Journal articles on the topic 'Sino-Indian Border Conflict'

The study attempts to analyze the coverage of recent Sino-Indian border conflict through peace and war journalism along with understanding how peace journalism ideals can be translated into conflict reporting. The descriptive analysis of news stories published from May 5, 2020, to October 5, 2020, in the mainstream contemporary English press of China (China Daily and Global Times) and India (Times of India and The Hindu) is carried out through content analysis. The period is significant because of the recent border conflict between China and India at Ladakh. The approach of peace and war journalism is explored through in-depth interviews of Indian and Chinese journalists. The study concluded that both Indian and Chinese press employed war framing more dominantly than peace framing while reporting on-going border conflict. A higher instance of peace journalism was recorded in the Chinese press in comparison to the Indian press. The ideals of peace journalism can be achieved by refraining from becoming part of the propaganda paradigm.

The complex Sino-Indian relationship is the result of the historical evolutions and shared borders between the two countries. Their underlying tensions are being exacerbated by today’s expectations of playing an increasingly important role in the global governance and a trend of mistrust of their respective geopolitical intentions. There exists a big gap of perception of Sino-Indian boundary and a massive deficit of mutual trust between the two states in addition to political differences and populism confronting both Chinese and Indian policy-makers. Sino-Indian relations are characterized by a security dilemma as a result of a mutual lack of trust. Both parties are trying to determine the true intentions of the other party. Although since the 1990s the management and control measures and the political vision of the policymakers have made their border disputes controllable without affecting the development of bilateral relations and cooperation in other fields, the boundary problem continues to reside in the nondeterministic elements between the two countries’ relationship, which in turn generates abnormality and even “crisis”, along with electoral changes in the Indian domestic political landscape from time to time. The “spillover effect” of the Sino-Indian border game is remarkable and has mitigated the border tensions or crises in the region. Therefore, the armed cold peace with controllable and low extent local crisis is expected to be the common “status-quo” for the Sino-Indian border regions. It is safe to assume that the spillover effect of the Sino-Indian border disputes leads to competitive cooperation under a dynamic, non-cooperative, incomplete information game. This central feature of the bilateral relations could not exclude the possibility of a conflict in the future as happened in 1962.

Border disputes between China and India in June 2020 almost lead South Asian countries to take a side. But, Nepal, situated between India and China, has always expressed a stern belief in neutrality and non-alignment. Even though New Delhi doubted Nepal’s neutrality and non-alignment citing China’s growing footprints in Nepal, Kathmandu reckoned such suspicion as the result of a new map row between two countries connected by open borders. While Nepal’s repeated calls to diplomatically resolve India-Nepal border problems remained unheeded by New Delhi, it provided room for the ruling communist party in Nepal to reap geopolitical benefits out of the Sino-Indian dispute. But, interestingly, such geopolitical benefits are usually targeted in tempering Indian influence in Nepal, by getting closer with China. Apprehending the same, this study aims to assess the geopolitical implication of Sino-Indian conflict on the survival strategy of Nepal. To fulfill the same objectives, the Chinese perception of Nepal-India relations, and Indian perception of Sino-Nepal ties have been critically assessed in this study. This study is methodologically based on the information collected from the secondary sources. In order to critically evaluate the geopolitical expression of Sino-Indian conflict in Nepal, this study reviews India’s perception of Nepal-China relations, and China’s perception of Nepal-India relations. Also, the reports and the press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, historical facts, treaties, government reports and decisions have been studied and analyzed. Media sources are also reviewed to understand the diverse narratives produced on the geopolitical reflection of Sino-Indian conflict. The themes that emerged from the reviews are thematically analyzed and interpreted, to discover that cultivating relations with one country at the expense of the other may be counterproductive to Nepal’s survival strategies.

This article assesses the dynamic political and military relationships among Tibet, China, and India in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By examining the three governments' calculations and security interests, the article shows that the relationships among the three are best understood from a realist perspective. The focus in the article is on the Sino-Indian dispute over the territory known as “Assam Himalaya,” located on the far eastern end of the Sino-Indian border, between southeastern Tibet and northeast India. The article covers a relatively lengthy period, from 1913 to 1962, but in doing so it shows that territorial claims and the desire for secure borders were the key concern of all the countries involved—Tibet, China, India under British imperial rule, post-1947 India, and the United States.

In official quarters in Beijing and New Delhi, the Tibet issue figures only as a bargaining chip to ‘regulate’ their bilateral relations, not as an issue that has an independent bearing on the intractability or resolution of the Sino–Indian border dispute. Scholars of the Sino–Indian border dispute either dismiss the relevance of the Tibet issue or treat it as only a prop in their framing of the dispute in terms of security, nationalism and great power rivalry. This article argues that the Tibet issue is more central to the border dispute than official and scholarly circles have recognised so far. The article demonstrates this through an examination of the historical roots of the border row, the centrality of Tibet and Tibetans in the boundary claims of both Beijing and New Delhi and the revelation of concurrent historical developments in the border dispute and the Sino–Tibetan conflict. On the place of Tibet in broader Sino–Indian relations, the article posits that while Tibet was a victim of India’s moralistic–idealist policies toward China in the 1950s, it has now become a victim of the new realism pervading India’s policy of engaging and emulating China in the post-Cold War era.

The middle of the twentieth century witnessed a serious border dispute between China and India. This article explores how these countries used multiple media (e.g., historical documents and film) to support their respective territorial claims. The two countries pursued similar authoritarian approaches by expanding their archival holdings, banning books, and selectively redrawing maps. They regarded dissenting views not only as incorrect but as national security threats. China and India policed domestic media to legitimize government policies and to present their cases to the international community. The British government, for its part, demonstrated its support for India. Because British leaders sympathized with their former colony and because the borders of India were a product of the British Empire, leaders in the United Kingdom endorsed Indian propaganda. Nevertheless, democracy in India and the United Kingdom rendered complete control of the media difficult. The Sino-Indian conflict therefore represented a war over information as well as territory.

The relationship between China and India is characterised by competition intertwined with issues over sovereignty, territorial integrity and prestige. Since the war in 1962, they have engaged in several small skirmishes. The increasing tension and frequency of clashes have led the smaller South Asian countries being caught in the middle. What impacts do the changing dynamics have on smaller South Asian countries? What options do these smaller countries have in navigating the relationship amid increasing border tensions? This article attempts to examine the aforementioned research questions.

The China-Indian boundary and territorial dispute is one of the major issues affecting Sino-Indian bilateral relations. This issue was a legacy of the British colonialists, but unfortunately, it has been fully inherited by the Indian ruling class. Over the past 60 years, China and India have missed three opportunities to resolve this issue. The Indian ruling class wanted to achieve “absolute security” and therefore introduced a “forward policy”, which led to the 1962 conflict. After the war, India occupied almost all of the strategic commanding heights in the border area between the two countries by continuously encroaching on Chinese territory and pushing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) toward the Chinese side. After Prime Minister Modi came to power in 2014, he adopted the Doval Doctrine and “offensive defense” policy in the border area, with a view to continuing the encroachment on Chinese territory and occupying the strategic commanding heights. The aim was to force China to resolve the border issue in accordance with India’s intentions, so that India can then shift its strategic focus to the Indian Ocean. China-U.S. strategic rivalry and Hindu nationalism have fueled India’s behavior in the border region, and the peaceful resolution of the 2017 Donglang/Doklam standoff has emboldened India, making the bloodshed in Galwan Valley an inevitable incident. That India’s Home Minister Amit Shah categorically declared in August 2019 in Parliament that Aksai Chin was part of new Ladakh Union Territory shows that the Indian government has restored its position on the western sector boundary that the Vajpayee Administration had abandoned in 2003. India is using the Galwan conflict as an excuse to pursue its policy of economic de-Sinicization and strategic alliance with the U.S. and other Western countries. In the future, China-Indian border conflict is likely to become commonplace due to India’s expansionism.

The relationship between such Asia-Pacific powers, as India and China, has recently become a significant factor of how regional security is being maintained and how efficient the regional multilateral cooperation can be. The two states are close neighbours, possessing a long border, and both are presented in high-profile international institutions, e. g. the BRICS. At the same time, they are involved in a long-term border controversy, which sometimes pushes the relations to the verge of war. In addition, India and China are diverged by contradictions in other areas, primarily in economic aspects, and their competition for influence at the international level and in various regions of the Global South. The aim of this paper is to trace, how the Sino-Indian conflict, on the one hand, and their cooperation, on the other hand, developed throughout the recent 20 years, and try to answer the question, how it all shaped their status for each other, namely, the one of a partner, a rival or an enemy. The author consequently studies the landmark events in border conflict since the beginning of the 21st century, the political exchanges between China and India meanwhile, and the basic trends of economic and military cooperation and competition between the two countries. In conclusion, the results of the research are presented, and the possible impact of Sino-Indian ambivalent relationship on Russian policy towards them and on the work of international institutions involving both countries, is discussed.

AbstractSouth Asia has some of the most intractable political conflicts in the world today, and at three levels: international, national and subnational. Many of these have their roots in the region's colonial past, and in the manner in which independence was attained. Conflict resolution in South Asia has three unusual features beginning with the Sino-Indian dispute over their common border along the Himalayas. This major international dispute is sui generis. Second, the principal assymetrical feature of the South Asian political system, the overwhelming dominance of India makes multi-lateral negotiations over issues that involve India's vital interests - save in the case of the dispute over Kashmir - virtually impossible. Third, separatist agitation, politicized religion and ethnic conflicts disturb the peace in many parts of South Asia. In these internal conflicts we confront the difficulties inherent in the resolution of conflicts involving ethnicity and politicized religion - such conflicts are less amenable to mediation than most others, including conflicts between states. A complicating factor in the resolution of these conflicts is the impetus given to separatism in general by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new states in these regions. Potential conflicts of the future in South Asia include disputes over the sharing of scarce resources, especially water and irrigation works; and the problem of refugees and displaced persons arising from the region's many disputes, as well as its problem of severe overpopulation.

Myanmar's geopolitical and geostrategic position is very important for China and India, the two regional powers in East Asia and South Asia. Myanmar is the main connecting hub for South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, and it is also connected with the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Myanmar is connected with the two corridors of China's ambitious projects, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM). Chinese ships have to navigate at the Malacca Strait, especially in the case of fuel oil imports and exports to global markets, which are, both times consuming and strategically risky. But, using the Rakhine state's Kyaukpyu port will reduce China's dependence on the Malacca Strait and expand trade. Due to the US presence in the Indian Ocean, the recent Sino-Indian conflict, and Myanmar's geostrategic position, Sino-Myanmar relations are now one of the topics of study. This article will analyze the geostrategic and economic issues of Sino-Myanmar relations. The study has found that both China and Myanmar have greatly been benefitted through the establishment of strong bilateral relationship based on trade and investment, connectivity, constructions of ports and special economic zones. The main objective of this study is to find a diplomatic way to improve the Bangladesh-Myanmar relations based on the results of the strong relationship of China and Myanmar. This study is a major contribution to the field of China–Myanmar bilateral relations in the context of some geostrategic and geo-economic issues. The study has been carried out based on secondary data with some primary data of border survey and focus group discussions. At the conclusion of this study, there has been provided with some policy recommendations to improve the geostrategic and economic relations between the two neighboring countries.

As a world power, Russia is China's largest neighbor and plays a special role in strengthening my country's international communication capabilities. Russia's reports related to China have both positive and negative content, but the viewing angle is more practical and objective. China's image is rarely distorted, belittled, and vilified by political bias and ideological divisions. The overall image of China and China in the international arena The role is positive. Media reports are mainly political and economic news, with a particular focus on information on political and economic and trade exchanges between China and Russia. What are the tendencies in the attitude of the Russian media towards China? How does society and theory view the situation in the trilateral relations between Russia, China and the United States? Are there any new trends in the perception of China's image by political elites and ordinary people? What has been causing concern about China in the Russian media lately? What direction are the media and think tanks showing on the burning issues of the Sino-Indian border conflict? These problems reflect Russians' perception of China's image, are related to the effectiveness of my country's "telling Chinese stories" and external communications, and also reflect the development of Sino-Russian relations and the level of my country's influence in the international arena.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to outline the history of the Sino-Indian conflict and to evaluate recent changes as reflected in the high level meetings between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It explores the evolving relationship in terms of three types of bargaining: elusive, tacit and convergent. Design/methodology/approach – By adopting a historical approach one gets a better sense of the evolving pattern of relations between China and India and the circumstances in which the evolution is occurring. Findings – China-India relations are similar to a journey where the progress is measured in terms of small steps rather than a final peace settlement. Relations have changed slowly towards a positive direction in economic relations, and there is a pattern of stability in border talks but the issue is complicated by the linkages between the Tibet question and border issues. Research limitations/implications – This topic requires considerable research because it is important for the future of Asian international relations and it is under-researched. Perhaps there could be an edited volume which brings together researchers from different backgrounds and expertise. The suggested work must be empirical but with a theoretical framework related to different types of bargaining cultures and experiences in Asia. Originality/value – As China and India evolve in their diplomatic practices and thinking, as Asian powers are readjusting their policies in the light of new circumstances, there are insights for policy analysts and practitioners in China and India among other Asian countries.

In May 2020, one of the largest conflicts in recent decades occurred on the Sino-Indian border. Against the background of discussion of heated armed clashes, observers have also noted that in the past years China has been using hybrid tactics as means of ensuring its control over the Line of actual control on the border with India. This article examines the hybrid tactics of the Chinese side to ensure sovereignty on the border with India the PRC's policy of installing military and civilian infrastructure in disputed and border areas. In the areas claimed by India and Bhutan, Chinese objects for various purposes appear - from camouflaged barracks and installations of unclear purpose to residential villages. These installations testify to the application by China of the so-called "сabbagestrategy" - the gradual "surrounding" the enemy with its infrastructure in order to establish de facto Chinese military and economic control over the disputed territories. In addition, Beijing has launched a large-scale development program for the border Tibet Autonomous Region in order to strengthen its borders. Such actions are hybrid tactics used by China in other territorial disputes, for example, around the islands in the South China Sea. They allow the PRC to have a military superiority over the opponent, to intimidate him with its economic and military influence in the region. Such actions fit into the framework of one of the priorities declared by the current Chinese leadership: the protection of national borders and the restoration of sovereignty over the territories “lost” during the so-called century of humiliation.

In the late sixteenth century, thriving private maritime trade brought forth maritime trouble to the late Ming state. In times of rampant “Japanese” piracy and Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, Chinese literati composed unofficial histories and vernacular fiction on China’s foreign relations. Among them, Yan Congjian 嚴從簡 wrote Shuyu zhouzi lu 殊域周咨錄 (Records of Surrounding Strange Realms) (1574), He Qiaoyuan 何喬遠 compiled Wang Xiangji 王享記 (Records of the Emperors’ Tributes) (1597–1620), Luo Yuejiong 羅曰褧 penned Xianbin lu 咸賓錄 (Records of Tributary Guests) (1597), and Luo Maodeng 羅懋登 composed a vernacular novel Sanbao taijian xiyangji tongsu yanyi 三寶太監西洋記通俗演義 (Vernacular Romance of Eunuch Sanbao’s Voyages on the Indian Ocean) (1598). This article examines how the imminent maritime realities reminded the late Ming authors of one cross-border war and two genocides in Java and Sanfoqi during Yuan and early and mid-Ming times. These transgressions that violated Chinese official tributary order became memorable and made Sino-Java relations a definite point of comparison for the late Ming maritime piracy problems. This article argues that the cultural memory of Sino-Java military and diplomatic exchange enabled the authors to lament and condemn the executed pirates Wang Zhi and Chen Zuyi. The four authors imbue their narratives with personal anxieties and nationalistic sentiments. While the historical narratives tend to moralize and idealize China’s tributary world order, the vernacular fiction paints a more realistic picture of the late Ming state by involving heterogeneous voices of the “other.” Collectively, the four narratives represent various images of the Ming Empire, revealing the authors’ deep apprehension of the Mings’ identity, their political criticism of the state, and their divergent and even self-conflicted views toward maritime commerce, immigrants, and people of different races.

Recent border skirmishes between China and India are the new episode in the competitive relationship between the two. Competitive relationship comes out of divergences between the on various fronts especially their rise in power potentials and desire to become regional hegemons. Though Sino-Indian relationship has been cooperative-competitive since the first India-China border war in 1962, today it is considered as the most complex, competitive, and conflict-prone. Their border issues, trade competition and political influence in the South Asia and Indian Ocean region are the crucial factors in the cooperative-competitive relationship. Chinese massive naval build-up and assertiveness in the south and East China Sea and India’s strategic partnerships with the extra-regional powers have made the relationship more complicated. This paper tries to dissect the complex nature and dynamics of the competitive-cooperative Sino-India relationship. It explains the pattern of China-India bilateral relations with specific focus on competition, conflict, and cooperation. Effort has also been made to evaluate the impact of the conflict or cooperation cycles on their nature and development of bilateral ties.

Inspired by the concepts of Arrested War and actor–network theory, this study has traced and analyzed four main actors in the wars and conflicts in the social media age: social media platform, the mainstream news organizations, online users, and social media content. These four human and nonhuman actors associate, interact, and negotiate with each other in the social media network surrounding specific issues. Based on the case study of Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017, the central argument is that social media is playing an enabling role in contemporary wars and conflicts. Both professional media outlets and web users employ the functionalities of social media platforms to set, counter-set, or expand the public agenda. Social media platform embodies a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, factors, interests, and relations. These actor-networks and the macro social-political context are influential in the mediatization of conflict in the social media era.

(Views of Major General S B Asthana,SM,VSM, (Veteran), Questioned by Jiangtao Shi of South China Morning Post on 29 August 2017.Question 1 (SCMP)Are you surprised that the over 70-day military standoff ended all of a sudden just days ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the BRICS summit? The deliberate ambiguity in both sides’ statements seems to indicate that both sides were willing to make some kind of concessions in a bid to end the dispute in a mutually acceptable face-saving manner. What are the main reasons and factors behind the seemingly peaceful solution for China and India respectively? (For China , BRICS and the 19th party congress? For India, domestic political support and economic reform?)Answer 1 by Major General S B AsthanaI am not really surprised that the over 70-day military standoff ended all of a sudden just days ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the BRICS summit. As you have rightly pointed out, both sides (China and India) were looking for an opportunity for a face saving resolution, without appearing to be weak domestically. The likelihood of absence of PM Modi in BRICS Summit, and its resultant political and diplomatic cost, triggered that opportunity. In my opinion, the main reasons behind such a sudden resolution were:-Any escalation beyond the point of standoff as on 28 August could have been cost prohibitive in terms of economical engagement, political and diplomatic cost, human casualties, without any worthwhile gains for both sides. Prolonging it was not in the national interest of either of the country.Success of BRICS is important for all member countries including China. China refusal to talk without precondition of Indian withdrawal and repeated provocative statements was exhibiting its arrogance. This wasn’t going well with global community, besides giving an indirect message to all including BRICS, about its hegemonic intentions and poor diplomatic acumen. Even US and Japan, who were not involved with Doklam, chose to state that both must talk to resolve it. The fact that China did not accept ICA verdict, continued aggressive posturing in South China Sea, violated 2012 Agreement in Doklam Triangle, and was seen as not doing enough to implement UN obligation against North Korea. It was affecting its global image adversely, hence some midcourse correction was needed, which has been done through this adjustment.An India China conflict, besides shattering dreams of economic prosperity of both countries, could have escalated to international dimensions, more so with ongoing problems of North Korea and South China Sea, and turbulence in Af- Pak Region. The fact that both are nuclear states cannot be discounted in strategic calculus of escalation dynamics.Militarily the escalation dynamics was not thought through. If war gamed properly, the escalation would have resulted in stalemate, which would have damaged the image of President Xi Jinping and reduced his chances for getting favourable people in 19th Party Congress in his second term and any possible prospects of his third term.From Indian perspective also, escalation of this standoff wasn’t in its National Interest. India needs China’s market for its growth in future, even if the balance of trade is not in its favour today. Now that India is on ‘Make in India’ path, as fastest growing economy to bring prosperity to its people,it may not like to slow down due to such meaningless disruptions.There was no domestic pressure on Indian Government, as all political parties,Security forces and public were determined to check Chinese encroachment and arrogance, at any cost.Question 2(SCMP)While an “expeditious disengagement” in Doklam brought an end to the border standoff and ease tensions between the two countries, do you think it could fuel nationalist sentiment, mistrust and hostility in both nations and cast a long shadow over the longstanding border dispute between China and India and their relations? What are the immediate and long-term implications of the border standoff on bilateral relations, especially considering the strategic competition and rivalry for dominance in the region between the nuclear-armed Asian giants? Will it have a long-term impact on the regional geopolitical landscape?Answer 2 by Major General S B AsthanaDoklam standoff is neither the first, nor the last, and not even the longest standoff between India and China. Many strategists argue that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are strong leaders, leading their nations with patriotic sentiments. The nationalist self-confidence from both sides may ignite a heated rivalry in which bilateral relations could deteriorate, because an “expeditious disengagement” in Doklam is only a temporary answer to the bigger problem of longstanding border dispute between both.Out of 14 countries with which China had border issues, it has resolved with 12 except India and Bhutan. With India, China has been delaying settling the border issue on some pretext or the other, and with Bhutan it has been shifting its claim lines many times. I understand that permanent resolution of Border Dispute is the ultimate solution, which needs to be expedited. It is a complex problem, as both sides read history in a manner that it supports their claims. This was the reason for both countries to have signed various agreements to ensure peace and tranquillity along the borders, which have been reasonably successful, as no bullet has been fired amongst both Forces in last four decades.Even if resolution of boundary is considered to be a complex problem, the demarcation, delineation and defining of Line of Actual Control (LAC), (which is not a mutually accepted line as of now), is an inescapable necessity. This is do-able by cooperative political intent, to be followed by intense diplomatic efforts. This action cannot be postponed further if the two neighbours have to live peacefully in future without further standoffs’. It needs to be understood that with un-demarcated LAC, troops of both sides will patrol as per their own perceptions of LAC; some areas will be common which both sides will patrol to be its own. Every such patrol will be called as intrusion by the other side, hence such face-offs will continue tillit’s demarcated, and the identification of its demarcation is made known to troops manning the borders. The short term impacts of standoffs were the anxiety among people, possible temporary setback to trade, tension on borders, non attendance of important events like BRF/BRICS if not resolved. The long term impact could have been hardening of varying stand on border resolution, aggressive strategic competition, and growth of interest based strategic partnerships to balance each other.Being neighbors, most populated, developing countries and significant trading partners of future, China and India have convergence of interests in many areas.Our economical engagements, mutual cooperation can proceed with strategic divergences, and this has been demonstrated adequately in past.Question3(SCMP)What are messages for other Asian nations caught between the increasing rivalry between China and India? What are the main takeaways for countries like Bhutan , Sri Lanka , Vietnam , Myanmar , Japan , Singapore and Mongolia ?Answer 3 by Major General S B AsthanaI do not subscribe to the idea of growing rivalry between China and India. The extension of economical and strategic space by large growing countries like China and India, to fulfil their genuine needs is natural and may not necessarily be a rivalry. In case some Asian nation is caught between contradictory needs of China and India, in my opinion it should look after its own national interest.The main message which comes out loud and clear from Doklam episode is that in today’s world no country can afford to be arrogant to bully smaller sovereign nation, if the smaller Nation is determined to stand up for its national interest. If Cuba could stand up to US, Bhutan could stand up to China, Vietnam could stand up to China as well as US, then smaller countries should also look after their national interest, without worrying about the size and might of any power, trying to push them or manipulate their genuine strategic choices.In my perception, the DoklamPlateau was presumably chosen by China for road construction to violate 2012 Treaty at this point of time because:-India and Bhutan boycotted Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation, the Doklam ingress could embarrass both the countries simultaneously.Stressing on 1890 Treaty by China takes away the logic of Tibet, as a player in dealing with India, thus a subtle message to Dalai Lama that he is not a stake holder in Tibet.Test the depth of Indo- Bhutanese security relationship.The area being too close to Siliguri Corridor/Chicken’s Neck, India had to be concerned and had to decide whether to intervene or otherwise in India’s own national interest, thereby conveying a message of standing up or not standing up to a challenge from Beijing in future too.As the construction activity was in Bhutanese Territory, a strong Indian reaction was not expected.In case India takes action, China can proclaim itself as an innocent victim and blame India to be an aggressor.China was however surprised by an unexpectedly strong Indian reaction, and then it realized that the point chosen was such, where it had strategic and tactical disadvantages for her in escalating it. China was also surprised that in multiparty democracy like India, all parties are on the same page as far as stand on sovereignty and Doklam Issue was concerned.The end result was that China was extremely disturbed about it, and churning out fresh provocative statements almost on daily basis, launching psychological and propaganda war, war of words, and resorting to every possible means short of war to put pressure on India to withdraw its troops. The Indian side on the other side has been relatively balanced, but firm in its stance, making very few statements, and was globally appreciated for its diplomatic maturity. No one bought the idea of India being an aggressor. India proved that it could physically resist China when its national interest demands so, and it also honors the security arrangement promised to Bhutan by physical action.Chinese efforts to establish bilateral talks with Bhutan, including financial allurement (Purse Diplomacy) did not materialize. India and Bhutan stood by each other and could resist Chinese aggressive activity. Chinese efforts to involve Nepal also resulted in response from their Deputy Prime Minister expressing unwillingness to take sides. Japanese Ambassador in New Delhi also said that there should be no attempt to change status quo on the ground by force.Vietnam has stood up earlier against China as well as US for its national interest. The Doklam episode will encourage countries like, Mongolia (Visit of Dalai Lama), Singapore( trade issues), Srilanka ( Hambantota Port), Myanmar( Dam construction), and Japan( East China Sea/Senkakuislands) to stand up to China for various issues of divergences, and cause others like Philippines, to reconsider their options to give away their strategic choices.China in last few years has been on island grabbing spree using ‘Incremental Encroachment’ as part of ‘Active Defence’ Strategy’, with its economic and military clout, using ‘Purse Diplomacy’ with some countries and ‘Infrastructure Diplomacy’ with others. In some cases the disagreements amongst some countries have become quite pronounced due to unfair deals. Singaporehad a strong interest in ensuring navigation in South China Seas is not restricted. Mongolia displayed the temerity of hosting the Dalai Lama, despite Chinese opposition.The bigger lesson is that no sovereign country should be pushed to take sides, and if it is done aggressively by any stronger power, the nation which is being pushed will be forced to seek security and other interests elsewhere, in terms of various other partnerships.Question 4 (SCMP)With India insisting that China should respect the 2012 understanding on tri-junctions, which specifically said “the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries,” do you think it will further delay the border talks between China and Bhutan? Does it mean India will have to be directly involved as the third party in Sino-Bhutanese border talks in the future?Answer 4 by Major General S B AsthanaAs per the lay of the ground, the resolution of border dispute of China and Bhutan especially at triangle/ junction points, is closely linked and cannot be done in isolation. At Doklam plateau the location of Tri-junction as per India supported by Bhutan is Batang La, whereas China contends it to be at Gyemochenon Jampheri Ridge, which amounts to an encroachment of 7-8 km. These issues cannot be resolved in isolation. If there is political will to resolve it, then meeting of three delegation will not take any time. The delay is only in making political decision and directing the diplomats to resolve it in time bound manner.Additional PointAlthough there is a contradiction in the manner in which each country has reported it perhaps to amuse their domestic audience, and both sides can claim it to be a diplomatic achievement. It is a welcomed step towards peace and tranquilityalong the borders, hence which side blinked first or had an upper hand is not relevant, although both will claim it. This resolution has ensured that there has been no exchange of bullets, and India and China as responsible nations have been able to resolve their differences peacefully on Doklam Standoff. It also ensured that both the countries found a peaceful solution, with a face-saving gesture to ease tension, without disturbing the core interest of either.

With decades of stupendous growth and political détente between India and China, Mandarin has become an important human capital for Indians. India clearly shows a preference of Taiwan over China, when mediated between them for different Mandarin resources, even before the epidemic and Sino-India border conflicts. Recently, there have been suggestions to replace Confucius Institutes with Taiwanese institutions, and Taiwan has urged for strengthening cooperation with India in Mandarin education. This paper aims to discuss the feasibility for Taiwan Education Centre to monopolize the Mandarin education market of India. Through data collection and detailed analysis of literature by scholars of Taiwan, China and India, this paper argues that Taiwan alone is incapable of occupying the whole Indian market due to the inadequacy of Mandarin teaching resources and complex tripartite political relations. Moreover, the current trilateral strategies adopted by China, India and Taiwan dissuade the common interests. We propose a customization, cooperation and supervision model to advance Mandarin education in India, and further analyze the feasibility and potential resistance towards the cooperation. This paper is helpful to understanding the Chinese teaching situation in India. It addresses a timely question and offers possible resolution not only to India but also to other countries who are skeptical of Confucius Institutes.