Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Skepticism / Journal articles

Journal articles on the topic 'Skepticism'

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Skepticism.

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 May 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Skepticism.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Johnson, Drew. "Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9, no. 2 (June 11, 2019): 116–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191302.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard’s brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local’) skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.

2

Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten. "Is skepticism an epistemological predicament? Skeptisizm epistemolojik bir çıkmaz mıdır?" Journal of Human Sciences 15, no. 2 (June 29, 2018): 1291. http://dx.doi.org/10.14687/jhs.v15i2.5183.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Skeptics, by being skeptical about the certainty, accuracy and truth claims, defend that there are no objective accuracy or certainty; and for this reason, it is not possible to have an epistemological justification. The arguments on skepticism claiming that knowledge is not possible or proofs are inadequate in justifying knowledge have caused that skepticism has been considered as a notorious concept and sometimes it has been considered as a destructive activity. There is the idea that knowledge and certainty are possible behind these considerations. On this basis, skepticism has been conceived as the rejection of knowledge, beliefs and proofs, and therefore, the arguments of skepticism have been presented as an epistemic predicament. In this study, the arguments of whether skepticism has faced an epistemological predicament or not will be dealt with. For this purpose, the etymological investigation of skepticism will be performed, and then it will be claimed that there are two types of skepticisms, which are the excessive one and the moderate one. After skeptical arguments are defined, it will be claimed that excessive skepticism is in an epistemological predicament; however, moderate skepticism has been saved from this predicament by holding tightly to some arguments. In this way, the negative criticisms towards skepticism will have an unfair position in the face of moderate skepticism. In other words, it will appear that that the charge of skepticism with denialism is faulty and incomplete. Extended English summary is in the end of Full Text PDF (TURKISH) file.ÖzetSkeptikler kesinlik, doğruluk ve hakikat iddialarından şüphe duyarak nesnel bir doğruluğun ya da kesinliğin olmadığını; dolayısıyla epistemolojik olarak gerekçelendirmenin de mümkün olmadığını savunmaktadır. Bilginin mümkün olmadığı ya da bilgiyi gerekçelendirmede kanıtların yetersiz olduğu şeklindeki skeptik tezler, skeptisizmin kötü bir unvanla anılmasına hatta yıkıcı bir uğraş gibi değerlendirilmesine neden olmaktadır. Bu değerlendirmelerin arkasında bilginin ve kesinliğin mümkün olduğu fikri yer almaktadır. Bu fikre dayanarak skeptisizm bilginin, inançların ve kanıtların reddi gibi düşünülmekte ve buna bağlı olarak skeptisizmin tezleri epistemik bir çıkmaz gibi sunulmaktadır. Bu çalışmada skeptisizmin epistemolojik bir çıkmaza girip girmediği ele alınacaktır. Bunun için öncelikle skeptisizmin etimolojik araştırması yapılacak ve daha sonra aşırı ve ılımlı olmak üzere iki skeptisizm türü olduğu ileri sürülecektir. Skeptik argümanlar ortaya koyulduktan sonra aşırı skeptisizmin epistemolojik çıkmazda olduğu; ancak ılımlı skeptisizmin bazı varsayımlara tutunarak bu çıkmazdan kurtulabildiği iddia edilecektir. Böylece skeptisizme yönelik olumsuz eleştiriler ılımlı skeptisizmle haksız bir konuma girecektir. Başka bir deyişle skeptisizmi inkarcılıkla suçlamanın hatalı ve eksik olduğu ortaya çıkacaktır.

3

Vincentnathan, Lynn, S. Georg Vincentnathan, and Nicholas Smith. "Catholics and Climate Change Skepticism." Worldviews 20, no. 2 (2016): 125–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685357-02002005.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Despite Church teachings on climate change and most Catholics accepting the science and being concerned, a large minority of Catholic laity and clergy deny it. This multi-sited, qualitative study, which includes supporting quantitative data, focuses on how skepticism is articulated by Catholic climate change skeptics, and transmitted and transmuted through Catholic networks. While Catholic climate change skeptics echo other skeptics, they also bring Catholic perspectives, often mingled with conservative religious and political views. Some express concern common among other Christian skeptics that believing in climate change leads to neopaganism and promotes anti-human sentiments. The focus is on Catholic climate change skeptics and their ideas, not Catholicism per se, and various cultural, social, and psychological factors, including their understanding of Catholicism, that impact their climate change skepticism. This contributes to the growing scholarship on climate change skepticism.

4

Schwab, Whitney. "Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth." Apeiron 46, no. 3 (July 2013): 327–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2012-0026.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Abstract This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the central argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepticism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argument in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of truth along the lines proposed by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, the argument fails because such criteria were introduced to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as knowledge, and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in the first place. Second, if we broaden our conception of a criterion of truth, such that a criterion is any standard against which an impression can be evaluated, the argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’. On the one hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion in order to make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning their existence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. On the other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a criterion, possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making judgments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptics’ epistemic attitude towards the existence of criteria of truth (i.e. suspension of judgment) does not entail that skeptics cannot possess any beliefs.

5

Goldberg, Sanford C. "Skepticism and Inquiry." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 3-4 (November 17, 2020): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10019.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Abstract In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish (i) the (skepticism-supporting) reasons for doubting whether p, (ii) one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and (iii) the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that (i) is sufficient to undermine the prospect described in (ii). By contrast (and second), ordinary forms of skepticism, which can be identified in connection with (ii), can actually be a boon to inquiry by enhancing (iii). In such cases, having reasons for skeptical doubt is not merely compatible with inquiring further, but also serves to motivate and to help frame such inquiry.

6

Vollbrecht, Lucy Alsip. "Skepticism & Feminism." Southwest Philosophy Review 40, no. 1 (2024): 5–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20244012.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

What is the value of Pyrrhonizing skepticism today? As an epistemologist, I am sympathetic to skepticism, but as a feminist, I am concerned by it. In this short paper, I’ll interrogate the troubled relationship between skepticism and feminism. More specifically, I’ll ask: Can feminists be skeptics? In the first half of the paper, I’ll articulate one feminist objection to skepticism. In the second half, I’ll suggest a pathway forward by which feminists can harness the power of the skeptical method to antiskeptical ends. Part 1 of my analysis engages Brian Ribeiro’s recent book Pyrrhonizers (2021), and Part 2 engages Jennifer Saul’s “Skepticism and Implicit Bias” (2013).

7

Loveland, Matthew T., Alexander G. Capella, and India Maisonet. "Prosocial skeptics: Skepticism and generalized trust." Critical Research on Religion 5, no. 3 (May 11, 2017): 251–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2050303217707245.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

We report on a study of the religious correlates of generalized trust. Our critical frame leads us to explore novel questions about how nonreligion may encourage social trust. We find that those who believe the bible to be a book of fables are more trusting than those with other beliefs about the text, and that nontheists report a greater willingness to trust. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research about religious belief and generalized trust.

8

Maia Neto, José R. "THE SKEPTICAL CARTESIAN BACKGROUND OF HUME'S "OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY" (FIRST INQUIRY, SECTION 12)." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 56, no. 132 (December 2015): 371–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2015n13204jrmn.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section (I) on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls (II) "consequent skepticism about the senses," (III) "antecedent skepticism," and (IV) "Academic skepticism."

9

Rusin, Jill. "Characterizing Skepticism’s Import." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2, no. 2 (2012): 99–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x627249.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

This paper discusses a common contemporary characterization of skepticism and skeptical arguments—that their real importance is instrumental, that they “drive progress in philosophy.” I explore two possible contrasts to the idea that skepticism’s significance is thus wholly methodological. First, I recall for the reader a range of views that can be understood as ‘truth in skepticism’ views. These concessive views are those most clearly at odds with the idea that skepticism is false, but instrumentally valuable. Considering the contributions of such ‘truth in skepticism’ theorists, I argue, shows that the good of furthering philosophical progress is partly achieved by the work of those who would reject the ‘merely methodological’ view of skepticism’s import. While this shows such a view of skepticism’s import to be partially self-effacing, it is not therefore incoherent. Rather, the characterization is revealed to be wedded to particular diagnoses of skepticism, and not independently innocuous or neutral. Second, I discuss the idea that the ‘merely methodological’ characterization of skepticism’s import draws a contrast with philosophical positions or theses that are supposed to have practical teeth. Here, I think the danger of acquiescing too readily to this view is that the normative import of skeptical arguments is obscured. At a time when discussions of the value of knowledge are in ascendency, this in particular seems a loss—a route from consideration of skeptical arguments to broader normative questions worth keeping open is rather more obscured than opened up. Any radically revisionary outcome of an encounter with skepticism is less likely, led by such an understanding, just when there is opportunity instead to connect up with broad questions of epistemic value. For these reasons I argue the characterization is not one to too readily, unthinkingly, endorse.

10

Brandom, Robert B. "Fighting Skepticism with Skepticism." Facta Philosophica 2, no. 2 (2000): 163–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/factaphil2000229.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Wang, Jaesun, and Seoyong Kim. "Analysis of the Impact of Values and Perception on Climate Change Skepticism and Its Implication for Public Policy." Climate 6, no. 4 (December 14, 2018): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/cli6040099.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Climate change is an unprecedented risk that humans have not previously experienced. It is accepted that people are generally worried about global warming. However, it is also a fact that there is a small but increasing number of climate change skeptics. These skeptics do not believe that there is any risk, nor are they concerned with other worrisome facts related to climate change. Skeptics regard the present scientific findings supporting climate change as false artefacts. Our study aimed to explore the factors that influence climate skepticism. In this work, to make a regression model, we established environmental skepticism as a dependent variable and included sociodemographic factors, values, and perception factors as the three independent variables. Also, to examine their roles indirectly, we regarded values as moderators. The results show that, in terms of values, ideology, environmentalism, religiosity, two kinds of cultural biases, and science and technology (S&T) optimism influence skepticism at the individual level, whereas, in terms of perception factors, perceived risk, perceived benefit, and negative affect have an impact. Also, values such as ideology, religiosity, environmentalism, and cultural biases play a moderating role that facilitates, buffers, or changes the effect of psychometric variables on an individual’s skepticism.

12

Prichard, Robert W. "Skepticism About Loss of Skepticism!" Archives of Internal Medicine 151, no. 3 (March 1, 1991): 612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archinte.1991.00400030140028.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Prichard, R. W. "Skepticism about loss of skepticism!" Archives of Internal Medicine 151, no. 3 (March 1, 1991): 612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archinte.151.3.612.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Claggett, Jennifer, Brent Kitchens, Maria Paino, and Kaitlyn Beisecker Levin. "The Effects of Website Traits and Medical Skepticism on Patients’ Willingness to Follow Web-Based Medical Advice: Web-Based Experiment." Journal of Medical Internet Research 24, no. 2 (February 18, 2022): e29275. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/29275.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Background As people increasingly turn to web-based sources for medical information, we offer some insight into what website traits influence patients’ credibility assessment. Specifically, we control for brand and content length, while manipulating three website traits: authorship, format, and tone. Furthermore, we focus on medical skepticism to understand how patients with high levels of medical skepticism may react to web-based medical information differently. Medical skepticism is related to a patient’s doubts about the value of conventional medical care; therefore, skeptics may have different practices and criteria when conducting their own web-based medical searches. Objective The aim of this study is to evaluate how website traits affect the likelihood that patients follow web-based medical advice and how this varies among patients with differing levels of medical skepticism. Methods This web-based experiment presented participants with a hypothetical medical situation about leg cramps and offered a website with treatment advice. We varied the websites the participants observed across three traits: authorship (patient or physician), format (article or discussion forum), and tone (objective or experience-based). The 2305 participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 possible conditions and then asked the extent to which they would follow the advice. Health care patterns and coverage, demographics, and the participants’ level of medical skepticism were captured. Results Our participants were selected to be demographically representative of the population of internet users in the United States. The 2305 complete responses were analyzed with ordinary least squares regression. Our analysis reveals that people are more likely to accept web-based medical advice authored by a physician (P<.001) and presented with an objective tone (P=.006), but these preferences erode as the levels of medical skepticism increase. Medical skepticism was measured by means of a previously established index on a 0 to 4 scale, and the average score was 2.26 (SD 0.84). Individuals with higher levels of medical skepticism were more likely to follow web-based medical advice in our experiment (P<.001). Individuals with low levels of medical skepticism found the discussion forum format more credible, whereas those with high levels of medical skepticism preferred the article format (P=.03). We discuss the interactions between medical skepticism and all 3 website traits manipulated in the experiment. Conclusions Our findings suggest that, generally, physician authorship and an objective tone create more persuasive web-based medical advice. However, there are differences in how patients with high levels of medical skepticism react to web-based medical resources. Medical skeptics are less discerning regarding the author’s credentials and the presentation tone of the information. Furthermore, patients with higher levels of medical skepticism prefer article format presentations, whereas those with lower levels of medical skepticism prefer discussion forum–style formatting.

15

Baum, Seth. "Superintelligence Skepticism as a Political Tool." Information 9, no. 9 (August 22, 2018): 209. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info9090209.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

This paper explores the potential for skepticism about artificial superintelligence to be used as a tool for political ends. Superintelligence is AI that is much smarter than humans. Superintelligence does not currently exist, but it has been proposed that it could someday be built, with massive and potentially catastrophic consequences. There is substantial skepticism about superintelligence, including whether it will be built, whether it would be catastrophic, and whether it is worth current attention. To date, superintelligence skepticism appears to be mostly honest intellectual debate, though some of it may be politicized. This paper finds substantial potential for superintelligence skepticism to be (further) politicized, due mainly to the potential for major corporations to have a strong profit motive to downplay concerns about superintelligence and avoid government regulation. Furthermore, politicized superintelligence skepticism is likely to be quite successful, due to several factors including the inherent uncertainty of the topic and the abundance of skeptics. The paper’s analysis is based on characteristics of superintelligence and the broader AI sector, as well as the history and ongoing practice of politicized skepticism on other science and technology issues, including tobacco, global warming, and industrial chemicals. The paper contributes to literatures on politicized skepticism and superintelligence governance.

16

Stith, Richard. "Will There Be a Science of Law in the Twenty-First Century?" Revue générale de droit 22, no. 2 (March 19, 2019): 373–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1058125ar.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

The skepticism of the American Legal Realists and their heirs threatens to make a politically neutral science of law impossible and thus to undermine the liberal polity which needs such a science. Ronald Dworkin attempts to refute the skeptics and defend both legal theory and liberalism. However, the author points out, Dworkin and liberalism are themselves skeptics when it comes to moral principles, and, therefore, they cannot wholly escape from similar skepticism with regard to legal principles. Both Anglo-American and Continental legal history are examined in the course of these arguments.

17

Ramírez-i-Ollé, Meritxell. "‘Civil skepticism’ and the social construction of knowledge: A case in dendroclimatology." Social Studies of Science 48, no. 6 (March 30, 2018): 821–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306312718763119.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Early Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars recognized that the social construction of knowledge depends on skepticism’s parasitic relationship to background expectations and trust. Subsequent generations have paid less empirical attention to skepticism in science and its relationship with trust. I seek to rehabilitate skepticism in STS – particularly, Merton’s view of skepticism as a scientific norm sustained by trust among status peers – with a study of what I call ‘civil skepticism’. The empirical grounding is a case in contemporary dendroclimatology and the development of a method (‘Blue Intensity’) for generating knowledge about climate change from trees. I present a sequence of four instances of civil skepticism involved in making Blue Intensity more resistant to critique, and hence credible (in laboratory experiments, workshops, conferences, and peer-review of articles). These skeptical interactions depended upon maintaining communal notions of civility among an increasingly extended network of mutually trusted peers through a variety of means: by making Blue Intensity complementary to existing methods used to study a diverse natural world (tree-ring patterns) and by contributing to a shared professional goal (the study of global climate change). I conclude with a sociological theory about the role of civil skepticism in constituting knowledge-claims of greater generality and relevance.

18

Jacques, Peter. "The Rearguard of Modernity: Environmental Skepticism as a Struggle of Citizenship." Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 76–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/glep.2006.6.1.76.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Environmental skepticism denies the reality and importance of mainstream global environmental problems. However, its most important challenges are in its civic claims which receive much less attention. These civic claims defend the basis of ethical authority of the dominant social paradigm. The article explains how political values determine what skeptics count as a problem. One such value described is “deep anthropocentrism,” or the attempt to split human society from non-human nature and reject ecology as a legitimate field of ethical concern. This bias frames what skeptics consider legitimate knowledge. The paper then argues that the contemporary conservative countermovement has marshaled environmental skepticism to function as a rearguard for a maladaptive set of core values that resist public efforts to address global environmental sustainability. As such, the paper normatively argues that environmental skepticism is a significant threat to efforts to achieve sustainability faced by human societies in a globalizing world.

19

Smith, Plínio Junqueira. "Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism." Sententiae 42, no. 3 (November 30, 2023): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.31649/sent42.03.047.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

This paper presents and argues for a contemporary version of skepticism: neo-Pyrrhonism. Interest in the history of skepticism engendered a new, more complex and attractive conception of skepticism. Accordingly, many philosophers now claim they are skeptics. In line with what they say, I develop neo-Pyrrhonism as I see it. It has a negative part, in which dogmas are criticized, and a positive one: first, the neo-Pyrrhonist lives his life according to his skeptical principles and following everyday life, and, second, he is able to describe philosophically his skeptical view of the world, thereby offering possible solutions to philosophical problems empirically conceived.

20

Robison, John W. "Skepticism about Skepticism about Moral Responsibility." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99, no. 3 (May 25, 2017): 555–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12197.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Dell, Paul F. "Not Reasonable Skepticism, but Extreme Skepticism." Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 176, no. 9 (September 1988): 537–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005053-198809000-00006.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Alpert, Joseph. "Skepticism About Loss of Skepticism!-Reply." Archives of Internal Medicine 151, no. 3 (March 1, 1991): 612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archinte.1991.00400030140029.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Schmid-Petri, Hannah, Silke Adam, Ivo Schmucki, and Thomas Häussler. "A changing climate of skepticism: The factors shaping climate change coverage in the US press." Public Understanding of Science 26, no. 4 (November 9, 2015): 498–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963662515612276.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Skepticism toward climate change has a long tradition in the United States. We focus on mass media as the conveyors of the image of climate change and ask: Is climate change skepticism still a characteristic of US print media coverage? If so, to what degree and in what form? And which factors might pave the way for skeptics entering mass media debates? We conducted a quantitative content analysis of US print media during one year (1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013). Our results show that the debate has changed: fundamental forms of climate change skepticism (such as denial of anthropogenic causes) have been abandoned in the coverage, being replaced by more subtle forms (such as the goal to avoid binding regulations). We find no evidence for the norm of journalistic balance, nor do our data support the idea that it is the conservative press that boosts skepticism.

24

Fosl, Peter S. "Cavell and Hume on Skepticism, Natural Doubt, and the Recovery of the Ordinary." Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies, no. 3 (March 27, 2015): 32–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.v0i3.1298.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

One curious aspect of Stanley Cavell’s investigations into skepticism is his relative neglect of one of philosophy’s most important skeptics, David Hume. Cavell’s thinking about skepticism is located in relation to Wittgenstein, Kant, Emerson, Austin, and others. But while Hume is occasionally mentioned, those encounters are brief and generally dismissive. In “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” for example, Cavell remarks that while “Hume is always a respectable place to begin,” Kant is “deeper and obscurer” (MWM, 88). The important Cavell scholar Timothy Gould follows Cavell in this, writing that: “Hume’s tactic of playing billiards as a relief from the melancholy of reflection and skepticism is a relatively unsophisticated strategy, compared to some that I know of.”

25

Grindal, Matthew, Dilshani Sarathchandra, and Kristin Haltinner. "White Identity and Climate Change Skepticism: Assessing the Mediating Roles of Social Dominance Orientation and Conspiratorial Ideation." Climate 11, no. 2 (January 17, 2023): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/cli11020026.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Prior research has found that white people are more likely to be climate change skeptics. In much of this prior work, white identity is treated as a categorical label, limiting the theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship. Drawing on survey data from a US national sample of 933 white young adults, we theorize that white identity is a developmental process where people explore the meanings of their racial identity and commit to a white identity marked by enhanced levels of social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, two social-psychological constructs consistently associated with climate change skepticism. Using regression analyses, we tested a mediation model that a strong white identity would increase climate change skepticism by enhancing one’s social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation. We found partial support for our model. While a strong white identity was positively associated with social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, only social dominance orientation increased climate change skepticism. Conspiratorial ideation reduced climate change skepticism. We discuss the implications of our findings for the climate change literature as well as how our findings can inform policies that could reduce climate change skepticism among white people.

26

Beebe, James R. "A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, no. 4 (November 25, 2015): 315–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-04010005.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the present article, I defend a priori skepticism against Vahid’s criticisms.

27

Sarathchandra, Dilshani, and Kristin Haltinner. "Climate Change Skeptics’ Environmental Concerns and Support for Clean Energy Policy: A Case Study of the US Pacific Northwest." Climate 11, no. 11 (November 2, 2023): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/cli11110221.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Resistance to clean energy policy in the United States stems partly from public hesitancy and skepticism toward anthropogenic climate change. This article examines self-declared climate change skeptics’ views of clean energy policy along a continuum of skeptical thought, spanning from epistemic denial to attribution doubt. To perform this, we use data from an online survey administered in the US Pacific Northwest and a series of pilot interviews conducted with skeptics in the same region. Results reveal that skeptics’ support for clean energy policy is consistently linked with their environmental concern across the skepticism continuum. Conspiracy ideation and distrust in science lead to a reduction in support. However, the positive effect of environmental concern trumps the effects of these beliefs. Important and hopeful implications of these findings for climate change communication and policy are discussed.

28

Macarthur, David. "Exploding the Realism-Antirealism Debate: Putnam contra Putnam." Monist 103, no. 4 (September 15, 2020): 370–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa010.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Abstract Putnam is famous (or infamous) for often changing his allegiance between various forms of realism and antirealism. In this paper I want to use Putnam’s own reflections and insights on the realism-antirealism issue to provide a powerful case for skepticism about the entire debate—in spite of the fact that that is not Putnam’s own ultimate attitude. From this skeptical perspective, I shall argue that Putnam has helped us see that the realism-antirealism debate faces a dilemma: either it resolves into existence questions about particular items that are resolvable by, say, scientific or mathematical or ethical etc. practices rather than by appeal to philosophical argument; or it represents a misguided response to skepticism about an entire class or realm of items (e.g., the unobservable items posited by physics, or the manifest world of tables and chairs) given that it hopelessly attempts to answer skepticism on the skeptic’s own terms. What Putnam tends to overlook in his realist moments is that we can philosophically undermine skepticism without being committed to any philosophically substantial realism or antirealism.

29

Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don't Know We Have Hands and it's Fine." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 13, no. 1 (April 14, 2020): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.13.1.106-117.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

30

Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don’t Know We Have Hands and It’s Fine." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 13 (2020): 106–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2020139.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

31

Haltinner, Kristin, and Dilshani Sarathchandra. "Pro-Environmental Views of Climate Skeptics." Contexts 19, no. 1 (February 2020): 36–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1536504220902200.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Using data from interviews with self-identified climate change skeptics, it becomes clear that there is a public misperception about climate change skepticism. Skeptics are concerned about pollution, support environmentally friendly policies, and oppose continued reliance on oil. Current climate change communication is problematic; here, we explore the policies that garner skeptics’ support.

32

Mills, Ethan. "Three Skepticisms in Cārvāka Epistemology: The Problem of Induction, Purandara’s Fallibilism, and Jayarāśi’s Skepticism about Philosophy." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12, no. 1 (December 23, 2021): 46–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10029.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Abstract The classical Indian Cārvāka (“Materialist”) tradition contains three branches with regard to the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). First, the standard Cārvākas accept a single means of knowledge, perception, supporting this view with a critique of the reliability and coherence of inference (anumāna). Second, the “more educated” Cārvākas as well as Purandara endorse a form of inference limited to empirical matters. Third, radical skeptical Cārvākas like Jayarāśi attempt to undermine all accounts or technical definitions of the means of knowledge (even perception) in order to enjoy a life free from philosophical and religious speculation. These branches respectively present something akin to David Hume’s problem of induction, endorse a fallibilistic, mitigated skepticism, and embody a thoroughgoing skepticism about philosophy itself. While all three branches are skeptics about religious matters, each branch exemplifies a different variety of epistemological skepticism.

33

García, Claudia Lorena. "Sosa’s Responses to Dreaming Skepticism." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 42, no. 125 (January 7, 2010): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.868.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against (what we have called) either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what appears to be some radical surgery on the concept of knowledge; a radical surgery that, as I show, is probably unnecessary to avoid dreaming skepticism. Finally, I sketch some independent considerations why I think that the hyperbolic skeptic's dreaming argument is not acceptable.

34

Atkins, Philip, and Ian Nance. "A Problem for the Closure Argument." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4, no. 1 (2014): 36–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03021102.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic’s argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient. Interestingly, perhaps, each of these has been proposed as the correct classification of Moore’s proof of an external world.

35

Saunders, Fenella. "Healthy Skepticism." American Scientist 109, no. 4 (2021): 194. http://dx.doi.org/10.1511/2021.109.4.194.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Penner, Myron A. "Religious Skepticism." Toronto Journal of Theology 30, no. 1 (March 2014): 111–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/tjt.2525.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Almeder, Robert F. "Defeating Skepticism." Philosophical Inquiry 25, no. 1 (2003): 245–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2003251/220.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Pemberton, Harrison J. "Zetetic Skepticism." International Studies in Philosophy 27, no. 2 (1995): 140–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil1995272123.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Hendricks, Vincent F., and John Symons. "Limiting Skepticism." Logos & Episteme 2, no. 2 (2011): 211–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20112232.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Hall, Leda McIntyre, and Gareth Morgan. "Suspending Skepticism." Public Productivity & Management Review 18, no. 1 (1994): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3380698.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Teive, Hélio A. G., Renato P. Munhoz, and Guilherme Ghisoni Silva. "Charcot's skepticism." Arquivos de Neuro-Psiquiatria 70, no. 11 (November 2012): 897–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0004-282x2012001100014.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Abstract:

This paper brings a short review about a peculiar characteristic of Professor Charcot, the father of neurology: the skepticism, emphasizing his personal view regarding the prognosis of several neurological conditions.

42

Higginbotham, James. "Skepticism Naturalized." Philosophical Issues 2 (1992): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522858.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Nau, Henry R. "Institutional Skepticism." Foreign Policy, no. 111 (1998): 168. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1149400.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Schneider, Jack. "Cyber Skepticism." Phi Delta Kappan 95, no. 4 (December 2013): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/003172171309500421.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Galley, Helen F. "Systematic skepticism*." Critical Care Medicine 31, no. 4 (April 2003): 1284–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/01.ccm.0000060006.78033.d7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Upson, Sandra. "Healthy Skepticism." Scientific American Mind 23, no. 2 (April 16, 2012): 58–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamericanmind0512-58.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Spector, Horacio. "IP Skepticism." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1991): 65–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap1991628.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Schwitzgebel, Eric. "1% Skepticism." Noûs 51, no. 2 (September 24, 2015): 271–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12129.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Luper-Foy, Steven. "DOXASTIC SKEPTICISM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 4 (December 1987): 529–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1987.tb01641.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Rohrer, James E., and Tyrone F. Borders. "Healthy skepticism." Preventive Medicine 39, no. 6 (December 2004): 1234–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2004.04.038.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles