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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Single-peaked preferences

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Academic literature on the topic 'Single-peaked preferences'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 25 May 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Single-peaked preferences"

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Fitzsimmons, Zack, and Martin Lackner. "Incomplete Preferences in Single-Peaked Electorates." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 67 (April 13, 2020): 797–833. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11577.

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Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable voting problems become tractable given singlepeaked preferences. We prove that the problem of recognizing single-peakedness is NP-complete for incomplete profiles consisting of partial orders. Despite this intractability result, we find several polynomial-time algorithms for reasonably restricted settings. In particular, we give polynomial-time recognition algorithms for weak orders, which can be viewed as preferences with indifference.

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Peters, Dominik, and Martin Lackner. "Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 68 (June 24, 2020): 463–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11732.

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We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. This preference restriction is useful, e.g., for scheduling decisions, certain facility location problems, and for one-dimensional decisions in the presence of extremist preferences. We give a fast recognition algorithm of this domain, provide a characterisation by finitely many forbidden subprofiles, and show that many popular single- and multi-winner voting rules are polynomial-time computable on this domain. In particular, we prove that Proportional Approval Voting can be computed in polynomial time for profiles that are single-peaked on a circle. In contrast, Kemeny's rule remains hard to evaluate, and several impossibility results from social choice theory can be proved using only profiles in this domain.

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Bade, Sophie. "Matching with single-peaked preferences." Journal of Economic Theory 180 (March 2019): 81–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004.

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Conitzer, V. "Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 35 (June 16, 2009): 161–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2606.

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Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is produced. However, when there are many alternatives, it is impractical to simply ask agents to report their complete preferences. Rather, the agents' preferences, or at least the relevant parts thereof, need to be elicited. This is done by asking the agents a (hopefully small) number of simple queries about their preferences, such as comparison queries, which ask an agent to compare two of the alternatives. Prior work on preference elicitation in voting has focused on the case of unrestricted preferences. It has been shown that in this setting, it is sometimes necessary to ask each agent (almost) as many queries as would be required to determine an arbitrary ranking of the alternatives. In contrast, in this paper, we focus on single-peaked preferences. We show that such preferences can be elicited using only a linear number of comparison queries, if either the order with respect to which preferences are single-peaked is known, or at least one other agent's complete preferences are known. We show that using a sublinear number of queries does not suffice. We also consider the case of cardinally single-peaked preferences. For this case, we show that if the alternatives' cardinal positions are known, then an agent's preferences can be elicited using only a logarithmic number of queries; however, we also show that if the cardinal positions are not known, then a sublinear number of queries does not suffice. We present experimental results for all elicitation algorithms. We also consider the problem of only eliciting enough information to determine the aggregate ranking, and show that even for this more modest objective, a sublinear number of queries per agent does not suffice for known ordinal or unknown cardinal positions. Finally, we discuss whether and how these techniques can be applied when preferences are almost single-peaked.

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Amorós, Pablo. "Single-peaked preferences with several commodities." Social Choice and Welfare 19, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 57–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8325-6.

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Moreno, Bernardo. "Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity." Economics Letters 75, no. 1 (March 2002): 87–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00576-6.

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Bonifacio, Agustín G. "Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences." Social Choice and Welfare 44, no. 3 (September 26, 2014): 617–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0849-0.

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Lackner, Marie-Louise, and Martin Lackner. "On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences." Social Choice and Welfare 48, no. 4 (March 7, 2017): 717–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1033-0.

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Trick, Michael A. "Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree." Mathematical Social Sciences 17, no. 3 (June 1989): 329–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(89)90060-7.

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Brown, Lindsey, Hoang Ha, and Jonathan K. Hodge. "Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives." Discrete Applied Mathematics 166 (March 2014): 14–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2013.11.006.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Single-peaked preferences"

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Block, de Priego Veronica Iris [Verfasser], and C. [Akademischer Betreuer] Puppe. "Single-Peaked Preferences: Extensions, Empirics and Experimental Results / Veronica Iris Block de Priego. Betreuer: C. Puppe." Karlsruhe : KIT-Bibliothek, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1052933394/34.

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Books on the topic "Single-peaked preferences"

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Buchler, Justin. Voter Preferences over Bundles of Roll Call Votes. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865580.003.0002.

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Legislators do not adopt locations in the policy space with a single action. Instead, they cast roll call votes. Thus, rational voters should evaluate legislative candidates, not based on their locations in the policy space, but based on the bundles of roll call votes implied by those locations. Voters with single-peaked, symmetric preferences over policy can prefer a distant candidate to a more proximate candidate when they rank legislative candidates based on the bundles of roll call votes implied by their locations. When the most substantively important votes on the legislative agenda are the votes that divide the party factions cleanly, extreme incumbents from both parties can defeat moderate challengers from the opposing party given the same legislative agenda.

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Thomson, William. Fair Allocation. Edited by Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199325818.013.6.

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The object is this chapter is to survey the central concepts of the theory of fair allocation is their application to several important classes of problems: the classical model of exchange, the full allocation of a single commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences, the adjudication of conflicting claims, object-and-money allocation problems, economies with production.

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Book chapters on the topic "Single-peaked preferences"

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Roy, Olivier, and Maher Jakob Abou Zeid. "Meta-agreement and Rational Single-Peaked Preferences." In Studies in Choice and Welfare, 85–93. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_6.

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Fotakis, Dimitris, Laurent Gourvès, and Jérôme Monnot. "Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences." In Web and Internet Economics, 221–35. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_16.

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Bredereck, Robert, Jiehua Chen, Ugo Paavo Finnendahl, and Rolf Niedermeier. "Stable Roommate with Narcissistic, Single-Peaked, and Single-Crossing Preferences." In Algorithmic Decision Theory, 315–30. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_22.

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Escoffier, Bruno, Olivier Spanjaard, and Magdaléna Tydrichová. "Recognizing Single-Peaked Preferences on an Arbitrary Graph: Complexity and Algorithms." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 291–306. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_19.

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Herrero, Carmen, and Antonio Villar. "The equal-distance rule in allocation problems with single-peaked preferences." In Current Trends in Economics, 215–23. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_13.

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Black, Duncan. "A Committee Using a Simple Majority: Single-Peaked Preference Curves." In The Theory of Committees and Elections, 14–25. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4225-7_4.

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McLean, Iain, Alistair McMillan, and Burt L. Monroe. "A Committee Using a Simple Majority: Single-Peaked Preference Curves." In The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing, 19–30. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_4.

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"CHAPTER 9. Single-Peaked Preferences." In The Theory of Social Choice, 100–110. Princeton University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400868339-010.

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Chen, Jiehua, Christian Hatschka, and Sofia Simola. "Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences." In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/faia230296.

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We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for single-crossing approval preferences, winner determination of the Monroe rule is polynomial, and for both rules, winner determination mostly admits FPT algorithms with respect to the number of voters to delete to obtain single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. Our results answer some complexity questions from the literature [19, 29, 22].

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"Single Peaked Fuzzy Preferences: Black’s Median Voter Theorem." In Application of Fuzzy Logic to Social Choice Theory, 187–220. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/b18155-8.

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Conference papers on the topic "Single-peaked preferences"

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Conitzer, Vincent. "Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries." In the 6th international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329204.

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Kraiczy, Sonja, and Edith Elkind. "Explaining Preferences by Multiple Patterns in Voters’ Behavior." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/53.

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In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree (so that voters' preferences are group-separable). However, sometimes a single axis or a decision tree is insufficient to capture the voters' preferences; rather, there is a small number K of axes or decision trees such that each vote in the profile is consistent with one of these axes (resp., trees). In this work, we study the complexity of deciding whether voters' preferences can be explained in this manner. For K=2, we use the technique developed by Yang [2020, https://doi.org/10.3233/FAIA200099] in the context of single-peaked preferences to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for several domains: value-restricted preferences, group-separable preferences, and a natural subdomain of group-separable preferences, namely, caterpillar group-separable preferences. For K > 2, the problem is known to be hard for single-peaked preferences; we establish that it is also hard for value-restricted and group-separable preferences. Our positive results for K=2 make use of forbidden minor characterizations of the respective domains; in particular, we establish that the domain of caterpillar group-separable preferences admits a forbidden minor characterization.

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Sliwinski, Jakub, and Edith Elkind. "Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Sampling and Tree Recognition." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/82.

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In voting theory, impossibility results and computational hardness results are often circumvented by recognising that voters' preferences are not arbitrary, but lie within a restricted domain. Uncovering the structure of the underlying domain often provides useful insights about the nature of the alternative space, and may be helpful in identifying a collective choice. Preferences single-peaked on a tree are an example of a relatively broad domain that nonetheless exhibits several desirable properties. We consider the setting where voters' preferences are independently sampled from rankings that are single-peaked on a given tree, and study the problem of reliably identifying the tree that generated the observed votes. We test our algorithm empirically; to this end, we develop an algorithm to uniformly sample preferences that are single-peaked on a given tree.

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Golowich, Noah, Harikrishna Narasimhan, and David C. Parkes. "Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/36.

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Moulin [1980] characterizes the single-facility, deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms for social choice with single-peaked preferences as the set of generalized median rules. In contrast, we have only a limited understanding of multi-facility strategy-proof mechanisms, and recent work has shown negative worst case results for social cost. Our goal is to design strategy-proof, multi-facility mechanisms that minimize expected social cost. We first give a PAC learnability result for the class of multi-facility generalized median rules, and utilize neural networks to learn mechanisms from this class. Even in the absence of characterization results, we develop a computational procedure for learning almost strategy-proof mechanisms that are as good as or better than benchmarks from the literature, such as the best percentile and dictatorial rules.

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Bredereck, Robert, Anne-Marie George, Jonas Israel, and Leon Kellerhals. "Single-Peaked Opinion Updates." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/20.

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We consider opinion diffusion for undirected networks with sequential updates when the opinions of the agents are single-peaked preference rankings. Our starting point is the study of preserving single-peakedness. We identify voting rules that, when given a single-peaked profile, output at least one ranking that is single peaked w.r.t. a single-peaked axis of the input. For such voting rules we show convergence to a stable state of the diffusion process that uses the voting rule as the agents' update rule. Further, we establish an efficient algorithm that maximises the spread of extreme opinions.

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Sornat, Krzysztof, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, and Yinzhan Xu. "Near-Tight Algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant and Thiele Voting Rules." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/69.

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We present an almost optimal algorithm for the classic Chamberlin-Courant multiwinner voting rule (CC) on single-peaked preference profiles. Given n voters and m candidates, it runs in almost linear time in the input size improving the previous best O(nm^2) time algorithm. We also study multiwinner voting rules on nearly single-peaked preference profiles in terms of the candidate-deletion operation. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for CC where a given candidate-deletion set D has logarithmic size. Actually, our algorithm runs in 2^|D| * poly(n,m) time and the base of the power cannot be improved under the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis. We also adapt these results to all non-constant Thiele rules which generalize CC with approval ballots.

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