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Journal articles on the topic 'Simultaneous Ascending Auctions'

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Published: 1 June 2024

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1

FÜLLBRUNN, SASCHA. "COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA." International Game Theory Review 13, no. 01 (March 2011): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100285x.

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In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner's dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment.
2

Rosa, Benjamin V. "Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 132 (March 2022): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.009.

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3

Kagel, John H., Yuanchuan Lien, and Paul Milgrom. "Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 3 (August 1, 2010): 160–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.3.160.

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We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoretically relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders will predict variations in performance across different environments. Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design, we find experimental support for these two hypotheses. We also compare the CCA to a simultaneous ascending auction. (JEL D44)
4

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, and Charles M. Kahn. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions." Management Science 51, no. 3 (March 2005): 508–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339.

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5

Fox, Jeremy T., and Patrick Bajari. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 100–146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.100.

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We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995–1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)
6

Brusco, Sandro, and Giuseppe Lopomo. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints." Economic Theory 38, no. 1 (February 13, 2007): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8.

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7

Zheng, Charles Z. "Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 76, no. 2 (November 2012): 648–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.002.

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8

BRUSCO, SANDRO, and GIUSEPPE LOPOMO. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS." Journal of Industrial Economics 56, no. 1 (March 2008): 113–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00335.x.

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9

Riedel, Frank, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result." Economic Theory 29, no. 3 (November 13, 2005): 721–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0039-5.

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10

Sherstyuk, Katerina, and Jeremy Dulatre. "Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment." International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, no. 2 (March 2008): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.005.

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11

BROWN, ALEXANDER L., CHARLES R. PLOTT, and HEIDI J. SULLIVAN. "COLLUSION FACILITATING AND COLLUSION BREAKING POWER OF SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AND DESCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS." Economic Inquiry 47, no. 3 (July 2009): 395–424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00153.x.

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12

Greenwald, A., S. Lee, and V. Naroditskiy. "RoxyBot-06: Stochastic Prediction and Optimization in TAC Travel." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 36 (December 29, 2009): 513–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2904.

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In this paper, we describe our autonomous bidding agent, RoxyBot, who emerged victorious in the travel division of the 2006 Trading Agent Competition in a photo finish. At a high level, the design of many successful trading agents can be summarized as follows: (i) price prediction: build a model of market prices; and (ii) optimization: solve for an approximately optimal set of bids, given this model. To predict, RoxyBot builds a stochastic model of market prices by simulating simultaneous ascending auctions. To optimize, RoxyBot relies on the sample average approximation method, a stochastic optimization technique.
13

Brusco, Sandro, and Giuseppe Lopomo. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities." Review of Economic Studies 69, no. 2 (April 2002): 407–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00211.

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14

Milgrom, Paul. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction." Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 2 (April 2000): 245–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262118.

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15

Goeree, Jacob K., and Yuanchuan Lien. "An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction." Journal of Economic Theory 153 (September 2014): 506–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.014.

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16

Griffin, Robert, and Christopher Anderson. "Bidder Behavior in a Common Value Simultaneous Ascending Auction." Strategic Behavior and the Environment 5, no. 3-4 (December 22, 2015): 215–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000061.

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17

Plott, Charles R., and Timothy C. Salmon. "The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53, no. 3 (March 2004): 353–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.003.

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18

KUŚ, Agnieszka. "Simultaneous multiple round ascending bid auction as an effective method of spectrum allocation." Scientific Papers of Silesian University of Technology. Organization and Management Series 2020, no. 149 (2020): 401–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.29119/1641-3466.2020.149.34.

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19

Reekie, WD. "The pricing of trees: A study of hold-ups, holdouts, buy-outs and sell-offs." South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 7, no. 4 (November 30, 2004): 616–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v7i4.1293.

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This paper draws on transactions cost analysis, price and auction theory, and competition authority findings in order to answer some questions on the structure and trading patterns of the South African forestry industry. Does a forestry firm linked contractually to supply an adjacent sawmill customer, form part of a bilateral monopoly? For competition policy what are the relevant markets each party sells into or buys from? Can either firm opportunistically hold-up the other in price revisions? Or, where contracts have no effective terminal date, can one party hold out against offers of contract buyout? If one party is a state agency are there rights of eminent domain? If the state agency is due to be privatised can the method of sale, for example a simultaneous ascending auction, resolve some of the dilemmas?
20

Datta, Debabrata. "Spectrum Auction and Investment in Telecom Industry: A Suggested Policy." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 37, no. 1 (January 2012): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920120102.

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Recently, Indian telecommunication industry has passed through an auction process of 3G spectrum, which has enabled the government to collect hefty license fees. The successful bidders are expected to borrow this bid amount from the commercial banks and repay from the revenue to be generated from the new services. This paper looks at this issue theoretically. The telecommunication firms operate on the basis of acquisition of airwave space, which is licensed by the government. The usual policy practice is to distribute the available spectrum by an ascending auction. As per the economic theory, auction has two merits. Firstly, auction ensures that spectrum goes to the most efficient firm, which is by definition the firm that makes the maximum profit among all. This firm by virtue of their maximum profit bids the highest amount in the auction and gets the spectrum. Secondly, spectrum auction ensures revenue maximization of the government. This result of efficiency optimization however holds under the assumption of perfect information and no uncertainty. Uncertainty and irrationality like over-optimism can lead to problems like ‘winners‘ curse' or ‘broke winners’ under auction. Still auction is market-based and less controversial than discretionary distribution. However, this paper argues that high amount of auction bid can result in several deficiencies in the telecom industry. An issue of debate is whether high auction bid will result in higher price for the services. Under the assumption of infinite time horizon, high license fee is a sunk cost and therefore does not raise price. But this paper shows that a high license fee can raise the lending bank�s interest charge for which not only price rises but the infrastructural investment in the telecom industry suffers. After the acquisition of spectrum through auction the industry needs infrastructural investments to roll out the quality services. Inadequate investment in infrastructural activities like procurement of quality equipments, erection of tower, etc., may result in lower quantum of services with degraded qualities. This is in fact a reality in India where not only rural telecom infrastructure is vastly inadequate, the urban telecom infrastructure is also under severe stress. In this paper, using the tool of game theory we show how capacity and quantity choice game of firms ends up in high auction bid and sub-optimal investment on infrastructure. Then how can the social planners simultaneously achieve the twin objective of growth and revenue maximization? The paper shows that these objectives are realized if a part of the license fee is spent for the subsidization of infrastructural investment in the telecom industry.
21

Wellman, Michael P., Anna Osepayshvili, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, and Daniel Reeves. "Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8, no. 1 (December 16, 2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1461.

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Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with various strategic problems, depending on preference structure. As long as bids represent non-repudiable offers, submitting non-contingent bids to separate auctions entails an exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. With multiple goods (or units of a homogeneous good) bidders also need to account for their own effects on prices. Auction theory does not provide analytic solutions for optimal bidding strategies in the face of these problems. We present a new family of decision-theoretic bidding strategies that use probabilistic predictions of final prices: self-confirming distribution-prediction strategies. Bidding based on these is provably not optimal in general. But evidence using empirical game-theoretic methods we developed indicates the strategy is quite effective compared to other known methods when preferences exhibit complementarities. When preferences exhibit substitutability, simpler demand-reduction strategies address the own price effect problem more directly and perform better.
22

Bedard, Nicholas C., Jacob K. Goeree, Philippos Louis, and Jingjing Zhang. "Sealed-bid versus ascending spectrum auctions." Experimental Economics, May 26, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09805-x.

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AbstractWe compare the first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction and the simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) in an environment based on the recent sale of 900 MHz spectrum in Australia. Three bidders compete for five indivisible items. Bidders can win at most three items and need to obtain at least two to achieve profitable scale, i.e. items are complements. Value complementarities, which are a common feature of spectrum auctions, exacerbate the “fitting problem” and undermine the usual logic for superior price discovery in the SMRA. We find that the FPSB outperforms the SMRA across a range of bidding environments: in terms of efficiency, revenue, and protecting bidders from losses due to the exposure problem. Moreover, the FPSB exhibits superior price discovery and almost always results in competitive (“core”) prices unlike the SMRA, which frequently produces prices that are too low because of demand-reduction or too high because of the exposure problem. We demonstrate the robustness of our findings by considering two-stage variants of the FPSB and SMRA as well as environments in which bidders know their own values but not the distributions from which values are drawn.
23

Riedel, Frank, and Elmar G. Wolfstetter. "Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.591203.

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24

Hild, Mathias. "The Simultaneous Ascending Auction: Rules and Procedures." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1284256.

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25

Goeree, Jacob K., and Yuanchuan Lien. "An Equilibrium Analysis of the Simultaneous Ascending Auction." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1476837.

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26

Xu, Yuguang, Zexi Li, Chaonan Wang, and Hongfeng Zhu. "Quantum sealed-bid auction protocol for simultaneous ascending auction with GHZ states." Quantum Information Processing 20, no. 7 (July 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11128-021-03173-2.

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27

Saurabha, Rritu. "Modelling of the Elective Allocation Process as a Simultaneous Ascending Auction." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706732.

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28

Brenner, Donald R., and John John Morgan. "The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves versus the Simultaneous Ascending Auction: An Experimental Approach." SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.61728.

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