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Journal articles on the topic 'Sidgwick, Henry'

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Published: 27 July 2024

Last updated: 28 July 2024

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1

SKELTON, ANTHONY. "Schultz's Sidgwick." Utilitas 19, no. 1 (March 2007): 91–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820806002378.

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Bart Schultz's Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Sidgwick. In this article, I direct my attention for the most part to one aspect of what Schultz says about Sidgwick's masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics, as well as to what he does not say about Sidgwick's illuminating but neglected work Practical Ethics. This article is divided into three sections. In the first, I argue that there is a problem with Schultz's endorsement of the view that Sidgwick's moral epistemology combines elements of both coherentism and foundationalism. In the second, I argue that Schultz has failed to do justice to Sidgwick's mature views in Practical Ethics. In the final section, I briefly say something about Schultz's suggestion that Sidgwick succumbed to both racism and dishonesty.

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2

Schultz, Bart. "Eye of the Universe: Henry Sidgwick and the Problem Public." Utilitas 14, no. 2 (July 2002): 155–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800003502.

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Henry Sidgwick has gone down in the history of philosophy as both the great, classical utilitarian moral theorist who authored The Methods of Ethics, and an outstanding exemplar of intellectual honesty and integrity, one whose personal virtues were inseparable from his philosophical strengths and method. Yet this construction of Sidgwick the philosopher has been based on a too limited understanding of Sidgwick's casuistry and leading practical ethical concerns. As his friendship with John Addington Symonds reveals, Sidgwick was deeply entangled in an effort to negotiate the proper spheres of the public and private, not only in philosophical and religious matters, but also with respect to explosive questions of sexuality – particularly same sex actions and identities, as celebrated by Symonds and other champions of Oxford Hellenism and Whitmania. His willingness to mislead the public about such issues suggests that Sidgwick's utilitarian casuistry was rather more complex and esoteric than has been recognized.

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3

Schultz, Bart. "Henry Sidgwick." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 9 (2000): 58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20009103.

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4

Lazari–Radek, Katarzyna. "The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwicka, czyli poszukiwanie świeckiej moralności." Etyka 41 (December 1, 2008): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.655.

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W artykule przedstawiono postać Henry Sidgwicka oraz główne założenia i recepcję jego najważniejszego dzieła The Methods of Ethics. Myśl Sidgwicka, w Polsce znana marginalnie, wpłynęła na współczesną dyskusję filozoficzną w większym stopniu niż teorie Benthama czy Milla i to nie tylko w obrębie utylitaryzmu i konsekwencjalizmu, ale również teorii umowy społecznej czy etyki cnoty. Kwestie moralne, które Sidgwick omawiał w The Methods, w dużym stopniu wynikły z obecnego w historycznych i społecznych realiach wiktoriańskich kryzysu powstałego na tle konfliktu wiary i rozumu. Myśl Sidgwicka zrodziła się z dwu bodaj najbardziej charakterystycznych symptomów owego okresu: zainteresowania nauką i wiary w postęp oraz sceptycyzmu w stosunku do religii. Zarówno w swym wielkim dziele jak i w życiu osobistym Sidgwick dowiódł, iż rzeczą podstawowej wagi było dla niego poszukiwanie prawdy. Świadectwem jego oddania prawdzie było to, że po racjonalnym dojściu do konkluzji sprzecznych z jego utylitarystycznymi „preferencjami”, uznał, iż istnieją dwie ostateczne, nie dające się ze sobą pogodzić zasady moralne — utylitarystyczna zasada życzliwości oraz egoistyczna zasada roztropności.

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5

Shaver, Robert. "Henry Sidgwick (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 41, no. 4 (2003): 569–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2003.0068.

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6

Skorupski, John. "Desire and Will in Sidgwick and Green." Utilitas 12, no. 3 (November 2000): 307–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800002910.

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This paper examines T. H. Green's and Henry Sidgwick's differing views of desireand the will, and connectedly, their differing views of an individual's good and freedom. It is argued that Sidgwick makes effective criticisms of Green, but that important elements in Green's idealist view of an individual's good and freedom survive the criticism and remain significant today. It is also suggested that Sidgwick's own account of an individual's good is unclear in an important way.

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7

Harrison, Ross. "Cambridge Philosophers VI: Henry Sidgwick." Philosophy 71, no. 277 (July 1996): 423–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910004167x.

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The philosophy department in Edinburgh is in David Hume tower; the philosophy faculty at Cambridge is in Sidgwick Avenue. In one way, no competition. Everybody (who's anybody) has heard of Hume, whereas even the anybody who's anybody may not have heard of Sidgwick. Yet in another way, Sidgwick wins this arcane contest. For if David Hume, contradicting the Humean theory of personal identity, were to return to Edinburgh, he would not recognize the tower. Whereas, if someone with more success in rearousing spirits than Sidgwick himself had could now produce him, Sidgwick would know the avenue. For he planned it; he partially paid for it; and he pushed it past the local opposition. He was its creator. And creator not just of the avenue: if Sidgwick is not quite the only begetter, it was he more than anyone who was responsible for building the school of philosophy in Cambridge which is being celebrated in this series of articles.

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8

DEIGH, JOHN. "Sidgwick's Epistemology." Utilitas 19, no. 4 (November 12, 2007): 435–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002737.

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This article concerns two themes in Bart Schultz's recent biography of Henry Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. The first is the importance of Sidgwick's conflict over his religious beliefs to the development of his thinking in The Methods of Ethics. I suggest that, in addition to the characteristics of Methods that Schulz highlights, the work's epistemology, specifically, Sidgwick's program of presenting ethics as an axiomatic system on the traditional understanding of such systems, is due to the conflict. The second is the relative neglect into which Methods fell in the first part of the twentieth century, neglect Schultz attributes to changes in philosophical fashions and to the undue influence of the Bloomsbury literati on British intellectual culture. I suggest that there is a deeper explanation, which lies in Sidgwick's program of presenting ethics as an axiomatic system on the traditional understanding of such systems. Such programs, I argue, became obsolete in analytic philosophy owing to changes in how axiomatization in mathematics was understood that resulted initially from the rise of non-Euclidean geometries and ultimately from the collapse of Frege's and Russell's logicism.

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9

Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna. "Czym jest przyjemność? – Czy definicja Henry’ego Sidgwicka jest wciąż aktualna?" Etyka 49 (December 1, 2014): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.477.

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Utylitarysta hedonista twierdzi, że jego moralnym obowiązkiem jest bezstronne maksymalizowanie przyjemności dla możliwie jak największej liczby istot zdolnych do jej odczuwania. Czym jednak jest owa przyjemność? Henry Sidgwick, filozoficznie najbardziej skrupulatny z hedonistów, definiuje przyjemność jako „pożą dany stan świadomości”. W pierwszej częś ci artykułu przyjrzę się szczegółowo temu, co Sidgwick miał do powiedzenia w kwestii przyjemności. W części drugiej przedstawię niektóre najnowsze wnioski badań empirycznych i zastanowię się, jaki wpływ mogą one mieć na definiowanie przyjemności przez Sidgwicka. Czy pragnienie zawsze towarzyszyć musi przyjemności? Czy świadomość jest koniecznym warunkiem do jej zaistnienia? Czy można porównywać ze sobą przyjemności i cierpienia? Wnioski skłonią mnie do postawienia pytania wyjściowego do kolejnych rozważań o możliwość użycia badań naukowych w dyskusjach filozoficznych.

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10

Mariz, George. "Essays on Henry Sidgwick." History: Reviews of New Books 21, no. 1 (July 1992): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1992.9950744.

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11

Dees, Richard H. "Essays on Henry Sidgwick." History of European Ideas 18, no. 1 (January 1994): 119–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(94)90162-7.

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12

Singer, Marcus G., and Bart Schultz. "Essays on Henry Sidgwick." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, no. 2 (June 1999): 533. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2653689.

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13

Bok, Sissela. "Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics." Utilitas 12, no. 3 (November 2000): 361–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800002946.

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How practical can ethics be? To what extent is it possible to put ethics ‘to the use of life’, in the words of Samuel Johnson? In Practical Ethics, Henry Sidgwick offers the distillation of a lifetime of reflection on how to relate moral theory and practice. This book provides both a model and a cautionary example. Its lucid, urbane, and broad-gauged approach to practical moral issues is exemplary; but its very lucidity also exposes the moral risks in Sidgwick's attempt to isolate deliberation about these issues from fundamental moral premises, including the interlocking intuitionist, utilitarian, and paternalist premises buttressing his conclusions about legitimate practices of violence and deceit.

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Artemyeva, Olga V. "The Golden Rule and the Principle of Justice in Henry Sidgwick’s Ethics." Ethical Thought 22, no. 2 (2022): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-86-99.

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The article analyzes the peculiarities of conceptualization of the Golden Rule in Sidgwick’s ethics. The significance of his approach to the study of the Golden Rule is determined, in particular, by the fact that he introduced the Golden Rule into the context of moral theory and, focusing on the analysis of the Golden Rule as a statement, started the tradition of thinking about the rule in analytical ethics. In his consideration of the Golden Rule, Sidgwick assumed that it represents a fundamental moral intuition recognized by all humans. However, the evangelical formulation of the rule, in his view, is vague, open to ambiguous and false interpretations and, because of the significance of the rule, needs to be clarified and reformulated. In an effort to rationalize and clarify the normative content of the Golden Rule, Sidgwick links it to the principle of justice, in which he emphasizes the idea of universalizability. Universalizability according to the model of the Golden Rule is realized through the correlation of one's own judgments and actions with other people’s judgments and actions. The idea of universalizability in his interpretation sets the criterion for right action in general and right action in relation to others, in particular. Sidgwick's association of the Golden Rule with the principle of justice was essential because justice was most often correlated with the Talion. The correlation of justice with the Golden Rule provides a different image of justice: it manifests itself in the reciprocal willingness of persons to act proactively, to balance their interests with the interests of others and to allow no exceptions for themselves. This creates a space of humanity, providing conditions for positive interactions between people.

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Krishna, Nakul. "Two Conceptions of Common-Sense Morality." Philosophy 91, no. 3 (April 12, 2016): 391–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819116000164.

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AbstractMany moral philosophers tend to construe the aims of ethics as the interpretation and critique of ‘common-sense morality’. This approach is defended by Henry Sidgwick in his influential The Methods of Ethics and presented as a development of a basically Socratic idea of philosophical method. However, Sidgwick's focus on our general beliefs about right and wrong action drew attention away from the Socratic insistence on treating beliefs as one expression of our wider dispositions.Understanding the historical contingency of Sidgwick's approach to ethics can help us reflect on whether there are other ways in which modern ethics can be Socratic.

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16

Daval, René, and Hortense Geninet. "Henry Sidgwick on Sovereignty and National Union of the Modern Nation." Revue internationale de philosophie 266, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 439–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rip.266.0439.

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Souveraineté et Union Nationale dans la Nation Moderne selon Henry Sidgwick La souveraineté nationale et l’union nationale sont deux notions centrales dans la philosophie politique de Sidgwick: l’évolution de Cité-Etat à Pays-Etat nécessite une forte cohésion de tous les individus d’une même nation respectant cette souveraineté. Sidgwick confronte les théories de Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu et Rousseau en montrant l’importance de fonder l’étude de la politique sur l’histoire de l’homme social plutôt que sur le concept hypothétique d’une nature première de l’homme.

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WHITE, MICHAEL V. "THIRSTING FOR THE FRAY: THE CAMBRIDGE DUNNING OF MR. MACLEOD." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 32, no. 3 (August 27, 2010): 305–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837210000428.

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In 1883 Henry Sidgwick complained that, with the recent undermining of the authority of political economy, “utterances of dissent from economic orthodoxy” could obtain a ready hearing. This was of particular concern to those writing and teaching on political economy at Cambridge University. As Henry Dunning Macleod was one of the dissenters named by Sidgwick, it appears odd that Macleod was also recognized as a lecturer in political economy at Cambridge between the late 1870s and mid-1880s. This article examines that peculiar occurrence, showing how Macleod exploited the struggle between reformers and conservatives over teaching reform in the university.

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18

HURKA, THOMAS. "Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology: A Critique." Utilitas 26, no. 2 (May 13, 2014): 129–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820814000089.

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In The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwick argued against deontology and for consequentialism. More specifically, he stated four conditions for self-evident moral truth and argued that, whereas no deontological principles satisfy all four conditions, the principles that generate consequentialism do. This article argues that both his critique of deontology and his defence of consequentialism fail, largely for the same reason: that he did not clearly grasp the concept W. D. Ross later introduced of a prima facie duty or duty other things equal. The moderate deontology Ross's concept allows avoids many of Sidgwick's objections. And Sidgwick's statements of his own axioms equivocate in exactly the same way for which he criticized deontological ones. Only if they are read as other things equal can they seem intuitive and earn widespread agreement; but that form is too weak to ground consequentialism. And in the form that does yield consequentialism they are neither intuitive nor widely accepted. Sidgwick's arguments against a rival view and for his own were, in multiple ways, unfair.

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Schultz, Bart. "Sidgwick's Feminism." Utilitas 12, no. 3 (November 2000): 379–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800002958.

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Henry Sidgwick shared many of the feminist concerns of John Stuart Mill and was an active reformer in the cause of higher education for women, but his feminism has never received the attention it deserves and he has in recent times been criticized for promulgating a masculinist epistemology. This essay is a prolegomenon to a comprehensive account of Sidgwick's feminism, briefly setting out various elements of his views on epistemology, equality, gender, and sexuality in order to provide some initial sense of how he carried on and developed the Millian project.

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SCHULTZ, BART. "The Methods of J. B. Schneewind." Utilitas 16, no. 2 (July 2004): 146–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820804000500.

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J. B. Schneewind's Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy was the single best philosophical commentary on Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics produced in the twentieth century. Although Schneewind was primarily concerned to read Sidgwick's ethical theory in its historical context, as reflecting the controversies generated by such figures as J. S. Mill, F. D. Maurice, and William Whewell, his reading also ended up being highly neo-Kantian, reflecting various Rawlsian priorities. As valuable as such an interpretation of Sidgwick surely is, Schneewind's approach has always been in some key respects too narrowly conceived in its construction of Sidgwick's philosophical and cultural context, failing to grapple with such troubling, philosophically relevant issues as the possible racism of Sidgwick's ethical and political views, or the sexual politics manifest in his collaboration with such figures as John Addington Symonds.

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21

Tribe, Keith. "Henry Sidgwick, moral order, and utilitarianism." European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 24, no. 4 (May 17, 2017): 907–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2017.1323938.

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22

TODD, ROBERT B. "E. R. DODDS AND HENRY SIDGWICK." Notes and Queries 44, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 361–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nq/44-3-361.

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23

TODD, ROBERT B. "E. R. DODDS AND HENRY SIDGWICK." Notes and Queries 44, no. 3 (1997): 361–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nq/44.3.361.

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24

Miller, David. "The Political Philosophy of Henry Sidgwick." Utilitas 32, no. 3 (January 17, 2020): 261–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820819000529.

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AbstractWhy has Sidgwick's political philosophy fallen into oblivion while his ethics continues to be celebrated? Not because his performance in that field was inferior, nor because his choice of topics has become outdated, nor because his conclusions were largely conservative. Instead the problem stems from the weight he attached to common sentiments and beliefs in his application of the utility principle, illustrated by his treatment of topics such as secession and colonialism. Moreover his Elements of Politics is arranged in such a way that he never has to confront the basic question of what makes states legitimate. This means that neither political moralists, who want to see the utility principle applied in more radical fashion, nor political realists, for whom the problem of establishing political order is central, find much to commend in his political philosophy.

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25

Beem, Christopher. "Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Bart Schultz." Journal of Religion 73, no. 3 (July 1993): 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/489248.

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SCHULTZ, BART. "Mill and Sidgwick, Imperialism and Racism." Utilitas 19, no. 1 (March 2007): 104–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s095382080600238x.

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This essay is in effect something of a self-review of my bookHenry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe(2004) and of the volume, co-edited with Georgios Varouxakis,Utilitarianism and Empire(2005). My chief concern here is to go beyond those earlier works in underscoring the arbitrariness of the dominant contextualist and reconstructive historical accounts of J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick on the subjects of race and racism. The forms of racism are many, and simple historical accuracy suggests that both Mill and Sidgwick could be described as ‘racist’ on some plausible understandings of that term.

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Crisp, Roger. "Sidgwick and Self-interest." Utilitas 2, no. 2 (November 1990): 267–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800000698.

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The notion of self-interest has not received from philosophers of this century the attention it deserves. In this paper, I shall first elucidate the views on self-interest of a philosopher who nourished in the last century. It could be argued that Henry Sidgwick's views on this topic are the most considered in the history of philosophy. I shall then point to a number of misconceptions in his position, and suggest a more satisfactory account. I shall attempt also to solve a problem for this new account with the aid of a Sidgwickian distinction.

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Dobrijevic, Aleksandar. "The dualism of practical reason and the autonomy: Sidgwick’s pessimism and Kant’s optimism." Filozofija i drustvo 27, no. 4 (2016): 749–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1604749d.

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The question this paper is concerned with is: what if Immanuel Kant found a solution to the problem of the dualism of practical reason before Henry Sidgwick even came to formulate it? A comparison of Sidgwick?s and Kant?s approach to the problem of the dualism of practical reason is presented only in general terms, but the author concludes that this is sufficient for grasping the advantage of Kant?s solution to the problem.

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29

Firdaus, Qusthan. "On Digital Rupiah And Islamic Economy: A Comparative Analysis And Ethics." Al-bank: Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance 4, no. 1 (January 31, 2024): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.31958/ab.v4i1.10775.

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This study aims to explore the meaning of and to conduct an ethical assessment towards Digital Rupiah to Islamic economy by exploring the thoughts of Baqir Sadr and Henry Sidgwick. This research is about an ethics of Digital Rupiah, and it would like to investigate two problems. First, do these retail and wholesale versions of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) or the so called Digital Rupiah cause any harm to some principles in Islamic economy especially the one in Sadr’s thought? Second, is utilitarianism, in the sense of Henry Sidgwick’s thought in ethics, of any help to justify the development and innovation concerning Digital Rupiah in Islamic economy and Islamic economics? This method of this research is a comparative analysis for which case seeking similarities and differences among some CBDC. The result is any potential harm of Digital Rupiah to Islamic economy by which case it relies on the way we understand interest, usury and underlying assets. Sidgwick’s account of rational benevolence and universal happiness could be a good framework for justifying Digital Rupiah in Islamic economy

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Shaver, Robert. "PROMISSORY OBLIGATION." History of Philosophy Quarterly 36, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/48563643.

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Abstract Henry Sidgwick grounds promissory obligation in an obligation not to disappoint expectations. After explaining the view, I note the two standard current objections to expectation views—creating expectations is neither necessary nor sufficient for promissory obligation. I then suggest how Sidgwick (or any expectation theorist) could respond: one should agree that raising expectations is not sufficient for promissory obligation, and one can find harms, other than disappointed expectations, to explain why there is promissory obligation in cases in which expectations are not raised.

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31

Gomberg, Paul. "Consequentialism and History." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (September 1989): 383–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1989.10716486.

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John Stuart Mill wrote in the opening chapter of Utilitarianism, ‘A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong,’ thus explaining why he thought the work to follow was practically important. In Chapter 3, ‘On the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility,’ he answers the question, ‘What are the motives to obey the principle of utility?’ This principle is presented as a morality to be adopted. Yet before the nineteenth century was over Henry Sidgwick was proposing that it may well be best, from a utilitarian view, that the utilitarian doctrine is not too widely adopted. Perhaps it should be an esoteric morality.Moreover, Sidgwick argues, it seems contrary to self interest to adhere to an impartially benevolent morality. Devotion to utilitarian duty seems to require that the agent sacrifice his or her own happiness in a devotion to the relief of others that can only ‘partially mitigate’ their distress (502-3). Such a morality seems impossibly demanding. Sidgwick’s argument challenges Mill's claim that there is an adequate sanction for adoption of utilitarian morality.

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Kędziora, Krzysztof. "Henry Sidgwick i John Rawls o neutralności normatywnej teorii moralnej." Etyka 41 (December 1, 2008): 130–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.650.

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W artykule zaprezentowane zostały zarówno podobieństwa, jak i różnice w rozumieniu projektu teorii moralnej u Henry’ego Sidgwicka i Johna Rawlsa. W pierwszej części omówione zostało rozumienie teorii moralnej przez autora The Methods of Ethics, w części drugiej przedstawiono koncepcję Rawlsa jako kontynuację, pod pewnymi względami, dzieła Sidgwicka. Według tego ostatniego teoria moralna jest porównawczą analizą różnych metod etyki odkrywanych w potocznej świadomości moralnej. Teoria moralna jest niezależna od metafizyki i psychologii oraz rozstrzygnięć właściwych dla nich problemów, takich jak problem wolnej woli czy źródeł władzy moralnej. Autor Teorii sprawiedliwości bezpośrednio nawiązuje do rozumienia teorii moralnej przedsta-wionego przez Sidgwicka. John Rawls stwierdza: „przez »teorię moralną« rozumiem systematyczne i porównawcze badanie koncepcji moralnych, zaczynając od tych, które historycznie i według obecnych szacunków wydają się najbardziej istotne”. Należy podkreślić niezależność teorii moralnej rozumianej jako etyka normatywna od innych dziedzin filozofii. Zadaniem filozofii moralnej jest rozwiązanie zagadnień powiązanych z tradycyjną problematyką filozoficzną (metafizyczną czy epistemologiczną), które dotyczą na przykład istnienia prawdy moralnej. Odpowiedzi udzielane przez filozofię moralną zależą od pogłębienia naszego rozumienia struktur koncepcji moralnych.

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Bares Partal, Manuel. "Una revisión de la "teoría triple" de Parfit." Quaderns de Filosofia 10, no. 1 (May 30, 2023): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/qfia.1.1.25877.

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Revisiting Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ Resumen: En On What Matters, Derek Parfit trata, según nos dice él mismo, de solucionar lo que Sidgwick denominó “el dualismo de la razón práctica”. Según Sidgwick, el intuicionismo y el consecuencialismo son fácilmente compatibles dentro de un utilitarismo sensato, si bien no se pueden hacer compatibles con el egoísmo ético. Parfit, quien considera a Kant y al propio Sidgwick como sus dos influencias más importantes, cree que es posible encontrar una solución a través de lo que denomina The Triple Theory. Una vez rechazado el egoísmo ético, el intuicionismo objetivista puede hacerse compatible con el universalismo kantiano a través del consecuencialismo de Thomas Scanlon. La articulación y defensa de esta propuesta conforman los tres gruesos volúmenes de On What Matters. En este trabajo trataré de argumentar que, además de tener que enfrentar importantes problemas teóricos ya clásicos, el proyecto de unificación de las diferentes propuestas éticas puede dejar sin contestar importantes cuestiones prácticas que eran tratadas por las distintas teorías por separado. Abstract: The main topic in On What Matters is, in Parfit’s own words, trying to solve what Henry Sidgwick called “the practical reason´s dualism”. Following Sidgwick, intuitionism and consequentialism are easily compatible related to a reasonable utilitarianism, but both became strongly incompatible with ethic egoism. Parfit, who considers Kant and Sidgwick as his most important influence, believes that it is possible to find a solution through what he calls “The Triple Theory”. Once rejected ethical egoism in his several forms, he thinks that objectivist intuitionism can be compatible with Kantian universalism through Thomas Scanlon consequentialism in his work What We Owe Each Other. The structure and defense of this thesis will make up most of the three volumes of On What Matters. In this essay I will try to argue that, in addition to having to face several classical criticisms, the aim of unifying different ethical theories can leave unanswered important practical questions that where dealt with by the different theories separately.

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Terestchenko, Michel. "Henry Sidgwick Le cosmos de la moralité réduit au chaos." Revue de métaphysique et de morale 41, no. 1 (2004): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rmm.041.0101.

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Black, R. A. "Henry Sidgwick and the Institutionalists on Goodwill of the Firm." History of Political Economy 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1992): 79–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-1-79.

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Dale, Peter Allan. "Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe: An Intellectual Biography (review)." Victorian Studies 47, no. 1 (2004): 123–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/vic.2005.0038.

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Pemble, John. "Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe: An Intellectual Biography (review)." Journal of the History of Sexuality 14, no. 1 (2005): 224–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sex.2006.0014.

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Card, Claudia. "Responsibility Ethics, Shared Understandings, and Moral Communities." Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2002.tb00684.x.

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Margaret Walker's Moral Understandings offers an “expressive-collaborative,” culturally situated, practice—based picture of morality, critical of a “theoretical-juridical” picture in most prefeminist moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick. This essay compares her approach to ethics with that of John Rawls, another exemplar of the “theoretical-juridical” model, and asks how Walker's approach would apply to several ethical issues, including interaction with (other) animals, social reform and revolution, and basic human rights.

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Martinoia, Rozenn. "That which is Desired, which Pleases, and which Satisfies: Utility According to Alfred Marshall." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 25, no. 3 (September 2003): 349–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1042771032000114764.

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In the period of the marginal revolution in England, utility was traditionally defined in reference to either desire or pleasure. William Stanley Jevons, for example, referred to pleasure. According to Jevons, utility was actually identical with the addition made to a person's happiness, that is to say to the sum of the pleasure created and the pain prevented (1871, pp. 5354). Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall's spiritual father and mother, criticized this Benthamist perspective (Sidgwick 1883, p. 63) and introduced another definition at Cambridge. By utility of material things, Sidgwick stated, we mean their capacity tosatisfy men's needs and desires (1883, p. 84, emphasis added). Marshall, for his part, repeatedly moved from one meaning to another. In the first edition of his Principles of Economics, the term utility alternatively designated desire or pleasure. Few commentators have noted this double meaning of utility (Homan 1933, p. 224; Stigler 1950, p. 384; Guillebaud 1961, pp. 23637; Aldrich 1996, p. 211). Only Arthur Cecil Pigou (1903) and Jacob Viner (1925, p. 64749) have actually brought out its theoretical implications. No explanation as to the prevalence of this duality or its status in Marshall's welfare economics seems to have been proposed. Such is the intention of this article.

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Hurka, Thomas. "Virtue as Loving the Good." Social Philosophy and Policy 9, no. 2 (1992): 149–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505250000145x.

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In a chapter of The Methods of Ethics entitled “Ultimate Good”, Henry Sidgwick defends hedonism, the theory that pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good, that is, good in itself and apart from its consequences. First, however, he argues against the theory that virtue is intrinsically good. Sidgwick considers both a strong version of this theory — that virtue is the only intrinsic good — and a weaker version — that it is one intrinsic good among others. He tries to show that neither version is or can be true.Against the strong version of the theory, Sidgwick argues as follows. Virtue is a disposition to act rightly, and right action is identified by the good it promotes. (He believes the second, consequentialist premise has been justified by his lengthy critique of nonconsequentialist moralities in Book III of The Methods of Ethics.) But this means that treating virtue as the only intrinsic good involves a “logical circle”: virtue is a disposition to promote what is good, where what is good is itself just a disposition to promote what is good. Virtue turns out to be a disposition to promote virtue.As Hastings Rashdall notes in a commentary on Sidgwick, one can accept many of this argument's premises yet reject its conclusion. One can agree that right action is identified by its consequences but still hold that virtue is the only intrinsic good. One can do this if one denies that the relevant consequences are good. This is the Stoic view: certain states are “preferred”, and thus supply the criterion of right action, but are not themselves intrinsically good.

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RÄIKKÄ, JUHA. "Political Reforms, People’s Expectations, and Justice." WISDOM 1, no. 1 (December 1, 2013): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v1i1.24.

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The topic of the present paper derives from Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), and is sometimes labeled as the “paradox of conservative justice”. In The Methods of Ethics (1st edition, 1874) Sidgwick asks whether political reforms that have a morally desirable goal could justifiably be rejected simply on the grounds that realizing them would spoil the life plans of those who believe that the future would be like the past. The paradox is that “ideal justice” demands us to make reforms but “conservative justice” requires respecting people’s reasonable expectations, although making reforms seems to imply that those expectations will not be respected. The question seems to be about a moral dilemma. The government has an obligation to improve society and correct existing injustices, but surely it has also an obligation not to disappoint people’s natural expectations, partly created by the government itself. When the circumstances are such that correcting injustices happens to disappoint people’s reasonable expectations, the government simply cannot comply with both of its obligations.

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Medema, Steven G. "Of Pangloss, Pigouvians and Pragmatism: Ronald Coase and Social Cost Analysis." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 18, no. 1 (1996): 96–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837200002972.

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The laissez-faire welfare theory of classical economics was very much concerned with demonstrating the optimality of the competitive market system, or, more generally, the harmony between individual and social interests. Under the influence of J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick, however, this view gradually began to erode. Sidgwick (1901), for example, pointed to a number of factors, including what we now call externalities, that can cause individually-optimal behavior to diverge from the social optimum, and suggested that these potentially call for governmental corrective measures. Alfred Marshall carried this discussion a bit further, but it was through A. C. Pigou's analysis—particularly in The Economics of Welfare (1932)—that the theory of market failure, and the need for government correction of these failures, reached full flower. His work formed the foundation for “modern” welfare economics. The contrast between the “old” and the “modern” welfare economics was pointed out by James Buchanan:

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Waller, Ralph. "James Martineau and the Catholic Spirit Amid the Tensions of Dublin, 1828-1832." Studies in Church History 25 (1989): 223–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0424208400008706.

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James Marrineau is generally known as a Unitarian divine, who in the years which followed the publication of Origin of Species (1859) brought his massive intellect to the defence of Christianity, especially in his debates with Henry Spencer, Professor John Tyndall, and Henry Sidgwick. What is less well-known about Martineau is that in 1828 at the age of twenty-three he began his ministry in Dublin at Eustace Street Presbyterian Meeting House. Through his ‘Biographical Memoranda’, a sermon preached before the Synod of Munster, and his hymn book, A Collection of Hymns for Christian Worship which he compiled for the Dublin congregation, we are given a glimpse of his view of Irish Christianity and see in them a reflection of his strong catholic spirit, which was confirmed and strengthened by his Dublin experience.

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Kim Il Soo. "Henry Sidgwick on Justification of Utilitarianism and The Method of Reflective Equilibrium." Journal of Ethics 1, no. 125 (June 2019): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.15801/je.1.125.201906.153.

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TREITEL, CORINNA. "WHAT THE OCCULT REVEALS." Modern Intellectual History 6, no. 3 (November 2009): 611–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244309990205.

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Where does occultism fit on the map of modernity? Frank Miller Turner proposed an intriguing answer in his 1974 study Between Science and Religion: The Reaction to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England. The book examined the lives and struggles of six Victorian men: the philosophers Henry Sidgwick and James Ward, the scientists Alfred Russel Wallace and George John Romanes, and the writers Frederic W. H. Myers and Samuel Butler. Of the six, three cultivated a serious and sustained interest in the occult. Sidgwick and Myers engaged in psychical research, while Wallace immersed himself in phrenology and spiritualism. Raised as Christians, all of them came to find Christian belief inadequate. Yet the scientific naturalism that might have provided an alternative pole for their allegiance, that was the alternative pole of allegiance for much of their generation, failed to entice them. All had ethical qualms about its refusal to comment on God's existence or on life after death. All, too, wondered about the soul and bemoaned the reluctance of scientists to investigate the immaterial and subjective aspects of human nature. Caught between the Christianity of their upbringing and the scientific naturalism of their adulthood, Turner argued, these men “came to dwell between the science that beckoned them and the religion they had forsaken.”

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Schultz, Bart. "Ross Harrison (ed.), Henry Sidgwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. vi + 122." Utilitas 14, no. 2 (July 2002): 263–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800003575.

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Booth, Howard J. "Same-sex desire, ethics and double-mindedness: the correspondence of Henry Graham Dakyns, Henry Sidgwick and John Addington Symonds." Journal of European Studies 32, no. 125-126 (September 2002): 283–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004724410203212514.

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Silva, Marcos Antonio Da. "DIÁLOGO ENTRE ÉTICA E DIREITO SEGUNDO O PENSAMENTO DE HENRY SIDGWICK E DE CHAÏM PERELMAN." Revista Paranaense de Filosofia 2, no. 1 (July 26, 2022): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.33871/27639657.2022.2.1.4744.

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Por mais que se queira divorciar a Política e o Direito da perspectiva ética e moral, o fato é que as duas últimas exercem ampla e profunda influência sobre as primeiras, apesar da insistência positivista em explicar principalmente o fenômeno jurídico isento de tais pretensões. Henry Sidgwick, ao abordar e ao analisar os métodos da ética, acaba preconizando e reafirmando essa inflexão sobre as demais práticas sociais. Chaïm Perelman, por sua vez, ao constatar o peso e a importância do pensamento jurídico, inverte a tese, ou seja, aplica os princípios gerais de direito, muitos dos quais há muito tempo sedimentados e cristalizados no imaginário da civilização ocidental, para auxiliar o filósofo na solução das questões éticas. Nesse diálogo, portanto, que se encontrará o centro em torno do qual orbitarão algumas de nossas reflexões.

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BELL, DUNCAN, and CASPER SYLVEST. "INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN VICTORIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: T. H. GREEN, HERBERT SPENCER, AND HENRY SIDGWICK." Modern Intellectual History 3, no. 2 (August 2006): 207–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244306000837.

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In the second half of the nineteenth century, British liberal ideology contained an open-ended vision of international order. The vision usually included a notion of an incipient or immanent international society composed of civilized nations. The fundamental distinction between civilized and barbarian nations meant that while this perceived society was international, in no sense was it global. In this essay we outline some of the broader characteristics of the internationalist outlook that many liberals shared and specifically discuss the claims about international society that they articulated. Liberal internationalism was a broad church and many (but not all) of its fundamental assumptions about the nature and direction of international progress and the importance of civilization were shared by large swathes of the intellectual elite. These assumptions are analysed by exploring the conceptions of international society found in three of the most influential thinkers of the time, T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer and Henry Sidgwick. Finally, the essay turns to the limitations of this vision of international society, especially in the context of the role of empire.

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Martinoia, Rozenn. "« Une triste fin pour un si grand travail » ? La révision de l’utilitarisme par Henry Sidgwick." OEconomia, no. 1-2 (June 1, 2011): 171–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.1722.

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