dutch-language education, from top to bottom. Walloon socialism grew more and more impatient of not being able to realise its program, due to the unbroken chain of Catholic governments in power since 1884. These governments found their support in Flanders, while an anticlerical majority of liberals and social-ists existed in Wallonia. Questioning the superiority of French in Belgium, or imposing the knowledge of Dutch on Walloons, was interpreted as another form of discrimination. If necessary there was the threat of administrative separation. Nevertheless, the party still looked for possibilities for compromise. Belgium consisted of two peoples, each with their own cultural rights. The sensitive point remained how one wanted to handle ‘linguistic minorities’ in both parts of the country, and how one wanted to define them.

O presente artigo tem o objetivo de discutir os regimes socioeconômicos que permitem a realização da justiça como equidade, focando em especial nos dois regimes apontados por Rawls como capazes de constituir uma sociedade bem ordenada, a democracia de cidadãos proprietários (property-owning democracy ou POD) de um lado e o socialismo liberal do outro. Para tanto, em um primeiro momento serão considerados os argumentos de Rawls a respeito dos regimes socioeconômicos dentro da Uma teoria da justiça. Em seguida, com base em Justiça como equidade: uma reafirmação, serão discutidos os argumentos em favor da POD e do socialismo liberal e contra as outras três opções: capitalismo de laissez-faire, socialismo de Estado dirigido por um partido único e o Estado de bem-estar social. Em seguida, serão considerados os argumentos a favor da POD ou do socialismo liberal, procurando em grande medida traçar quais são as distinções entre ambos os regimes, a partir dos autores que buscam ir além de Rawls. Ao final, conclui-se que nos limites de uma teoria da justiça Rawls está correto ao não definir quem é o regime vencedor, a POD ou o socialismo liberal, mas no avanço atual do capitalismo liberal e no seu movimento de distanciamento das democracias liberais mostra-se necessário discutir qual é o regime mais adequado a partir das bases fornecidas pela justiça como equidade.

The period immediately following Independence when Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister of India (1947–64) has been described conventionally as an era dominated by “socialist” developmentalism. This article contends that an examination of the ideas of Nehru and his closest colleagues reveals a much more complex amalgam of political ideologies and sentiments. Ideas of small-scale development through local bodies and cooperative societies, typical of earlier “communitarian” liberals such as G. K. Gokhale, were blended, and sometimes contended, with visions of rapid industrialization more obviously based on the Soviet model. Nehru himself remained distinctly liberal in his political stance, musing that he could not impose further socialist measures “because most Indians were not socialists.” The article considers the importance of the events of India's partition for this ideological amalgam and the examines the ideas of key figures in Nehru's circle, notably G. B. Pant, D. R. Gadgil, P. C. Mahalanobis and S. Radhakrishnan.

The surprising fact about the 20th century was the return of the liberal free market, circling back to where it began. It was helped because liberalism, unlike socialism, was never a theory of history and could not be falsified by events. But, socialist historians still control the past, and it is still widely believed that the welfare state was created by socialism and that genocide is right-wing. In fact, socialist leaders, fearful of preserving capitalism, opposed the welfare state, which in Britain was the creation of Asquith. Between the wars, Labour had no national health plans, and it was the last of the British parties to accept the Beveridge report. Repetition and suppression have entrenched the myth, which is widely accepted, that welfare equals socialism. The first history of socialism, by a French radical, Alfred Sudre, was opposed to socialism as a conservative idea; Marx and Engels, Ruskin and Morris were openly conservative and the Bolsheviks proudly elitist.

C. B. Macpherson's project was to revise liberal-democratic theory in the light of Marxism, to rescue the valuable part of the liberal tradition from the dangers of capitalist market relations, and to democratize socialism. I identify Macpherson's concept of political theory, which informs his project; reconstruct his criticisms of liberal democratic theory and capitalist market relations; and note his prescriptions for a better political theory and practice. The project remains significant and valuable in a world in which political and economic liberalism is said to be triumphant and socialism dead or in retreat. It is not without its problems, however, which include an inadequate theory of human nature and a lack of detail on the nature of a democratic socialist society.

Abstract This paper addresses the controversy over Keynes’s political thought. Robert Skidelsky portrays Keynes as a liberal who wanted to save capitalism. By contrast, Rod O’Donnell argues Keynes was a socialist. This paper presents unexplored evidence that shows Keynes was a non-Marxist socialist from 1907 until his death in 1946. First, the paper demonstrates that Keynes described himself as a socialist and aligned himself with socialism. Next, the paper shows Keynes can be defined as a socialist because he advocated socialist policy. Finally, the paper discusses Keynes’s socialist political and journalistic activities. Keynes was a non-Marxist socialist, meaning Skidelsky has misinterpreted Keynes’s political philosophy.

Socialism is alive. Theatre is alive. Socialist theatre is alive. And, in every sense except the literal one, John McGrath, whose body gave up a long, brave fight against illness in January this year, is alive and kicking – Liberal and Tory arses for choice.

The relationship between feminism and socialism in both the theoretical and practical realms has been marked with difficulty and “unhappiness.” Feminists have criticized leftists for their lack of attention to sexual domination, and many socialists, in turn, have looked at women's liberation movements as a bourgeois deviation or, worse yet, a conspiracy against the workers' struggle. In 19th-century social democratic movements in Europe, conflicts between feminist-socialist advocates of women's rights such as Clara Zetkin and “proletarian anti-feminism” among workers and communists were constant. Eventually, guided by the theoretical insights of a number of socialist leaders such as Bebel, Engels, and Zetkin, socialist parties of the First and Second Internationals came to realize that the cause of the women's movement was just and to accept autonomous women's organizations. The Third International, or Comintern, although it initially claimed to liberate women “not only on paper, but in reality, in actual fact,” treated the inequality of women as a secondary consideration. Focusing on production and labor conflict, the Comintern paid attention only to women's exploitation by capital to the extent that “by the end of the 1920s, any special emphasis on women's social subordination in communist propaganda or campaigning came to be regarded as a capitulation to bourgeois feminism.” Leftist women activists lost their organizational autonomy and had to work under the supervision of their national communist party.

Attitudes toward the consumption of alcohol by the British working class had begun to shift during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, as the environment and working conditions were gradually recognised as being a major contributory factor in drunkenness. Friedrich Engels had raised the environmental issue in 1845 in The Conditions of the Working Class in England, arguing that cramped, uncomfortable living conditions and harsh working practices drove the worker to drink. Engels states of the worker, “His enfeebled frame, weakened by bad air and bad food, loudly demands some external stimulus; his social need can be gratified only in the public house, he has absolutely no other place where he can meet his friends. How can he be expected to resist the temptation?” (133). But the power of the temperance movement's focus on individual responsibility and self-help during the mid-nineteenth century meant Engels's focus was not widely accepted until the resurgence of socialism at the end of the century. By then resentment was rising within both the working class generally and the socialist movement against the imposition of abstinence, especially when the consumption of other classes remained steady. As Brian Harrison states, “it was now suspected that [the workers] were being hypocritically inculcated by self-interested capitalists,” (402) and British socialists were keen to promote this perspective.

AbstractAccording to a long-standing conservative critique, the proponents of fundamental or revolutionary social change necessarily fail by sacrificing the organic complexity of society and the individual upon a procrustean bed of dogmatic and rigid universal principles. I will argue that Marx's concept of proletarian self-emancipation is not only compatible with this conservative critique but is appropriately understood as a variant of it. The self-emancipation of the working class is the core of Marx's critique of the Utopian socialists, for whom socialism is the instantiation of universal ideals rather than the product of class struggle. This critique should be construed, not as a theoretical promissory note for the realisation of these ideals through the agency of the workers, but as a criticism of the very project of founding political ethics on the basis of universal ideals. Marx's political thought bears a structural similarity to conservative thought in that each seeks to ground its political programme upon the study of society as it actually exists, rather than upon a vision of human nature considered apart from society. If Marx's critique of Utopian socialism holds water, the intellectual roots of Stalinist authoritarianism may be traced, not to the failure of Marx fully to outline the ideal communist society, but to the assimilation of elements of his thought to the Utopian style and tradition of political thought. There should be no surprise, therefore, when attempts to transcend Stalinism by basing radical politics upon sanitised versions of a socialist Utopia or socialist renditions of such universal liberal principles as human rights prove counter-productive.

In the Flemish region the greatest losers are the Flemish nationalists VU and the Socialist Party, followed by de christian-democrats of the CVP. The liberal party PVV, the ecologist AGALEV and the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok (particularly in the city ofAntwerp) are the winners. The results of the Walloon region show a gain for the socialists (PS), christian-democrats (PSC) and the ecologists (ECOLO) and a sligtly liberal (PRL) recede. The high number of winners is caused by the disapearrance of the socialist-Walloon nationalist alliances and the anti-tax party UDR T. Another important factor is the fall in of the walloon nationalist party RW.The elections in the Brussels region are characterized by the further set-back of the once so strong French-speaking party FDF. The three traditional political families and the ecologists benefit by this decline.In Flanders the christian-democrats and the socialists profit by their participation in the boards of mayor and aldermen (the local majorities), in the Walloons the socialists. The data concerning the profits by this participations show no evidence for the other parties.

The article discusses the development of the idea of the “social truth of the Gospel” in the works of Professor of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy B.V. Titlinov, who, after the February Revolution of 1917, became one of the active supporters of the new liberal government, and in 1922 veered into the Renovationist schism in the Russian Orthodox Church, became a key figure in Renovationism, one of the ideologists of the Renovationist schism. The author of the study, based on the texts of Titlinov from different years, proposes to identify the point that made it possible to establish a certain compromise between the renovation movement and the Bolshevik authorities of socialist Russia. A feature of this historical moment was the situation in which what for B.V. Titlinov and other Renovationists was an attempt to reconcile Christianity and revolutionary socialism, for the Bolsheviks themselves it was exclusively a tool for the defeat of Christianity in Russia. The antagonism of these two views — Christianity and Bolshevism — was manifested even at the time of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, although the desire for social truth was also expressed by church liberal democrats of these years, to which Titlinov can be attributed, and the leader of the Bolshevik socialists V.I. Lenin.

La democracia liberal representativa es presentada como la única y verdadera democracia. Además de que, en su nombre, se invaden territorios y sacrifican pueblos enteros, la voluntad popular no se expresa libremente en las urnas y, en última instancia, el pueblo no es quien gobierna. No es suficiente otorgar un sentido social a la democracia liberal —al atender, por ejemplo, problemas como alimentación, salud y educación—, sino que el desafío es que los pueblos rescaten la política para instalar un democracia verdadera donde las personas, al luchar por cambiar las circunstancias, se transformen a sí mismas. Dada la injusticia y desigualdad predominantes, hablar hoy de socialismo tiene sentido. No se trata de copiar modelos foráneos o de exportar el nuestro, sino de transformar la economía, instalar la democracia participativa y consolidar una ética solidaria e igualitaria para construir el socialismo en cada país. La participación popular y las redes de democracia directa son el fundamento para el desarrollo humano socialista.

“Humanitarian” (humanitaire) came into use in French contemporaneously with the emergence of romantic socialism, and in the context of the rebuilding of post-revolutionary French society and its overseas empire beginning in the 1830s. This article excavates this early idea of humanitarianism, documenting an alternative genealogy for the term and its significance that has been overlooked by scholars of both socialism and humanitarianism. This humanitarianism identified a collective humanity as the source of its own salvation, rather than an external, well-meaning benefactor. Unlike liberal models of advocacy, which invoked individualized actors and recipients of their care, socialists privileged solidarity within their community and rejected the foundational logic of liberal individualism. In tracing this history, this article considers its importance for contemporary debates about humanitarianism’s imperial power dynamics.

This paper stands at the confluence of two streams in contemporary political thought. One stream is composed of those critics of liberal political philosophy who are often described collectively as ‘communitarians’. What unites these critics (we shall later want to investigate how deep their collegiality goes) is a belief that contemporary liberalism rests on an impoverished and inadequate view of the human subject. Liberal political thought – as manifested, for instance, in the writings of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin – claims centrally to do justice to individuality: to specify the conditions under which distinct individuals, each with his own view about how life should be lived, can pursue these visions to the best of their ability. But, the critics claim, liberalism is blind to the social origins of individuality itself. A person comes by his identity through participating in social practices and through his affiliation to collectivities like family and nation. An adequate political philosophy must attend to the conditions under which people can develop the capacity for autonomy that liberals value. This, however, means abandoning familiar preoccupations of liberal thought – especially the centrality it gives to individual rights – and looking instead at how social relationships of the desired kind can be created and preserved. It means, in short, looking at communities – their nature and preconditions.

The topic of this article is the analysis of Mill's attitude to socialism The author starts from the contemporary libertarian dogma about Mill as the spoiler of liberalism who supposedly turned this ideology towards socialist trends. The detailed and taxonomic analysis based on Mill's Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism shows that this theory in not correct; that the opposite is true - Mill actually, as the first serious critic of socialism, set all the relevant arguments which the liberal theory would later use to challenge this rival ideology. The emphasis is placed on the problems of redistribution and extension of the right to vote, but the author also tackles the issues of corporations, protectionism and tax policy.

Elie Halévy's legacy is bounded by the two primary objects of his scholarly interest: the history of modern Britain and the study of French socialist doctrines. Taken together, his writings on temperate English politics and occasionally intemperate French socialists cemented his status as a leading French liberal of his generation. Read out of context, the tone of his criticism of wartime socialization and the growth of wartime governments has given him a conservative reputation in some circles and inspired a backlash among historians seeking a more progressive Halévy in his prewar writings. Meanwhile, the depth of his historical study of Britain has elicited several discussions of Halévy's turn from philosophy to history at the end of the 1890s. The portrait of Halévy that emerges in light of his historical studies of England and of French socialism is detailed, accurate, and flattering, but, like any portrait, it is incomplete. Before he was a historian, Halévy was a philosopher, and before he mastered his craft in the early twentieth century, Halévy struggled to find his voice in the late nineteenth.

There is no “after socialism.” There will not be in our or in our children's lifetimes an “after socialism.” In the wake of the Holocaust and the ruins of Nazism, anti-Semitism lay low a bit, embarrassed by its worst manifestation, its actual exercise of state dominion. In the wake of the collapse of Communism, socialism's only real and full experience of power, socialism too lays low for just a moment. Socialism's causes in the West, however, remain ever with us, the product of the convergence of two extraordinary achievements: liberal free enterprise and political democracy. The former creates wealth that has transformed all human possibility, but it also gives rise to particularly deep envy. The latter allows ambition a route to power by an appeal to the democratic state to seize and redistribute wealth in the name of social equality. As Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises understood perfectly, the bounty of free enterprise leads the unproductive to believe that such wealth is a fact of nature, there for the taking.

Abstract In recent years, the historiography of late nineteenth-century British Socialism has reached a new level of sophistication. The determinism and essentialism that typified much of the work on the subject prior to the so-called linguistic turn in social history has been decisively dropped. This article, however, argues that the influence of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels still persists in two crucial respects. Firstly, it suggests that historians continue to take their lead from Marx in pinpointing the start of the Socialist movement; and second, it posits that historians also continue to follow Engels by describing the political beliefs of H.M. Hyndman as belonging to an intellectual tradition of Tory Radicalism. This article argues that, partly as a consequence of that first error, historians have overlooked the small but crucial burst of articles on the topic of Socialism published in the periodical press between 1878 and 1880. It also claims that, contrary to the historiographical consensus, Hyndman was not an ‘ex-Conservative’ or Radical of Tory inclination. It demonstrates, rather, that Hyndman’s ideological heritage was overwhelmingly Liberal. It situates Hyndman’s first article on Socialism against the anterior discussion in the periodical press. The article reveals how Hyndman’s intervention was indebted to the arguments previously advanced by J.S. Mill, Henry Fawcett, and William Cunningham. It posits, furthermore, that once it is recognised that the writings of Mill, Fawcett and other Liberals occupied a central place in Hyndman’s political imagination a number of other features of Hyndman’s political thought also fall into place.

Rond 1910 werd in de BWP de Vlaamse kwestie een vrije kwestie. De ‘versmelting’ van twee volken in een ‘âme belge’, via tweetaligheid, werd afgewezen. Onder impuls van Huysmans beriep het Vlaamse socialisme zich op de idee van culturele autonomie: het recht op onderwijs in de moedertaal van de lagere school tot de universiteit en dus de vernederlandsing van de Gentse Rijksuniversiteit. Daarmee behoorde het Vlaamse socialisme tot de voorhoede van de Vlaamse beweging. Het Waalse socialisme daarentegen verdedigde nog de superioriteit van het Frans en de mythe van een tweetalig Vlaanderen, en kantte zich tegen die Vlaamse hoofdeis.Tijdens de tweede fase (1919-1935) was de Vlaamse beweging verzwakt en het Vlaamse socialisme verdeeld. Huysmans slaagde er slechts met moeite in om een ongunstig partijstandpunt ter zake te verhinderen en de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie te behouden. Het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’ van november 1929 was gebaseerd op regionale eentaligheid en een minimale tweetaligheid in het leger en de centrale besturen. Het legde mee de fundamenten van de evolutie naar het beginsel van de territorialiteit inzake bestuur en onderwijs (1930 en 1932).Tijdens de derde fase (1935-1940) hield die pacificatie geen stand. Conflicten versterkten elkaar. De partijleiding kwam in handen van de Brusselaar Spaak en de Vlaming De Man, die met zijn Plan van de Arbeid in 1933 de BWP even uit de impasse had gehaald. Het ging om een nieuwe generatie die het socialisme een andere inhoud wilde geven: streven naar een volkspartij in plaats van klassenstrijd, een ‘socialisme national’, een autoritaire democratie als antwoord op een aanhoudende politieke crisis. Vooral aan Waalse kant werd daartegen gereageerd. Tevens werd de evolutie in het buitenlandse beleid, de zelfstandigheid los van Frankrijk, bekritiseerd. De Spaanse burgeroorlog en de eventuele erkenning van generaal Franco dreef de tegenstellingen op de spits. Voor het eerst had de partij met Spaak een socia-listische eerste minister (mei 1938-januari 1939). Hoewel alle socialisten tegen Franco waren, verschilden de Waalse socialisten van mening met de meeste Vlaamse socialisten over de vraag of de regering daarover moest vallen. Er was ook de tegenstelling over een al dan niet toenadering tot de christelijke arbeidersbeweging vanwege een dan noodzakelijke schoolvrede en een subsidiëring van de katholieke ‘strijdscholen’. Daarop entte zich de taalkwestie. In de Kamer viel de fractiecohesie terug tot 53%.De Vlaamse socialisten waren niet alleen veel sterker vertegenwoordigd in de fractie (40% in 1936), hun zelfbewustzijn nam ook sterk toe. Ze ergerden zich steeds meer aan het bijna exclusieve gebruik van het Frans in de fractie, in het partijbestuur en vooral tijdens congressen. Wie geen of weinig Frans kende, wilde niet langer als minderwaardig worden behandeld. Zeker als dat samenviel met een andere visie. Het eerste aparte Vlaams Socialistisch Congres ging door in maart 1937. Het wilde de culturele autonomie zo veel mogelijk doortrekken, maar keerde zich tegen elke vorm van federalisme, waardoor de Vlaamse socialisten in een klerikaal Vlaanderen een machteloze minderheid zouden worden. Bij de Waalse socialisten groeide de frustratie. Ze organiseerden aparte Waalse Congressen in 1938 en 1939. Ze benadrukten drie vormen van Vlaams imperialisme. De ongunstige demografische evolutie maakte een Vlaamse meerderheid in het parlement en politieke minorisering mogelijk. De financieel-economische transfers van Wallonië naar Vlaanderen verarmden Wallonië. Het verlies aan jobs voor ééntalige Walen in Wallonië en in Brussel was discriminerend. Dat laatste zorgde voor een francofone toenadering en een gezamenlijke framing. Het flamingantisme had zich al meester gemaakt van Vlaanderen, bedreigde via tweetaligheid nu de Brusselse agglomeratie, waarna Wallonië aan de beurt zou komen. Op 2 februari 1939 stonden Vlaamse en Waalse socialisten tegenover elkaar. De unitaire partij dreigde, naar katholiek voorbeeld, in twee taalgroepen uiteen te vallen. Zover kwam het niet. De wallinganten, die een politiek federalisme nastreefden, hadden terrein gewonnen, maar de meeste Waalse socialisten bleven voorstander van een nationale solidariteit. Mits een nieuw ‘Compromis’ dat met de Waalse grieven rekening hield. De mythe van het Vlaamse socialisme als Vlaams vijandig of onverschillig is moeilijk vol te houden. Wel ontstond na de Tweede Wereldoorlog een andere situatie. Tijdens de jaren 1960 behoorde de Vlaamse kwestie tot de ‘trein der gemiste kansen’ . Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog en de invoering van het enkelvoudig stemrecht voor mannen werd de socialistische partij bijna even groot als de katholieke. De verkiezingen verscherpten de regionale en ideologische asymmetrie. De katholieke partij behield de absolute meerderheid in Vlaanderen, de socialistische verwierf een gelijkaardige positie in Wallonië. Nationaal werden coalitieregeringen noodzakelijk. In de Kamer veroverden zowel de socialisten als de christendemocratische vleugel een machtsbasis, maar tot de regering doordringen bleek veel moeilijker. Die bleven gedomineerd door de conservatieve katholieke vleugel en de liberale partij, met steun van de koning en van de haute finance. Eenmaal het socialistische minimumprogramma uit angst voor een sociale revolutie aanvaard (1918-1921), werden de socialisten nog slechts getolereerd tijdens crisissituaties of als het niet anders kon (1925-1927, 1935-1940). Het verklaart een toenemende frustratie bij Waalse socialisten. Tevens bemoeilijkte hun antiklerikalisme de samenwerking van Vlaamse socialisten met christendemocraten en Vlaamsgezinden, zoals in Antwerpen, en dat gold ook voor de vorming van regeringen. In de BWP waren de verhoudingen veranderd. De macht lag nu gespreid over vier actoren: de federaties, het partijbestuur, de parlementsfractie en eventueel de ministers. De eenheid was bij momenten ver zoek. In 1919 was het Vlaamse socialisme veel sterker geworden. In Vlaanderen behaalde het 24 zetels (18 meer dan in 1914) en werd het met 25,5% de tweede grootste partij. Bovendien was de dominantie van Gent verschoven naar Antwerpen, dat met zes zetels de vierde grootste federatie van de BWP werd. Het aantrekken van Camille Huysmans als boegbeeld versterkte haar Vlaamsgezind profiel. In een eerste fase moest Huysmans nog de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie verdedigen. Zelfs tegen de Gentse en de Kortrijkse federatie in, die de vooroorlogse Vlaamsgezinde hoofdeis – de vernederland-sing van de Gentse universiteit – hadden losgelaten. Naar 1930 toe, de viering van honderd jaar België, was de Vlaamse beweging opnieuw sterker geworden en werd gevreesd voor de electorale doorbraak van een Vlaams-nationalistische partij. Een globale oplossing voor het Vlaamse probleem begon zich op te dringen. Dat gold ook voor de BWP. Interne tegenstellingen moesten overbrugd worden zodat, gezien de financiële crisis, de sociaaleconomische thema’s alle aandacht konden krijgen. Daarbij stonden de eenheid van België en van de partij voorop. In maart 1929 leidde dit tot het ‘Compromis des Belges’ en een paar maanden later tot het minder bekende en radicalere partijstandpunt, het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’. Voortbouwend op de vooroorlogse visie van het bestaan van twee volken binnen België, werd dit doorgetrokken tot het recht op culturele autonomie van elk volk, gebaseerd op het principe van regionale eentaligheid, ten koste van de taalminderheden. Voor de Vlaamse socialisten kwam dit neer op een volledige vernederlandsing van Vlaanderen, te beginnen met het onderwijs en de Gentse universiteit. Niet zonder enige tegenzin ging een meerderheid van Waalse socialisten daarmee akkoord. In ruil eisten zij dat in België werd afgezien van elke vorm van verplichte tweetaligheid, gezien als een vorm van Vlaams kolonialisme. Eentalige Walen hadden in Wallonië en in nationale instellingen (leger, centrale besturen) recht op aanwerving en carrière zonder kennis van het Nederlands, zoals ook de kennis ervan als tweede landstaal in Wallonië niet mocht worden opgelegd. De betekenis van dit interne compromis kreeg in de historiografie onvoldoende aandacht. Dat geldt ook voor de vaststelling dat beide nationale arbeidersbewegingen, de BWP vanuit de oppositie, in 1930-1932 mee de invoering van het territorialiteitsbeginsel hebben geforceerd. Een tussentijdse fase C uit het model van Miroslav Hroch.___________ ‘Frenemies’? 2Communitarian tensions in the Socialist Party 1919-1940. Division, Compromise. Crisis. Part Two: 1935-1940 Around 1910, the Flemish question became a free question in the BWP. The ‘merging’ of two peoples in a Belgian soul (âme belge) through bilingualism was rejected. According to Huysmans, Flemish socialism appealed to the idea of cultural autonomy: the right to education in one’s native language from primary school to university, and therefore, the transformation of the state University of Ghent into a Dutch-speaking institution. Hence, Flemish socialism became part of the vanguard of the Flemish Movement. Walloon socialism, on the contrary, continued to support the superiority of French in Belgium and the myth of a bilingual Flanders. It turned against this key Flemish demand.The next stages were dominated by the introduction of simple universal male suffrage in 1919. The Catholic Party maintained an absolute majority in Flanders, the Socialist Party acquired a similar position in Wallonia. During the second phase (1919-1935) initially the Flemish Movement was weakened and Flemish socialism divided. Huysmans hardly managed to keep the Flemish question a free question. The ‘Compromise of the Belgian Socialists’ (Compromis des socialistes belges) of November 1929 was based on regional monolingualism and a minimal bilingualism in the army and the central administration. The territorial principle in administration and education (1930 and 1932) was accepted. Dutch became the official language in Flanders.During the third phase (1935-1940) pacification did not hold. Conflicts strengthened one another. The party leadership fell into the hands of the Brussels politician Spaak and the Fleming De Man. The latter had just offered the BWP an answer to the socio-economic depression with his ‘Labour Plan’ (Plan van de Arbeid). This new generation wanted a different socialism: rather a people’s party than stressing class conflict, a ‘national socialism’, an authoritarian democracy as a response to a persistent political crisis. In particular Walloons reacted against these developments. At the same time, they critisized the foreign policy of diplomatic independence from France (‘los van Frankrijk’). The Spanish Civil War and the possible recognition of General Franco stressed the divisions. With Spaak, the party had a Socialist Prime Minister for the first time (May 1938-January 1939). While all socialists were opposed to Franco, Walloon socialists had a conflicting view with most Flemish socialists on whether the govern-ment should be brought down on this subject. There was also a conflict over the question of rapprochement with the Christian labour movement concerning a truce over the school question and subsidies for the Catholic ‘propaganda’ schools. The language question worsened the situation. In the Chamber, party cohesion dropped down to 53%.Not only were the Flemish socialists much more strongly represented in the socialist parliamentary group (40% in 1936), their assertiveness also increased. They became more and more annoyed with the quasi-exclusive use of French in their parliamentary group, in the party administration, and mostly during party congresses. Those who knew little or no French no longer wanted to be treated as inferior. Especially, when they had different opinions. The first separate Flemish Socialist Congress was held in March 1937. The Congress wanted to pursue cultural autonomy as far as possible, but opposed any form of federalism, as Flemish socialists would become a powerless minority in a clerical Flanders.Frustration grew among Walloon socialists. They organised separate Walloon Congresses in 1938 and 1939. They emphasized three forms of Flemish imperialism. Unfavourable demographic developments made a Flemish majority in Parliament and political minoritisation likely. Financial-economic transfers impoverished Wallonia to the benefit of Flanders. The loss of jobs for monolingual Walloons in Wallonia and Brussels was discriminatory. This contributed to common framing among Francophones: “Flemish radicalism” was accepted in Flanders, presently threatening the Brussels agglomeration via bilingualism, and Wallonia would be next.On 2 February 1939 Flemish and Walloon socialists opposed one another. The unitary party was in danger of splitting into two language groups, following the Catholic example. It did not come to that. The Walloon radicals, who pursued political federalism, had won some ground, but most Walloon socialists remained supporters of national solidarity, provided the adoption of a new ‘Compromise’ that took account of Walloon grievances.The myth of Flemish socialism as hostile or indifferent to Flemish issues is hard to maintain. After the Second World War, however, the situation became different.

As G. A. Cohen’s camping trip argument shows, community is an important value. But is there anything particularly socialist about it? Critics suggest not. Jason Brennan argues that we don’t need socialist institutions to secure community; capitalist ones will do just fine. Louis-Philippe Hodgson argues, in a similar spirit, that we don’t need explicitly socialist principles to secure community; standard-issue liberal egalitarian ones (like Rawls’s) suffice. But these critics are mistaken. Pace Brennan, I show that capitalism inevitably runs roughshod over community. Pace Hodgson, I show that Rawls’s justice as fairness cannot, absent explicitly socialist supplementation, adequately protect community. In sum, I show that advocates of community must also, and for that reason, be advocates for distinctively socialist principles and institutions. Or, in a slogan: no community without socialism.

At the end of 1917, the main directions of the Polish social movement - conservative, nationalist, liberal-democratic and socialist - were presented in Ukraine. The ideological delineation of Polish political forces in Ukraine took place in the summer of 1917. The representatives of the liberal-democratic camp, the left-wing Socialists and the PPP-faction supported the policy of the Ukrainian Central Rada and became part of the Ukrainian government structures. The opposites in the basic ideological principles led to the exclusion from the participation of nationalist and conservative forces in the authorities. The Liberal Democrats campaigned for cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities and were represented in legislative and executive bodies of power. The leftist socialists, refusing to cooperate with the Ukrainian authorities after the Bolshevik coup, solidarized with the Bolsheviks on the basis of common class interests.The signing of the Brest peace led to the negative attitude of Polish political forces to it, through the condition of the accession of the Kholmshchyna and western Volhynia to Ukraine. The Conservatives and the nationalists protested, the Democrats and the PPP faction left the UCR, but continued to work in government structures to protect the interests of the Polish population. The coming to power of the conservative forces headed by Hetman P. Skoropadsky was supported by the Polish conservatives and the departure from the cooperation of the liberals. Provision of order in Ukraine with the help of German troops was positively perceived by the conservative circles - Polish landowners and bourgeoisie. The withdrawal of German troops from the Ukrainian lands after the defeat of Germany in the war, the armed struggle of the Russian Bolsheviks, the forces of the UNR and the army of Denikin ended with the establishment of the Bolshevik authorities in Ukraine, which resulted in the departure of most of the political and public figures.

Abstract:In Socialism after Hayek, Theodore Burczak uses Hayekian insights to argue in favor of a socialist society with real markets, but also with wealth redistribution and prohibition of wage labor. In so doing, he offers not only a socialist vision but also asks questions that may challenge Hayekian liberals to reformulate their institutional analyses. A critical assessment that combines Austrian and institutional theories leads to the conclusion that some redistributive policies may enhance the knowledge-disseminating function of markets, but that a market order that is limited to worker-managed firms diminishes the knowledge dissemination properties of the market process.

This essay is concerned with the question of what kind of economic system would be needed in order to realize Rawls’s principles of social justice. Hitherto, debates about ‘property-owning democracy’ and ‘liberal socialism’ have been overly schematic, in various respects, and have therefore missed some of the most important issues regarding the relationships between social justice and economic institutions and systems. What is at stake between broadly capitalist or socialist economic systems is not in fact a simple choice in a single dimension, but rather a range of choices across a range of different dimensions. This essay, then, has a dual objective: first, it aims to provide a richer account of this normative territory, while showing how issues of economic democracy, decommodification and the limits of markets, and the role of democratic economic planning, all raise questions of justice that are not well captured by focusing only on questions of ownership. Second, it aims to show how the case for democratic socialism can be developed from Rawlsian foundations, in a way that is sensitive to the normative affinities between Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism and democratic socialism, and which attends carefully to the different kinds of institutional elements which a stable, just, and democratic society would require. Taking these aims together, the hope is that we can move onward to a richer debate about the ways in which the realization of democratic socialist institutions may be seen as a requirement of social justice.

The period between the two world wars was a time of the emergence and rise of fascism all over the world, including Latin America, where one of the few countries where a mass fascist movement emerged was Chile. In this article the author analyses the ideology and political praxis of Chilean National Socialism in the 1930s. The analysis is based on the Chilean National Socialist political and ideological journalism, the press, and the memoirs of the activists and their opponents. The National Socialist Party (“Creole Nazism”) was formed in Chile, proclaiming nationalism, anti-democracy, anti-liberalism, and anti-communism. It was an anti-systemic movement which rejected the values of liberal democracy, which was associated with the domination of plutocracy and imperialism. They adopted corporatism, anti-Semitism, and racism from European fascists and saw themselves as the only alternative to Marxism, which threatened the Western world. The Chilean Nazis envisioned an anti-liberal revolution, the construction of a totalitarian state. Taken to its logical conclusion, these principles made the movement a dangerous force for the ruling circles, which differed little from the left, Marxist parties, which explains the harsh repression against the “Creole Nazis”, which in turn brought them closer to the left. Chilean Nazism was characterized by its constant evolution towards the left and opposition to traditional right-wing parties, which led this movement to an alliance with the anti-fascist Popular Front, which was created precisely to counter the fascist threat in the face of National Socialism. Thus, the Nazis found themselves in the same political bloc with the communists and the socialists. This unnatural alliance with the left, the preaching of the need for a “right-wing revolution”, as well as the hostility of the traditional right, led to the collapse of the movement and its disappearance from the political arena. Despite the elimination of the movement, the ideas of a right-wing revolution, a totalitarian state, corporatism were firmly established on Chilean soil, and their most striking manifestation was the regime of A. Pinochet in the 70s of the twentieth century.

Socialist republicans advocate public ownership and control of the means of production in order to achieve the republican goal of a society without endemic domination. While civic republicanism is often attacked for its conservatism, the relatively neglected radical history of the tradition shows how a republican form of socialism provides powerful conceptual resources to critique capitalism for leaving workers and citizens dominated. This analysis supports a programme of public ownership and economic democracy intended to reduce domination in the workplace and wider society. I defend this socialist republicanism from both the Marxist objection that it overlooks the impersonal nature of domination under capitalism and the left-liberal objections that property-owning democracy or worker codetermination are sufficient to suppress dominating relationships. The resulting position identifies the need for more ambitious institutional grounds for republican liberty than is often supposed, while offering us a distinctive emancipatory justification for socialism.

Abstract This introductory essay provides an overview of the scholarship on state socialist engagements with international criminal and humanitarian law, arguing for a closer scrutiny of the socialist world’s role in shaping these fields of law. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the historiography on post-1945 international law-making has been generally dominated by a post-1989 sense of Western triumphalism over socialism, where the Soviet Union and its allies have been presented as obstructionists of liberal progress. A wave of neo-Marxist scholarship has more recently sought to recover socialist legal contributions to international law, without however fully addressing them in the context of Cold War political conflict and of gross human rights violations committed within the Socialist Bloc. In contrast, this collection provides a balanced understanding of the socialist engagements with international criminal and humanitarian law, looking at the realpolitik agendas of state socialist countries while acknowledging their progressive contributions to the post-war international legal order.

AKP (Justice and Development Party) can be accepted as the last and most powerful representative of Islamism in Turkey. The party came to power alone, after the general elections in 2002 and in 2007. Within its fi rst period of power, AKP claimed divergence from its extreme Islamist views and it gained trust among the majority of intellectuals. Furthermore, some socialist and liberal intellectuals supported most claims of AKP, in its fi rst period of power. In the second period, AKP’s discourse began to have references to şeria law, more frequently; and fi nally, it lost the support of liberals and socialists. We witnessed some important and mysterious assassinations in the years 2006 and 2007 before the 2007 elections; and pre-elections period of 2007 was characterised by legal issues, which put AKP in a ‘suff ering’ position, once more. This essay is an eff ort in re-evaluating the tension between Islamism and laicism and some political issues of AKP years of Turkey, including four chosen acts of violence against laicite defenders or non-Muslims.

Abstract The abridged Chapter 5 from Praznik’s Slovenian book The Paradox of Unpaid Artistic Labour: Autonomy of Art, the Avant-Garde and Cultural Policy in the Transition to Post-Socialism (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2016) reconsiders alternative art workers’ political agenda of the 1980s in light of political transformations of late Yugoslav socialism and the emergence of neo-liberal rationality. During the 1980s, art workers of the alternative art scene in Yugoslavia aimed to redefine and transform socialist production model by critiquing socialist ideology and institutions without taking issue with class differences in the arts. The chapter demonstrates how the 1980s alternative art scene did not consider transformations of working relations of the freelance art workers who were at that time redefined by cultural policy as socialist cultural entrepreneurs. By examining government’s attitudes of and policies for artistic labour the author argues that the spontaneous absorption of neo-liberalism (the realization of personal freedom) and exclusive focus on the critique of repressive state apparatuses during the late Yugoslav socialist period undermined the mandate of the welfare state’s institutions, which secured collective social reproduction and security. After the destruction of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the protagonists of the alternative art scene became members of the post-socialist precariat of self-employed cultural entrepreneurs who are divorced from social security and economic stability.

This article addresses the problematic relationship between feminism and socialism, based on four experiences of social struggle developed in the first decades of the 20th century in Colombia. From these cases, the forms of relationship between feminist and socialist expressions of the time are explored, as well as the existence of popular feminism at the dawn of the 20th century and its characteristics. As main findings, advances and limitations in the relationship between feminism and socialism in terms of organization and program are identified; in turn, the existence of liberal and popular feminist experiences at this time is verified, with characteristic subjects, demands and repertoires, which supposes the questioning of the historical account of the waves of feminism.

La victoria electoral en algunos de los países andinos de proyectos políticos de izquierda transformadora, y de nuevos procesos constituyentes, especialmente en Venezuela, Bolivia y Ecuador, ha despertado una reacción entusiasta en los observadores progresistas. El discurso o fraseología revolucionaria y las transformaciones impulsadas (nacionalización de los sectores productivos estratégicos, reformulación de la división en los tres poderes clásicos del Estado, creación de nuevas formas de participación ciudadana, la garantía efectiva de los derechos económicos y sociales, la reconstrucción de la Constitución económica incluido el concepto de propiedad privada, etc.), han puesto sobre la mesa un debate que parecía cerrado desde la derrota de la Unidad Popular del Presidente Allende, el de la “transición pacífica al socialismo” o hacia un Estado y un Derecho nuevo. El nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano está suponiendo un proceso de construcción del llamado socialismo del siglo XXI, y de un nuevo Estado y Derecho, que ahora son puestos en cuestión. Entonces, ¿nos encontramos ante una auténtica revolución de la que está emergiendo una nueva forma de Estado y de Derecho no liberal?, o bien, ¿estamos ante una simple evolución, ampliación y especificación de los derechos liberales y de un constitucionalismo liberal de tercera generación?

Este artigo analisa a proposta de Bobbio de unir os aspectos positivos do liberalismo e do socialismo, no projeto denominado socialismo-liberal, que conjuga as duas correntes do pensamento político ocidental com a democracia, estabelecendo na mesma estrutura, três características da cidadania: as liberdades civis, as garantias políticas e os direitos sociais.

Este artigo analisa a proposta de Bobbio de unir os aspectos positivos do liberalismo e do socialismo, no projeto denominado socialismo-liberal, que conjuga as duas correntes do pensamento político ocidental com a democracia, estabelecendo na mesma estrutura, três características da cidadania: as liberdades civis, as garantias políticas e os direitos sociais.