Journal articles on the topic 'Sinhalese nationalism'

In 1956, eight years after political independence was secured for Sri Lanka, a major transformation was effected through the ballot. A confederation of forces led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) under S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike turfed the United National Party (UNP) and its right wing, English-educated leadership out of office. These forces represented a groundswell of the underprivileged against the privileged, and, as such, represented a radical socialist thrust. They also included a powerful strand of Sinhala nativism, i.e., of cultural nationalism, which made Sinhala the language of administration and which espoused conspiracy theories directed against the influence wielded by Catholic cabals. This body of thought has been described in the literature as “Sinhala linguistic nationalism” and “Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.” What requires underlining here is the fact that this ideological corpus had previously been in a defensive position because it was deemed a “communalism.” But, now, in 1956, the majoritarian sanction of a populist and radical victory converted it into a nationalism (see Roberts 1994, 258–59, 263–64, and ch. 12)–a force which some scholars, standing in the mid-1990s, would redefine as “chauvinism.”

AbstractIn 1915 the south-western quadrant of Ceylon was convulsed by a week of rioting in which the Buddhist Sinhalese majority attacked a Muslim minority known as the Moors. The consensus amongst historians has long been that the pogrom (as it is best described) was the spontaneous result of religious tension and/or economic grievances at the popular level, with no leadership beyond the uncoordinated activities of local agitators. The consensus ignores significant evidence of wider orchestration, including the activities of itinerant gangs and other mobile agitators, the deliberate propagation of identical false rumours throughout the affected area, and the activities of individuals and societies associated with the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement. Although the picture is far from complete, the best interpretation of the evidence is that this movement orchestrated the pogrom, albeit with varying degrees of success in each locality. That it was able to do so shows that Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (as opposed to non-communalist, Ceylon-wide nationalism) was more deeply entrenched than is usually thought, which helps to explain Sri Lanka's political direction later in the century.

This paper examines the political, socio-economic, and cultural aspects of Japanese decorative tiles or the so-called majolica tiles widely diffused in colonial South Asia in the early twentieth century. A tile became a popular building material in European countries by the first half of the nineteenth century, and European tiles spread over the world with the expansion of colonialism. Japan in the making of a modern nation established domestic manufacturing of tiles mainly after British models, and the industry’s rapid development was helped by the First World War (1914–1918) and the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923). The Japanese tile industry successfully entered into foreign markets, among which India was the largest and most important market that resulted in developing a variety of new Indian or Hindu designs associated with the rise of nationalism and mode of consumption. Not only within India, tiles, however, also played a crucial role in formulating cosmopolitan identities of migrant mercantile networks exemplified by the Chettiar architecture in South and Southeast Asia. However, in the late 1930s, cosmopolitanism shared by different communities in colonial urban settings became overwhelmed by nationalisms as seen in Sri Lanka where Japanese majolica tiles were differently used as a means to express religiously-regulated nationalisms in the Chettiar and Sinhalese Buddhist architecture. Thus, the analysis reveals visual politics of different religious nationalisms symbolized by Japanese majolica tiles in the interwar period that still structure the present visualscapes.

Following the spectacular disintegration of the Soviet Union, popularand academic interest in nationalism and religion gathered momentum. Inaddition to recent ethnic clashes and religious conflicts in many parts of theworld, particularly the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, and manyAfrican states, questions have been raised about the relation betweennationalism and religion. What, if any, is the relationship between nationalismand religion? To what extent can religion influence the emergenceand maintenance of nationalism? Can religious beliefs and sentiments legitimizea nationalist ideology? What is meant by “religious nationalism,” andhow is it related to nation-states, resistance, and violence? These questionswere addressed during a one-day conference held at the London School ofEconomics, University of London on 22 March 1996. The well-attendedconference was organized by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity andNationalism, which was established in 1990 and has published the journalNations and Nationalism since March 1995.The first paper at the Nationalism and Religion conference was presentedby Bruce Kapferer (University College of London, London, UK).In his paper “Religious and Historical Metaphors in the Context ofNationalist Violence,” he addressed political action, the force of ideologies,and the relevance of mythological schemes to religious and ritual practiceby means of a case study of Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka and theevents of 1989-90. In his own words, his focus was “the dynamics ofremythologization, or the process . . . whereby current political and economicforces are totalized within mythological schemes constructed in historicalperiods relatively independent of the circumstances of contemporarynationalism” and “the force of such ideological remythologizations, that is,how such remythologizations can became a passionate dimension of politicalactivity and give it direction.”According to Kapferer, the relation of mythologization to routine religiousbeliefs and ritual practice is significant. In his paper, he argued that“nationalism is the creation of modernism and it is of a continuous dynamicnature whose power is embedded in and sanctified by the culture that hasoriginated in the rituals of religion which provide a cosmology for nationalism.Cosmology of religion as diverse as nationalism itself that is far fromuniversal claims but exists in diversity.” Kapferer’s theorization is based onhis research in Sri Lanka where, he thinks, continuing conflict is related tonationalism based on cosmologies. The case of Sri Lanka provides anSeminars, Conferences, Addresses 425excellent example of how the construction of state ideology is influencedby religious forces, in this case Buddhism. Kapferer asserted that religionhad a deep territorialization aspect and that nationalism, in this sense, mighthave functioned as reterritorialization of a particular land and postcolonialstate. One can discern from his statements that, in the construction of stateideology in Sri Lanka, myths written by monks and religious rituals wereused to create a nationalist movement that eventually developed into a violentand destructive force in the context of Sri Lanka. Kapferer believes thatthe hierarchical order of the Sri Lankan state is embedded in the cosmologyof ancient religious chronicles.Christopher Cviic (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,UK) analyzed another phenomenon taking place in WesternEurope. His paper, “Chosen Peoples and Sacred Territories: TheBalkans,” discussed the relationship between religion, nation, and statein the Balkans throughout history and analyzed how these forces haveplayed themselves out in current events. According to Cviic, historicaldevelopments in the Balkans can provide important clues to understandingthe ongoing Balkan crisis, in which the Orthodox Church hasassumed the status of a nationalist institution representing the Serbiannation. The roots of these developments and the creation of a mythical“chosen” Serbian nation legitimized by religion can be traced to thedefeat and fall of medieval Serbia at Kosova by the Ottomans. Thisdefeat meant that they lost the land.However, under the Ottoman millet system, non-Muslim communitieswere allowed to organize their religious life and legal and educationalinstitutions. This allowed the Serbs to preserve and develop their ethnicand religious identities under the leadership of the Orthodox Church.Thus, religion and identity became inextricably linked, and the OrthodoxChurch assumed an extremely important role in the public life of individualBalkan nations. Cviic pointed out that “in the case of the Serbs, theirOrthodox Church played an important role in the formation of the modemSerbian nation-state by nurturing the myth of Kosova, named after theKosova Polje defeat by the Turks. Essential to that myth was the view thatby choosing to fight at Kosova Polje, the Serbs had opted for the Kingdomof Heaven. Later on the myth grew into a broader one, representing theSerbs as the martyr/victim people with a sacred mission of wresting theirHoly Territory of Kosova from the infidel Muslims to whom it had fallen.A later variant of that myth defined Serbia in terms of wherever Serbiangraves were to be found.” ...

Sri Lanka emerges from this latest election with a hung Parliament in 2015. A coalition called the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) won 106 seats and secured ten out of 22 electoral districts, including Colombo to obtain the largest block of seats at the parliamentary polls, though it couldn’t secure a simple majority in 225-member parliament. It also has the backing of smaller parties that support its agenda of electoral. In the August parliamentary election, the former president Rajapaksa forces upped the nationalist ante and campaigned to win a majority of parliamentary seats with the votes of the Sinhala Buddhists only, but extreme appeals to nationalism failed to get traction in the elections among the Sinhalese. It is fair to say that the double blow against nationalism in the south was occasioned by the politics of good governance promoted by the UNP and its alliance in the election. In Sri Lanka’s eighth General elections, none of the two major political alliances- the (UNF), nor the (UPFA)- gained a clear majority in the election. More important, for the fourth time the fragmentation of seats among the major parties and regional level party has inaugurated a period of unstable coalition governments, creating an air of political and economic ambiguity in the nation as it enters a post- Mahinda Rajapakse era. This study is based on an interpretive approach. The data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The study examines distinguishes the 2015 election from previous ones and what extent? What are the major factors leads to defeat the ruling party? However, this study argues that the election results are indicative not only of the decline of Mahinda Rajapakse era but also of a gradual transition toward good governance.

While a stalemate in the predominantly Tamil North and East of Sri Lanka continues despite Indian intervention on the government's behalf, in the Sinhala South death squads associated with the pseudo People's Liberation Front, the JVP, have been ruthlessly eliminating its opponents. The United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), having created and nurtured popular racism for over thirty years in order to get into power (through a ready-made Sinhalese majority of 70 per cent of the population), * would now like to draw back from the brink of another crippling civil war, this time in the South. But they are unable to do so because the JVP has taken up the Sinhala cause and pushed it to the point of social fascism through assassination and murder. Popular racism based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism promoted in the schools and expressed in song, textbook and media served to fuel the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983, in which thousands were killed at the hands of street mobs. Some of the most violently anti- Tamil propaganda (deriving inspiration from mythical Sinhalese history) has emanated from the present government. Colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese was justified on the pretext of protecting ancient Buddhist shrines. And it is an open secret that ministers hired their own hit squads in the 1983 pogrom. When, in a bid to end the unwinnable war with the Tamils, the UNP signed the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, allowing Indian troops to operate on Sri Lankan soil, it alienated the very Sinhala nationalists it had itself fostered. And it was the JVP which capitalised on the resentment over India's interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Accusing the UNP government (and other supporters of the Accord) of treachery, it enlarged and deepened popular racism into fanatical patriotism. But what has given the JVP terror tactics a hold over the population has been the steady erosion of democratic freedoms, on the one hand, and the self-abasement of the Left, on the other. Both the SLFP and UNP governments have postponed elections to stay in power, but the UNP went further and got itself re-elected en bloc on a phoney referendum to postpone elections. Local elections were never held under the SLFP and whatever elections took place under the UNP have either been rigged and/or carried out under conditions of massive intimidation. In the process, the political literacy that the country once boasted has been lost to the people and, with it, their will to resist. At the same time the collaborationist politics of the Left in the SLFP government of 1970-77 have not only served to decimate its own chances at the polls (it obtained not a single seat in the election of 1977) but also to leave the working-class movement defenceless. So that it was a simple matter for the UNP government to crush the general strike of 1980, imprison its leaders and throw 80, 000 workers permanently out of work. And it has been left to the JVP to pretend to take up the socialist mantle of the Left even as it devotes itself to the racist cause of the Right, and so win the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist people. In the final analysis the choice before the country is that of two terrors: that of the state or that of the JVP. Below we publish an analysis of the situation as at October 1988, put out by the underground Campaign for Social Democracy in the run up to the presidential elections.

In the same year (1968) that students blockaded the streets of Paris, the formerly somnolent Jaffna Peninsula—the center of Tamil culture in Sri Lanka—was rocked by its own version of civil unrest. Led by an activist affiliated with the “Peking wing” of the Ceylon Communist party, several hundred “Minority Tamils” (mainly of the traditionally “untouchable” Paḷḷar and Naḻavar castes) sat in nonviolent protest (satyagrãha) before the gates of Jaffna's most orthodox Hindu temple, the temple of Lord Kandacami (Skanda) in the village called Maviddapuram. Hindus believe this large and beautiful structure represents the very ideal of the reformed Śaivite temple advocated by Arumuka Navalar (1822–79), Jaffna's champion Hindu reformer. Traditionally closed to untouchables, the Brahman-owned temple provided the setting for a two-week campaign to gain admittance that was timed to coincide with the temple's summer festival. After days of tense but peaceful confrontation, the demonstration turned violent as dozens of self-styled “Defenders of Saivism,” Hindus of high-caste rank (Veḷḷāḷars and their domestic servants, the Kōviyars), beat back the Minority Tamils with iron rods and sand-filled bottles. Feelings ran very high throughout the peninsula, and there were many incidents of violence, some lethal. To many Tamils and outside observers, it seemed as though Jaffna was poised on the brink of an all-out war between the castes (see, for example, Fontgalland 1968). Yet the conflict abated, and although there were temple-entry skirmishes in Jaffna as late as 1978, the Maviddapuram fracas was followed by a process of political unification as the Tamil community—Veḷḷāḷars and Minority Tamils alike—joined hands to contest the declining fortunes of Tamils in a country dominated by Sinhalese.

Positioning minority concerns within a power-sharing mechanism is a key issue that has been influential in Sri Lanka’s modern state-building process experimented from the later part of the colonial period. Throughout the post-independent era, most state-building projects were critically debated with regard to sharing political autonomy between the majority Sinhalese and the minorities. This study attempts to locate the claims and concerns of minorities seeking political autonomy in Sri Lanka’s state-building and power-sharing discourse. The study found that the state-building process in Sri Lanka has always been a struggle between establishing a majoritarian-ethno-nationalist hegemonic state system and preserving the right of minority ethnic groups to political power-sharing. The study further found that (a) insufficient emphasis given towards understanding power-sharing and federalism as a means to accommodate diverse interests and rights, including the political autonomy rights of minorities, (b) the opportunistic politics of opposition parties, and (c) the ethno-nationalist agenda of the majority Sinhalese were the major factors that have induced to undermine the minorities’ claims for political autonomy. The ultimate result of this is the continuous struggles by minorities to situate their political autonomy demands within Sri Lanka’s state-building and power-sharing discourse.

Introduction: Dengue is the most prevalent infectious mosquito-borne viral infection in the world. Over time dengue has causedhigh mortality and morbidity. Methods: A cross-sectional study was conducted to assess the level of knowledge, attitude, and practice among 510 residents ofJa-Ela MOH area using an interviewer-administered questionnaire. Ethical clearance was obtained from the National Institute ofHealth Science Kalutara. Results: The majority (50.8%) of the respondents were females, and the mean age of the sample was 43.7±16.7 years. Thestudy results showed that 56.5% (n=288), 52.9% (n=270), and 50.7% (n=257) of the sample had good knowledge, attitudes,and practices (KAP) towards dengue prevention, respectively. Good knowledge is significantly associated with 41-60 years ofage (odds ratio [OR]=2.513, P<0.001), secondary education or higher (OR=1.857, P=0.008), and a monthly income of LKR20000–40000 and more than 40000 (OR=0.477, P=0.016; OR=0.440, P=0.015). Non-Sinhalese nationality (OR=0.180,P=0.033) was associated with poor levels of knowledge. Good attitudes towards the prevention of dengue were found in males(OR=2.095, P=0.001), unemployed individuals (OR=1.759, P=0.018), and individuals with a monthly income of<LKR 20000(OR=2.393, P=0.001). Poor practices towards dengue prevention were found in other nationalities compared to Sinhalese(OR=0.104, P=0.001) while Roman Catholics had poor practices towards dengue prevention (OR=0.677, P=0.041). The studyshows that the experience of dengue is positively associated with better attitudes towards dengue prevention (Mann-Whitney Utest; P<0.001). Conclusion: KAPs were not significantly correlated with each other. Targeted health education and promotion programmesprovided for specific populations should be considered a priority activity.

Following the end of the thirty years old civil war in Sri Lanka, there were expectations that the post‐war period would usher in peace, development and reconciliation. The last four years have witnessed several positive developments including resettlement of people and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Nonetheless there are range of problems and policy gaps that have hindered the transition from war to sustainable peace. A key post-war challenge is that of violence against religious sites and members of religious communities. More recently, from last year, there has been an unprecedented level of violent attacks, demonstrations and hate speech targeting Sri Lanka’s Muslim population. It noted a ‘sharp uptick’ in religiously-motivated violence and said the authorities are ‘passively and sometimes actively’ condoning extremist Buddhist groups, Mainly perpetrated by Buddhist-fascist fundamentalist groups, such as the ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ or ‘Buddhist power force’ and the Hela Urmaya or Sinhala Heritage Party are the main groups behind these targeting of Muslims.The events have left the country’s second largest minority community - the Muslims feeling afraid and vulnerable which forcing a concerted campaign against them. In addition to attacks on places of religious worship there are calls to boycott Muslim shops and establishments, all of which is increasing tensions, particularly in areas where Muslims and Sinhalese live close to each other. These were virtually programmed by some prominent and influential personalities in governing circles, besides others who had a vested interest in seeing Sri Lanka imploding amid heightening ‘communal tensions.’On this context, this study focuses on the recent incident of violence against Muslims in Sri Lanka. The primary objective of this study is to examine the motive for violence against Muslims as well as impact of the violence. The fundamental questions of this research are the following: why does post-war violence and hate propaganda arise against Muslim in Sri Lanka? In which ways the violence against minorities, particularly Muslims impact on reconciliation process? And why does Buddhist nationalist hegemony arise soon after civil war in Sri Lanka? This study is based on an interpretive approach. The data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. In addition to primary sources, qualitative interviews were conducted with selected specialist on this particular research area. I conclude that after end of war against LTTE by government of Sri Lanka, religious tension has been increased in the recent past and the government’s reluctance even to take firm action against to perpetrators which would be helpful in restoring the rule of law and security of Sri Lankan minorities has been a big hurdle in the post-conflict situation and government are perceived to serve only the Buddhist side and to marginalize those holding legitimate grievances.

Whether or not nationalism fuels terrorist violence by ethnic groups is an important yet underexplored research question. This study offers a theoretical argument, empirical analysis and a case study. When political leaders such as presidents and prime ministers use nationalism to shore up legitimacy, they threaten the existence of disfavored ethnic groups. In turn, those groups are more likely to respond with terrorist attacks. The author tests this argument using a sample of 766 ethnic groups across 163 countries from 1970 to 2009. The multilevel mixed-effects negative binomial regression results provide evidence that leader nationalism is a significant driver of ethnic terrorism. The detrimental effect of nationalism remains the same after using a generalized method of moments method to account for possible reverse causality. A case study of Sinhalese nationalist leaders versus Tamil Tigers also supports the nationalism and terrorism nexus.

Birgitte Refslund Sørensen: “The Good Citizen is a Buddhist!” Understandings of Citizenship in Singhalese Schools, Sri Lanka Schoolchildren in Sinhalese schools learn to perceive themselves and the surrounding world through a Buddhist lens. This article, which draws on essays written by schoolchildren (grades 6-12) from three different schools, demonstrates how the children apply Buddhist values in developing a social imaginary of the good citizen, and how they apply this understanding in their assessments of transformations in society. I argue that even when their Buddhist views stress values like discipline, moral conduct, social responsibility and compassion that promise to foster a peaceful society, the children’s strong commitment to Buddhism as a basis for being a good citizen could also be a source of conflict. This is so, because Buddhism enjoys a privileged position in the constitution of Sri Lanka, where Buddhist Sinhalese are the majority, and because it has been politicised and serves as the foundation of a strong Sinhalese ethno-nationalism. So even though none of the Sinhalese schoolchildren would speak negatively of other groups, I argue that the strong linkage they make between Buddhism and the good Srilankan citizen is nevertheless expressive of a hegemonic discourse, which defines cultural citizenship and which marginalises others in Sri Lanka today. Keywords: Buddhism, conflict, discipline, ethnicity, modernization, moral community.

This article examines survivor/witness narratives of the Sri Lankan civil conflict (1983–2009) and their potential as counter-memories that contest and challenge authorized history dictated by the state. In situating the significance of these narratives the article draws on the prevailing conditions in post-conflict Sri Lanka, especially the surveillance and intimidation against public memory in the former war regions and the dominance of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism within state power. In orientation, the study is future-oriented and is preoccupied with how survivor narratives can be utilized to strengthen reconciliation and solidarity among different victim groups. It advocates for survivor/witness narratives to be incorporated as classroom material and for frameworks that appreciate comparative readings of conflict to be developed and adopted.

Abstract This article compares the ideas, connections, and projects of two South Asian figures who are generally studied separately: the Indian pan-Islamist Muhammad Barkatullah (1864–1927) and the Sinhalese Buddhist reformer Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1934). In doing so, I argue that we can understand these two figures in a new light, by recognizing their mutual connections as well as the structural similarities in their thought. By focusing on their encounters and work in Japan, this article demonstrates how Japan—particularly after defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905—had become a significant site for inter-Asian conversations about world religions. Importantly, exploring the projects of Barkatullah and Dharmapala makes visible the fact that, from the late nineteenth century until the outbreak of the First World War, religion played a central role—alongside nationalism, race, and empire—in conversations about the possible futures of the international order.

The study examined how clothing of Sri Lankan female school teachers affects their job performances. A representative sample was selected among school teachers from Western and Central provinces. A Sequential Explanatory design integrating quantitative survey (n=100) along with qualitative interviews (n=15) and secondary data were used. Results revealed that evolution and current practices of female dress were more into promote nationalism/culture. Though the current dresses of Sri Lankan school teachers are the Saree (for Sinhalese and Tamil teachers) and Abaya (for Muslim teachers), the majority of the respondents preferred to wear casual dresses (54%). Wilcoxon Signed Rank test showed significant differences in terms of perceived comfort and performing given four tasks (washing, ironing, dressing and walking after dressed) in favour of casual dress over traditional dress. Thirty percent of respondents have faced accidents due to their current dress. Aforementioned suggested that, teaching and performing extra-curricular activities would be more productive if they wear casual dresses. Key words: Dress Code, Job performance, Females, School teachers Cite this paper: U.G.L.B. Jayasooriya, Saliya De Silva, W.A.D.P. Wanigasundera. (2021), Effect of Dress Code of Sri Lankan Female School Teachers on their Job Performance, Vidyodaya Journal of Management, 7(1), 105-132.

The evolution of the ‘Kandyans’ of Sri Lanka, now considered a (culturally distinct) part of the country’s Sinhala majority, presents an intriguing puzzle. Even though they currently very much identify with the nationalist imagination and unitary state project of the greater Sinhala collectivity, they were historically the first in the island to forward a federal demand. As such, inquiring into how the Kandyans found it possible to integrate, politico-ideologically as much as materially, to the majority polity promises to be a worthy pursuit. It is even more intriguing when one considers the retention of their cultural distinction from other Sinhalese, notwithstanding politico-ideological integration. In seeking answers to this puzzle, the present study reveals that the plantation economy, administrative restructuring of the island and the choice of Buddhism as the exemplification of the cultural identity of Sri Lanka have been instrumental in the formation as well as subsequent dilution of the Kandyan identity over time. In this equation, the colonial intervention ironically has been crucial in marking the distinction of Kandy’s identity, and—rather unwittingly—its later integration with the larger Sinhala polity as well.

An emerging body of fiction by contemporary English novelists in Sri Lanka during the immediate post-civil war decade (2010–2020) indicates a renewed interest in the feudal grand house (the walauva) as a site of power. Often described in romantic terms and presented from positions of entitlement, in its renewed form, the walauva is constructed as a benevolent patriarchal system in which class superiors and servants share cordial and meaningful relationships. With primary reference to Nayomi Munaweera’s “What Lies Between Us”, Madhubhashini Ratnayake’s “There is Something I Have to Tell You” and Charulatha Thewarathanthri’s “Stories”, I place this emergent romanticized impression of the feudal grand house within the centralist power agenda of majoritarian populism prevalent in post-civil war Sri Lanka: a mass consciousness engineered by Sinhalese nationalist political fronts postwar, which historian Nira Wickramasinghe terms Sri Lanka’s ‘new patriotism’. While appreciating the contemporary writer’s imagination as being shaped by demands of ‘new patriotism’ the article identifies a deviation of her reading from the representations of the walauva as a site of power by Sri Lanka’s English literary canon from the 1950s to the mid-1990s.

Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, and the government of Sri Lanka comprising the majority of the Sinhalese Buddhist community came to a bloody end in May 2009. Muslims, whose political and civil society elite had largely supported the Sri Lankan state and security forces, welcomed the end of the war and the defeat of the Tamil Tigers given the history of the community with the LTTE. The expectations by the Muslims (and other communities) that peace would return to the country, were quickly dashed as it appeared that a new extremist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement targeting religious minorities especially the Muslims would emerge as the country grappled with post-war reconciliation. The rise of anti-Muslim rhetoric, hate speech, and incitement to violence against the community has pushed some Muslims to think that they have become the new focus for Sinhala-Buddhist extremists in the wake of the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. With suspicions of the complicity of the state apparatus in the anti-Muslim campaign, there are serious concerns around the role and place of minorities (non-Sinhala and non-Buddhist) in the future makeup of the country. While there is no concrete evidence on the state’s support for such an action, it is clear that the reluctance of the state to bring to justice those responsible for hate speech and incitement to violence since 2009 raises some serious questions about impartiality. In addition, with the increase of detentions and scrutiny of the Muslim community’s post-Easter Sunday attacks and the recent treatment of the Muslim community in the response to the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic, including shutting down of key Muslim towns and the enforcement of forced cremations (which goes against Islamic teachings of dignified burials), there is much to ponder of an anti-Muslim strategy being mainstreamed and institutionalized by the state. This paper will seek to situate the present response to the COVID-19 pandemic by the state and its particular actions affecting the Muslim community amid a wider backdrop of a rise in anti-Muslim hatred and action. In order to understand this, the paper will seek to understand the reasoning behind why Muslims who supported the war against the Tamil Tigers, have now become the enemy for Sinhala-Buddhist extremists. It does this through primary and secondary data gathering including interviews conducted between July 2020 and February 2021. In so doing this paper will explore the development of Muslim political and religious identity by looking at a historical perspective. This paper makes the argument that a holistic approach needs to be developed to avoid a new conflict taking place in Sri Lanka and to avoid violent Islamist extremism taking hold.