Relevant bibliographies by topics / Social Dilemma Games

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Social Dilemma Games'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Social Dilemma Games"

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Kas, Judith, David J. Hardisty, and Michel J. J. Handgraaf. "Steady steps versus sudden shifts: Cooperation in (a)symmetric linear and step-level social dilemmas." Judgment and Decision Making 16, no. 1 (January 2021): 142–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008342.

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AbstractAre groups of people better able to minimize a collective loss if there is a collective target that must be reached or if every small contribution helps? In this paper we investigate whether cooperation in social dilemmas can be increased by structuring the problem as a step-level social dilemma rather than a linear social dilemma and whether cooperation can be increased by manipulating endowment asymmetry between individuals. In two laboratory experiments using ‘Public Bad’ games, we found that that individuals defect less and are better able to minimize collective and personal costs in a step-level social dilemma than in a linear social dilemma. We found that the level of cooperation is not affected by an ambiguous threshold: even when participants cannot be sure about the optimal cooperation level, cooperation remains high in the step-level social dilemmas. We find mixed results for the effect of asymmetry on cooperation. These results imply that presenting social dilemmas as step-level games and reducing asymmetry can help solve environmental dilemmas in the long term.
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Haesevoets, Tessa, Chris Reinders Folmer, Dries H. Bostyn, and Alain Van Hiel. "Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner'S Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation." European Journal of Personality 32, no. 4 (July 2018): 405–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2158.

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Mixed–motive games represent situations that confront people with a conflict between cooperative and non–cooperative alternatives. Despite this common basis, recent research has shown that the consistency of people's choices across different mixed–motive games is rather low. The present research examined behavioural consistency within the same mixed–motive game, by presenting participants with a series of one–shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Across this set of games, payoffs were manipulated in order to intensify or weaken the conflict between self and the other party while maintaining the game's underlying structure. Our findings indicate that significant differences in choice behaviour are observed as a function of both situational (i.e. manipulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game's payoff structure) and personality differences (i.e. individual differences in personality and motivational traits). Moreover, our included situational variables and personality features did not interact with each other and were about equally impactful in shaping cooperation. Crucially, however, despite the significant behavioural differences across game variants, considerable consistency in choices was found as well, which suggests that the game's motivational basis reliably impacts choice behaviour in spite of situational and personality variations. We discuss implications for theorizing on mixed–motive situations and elaborate on the question how cooperation can be promoted. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology
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Jensen, Niels Holm. "Male mating signaling in social dilemma Games." Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 11, no. 3 (September 2013): 131–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/jep.11.2013.3.3.

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Drouvelis, Michalis. "Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games." Games 6, no. 3 (September 21, 2015): 368–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g6030368.

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Stoop, Jan, Daan van Soest, and Jana Vyrastekova. "Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 88 (March 2018): 300–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.12.007.

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Cox, Caleb A., Arzé Karam, and Ryan J. Murphy. "Social preferences and cooperation in simple social dilemma games." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 69 (August 2017): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2017.05.002.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Alain Van Hiel, Kim Dierckx, and Chris Reinders Folmer. "Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games?" Judgment and Decision Making 15, no. 3 (May 2020): 330–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500007142.

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AbstractMost prior research on the external validity of mixed-motive games has studied only one single game version and/or one specific type of real-life prosocial behavior. The present study employs a different approach. We used multiple game trials — with different payoff structures — to measure participants’ behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, and the Public Goods Dilemma. We then examined the associations between these aggregated game behaviors and a wide set of self-reported prosocial behaviors such as donations, commuting, and environmental behaviors. We also related these prosocial behavior measures to a dispositional measure of prosociality, social value orientation. We report evidence that the weak statistical relationships routinely observed in prior studies are at least partially a consequence of failures to aggregate. More specifically, our results show that aggregation over multiple game trials was especially effective for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas it was somewhat effective for the Public Goods Dilemma. Yet, aggregation on the side of the prosocial behaviors was effective for both these games, as well as for social value orientation. The Commons Dilemma, however, turned out to yield invariably poor relationships with prosocial behavior, regardless of the level of aggregation. Based on these findings, we conclude that the use of multiple instances of game behavior and prosocial behavior is preferable to the use of only a single measurement.
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MERLONE, UGO, DAREN R. SANDBANK, and FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY. "SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO N-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES: CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS." International Game Theory Review 14, no. 03 (September 2012): 1250015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500156.

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This paper presents a new systematic review of N-person social dilemma games using a new approach based on dynamic properties of the corresponding system. Traditionally N-person social dilemma games are classified by relative orders of magnitude of payoff parameters. Without border-line cases 24 are identified. The new approach introduced in this paper categorizes the social dilemma games in cases with different number and asymptotic properties of the equilibria. In these cases the solution structure or the trajectory of the percentage of cooperators is readily apparent. These cases also provide the modeler with additional information concerning the impacts of the model parameters on the game outcomes. The example of a simple cartel illustrates this methodology.
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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 5, no. 10 (October 2018): 181085. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181085.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules have four different dilemma resolution (relaxation) mechanisms. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.
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Akimov, Vladimir, and Michail Soutchanski. "Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games." Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 1 (March 1994): 138–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002794038001007.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Social Dilemma Games"

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De, Silva Hannelore, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen, and Karl Sigmund. "Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism." Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8.

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Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only. (authors' abstract)
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Galbraith, Todd William. "Examining Friendship Dynamics in Social Anxiety with Iterated Games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/409829.

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Psychology
Ph.D.
Individuals with social anxiety have been shown to have higher levels of friendship impairment and greater difficulty establishing close relationships than persons without social anxiety. However, the mechanisms associated with such impairment have not been widely examined. Previous research suggests that deficiencies in prosocial behaviors (e.g., low warmth, limited self-disclosure, and constrained cooperation) during interpersonal exchanges may partially explain their difficulties developing close relationships. The present study aimed to examine the effect that rejection may have on prosocial behaviors, as well as other factors associated with developing and maintaining friendships, including trust, perceived likeability, closeness/connectedness, using an iterated, computerized version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Participants with high (n = 56) and low (n = 35) social anxiety were asked to play the PD game with another participant (actually an experimental confederate) whom they met at the start of the study. Participants were led to believe that they were playing the PD game against the other participant but were actually playing against a computer that was programmed with a strategy meant to initially facilitate cooperation. Cooperation, or giving, in the PD game was measured primarily by the number of tokens that the participant shared with his/her partner. Additionally, participants were randomized to either rejection or non-rejection conditions. Partway through the study, those in the rejection condition were exposed to a programmed decrease in giving by their partner as well as an ambiguous in-person rejection (administered by the experimenter). Participants in the non-rejection condition were not exposed to either the programmed or in-person manipulations. Outcomes of interest included total giving during the PD game, constriction of giving, and the use of particular strategies following rejection in the PD game, as well as various measures of relationship quality collected at the end of each round of play. It was hypothesized that individuals with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would exhibit less total giving and a constricted response to low partner giving and also be less likely to use prosocial strategies to encourage cooperation (i.e., a coaxing strategy) following rejection by the partner compared to those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Additionally, we anticipated that those with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would provide lower ratings of the following relationship quality domains following the rejection condition: trust, closeness/connectedness, and perceived likeability than those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Overall, results provided little support for these hypotheses. However, there were several significant main effects that highlighted differences among those with high and low social anxiety. For example, individuals with high social anxiety had greater ratings of the expectancy of future rejection and of the importance of their next turn for maintaining the quality of their relationship with their partner. Additionally, there was a trend level (p = .08) social anxiety group by rejection condition interaction on the participant’s trust of his/her partner, such that those with high social anxiety exhibited reductions in relationship trust following rejection whereas those with low social anxiety did not. Implications of these findings as well as limitations and future directions of study are also explored.
Temple University--Theses
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Hanley, James E. "The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation /." view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9986740.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Sandbank, Daren. "ANALYTICAL SOLUTION, AGENT BEHAVIORAL TRANSITIONS AND CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURES IN N-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194612.

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This dissertation presents the analytical solution, agent behavioral transitions and classification structures in N-person social dilemma games. The specific model in this research uses Pavlovian agents making decisions in a cellular automaton environment with linear payoff functions. This effort culminated in four papers being submitted to journals that publish in this field of study. The first paper demonstrates that the analytical solution to the N-person Prisoners' Dilemma game discussed in previous literature fails when the learning factors are unequal. The paper then derives a more general analytical solution that corrects this issue. The second paper analyzes agent behavior and transitions extending over all social games. Three plateaus are identified. It is found that the agents in each plateau have a significantly different behavior. The transitions between these plateaus are analyzed. Previous literature indicates that there are indeed transitions, but offers no explanations. The third paper presents under what conditions the analytical solution is applicable. The previous literature implies the analytical solution is always applicable in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. This paper thoroughly analyzes for which games the analytical solution actually works and concludes that it applies in the Chicken game with the parameter S slightly negative. The fourth paper views the N-Person Social Dilemma model from a new perspective based on dynamic system theory. Thirteen cases or games are identified. These cases plot the state transition formula, which is a quadratic curve with linear payoff functions, versus the 45 degree line. From case diagrams the solution structures are readily apparent without the use of simulation. Also, additional information concerning proper selection of parameter values is provided above the traditional approach. The case diagrams can be used by modelers to easily develop and validate models for specific applications. There is no previous literature viewing N-person social dilemma games from this system theoretical perspective.
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Levati, Maria Vittoria. "Individuals behaviour in social dilemma games and the role played by persuasion : theory and experiments." Thesis, University of York, 2000. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14042/.

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Antinyan, Armenak <1987&gt. "Three essays on social preferences, social dilemmas and taxation." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/4669.

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The dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies other-regarding preferences of decision makers in the domain of losses. The framework of the Dictator Game is modified by introduction of a bi-directional monetary loss. Chapter 2 studies the interaction of individuals with heterogeneous characteristics in a social dilemma. The framework of the Public Goods Game is modified, by manipulating the endowment sources of the individuals included in the same group. Chapter 3 studies whether providing information on the national public expenditure to the taxpayers and whether involving taxpayers in the process of allocating tax revenues over public goods influence the level of the adequate tax rate- the fraction of income that individuals consider adequate to pay as taxes.
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Izquierdo, Luis R. "Advancing learning and evolutionary game theory with an application to social dilemmas." Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.444030.

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Papadomichelakis, Giorgos. "Essays on the Economics of Social Dilemmas." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/670052.

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The purpose of this dissertation is to study specific cases of all those aforementioned questions in a number of different settings, all of which share one common characteristic of particular economic relevance. The settings that will be studied all involve a two-ways interaction of an individual with the group of his peers. More specifically, the essays in this thesis are concerned with a problem classified in the literature under the umbrella term of, “Social Dilemma” (Olson 1965, Kollock, 1998). A social dilemma is any strategic situation (in the game-theoric sense of the term) in which there is a conflict between individual and collective interest. To be more precise, the defining characteristics of a social dilemma situation is that everyone collectively is better off if everyone cooperates towards a specific action, but each one individually is better off defecting, regardless of the actions of others. The famous “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Rappoport and Chammah, 1965) is a classical example showcasing the conflict of interest. The reason why social dilemmas are interesting from an economist’s perspective, is because this conflict of interest is at the heart of many issues of economic importance, such as labor productivity, public finance, crime and environmental policy among others. Understanding the drivers of individual behavior, as well as the interaction of individuals within a group, and identifying problematic points to these interactions is the key to the design of the appropriate policies, and this thesis aims to contribute towards that goal. Two distinct cases of social dilemma, represented mathematically as two seminal games, are studied. These two cases are a standard public good game augmented by the presence of a mechanism for the enforcement of cooperation, and a social learning game, where information can only be communicated among the individuals of the group through their actions. As explained before, what connects these two games, is the interdependence of actions and payoffs of their players, as well as the misalignment between individual, and collective best, creating a classical problem of externalities. These two cases are formally defined, their respective equilibria and other features are identified, and potential welfare-improving mechanism are discussed. An additional common element of these two studies, that constitutes another point of contribution of this body of work, is that I study the role of mechanisms that do not solely rely on the provision of extrinsic (monetary) incentives, as it is the standard approach of the economic literature. In the public good game case, I model the role of endogenous norms that reinforce cooperation among agents and how it interacts with the presence of a punishment mechanism for defectors. In the case of the social learning game, the mechanism to address the inefficiencies that I shall demonstrate, is one that relies on the strategic disclosure of available information, instead of a provision of payoff-relevant incentives to implement the socially optimal behavior. Finally, this thesis which is primarily involved with theoretical analysis of social dilemma problems, is supplemented with a laboratory experiment on social learning, aimed at both testing empirically the propositions of the theoretical work, and other hypotheses that remain ambiguous in the literature.
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Lindahl, Therese. "Strategic and environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2005. http://web.hhs.se/efi/summary/674.htm.

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Lemoine, Ida, and Peter Fredin. "How Does Ego Depletion Affect Moral Judgments and Pro-social Decisions?" Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Nationalekonomi, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-111858.

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BACKGROUND: Today’s societal changes, including high rate of change and increasing information flows, are increasing the demand on the individual mental capacity. It becomes increasingly difficult to analytically process all the different dilemmas and everyday decisions as individuals have a limited mental capacity available to make these decisions. Thus, it has been suggested that ego-depleted relies more heavily on intuition, which is less burdensome, when making decision. However little is known about to what extent intuitive decisions differ from analytic. Are ego-depleted individuals more or less likely to maximize outcome in moral dilemmas involving conflicting values? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less willing to cooperate? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less altruistic? Is our intuition more or less in accordance with Homo Economicus?AIM: Starting from a Dual Process perspective on decision-making the aim of this study is to examine how ego depletion affects moral judgment and pro-social decisions.METHOD: A laboratory experiment involving 115 subjects, using real monetary incentives, was conducted among students at Linköping University. Subjects were randomized into one of two treatments. Everything was identical across treatments except for the initial ego-depletion manipulation. Using a standard paradigm for ego-depletion subjects in treatment 1 were put under high cognitive load while subjects in treatment two were put under low cognitive load. Subjects faced 16 questions divided into four different decision tasks: Moral dilemmas, Public Goods game, two types of Dictator Game where the type of sacrifice subjects could make in order to contribute money to charity was varied.RESULTS: Subjects in the high cognitive load treatment made fewer consequentialists moral judgments compared to other subjects (p = 0.075). The effect is especially strong when looking only at high-conflict dilemmas such as Crying Baby. No difference between treatments was found for the public goods games. In the dictator game involving monetary sacrifice subjects donated less money to charity when put under high cognitive load. However the finding was not significant (p = 0.292). No difference was found in the dictator game involving effort as personal sacrifice since almost everyone chooses to donate to charity.CONCLUSION: According to The Dual Process perspective this essay shows that intuitive thinking does not evidently lead to that they makes decision that more or less is in accordance with Homo Economicus. The connection between ego depletion and pro-social decisions is more complex. Further research needs to investigate which different mental shortcuts that individuals uses in various types of pro-social decisions and why intuitive and analytical decision-making differ between different decisions. Further research within the area can identify potential mechanisms and policies that can support individuals’ capacity to make decisions in accordance with their own and society’s preferences.
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Books on the topic "Social Dilemma Games"

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Marcus Adrianus Leonardus Maria van Assen. Essays on actor models in exchange networks and social dilemmas. [S.l: s.n.], 2001.

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Komorita, Samuel S. Social dilemmas. Madison, Wis: Brown & Benchmark, 1994.

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Rational association. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1987.

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The evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books, 1990.

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Otnes, Per. Society and economy: Models of social man. Oslo: Solum, 2003.

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Otnes, Per. Society and economy: Models of social man. Oslo: Solum Forlag, 2004.

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Antagonistische Kooperation: Elementare spieltheoretische Modelle spontaner Ordnungsentstehung. Freiburg: K. Alber, 1986.

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Rationale Akteure und soziale Institutionen: Beitrag zu einer endogenen Theorie des sozialen Tauschs. München: Oldenbourg, 1985.

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Yazid, Ega Kurnia. Game theory di balik dilema mudik lebaran saat pandemi COVID-19. Jakarta], Indonesia: CSIS Indonesia, 2020.

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Capturing the complexity of conflict: Dealing with violent ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era. London: Pinter, 1999.

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Book chapters on the topic "Social Dilemma Games"

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Tanimoto, Jun. "Social Dilemma Analysis for Modeling Traffic Flow." In Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics, 105–54. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8_3.

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Tanimoto, Jun. "Social Dilemma Analysis of the Spread of Infectious Disease." In Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics, 155–216. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8_4.

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Merlone, Ugo, Daren R. Sandbank, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Agent Behavior and Transitions in N-Person Social Dilemma Games." In Games and Dynamics in Economics, 205–29. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3623-6_12.

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Mitter, Peter. "Take-Some Games: The Commons Dilemma and a Land of Cockaigne." In Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior, 199–208. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_14.

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Szabó, György, Attila Szolnoki, and Jeromos Vukov. "Mechanisms Supporting Cooperation for the Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Games." In Econophysics and Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques, 24–31. Milano: Springer Milan, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_4.

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Greenwood, Garrison W. "Emotions and Their Effect on Cooperation Levels in N-Player Social Dilemma Games." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 88–99. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14803-8_7.

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Gibbons, Maud D., Colm O’Riordan, and Josephine Griffith. "Evolution of Mobile Strategies in Social Dilemma Games: An Analysis of Cooperative Cluster Formation." In Studies in Computational Intelligence, 87–103. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99283-9_5.

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Capraro, Valerio, Matteo Venanzi, Maria Polukarov, and Nicholas R. Jennings. "Cooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 146–58. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_13.

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Lomborg, Bjørn. "Game theory vs. multiple agents: The iterated prisoner's dilemma." In Artificial Social Systems, 69–93. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58266-5_5.

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Gokhale, Chaitanya S., and Hye Jin Park. "Eco-evolutionary Spatial Dynamics of Nonlinear Social Dilemmas." In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, 185–98. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56534-3_8.

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Conference papers on the topic "Social Dilemma Games"

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"MONITORING INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH GAMES WITH SOCIAL DILEMMA." In International Conference on Evolutionary Computation Theory and Applications. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0003623400050012.

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Greenwood, Garrison W. "Evolving N-person social dilemma strategies to resolve questions on participation in climate change programs." In 2010 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itw.2010.5593349.

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Kumar, Medha, Kapil Agrawal, and Varun Dutt. "Modeling Decisions in Collective Risk Social Dilemma Games for Climate Change Using Reinforcement Learning." In 2019 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cogsima.2019.8724273.

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Greenwood, Garrison W. "Evolving strategies to help resolve tragedy of the commons social dilemmas." In 2015 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2015.7317905.

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Greenwood, Garrison W. "Altruistic punishment can help resolve tragedy of the commons social dilemmas." In 2016 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2016.7860402.

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Zhang, Tongda, Futian Huang, Jun Qian, Xiao Sun, Yueting Chai, and Yi Liu. "Contributor Dilemma in Structured Tri-game." In 2020 IEEE Intl Conf on Parallel & Distributed Processing with Applications, Big Data & Cloud Computing, Sustainable Computing & Communications, Social Computing & Networking (ISPA/BDCloud/SocialCom/SustainCom). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ispa-bdcloud-socialcom-sustaincom51426.2020.00165.

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Fukuyama, Yuki, and Yusuke Morita. "Games for learning social dilemmas: From the viewpoint of enhancing knowledge, morality, and trust." In 2013 IEEE 63rd Annual Conference International Council for Educational Media (ICEM). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cicem.2013.6820207.

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Feng, Haowen, and Weimin Ouyang. "Analysis on the Dilemma of College Teaching Team Construction from the Perspective of Game Theory." In International Conference on Humanities and Social Science 2016. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/hss-26.2016.41.

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Feng, Haowen, and Weimin Ouyang. "Research on the Dilemma of Taxi Management in China from the Perspective of Game Theory." In 2016 2nd International Conference on Social Science and Higher Education. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icsshe-16.2016.49.

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JEFFREYS, MARK. "NATURAL-LANGUAGE "CHEAP TALK" ENABLES COORDINATION ON A SOCIAL-DILEMMA GAME IN A CULTURALLY HOMOGENEOUS POPULATION." In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference (EVOLANG6). WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812774262_0019.

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Reports on the topic "Social Dilemma Games"

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Martin, Noémie, and Pierre-Olivier Pineau. Choosing to Pay More for Electricity: an experiment on the level of residential consumer cooperation. CIRANO, June 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54932/xdvi6385.

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Abstract:
Reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions are two cornerstones of the fight against climate change. Signaling negative externalities of individual consumption on the environment is at the heart of public policies, and usually materializes through an increase in the price of polluting good and services. However, social resistance typically arises when such policies are implemented. In this experiment, we are interested in testing the context in which individuals would be willing to pay more for electricity. We use the situation of Québec (Canada), where low-cost hydropower sold below market value, akin to a consumption subsidy, leads to high residential consumption. Increasing regulated prices closer to their market value would result in a direct welfare gain and free some green energy, reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) in other sectors. The choice to pay more is a prisoner’s dilemma, and we find in this framework that giving clear and transparent information on the consequences of the price increase induces a majority of people to choose to pay more. In addition to the economic benefit of the public good, the presence of the environmental benefit increases contributions. Participants with a more severe budget constraint tend to contribute less. These results are encouraging for the development of efficient energy policies reducing GHG emissions.
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