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Journal articles on the topic 'Shareholders- Management'
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1
Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (July 21, 2014): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v3i1.173.
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In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.
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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value: EVA Concept." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (January 19, 2016): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/.v3i1.173.
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<p>In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.</p>
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Gounder, Chitra Gunshekhar, and M. Venkateshwarlu. "Shareholder Value Creation: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector." Accounting and Finance Research 6, no. 1 (February 14, 2017): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/afr.v6n1p148.
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This study investigates the importance of economic value added for the shareholders’ value maximization. Economic value added (EVA) is a value based performance measurement tool that helps to settle down the management decision regarding creation of shareholders value. Very few literatures are found regarding creation of shareholder values in banks. Sample of 40 Indian commercial listed Banks and panel data are used for the period of 2001 to 2015, the empirical findings for Public limited banks and overall Indian banks revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between shareholder’s value maximization and EVA but in case of Private limited banks, DPS was found to have significant relationship with shareholder value. The Higher the value of EVA, higher shareholders value .The finding shows significant support for EVA and DPS, but it was found that EVA is not efficiently used for Analysis and decision making regarding creation of value. Thus it is suggested to focus on criteria of EVA for analyzing shareholder’s value of banks.
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Li, Weian, and Jianbo Niu. "Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 254–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p1.
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We try to explore the relation among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure and the ownership concentration costs. Different corporations have different optimal governance mechanism. Noticing the substitute relation between the level of the management-and-shareholder-conflicts and the different governance mechanism, we take use of the data from China’ stock market and conduct an empirical analysis on the influence both of the different shareholder’s participating in governance and the ownership structure over corporate performance, and have reached two conclusions. First, in the companies with a higher level of conflicts between the management and the shareholders, the shareholder will be more active in participating in governance because the benefits earned here is much more than the company with a lower level of conflicts. Second, when the other governance mechanisms in one company perform poorly, the shareholder is less active in participating in governance because the extra benefits earned here cannot offset their costs. So only in these companies with poor governance mechanisms, the shareholders’ active monitoring can produce benefits. These conclusions can help our further research on the relationship among the shareholder supervision, ownership structure and corporate value, and we should also re-evaluate some traditional theoretical viewpoints
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Xie, Yue, Tianhui Wang, Jinhua Zhang, and Na Wang. "Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective." PLOS ONE 18, no. 7 (July 19, 2023): e0288705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0288705.
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Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.
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Zhou, Tingting. "Partial privatization, control rights of large shareholders and privatized shares transfer." Nankai Business Review International 9, no. 4 (November 5, 2018): 472–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-11-2017-0060.
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Purpose The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from the perspective of large shareholders’ control rights. Design/methodology/approach Considering the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, this paper extends existing analyses to study the impact of the ultimate controller’s control rights on privatized shares transfer. This paper also investigates the relationship between excessive control rights of the largest controlling shareholder and PST in view of the principle of equity of rights and obligations. In addition to a perspective on the holding of key positions by large shareholders, this paper further explores the impacts of the ownership of the largest controlling shareholder on privatized shares transfer. Findings The results capture the fact that the higher control rights of large shareholders lead to more privatized shares transfer. After exploring the impacts of excessive control rights, the results provide evidence supporting the idea that firms with excessive numbers of directors, senior managers or supervisors who also have positions in the largest controlling shareholder’s entity are more likely to transfer privatized shares owned by private owners. In addition, the largest shareholders’ ownership also plays a role in privatized shares transfer. Originality/value This evidence suggests that the large shareholders’ control rights should be limited to an appropriate range during the process of privatization, thereby giving private shareholders more opportunity to participate in the operation of firms, strengthen the state and enhance the competitiveness of state capital.
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Oskouei, Malektaj Maleki, Hashem Nikoomaram, and Freydoon Rahnama Roodposhti. "Shareholders’ perception of management communications in annual general meetings: narrative or not?" Argumenta Oeconomica 2020, no. 2 (2020): 77–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/aoe.2020.2.04.
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This study investigates management communications in annual general meetings (AGMs) from a narrative perspective. This study evaluates the effective elements of AGMs from the shareholder’s viewpoint. According to the theoretical framework, the authors developed a conceptual model and extracted the suggested narrative model for the first time. The shareholder’s perception was measured through a questionnaire survey containing three sections – narrative, audience, and narrator – with 32 indicators from 151 shareholders measuring shareholders’ opinions about AGMs in Iran. The results indicate that although shareholders do not consider the AGM communications made by management board as a narrative, they obtain relevant information with a logical flow in AGMs, and believe that these relations are useful. The characteristics of the management board impact on the persuasiveness of their communications. The results supported the mediating effect of AGM communication between managers and shareholders
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Van der Elst, Christoph. "Shareholder activism in good and bad economic times." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 2, Special issue (2011): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2sip3.
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Over the last few years the economy shifted from fast growth to a deep financial and economic crisis. Slowly companies are returning to growth rates in 2009-2010 after a sharp fall of profits in 2007-2009. This provides an excellent backdrop to assess trends in shareholder activism, how shareholders responded to the fall in profits and how they have exercised influence in these turbulent times. This paper focuses on the activism exerted by shareholders at annual general meetings of shareholders between 2007 and 2010 via their attendance and voting at AGMs in four European countries. The main research questions answered are the way large and minority shareholders expressed their voice at general meetings of shareholders and what drives this type of shareholder activism. The drivers of shareholder activism at general meetings are empirically tested. Four factors that can influence the willingness and probability of shareholder attendance and voting turnouts that are tested are shareholder structure, corporate performance, institutional framework and size of the companies. Overall shareholder activism measured as the attendance at general meetings between 2007 and 2010 did not significantly change. It is found that the ownership structure and institutional frameworks are important drivers of shareholder attendance. Corporate performance and size have no significant impact on attendance. We conclude that shareholder activism depends on the identity of large individual shareholders shedding doubts on the effectiveness of one size fits all (mandatory) corporate governance measures.
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Li, Ting, Xinlei Zhao, and Aiwu Zhao. "Voting with hands, earnings management and corporate governance." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 2 (May 13, 2019): 178–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-02-2016-0016.
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Purpose Motivated by managers’ intentions to pursue private interests by engaging in earnings management, this paper aims to investigate whether voting with hands (shareholders cast votes on shareholder proposals) by shareholders acts as an external disciplining mechanism over earnings management relative to corporate governance. Also, as corporate governance can scrutinize managers’ behavior, this study also examines whether there is a substitutive relation between shareholder proposals and corporate governance mechanism. Design/methodology/approach First, this paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discrepancy accruals on the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals to test the incremental effect of shareholder proposals on earnings management. Second, firms receiving shareholder proposals are matched with those not receiving proposals by propensity scores, and the levels of earnings management and corporate governance between these two groups are compared by univariate analysis and OLS regressions. In addition, six portfolios are created based on whether firms receive shareholder proposals, as well as on the levels of corporate governance, to assess whether external control from shareholder proposals can substitute internal control for corporate governance in disciplining earnings management. Regressions of earnings management on corporate governance (shareholder proposals) are conducted in the sub-samples formed on shareholder proposals (corporate governance) to further explore the above substitution effects. Findings Based on a sample of 2,041 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the “For” votes received from the shareholder proposals have a significant negative relationship with the practice of earnings management, even when corporate governance is controlled. The negative relationship between shareholder proposal and magnitude of earnings management is also found to be stronger when firms have weak corporate governance. The overall evidence suggests that the external control from “voting-with-hand” shareholders has a significant impact on earnings management. In addition, shareholder proposals can substitute the monitoring mechanism for corporate governance in constraining managers’ myopic behavior. Originality/value This paper contributes to the extant literature by using the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals as a proxy for shareholder pressure and concerns. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by showing the disciplinary effect of outside shareholders on managers’ reporting behavior. Also, it contributes to the corporate governance research by presenting that shareholder proposals can substitute for the internal control of corporate governance in decreasing earnings management. This paper should be of interest to investors and standard setters.
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Ezzamel, Mahmoud, Jason Zezhong Xiao, and Rongli Yuan. "Can Small Shareholders Protect Their Interests from Expropriation: The Case of a Chinese Bank." Management and Organization Review 16, no. 1 (August 29, 2019): 139–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mor.2019.23.
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ABSTRACTThis article examines how small shareholders protected their interests from large shareholders’ expropriation by forming an alliance and taking collective action to block a convertible bonds issue by a Chinese bank that they considered harmful. Forming an alliance strengthened small shareholders’ network density, enhanced their salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency), and reduced the bank's centrality. This enabled small shareholders to change their strategy from being a subordinator to a compromiser and forced the controlling shareholders and their representatives to change their strategy from a commander to a compromiser. Apart from interest-based motives, the alliance provided small shareholders with identity-based incentives to persistently oppose expropriation by controlling shareholders. This article enriches the literature on small shareholder activism and principal-principal problem.
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Guangguo, Sun, Sun Ruiqi, and Li Hezun. "Does executive directors from controlling shareholders improve corporate governance?" Nankai Business Review International 10, no. 4 (November 4, 2019): 546–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-11-2018-0064.
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Purpose The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement. Design/methodology/approach In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management. Findings The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team. Originality/value As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.
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Zulkafli, Abdul Hadi, and Ahmad Husni Hamzah. "Corporate contestability and corporate expropriation." Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions 6, no. 4 (2016): 403–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/rcgv6i4c3art5.
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This paper presents evidence on the role of ownership in dealing with corporate expropriation of listed companies in Malaysia. From the perspective of expropriation, a single controlling shareholder is always associated with such behavior due to their power and control at the expense of minority shareholder. However, subsequent individual or coalition of large shareholders can be an important corporate governance tool by providing effective monitoring that would lessen the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. Relating to that, this study evaluates the role of controlling and large shareholders in dealing with corporate expropriation. It is found that there is a negative relationship between single controlling shareholders and dividend payout ratio indicating that firms with only controlling shareholder will pay a lower dividend due to possible expropriation through profit diversion by controlling shareholder. Using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for ownership contestability, the presence of large shareholders along with controlling shareholder has a positive relationship with dividend payout implying that increased contestability helps to curb the power of controlling shareholder to expropriate fund for their own benefit. In accordance with agency theory, the outcome suggests that large shareholders play a monitoring role in minimizing the Type II agency problem. It is also verifying the argument made based on the Catering Theory of Dividend that the presence of large shareholder brings benefit to all shareholders as they are able to reduce profit diversion by demanding for higher dividend.
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Lutsenko, S. I. "FIDUCIARY GAME RULES AND THE GOVERNANCE NATURE IN THE COMPANY." Strategic decisions and risk management 10, no. 2 (July 30, 2019): 144–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.17747/2618-947x-2019-2-144-155.
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The author considers features of relationships between the fiduciary (management, board of director) and shareholders (beneficiaries). The nature of fiduciary relations is connected with «a critical resource» (assets) of the beneficiary. In the company economic interests of various participants (shareholders, management) face. Delegation discretion the shareholder to the management will allow to build together with the shareholder effective economic strategy of the company, under condition of execution of fiduciary duties. The management possesses administrative immunity within the limits of application of the business judgment rule. Actions of the management at transaction fulfilment should have real character, possess economic sense, a rationality and to promote achievement of economic benefit in the form of increase to shareholder value. The special attention is given to the fiduciary nature of interaction. Imposing of fiduciary duties on the management allows the beneficiary to protect the company from destruction of shareholder value. The shareholder should specify such game rules that the management was unable break them or, at least, cost of their infringement would be above reception of personal benefit. Fiduciary principles allow to soften the conflict between management and the shareholder. Besides, the fiduciary mechanism possesses a preventive element, keeping the company from destruction. The given obligation of loyalty protects resources of the shareholder from wrongful acts from the management. Fiduciary principles allow to balance economic interests between a management and shareholders.
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Rutterford, Janette. "The Shareholder Voice: British and American Accents, 1890–1965." Enterprise & Society 13, no. 1 (March 2012): 120–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1467222700010958.
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This article discusses the interaction between directors and small shareholders who made up the majority of names on the share ledgers of many companies in both the UK and the USA. It is concerned with the period 1890–1965 and concentrates on the management/shareholder relationship in the context of the annual general meeting and shareholder activism. I argue that there were significant differences between shareholder activism in the UK and the USA, due to the difference in relative numbers of the shareholders themselves, to legal and geographic differences, to corporate culture, and to the earlier diffusion of shareholding in the UK compared to the USA. UK shareholders concentrated their interventions on management issues, as well as some social and labor matters. US shareholders, mostly through so-called ‘corporate gadflies’, concentrated their efforts on corporate governance issues, some of which were already enshrined in UK company law and practice.
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Djordjevic, Marija. "Corporate management: Ownership, control and shareholders' rights." Privredna izgradnja 48, no. 3-4 (2005): 211–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/priz0504211d.
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In spite of extent of economy development in one country, every corporation faces up with same problems connected with corporate governance. Problems are ownership, shareholders rights and control. The way to acquire ownership is by buying shares of company. Ownership is connected with making essential decisions in corporation like changing statute of firm, allowing new stock market flotation, etc. There are two types of ownership: widespread or dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. Dispersed ownership is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom and United States) where one-tier system is representative model of corporate governance. Dispersed ownership means that every single packet of shares is smaller than 20% of total shares in corporation. On the other hand concentrated ownership characterizes presence of ultimate owner(s) in company. Ultimate owner is person who holds more than 20% of shares in firm. If shareholder holds more than 50% of shares he is major shareholder what means that he has control over company. Concentrated ownership is characteristic of continental Europe and Japan where is presented two-tier model of corporate governance. Law and other institutional rules, like rules for listed companies of stock market, must guarantee the shareholder rights. Today, every country accepts Principles of Corporate Governance published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further more, the transitional countries, as Russia, must pass and respect laws, which protect shareholders rights. Control of management is one of the ways to protect shareholder rights. Control could be internal and external. Audit or Supervisory board is main part of internal control. Independent external auditor who is in relation with company does external control by contract of giving services. It is important that all auditors (internal of external) be independent of management of corporations. In this paper, we try to adduce main problems of modern corporate governance as ownership control and shareholders rights.
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Su, Kun, and Peng Li. "The Effects Of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders On Debt Maturity Structure." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 29, no. 2 (February 13, 2013): 553. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v29i2.7656.
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Using a balanced panel data of 915 Chinese listed firms, this paper studies the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders on debt maturity structure by adopting random effect model. Our results show: the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders cash flow rights, the higher the cost of expropriating outside investors by ultimate controlling shareholder, and can reduce the agency costs of debt financing, so banks are willing to provide more long term debt funds for the firms. Ultimate controlling shareholders cash flow rights are positively related to debt maturity structure. The larger the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders control rights and cash flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling shareholder to expropriate outside investors, and this increase the agency conflicts between firms and creditor, which leading to higher agency costs of debt financing, so banks tend to provide more short term funds for firms to constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder. The divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders controlling rights and cash flow rights are negatively related to debt maturity structure.
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Antonius Siahaan, Yosman Bustaman, and Indah Larisa Sari. "Ownership Concentration, Corporate Liquidity, and Dividend Payment Policy: Evidence from Indonesian Financial Industries." International Journal of Business and Society 21, no. 3 (April 27, 2021): 1310–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.33736/ijbs.3351.2020.
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The main objective of this research is to analyze the effect of ownership concentration and corporate liquidity on dividend payment policy in the Indonesian financial industry. Dividend payment is measured using dividend pay-out ratio on measuring dividend payment. Corporate ownership concentration is measured using the number of shares held by legal individual investors and large block shareholders. Ownership concentration is divided into three categories, which are inside shareholders, stable shareholders, and market shareholders. Corporate liquidity is measured by corporate profit, defined by retained earnings/total assets and retained earnings/total equity, corporate leverage (total liabilities/total assets), and corporate size (log normal total assets). We apply data panel regression and the robust least square method. Based on the robust least square method of testing data panel regression, we find there is a relationship between insider shareholder, market shareholder, and dividend payment policy. In contrast, there is no relationship between stable shareholder and dividend payment policy. We also found a relationship between corporate profit, which variable is retained earnings/total assets, corporate leverage, and corporate size, and dividend payment policy. These results lead to the conclusion that dividend payments increase when ownership by inside shareholders decreases, and that when ownership by market shareholders increase corporate profit will also increase, and corporate leverageand corporate size decreases.
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Sollars, Gordon G., and Sorin A. Tuluca. "Fiduciary Duty, Risk, and Shareholder Desert." Business Ethics Quarterly 28, no. 2 (February 19, 2018): 203–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2017.47.
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ABSTRACT:A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory demonstrates that this argument should be modified by the recognition of a principle of desert, the shareholder desert principle (SDP). Financial theory can usefully circumscribe the duty owed to shareholders and the extent to which risk bearing justifies a claim on corporate value. When combined with the SDP, the result provides management with a guideline for what is owed to shareholders before other stakeholder non-contractual claims may be satisfied. As such, our approach provides management with some guidance through the thicket of competing stakeholder claims.
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Søndergaard Birkmose, Hanne. "Forcing Shareholder Engagement: Theoretical Underpinning and Political Ambitions." European Business Law Review 29, Issue 4 (July 1, 2018): 613–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2018024.
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This paper explores the post-crisis debate on shareholder engagement and argues that the debate and subsequent legislative initiatives aimed at increasing shareholder engagement and accountability seem to be moving away from the traditional corporate governance basis. While corporate governance theory may explain the need for shareholders to balance management powers, it does not support that shareholders have an obligation to engage in investee companies. Neither do we find that the ownership rhetoric supports any duties for shareholders. Finally, we examine elements of stakeholder theory and public policy theory. While these theories emphasise that companies should include other interests than shareholders’ financial interests, they do not support a stronger shareholder role in that respect. Thus, the paper concludes that the post-crisis debate on shareholder engagement should be seen as the result of a strong political agenda and that the theoretical basis for pushing shareholder engagement further is weak.
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Kuek, Thiam-Yong, I.-Chi Chen, Yuen-Onn Choong, Saw-Chin Khor, Mei-Peng Low, and Timothy Tzen-Vun Yap. "STUDY OF PAST DECADE (2010 - 2020) SELECTED LITERATURE ON MINORITY SHAREHOLDER AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN MALAYSIA." Advanced International Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 3, no. 7 (March 1, 2021): 49–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.35631/aijbes.37005.
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Due to its vitality in preserving the stability, transparency, and sound management of businesses, corporate governance continues to play a dominant role in many Malaysian companies. This will give the country and foreign countries good opportunities to invest in Malaysia and provide an investment-friendly environment. It adds color to the existing soft stock market in Malaysia as a result of the economic instability, the political turmoil, and the pandemic effects of Covid-19. Two main elements of corporate governance in Malaysia, minority shareholders, and shareholder activities will be addressed in this article. Minority shareholders, in particular publicly-listed companies in Malaysia, are major players in companies. However, in other countries, the general opinion among minority shareholders is that executives, administrators, and main shareholders or control shareholders tend to take advantage of them for their own personal purposes. As a result, shareholder activism plays a key role in making shareholders aware of their rights and obligations in the ownership of the firm, in particular as minority shareholders, through this activism. However, Malaysia has not yet come to a firm conclusion on the effectiveness of shareholder interference. Five articles on minority shareholders and shareholder activism relevant to Malaysia, each from 2010 to 2020, were retrieved from Google Scholar and examined from Malaysia's corporate governance perspective to determine the extent of their growth.
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Yousaf, Imran. "Effect of Corporate Governance Practices on the Earnings Management Practices: A Case of Pakistani Banking Sector." Asia Proceedings of Social Sciences 2, no. 2 (December 2, 2018): 26–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31580/apss.v2i2.286.
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Banks are highly focusing on real Corporate Governance practices to provide accurate and unbiased information in their annual financial reports but still managers are encouraged to do earnings managementr to beat expectations. Further, concentrated ownership in banks, give more benefit to majority shareholder as compare to minority shareholders which ultimately resulting in exploitation of the of minority shareholder’s intersts, causing principal-principal(P-P) conflict. This study examines the effect of Corporate Governance practices and P-P conflicts on practices of Earning Management in banking Sector. This study uses regression analysis for estimation. The findings reveals that there is a inverse relationship between percentage of independent directors in Board and earning mangement Practices . Moreover ownership concentration is positively associated with the Earning Management Practices. This study has implications for management of the banks, regulatory bodies and for investors.
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Cuervo García, Álvaro, and Luisa Reyes-Recio. "The substitution effect between managerial control mechanisms and its effect on the creation of value in reference to firm diversification." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 382–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c4p6.
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This paper aims to investigate the relationships between two governance mechanisms such as active shareholder control and the board of directors, as well as their effect on the creation of value for the shareholder, using firm diversification strategy as the moderating variable. These relationships indicate the existence of a substitution effect between both governance mechanisms, with a more inactive board in firms with large shareholders. On the other hand, the analysis of governance mechanisms and firm diversification strategy indicate the positive effect of shareholder concentration on the creation of value for shareholders in non-diversified firms and, the positive effect of the board of administration on the creation of value for shareholders in diversified firms
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Ongsakul, Viput, Pornsit Jiraporn, and Young Sang Kim. "The effect of earnings management on shareholder value and the role of board gender diversity." Pacific Accounting Review 32, no. 3 (April 18, 2020): 323–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/par-09-2019-0110.
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Purpose This study aims to investigate whether shareholders are convinced by earnings management. This study also explores how board gender diversity (the presence of female directors on the board) may influence the extent to which shareholders are convinced by earnings management. Design/methodology/approach The authors estimate the stock market reactions to the September 11 terrorist attack using the standard event study methodology. The authors then run a cross-sectional analysis to investigate whether the market reactions are influenced by the extent of earnings management. Furthermore, the authors test how board gender diversity affects the degree to which earnings management influences the stock market reactions. Findings The study results show that the market reactions to the attack are substantially mitigated for firms that exercise more upward discretionary accruals, implying that earnings management is successful in convincing shareholders. Additional analysis corroborates the results, including propensity score matching, instrumental variable analysis and using Oster’s (2019) method for testing coefficient stability. Crucially, the authors find that board gender diversity helps shareholders see through earnings management better. The presence of female directors significantly weakens the extent to which shareholders are persuaded by earnings management. Originality/value This study is the first to explore the effect of earnings management on shareholder wealth using the September 11 terrorist attack. The research design is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus much more likely to show a causal effect of accounting accruals on shareholder wealth.
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Alikaj, Albi, and Aditya Limaye. "The Impact of Legal Systems on Dividend Payments." Studies in Business and Economics 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 5–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/sbe-2021-0001.
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Abstract This paper focuses on the amount of dividends paid to shareholders by companies in different countries and examines whether being in a country where the legal system offers weak shareholder protection affects dividend payments distributed to shareholders. The sample used for this study comprises 8,045 companies from 46 countries. Seven individual factors affecting shareholder protection were examined. Out of the seven factors, only two of them provide a significant relationship with dividend payments, and more specifically, the mechanisms put in place by companies to protect oppressed minority shareholders as well as minimum percentage share of capital in order for the shareholders to be eligible to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting.
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Kalicanin, Djordje. "Value-based management: Theoretical base, shareholders' request and the concept." Ekonomski anali 50, no. 165 (2005): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka0565165k.
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The pressure of financial markets, which is a consequence of shareholder revolution, directly affects the solution to the following dilemma: is the mission of corporations to maximize shareholders' wealth or to satisfy interests of other stakeholders? The domination of shareholder theory has caused the appearance of the valuebased management concept. Value-based management is a relevant concept and a process of management in modern environment. The importance of shareholder value requires transformation of traditional enterprise into value driven enterprise. This paper addresses theoretical base, shareholder revolution and the main characteristics of value-based management.
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Hennessey, Sean M. "Corporate governance mechanisms for publicly-traded companies." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 4 (2008): 309–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4c2p4.
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The resolution of conflicts between shareholders and managers, at minimal cost, is the goal of corporate governance. This paper discusses four mechanisms, two internal, two external, that attempt to ensure managers act in the best interests of shareholders: 1) the board of directors, 2) management compensation plans, 3) the market, and 4) takeovers. Theoretically, these four forms of corporate governance should ensure management maximizes shareholder value. But, agency costs are real for shareholders. In practice each the mechanisms may be severely limited in their ability to protect shareholders. The best protection is an independent, credible board of directors. Without good boards, shareholders are left to the mercy of the agents. In such cases, it is very difficult, and expensive, to discipline the senior managers of a publicly-traded company
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De Masi, Sara, and Andrea Zorzi. "Enhancing Board Monitoring Tasks: The Effect of Minority-Elected Directors." International Journal of Business and Management 15, no. 7 (June 8, 2020): 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v15n7p85.
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In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders poses significant issue. Managers may pursue, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, the interest of the controlling shareholder. When there is a controlling shareholder, independent directors may not prove sufficient to monitor the management behaviour, given that they are ultimately appointed by the same controlling shareholder whose possible opportunistic behaviour they are meant to constrain. Therefore, minority shareholders may be given appointment rights to the board: directors elected by minority shareholders may work as a corporate governance mechanism that fosters the board’s willingness and ability to monitor managers’ behaviour, on the assumption that managers are appointed by the controlling shareholder. This paper examines empirically whether having a minority-elected director on corporate boards increases the ability of the board to monitor management behaviour. Using a sample of the largest listed Italian companies in years 2008-2017, we find that minority-elected directors have a positive and statistically significant effect on board monitoring tasks. We also document that this effect is higher when they are elected by institutional investors. Our results have important implications for policy makers and, more generally, corporate governance best practice in all contexts in which companies have a concentrated ownership structure.
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Subramanian, Ram. "Shareholder spring and social activism: a study of 2013-2015 proxy filings." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 17, no. 3 (June 5, 2017): 560–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-08-2016-0170.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine social issue proxy filings by shareholders of US corporations in a period commonly referred to as the “shareholder spring” to understand who the filers are, what issues are typically the focus of the filings, what the dominant strategy is of various filers and the success rate of proxy-based shareholder social activism. Design/methodology/approach Using the shareholder-filed proxy as the unit of analysis, the study parsed the data from 410 proxies to gain insight into the process of shareholder social activism. Findings Religious groups, in contrast to large pension and mutual funds, use a small shareholding approach to form coalitions with other stakeholders to gain voting support. Proxies that call for disclosure elicit greater support than those that demand a change in a company’s business practices. If the goal of shareholder social activism is to keep the proxy issue alive from one shareholder meeting to the next, then non-individual proxy filers can be considered successful. Research limitations/implications While the study only considered proxies for 250 of the Fortune 500 companies, there is evidence that social activism can succeed if a coalition strategy is used and the shareholder’s motives appear to be legitimately altruistic. Practical implications It is important for corporate managers to consider the prevailing shareholder sentiment on social issues because such sentiments largely echo general societal concerns. Social implications While the debate is still unsettled on the shareholder versus the stakeholder argument, there is a high level of scrutiny on how a company operates in the larger societal context. Originality/value Propelled by the Dodd–Frank law and the shareholder spring movement, certain types of shareholders (primarily religious groups) are quite adept at eliciting support for social issues because of both their legitimacy and by the strategy that they follow.
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Mohd Shazwan Mohd Ariffin, Siti Seri Delima Abdul Malak, and Wan Nordin Wan-Hussin. "SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PUBLICATION OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING MINUTES ONLINE: EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIAN LISTED COMPANIES." International Journal of Business and Society 24, no. 1 (April 7, 2023): 488–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.33736/ijbs.5630.2023.
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This study primarily examined the role of Minority Shareholder Watch Group (MSWG), regarded as an advocate for shareholder activism in Malaysia, in encouraging management to take actions in shareholders’ interests by making minutes of annual general meeting (AGM) available electronically. Shareholder activism was assessed through companies monitored by the MSWG and through shareholder participation based on percentage of issued shares that voted at the AGM. The paper utilised secondary and proprietary data. Based on a sample of 261 firms that conducted their AGM in 2017, we found that 43% firms disclosed comprehensive AGM minutes, 24% firms only disclosed summary of key matters discussed and for the rest, no AGM minutes were uploaded on their corporate websites. From the sample, 34% of firms were under the radar of the MSWG. We found that firms targeted by MSWG were significantly associated with detailed disclosure of AGM minutes. However, shareholder participation through ownership voted at the AGM did not yield a significant association. The prevalence of controlling blocks in Malaysian firms may contribute to this result. Overall, the result supports the notion that institutionalised shareholder activism is an effective way to reduce agency problems and information asymmetry between controlling shareholders, management and minority shareholders. Finally, the study limitations and direction for future research are briefly discussed.
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Cullinan, Charles P., Lois S. Mahoney, and Pamela Roush. "Corporate social responsibility and shareholder support for corporate governance changes." Social Responsibility Journal 12, no. 4 (October 3, 2016): 687–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/srj-10-2015-0161.
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Purpose This paper examines whether shareholders consider corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance when voting on corporate governance change proposals submitted by dissident shareholders. These proposals recommend changes to the corporate governance status quo and are made by dissident shareholders who are dissatisfied with the company’s existing governance practices. Design/methodology/approach Using 195 governance change proposals voted on during 2013, the paper examines the relationship between CSR performance (obtained from the MSCI database) and the level of voting support for these proposals. Findings This study finds that shareholder support for corporate governance change proposals submitted by dissident shareholders is positively related to firms’ CSR concerns, especially environmental concerns. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that shareholders may be concerned with the potentially adverse effects of weak CSR performance, especially poor environmental performance, and may support changes to corporate governance structures when a company’s CSR and environmental performance is weaker. Originality/value As the first research to examine the relationship between CSR and proposed changes to corporate governance, this study provides unique insights into shareholder perceptions of the value of CSR based on shareholders’ support (or lack thereof) for governance changes proposed by dissident shareholders.
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Thomas, Jill. "Attitudes and expectations of shareholders: The case of the multi-generation family business." Journal of Management & Organization 15, no. 3 (March 2010): 346–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1833367200002662.
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AbstractAs family shareholder support is essential for the ongoing viability of the business as a family business, multi-generation family businesses which allow ‘the ownership tree’ to grow need to monitor the attitudes and expectations of the expanding number of family member shareholders. This paper reports on a case study of a multi-generation family business where the shareholder group had grown to 50 individual shareholders. The study explored the shareholders' views about the business and particularly their attitudes to stewardship and whether and under what circumstances, they would hold their shareholdings, pass them to the next generation of family or possibly consider relinquishing their holdings. Data was obtained from a semi-structured questionnaire and follow-up interviews. While respondents indicated that they had immense pride in being a shareholder of the family business, they admitted that their knowledge of that business was less than optimal. Financial returns were viewed as important, but the intangible rewards relating to the heritage of forebears were more so. While they were keen to pass on their shares to their children, they were uncertain about the level of commitment the next generation members would have. Lessons from this case study are discussed for other multi-generation family businesses focusing on shareholders' responsibilities as owners and the board's need to ensure timely transfer of knowledge to the wider shareholder group.
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Thomas, Jill. "Attitudes and expectations of shareholders: The case of the multi-generation family business." Journal of Management & Organization 15, no. 3 (March 2010): 346–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5172/jmo.2009.15.3.346.
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AbstractAs family shareholder support is essential for the ongoing viability of the business as a family business, multi-generation family businesses which allow ‘the ownership tree’ to grow need to monitor the attitudes and expectations of the expanding number of family member shareholders. This paper reports on a case study of a multi-generation family business where the shareholder group had grown to 50 individual shareholders. The study explored the shareholders' views about the business and particularly their attitudes to stewardship and whether and under what circumstances, they would hold their shareholdings, pass them to the next generation of family or possibly consider relinquishing their holdings. Data was obtained from a semi-structured questionnaire and follow-up interviews. While respondents indicated that they had immense pride in being a shareholder of the family business, they admitted that their knowledge of that business was less than optimal. Financial returns were viewed as important, but the intangible rewards relating to the heritage of forebears were more so. While they were keen to pass on their shares to their children, they were uncertain about the level of commitment the next generation members would have. Lessons from this case study are discussed for other multi-generation family businesses focusing on shareholders' responsibilities as owners and the board's need to ensure timely transfer of knowledge to the wider shareholder group.
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Liu, Ruijie, and Yajing Huang. "Structural Analysis of Projected Networks of Shareholders and Stocks Based on the Data of Large Shareholders’ Shareholding in China’s Stocks." Mathematics 11, no. 6 (March 22, 2023): 1545. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math11061545.
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This paper establishes a shareholder-stock bipartite network based on the data of large shareholders’ shareholding in the Shanghai A-share market of China in 2021. Based on the shareholder-stock bipartite network, the statistically validated network model is applied to establish a shareholder projected network and a stock projected network, whose structural characteristics can intuitively reveal the overlapping portfolios among different shareholders, as well as shareholder allocation structures among different stocks. The degree of nodes in the shareholder projected network obeys the power law distribution, the network aggregation coefficient is large, while the degree of most nodes in the stock projected network is small and the network aggregation coefficient is low. Furthermore, the two projected networks’ community structures are analyzed, respectively. Most of the communities in the shareholder projected network and stock projected network are small-scaled, indicating that the majority of large shareholders hold different shares from each other, and the investment portfolios of large shareholders in different stocks are also significantly different. Finally, by comparing the stock projected sub-network obtained from the shareholder-stock bipartite sub-network in which the degree of shareholder nodes is 2 and the original stock projected network, the effectiveness of the statistically validated network model, and the community division method on the research of the shareholder-stock bipartite network are further verified. These results have important implications for understanding the investment behavior of large shareholders in the stock market and contribute to developing investment strategies and risk management practices.
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Zhang, Xinsheng, Jin Liu, Wenhao Zhu, and Haolan Li. "Research on the Legal System of Shareholders’ Rights Exercise for China’s State-owned Enterprises." E3S Web of Conferences 257 (2021): 02073. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125702073.
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In the context of the new round of reform of China’s state-owned enterprises, the modernization of governance system and governance capabilities has put forward new requirements for Chinese central enterprises to exercise shareholders’ rights, which not only means value reconstruction, business restructuring and process reengineering, but also requires central enterprises to make positive responses in terms of corporate governance, group management and control, and shareholder exercise. This study effectively integrates corporate governance and group management and control, constructs a modern legal system for shareholder exercise, and provides useful legal guarantee and reference for central enterprises to exercise shareholders’ rights.
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Phuong, Ta Thu, Le Duc Hoang, Tran Minh Tuan, and Trinh Mai Van. "Minority shareholder protection and dividend policy: Evidence from the material industry." Journal of Governance and Regulation 12, no. 3 (2023): 163–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgrv12i3art17.
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This study investigates the impact of minority shareholder protection on corporate dividend policy. On one hand, strong minority shareholder protection can be associated with a reduction in dividend payment because shareholders want to receive more dividends to mitigate agency costs. On the other hand, weak minority shareholder protection can lead to an increase in dividend payment since shareholders, in order to protect themselves, may require the company to pay more dividends to compensate for weak minority shareholder protection. Our sample consists of 101 Vietnamese listed firms in the material industry during the period from 2015 to 2021. Employing a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model, we find a negative impact of minority shareholder protection on corporate dividend payment. To deal with the endogeneity problem, we apply a system generalized method of moments (GMM) method. The main result estimated from this method is qualitatively unchanged. The finding of this paper suggests that the manager of a company should enhance the corporate governance of the company to protect the minority shareholders.
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Wang, Yang, Anqi Li, and Jiahuan Liu. "Earnings Management Behavior of Enterprise Managers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2022 (March 19, 2022): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/8037226.
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Today, earnings mismanagement in China’s enterprises has become a serious problem as managers conduct financial fraud by means of earnings management, hindering China’s overall economic development. Upon shareholders’ requirements and investors’ concerns, managers should disclose real financial information. The essay analyzes the revenue function generated by the manager and the shareholder through an evolutionary theory model where the managers team of the enterprise and shareholders are both game parties. After building the model, the essay utilizes Python to stimulate the theoretical model to analyze both parties’ behavior to explain the process of evolutionary game theory.
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Goto, Gen. "Legally "Strong" Shareholders of Japan." Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review, no. 3.2 (2014): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.36639/mbelr.3.2.legally.
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Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere— are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits are easily initiated and maintained. Shareholders of Japanese corporations are, therefore, in an arguably stronger position than those in, for example, the United States. Still, notwithstanding these Japanese statutory rights, foreign investors’ criticisms persist. Two questions arise from this debate. First, why are shareholders of Japanese corporations unable to leverage their strong rights to force corporate management to prioritize shareholders’ interests? Alternatively, why are shareholder activists inactive in Japan? Second, if the existing shareholders’ rights are not actually used for activism, are they completely meaningless? Or, do they have alternative effects, whether positive or negative? This article answers these questions by summarizing and categorizing the rights of shareholders of Japanese corporations into two characteristics. First, shareholders of Japanese corporations have strong class-based rights with respect to decision-making on a wide range of matters related to the corporation and ample opportunity to take an initiative. These rights might, in fact, be too strong, inducing managers to insulate themselves by engaging in so-called “cross-shareholding” (kabushiki mochiai) relationship, which in turn likely weakens the rights of other shareholders in practice. The lack of support provided to activist shareholders by other shareholders, especially those in these cross-shareholding relationships, is the primary cause of activist ineffectiveness in Japan. When cross-shareholdings are unwound, however, these shareholder rights function as a latent threat on managers, disciplining them. The keys to ensuring that classbased shareholder rights are meaningful are, thus, distribution of share ownership and restraint on management’s attempt to manipulate this distribution. Unfortunately, it is not easy to unwind already-established crossshareholdings through regulatory intervention. Second, shareholders also possess strong individual rights to raise issues with the corporation, either by asserting a shareholder proposal or filing a derivative suit, neither of which would the corporation disrupt for the interest of other shareholders. These rights, again, might be too strong, incentivizing individuals to take advantage of them in pursuit of personal goals, rather than for the good of the corporation. Yet, whether the use of these individual rights amounts to an abuse hinges on an evaluation of the benefits achieved, namely, the supply of diverse views through shareholder proposals and the deterrence effect of derivative suits. Possible future reforms to Japanese law ought to consider how to strike the right balance of power for shareholders of Japanese corporations.
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S, Preetha. "Emerging Prospects of Shareholder Engagement in India." Indian Journal of Corporate Governance 14, no. 2 (October 6, 2021): 226–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09746862211045760.
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The need for strengthening engagement between companies and its shareholders is being increasingly recognised over the past few years. Various authors have discussed about the role of shareholder engagement in enhancing corporate governance standards. The literatures discussing these aspects are focusing on developed countries. This study seeks to make a contribution to the debate by discussing the scope and challenges for shareholder engagement in India. Many reforms were introduced to enhance shareholder participation and engagement in India. The study explains the significance of shareholder engagement and the strategies adopted by shareholders to influence corporate policy. The study gives a brief overview of scheme of division of power between board of directors and the company in general meeting in India. It examines the statutory reforms introduced in India for promoting shareholder engagement in corporate governance processes. It also discusses some incidents in Indian corporate sector to examine the growth of shareholder engagement in India.
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Sun, Ping, Sheng Ma, and Xinxin Xu. "Multi-Factor Collaborative Governance of Controlling Shareholder Expropriation Behavior in Emerging Economies: A Perspective of Double Principal-Agent Conflicts." SAGE Open 12, no. 2 (April 2022): 215824402210974. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/21582440221097403.
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Controlling shareholder expropriation is an important issue in corporate governance in emerging economies. The existing literature discusses the effects of minority shareholder legal protection, controlling shareholder ownership, and managerial shareholding on controlling shareholder expropriation, which is mainly empirical research with insufficient attention to the internal relationships among the governance factors. This research builds theoretical models to study the interactive mechanisms between minority shareholder legal protection, controlling shareholders’ initial shareholding ratios, managerial shareholding, controlling shareholder expropriation, and management effort. Furthermore, setting reasonable ranges for parameters, we use MATLAB to conduct numerical simulations and expand the detailed analyses to quantitatively reveal the degrees of influence of the governance factors. Our results show that controlling shareholder expropriation is negatively related to the degree of minority shareholder legal protection and controlling shareholders’ initial shareholding ratios, while the optimal managerial shareholding ratio is positively related to the degree of minority shareholder legal protection and controlling shareholders’ initial shareholding ratios. The findings enrich the literature on the governance of controlling shareholder expropriation and provide new approaches to and theoretical explanations for the governance of controlling shareholder expropriation toward sustainability in emerging economies.
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Guo, Chuanzi, Minghua Gao, and Junyi Li. "Research on the Role of Minority Shareholders in State-Owned Enterprises Based on Big Data." Sustainability 15, no. 3 (January 28, 2023): 2355. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15032355.
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The era of big data has changed the traditional data science based on mathematical statistics, and promoted the innovation of data analysis methods. This paper takes China state-holding holding enterprises as the research object, uses game theory as the method, uses top management team (TMT) knowledge hiding degree as the background to construct a minority shareholder governance information database, and discusses the feasibility of using minority shareholders’ active governance to break through and increase earnings management costs. The findings indicate, firstly, by optimizing enterprise information disclosure and reducing TMT knowledge hiding, the cost of minority shareholders’ participation in governance can be reduced and the enthusiasm of minority shareholders’ participation in governance can be promoted. Secondly, the presence of minority shareholders actively engaged in corporate governance can discourage two kinds of earnings management practices of managers in China state-holding enterprises. Finally, for the companies with weak state-holding and unannounced dividend policy, the active governance of minority shareholders has a more prominent restraining effect on the two types of earnings management. With an eye on strengthening the corporate micro-governance mechanism, this paper provides guidance for minority shareholders to strengthen their participation in the governance of China’s state-holding enterprises.
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Pérez Carrillo, Elena F. "Approach to corporate governance and supporting shareholders’ interests." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 1 (2009): 18–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1p2.
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Shareholders interests play a relevant role in corporate governance. Notwithstanding the different legal regimes across the globe, there is a trend towards converging mechanisms protect shareholders through disclosure and other instruments. Simplification of voting process and procedures to ease the taking into account of shareholder preferences are matters still to be resolved.
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Lutsenko, Sergej I. "Role of Corporate Governance in Permission of the Agency Conflict." Economic Strategies 144 (October 23, 2020): 116–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.33917/es-6.172.2020.116-121.
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The author considers the mechanism of permission of the agency conflict (redistribution of cash flows) between the shareholder and management with use of model of business. In article are considered the economic interests of the company as legal abstraction behind which there are interests of shareholders. Corporate governance in modern realities has to be directed not only to rapprochement of financial interests of shareholders and the management of the company but also to creation of the social benefit.
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Luo, Jin-hui, Di-fang Wan, Di Cai, and Heng Liu. "Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance: The Role of Shareholder Numbers, Contest for Control, and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms." Management and Organization Review 9, no. 2 (July 2013): 265–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/more.12000.
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AbstractThe principal–principal (PP) perspective of corporate governance shows that multiple large shareholder (MLS) structure has competing monitoring and entrenchment governance effects. We argue that the dominant effect depends on contest for control among large shareholders and the number of large shareholders involved. Using data from Chinese family listed companies from 2004 to 2007, this study shows inverse U-shaped relationships between contest for control and corporate market value, as measured by Tobin's Q, and between the number of large shareholders and corporate market value. Findings indicate that at low to medium levels of contest for control or number of large shareholders, formal institutions can strengthen MLS structure's monitoring effect and can help this effect last longer. As a whole, the findings extend the institution-based view in the context of family corporate governance by showing that formal institutions can shape the ability of MLS structure to exert governance.
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Gleason, Katherine I., and Mark S. Klock. "Is there power behind the dead hand? An empirical investigation of dead hand poison pills." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 1 (2009): 370–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1c3p4.
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Dead hand poison pills prevent potential hostile acquirers from circumventing a poison pill with a proxy contest whereby newly elected directors could redeem the pill. Dead hand provisions only permit continuing directors to redeem. Shareholder rights advocates and legal scholars have criticized dead hand poison pills as an assault on shareholder governance, but economic theory suggests potential shareholder benefits. We provide the first empirical study of dead hand poison pills. We find that adoption of dead hand poison pills leads to gains for shareholders and losses for bondholders. This supports Schwert’s (2000) conjecture that poison pills provide shareholders with better premiums rather than entrench ineffective managers.
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Armour, John. "Shareholder rights." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 36, no. 2 (2020): 314–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa005.
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Abstract ‘Shareholder rights’ are the legal entitlements of shareholders vis-à-vis companies in which they invest. A large body of research has sought to investigate how shareholder rights foster accountability of controllers. The concern has been that without accountability, managers and dominant shareholders will use their power to further their own interests at the expense of outside investors. A contrasting concern is that strengthening shareholder rights may come at the expense of other parties, which may also lead to misallocation of corporate resources. A recently-emerging body of research suggests that the relationship between shareholder rights and social welfare is not monotonic, but rather inverse-U-shaped. We argue that the calibration and impact of shareholder rights depends crucially on the institutional channel(s) through which they are implemented—voting, litigation, and/or market pricing. In particular, the market pricing channel intensifies the effects of shareholder rights in ways that can be excessive. This can harm not only other constituencies but also shareholders, as it can promote short-termism and systemic externalities. These problems are less pronounced for shareholder rights implemented through the voting channel.
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Lingmin, Xie. "Ultimate ownership structure and capital structure: evidence from Chinese listed companies." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 4 (2016): 297–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4c2p3.
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This study investigates the impact of the ultimate corporate ownership structure, particularly the divergence of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights, on the capital structure decisions among firms listed in Chinese market where the legal protection for creditors and minority shareholders is weak. I find that firms with a wider divergence between the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights have significantly higher leverage level of capital structure. I also identify factors that affect this relation, including state ownership, institutional ownership, the presence of large tradable shareholders and NTS reform. My results suggest that leverage-increasing motivation of ultimate controlling shareholders with the risk of expropriation dominates in Chinese market and raising debt is a tool for them to maintain control over resources and corporate decisions to facilitate their self-dealing expropriation
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Hai, Lien Dang Phuoc. "A comparison of Japan and Vietnam legal approaches to derivative suit." Science & Technology Development Journal - Economics - Law and Management 4, no. 2 (June 21, 2020): First. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdjelm.v4i2.626.
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Derivative suits are claims brought by a shareholder or a group of shareholders on behalf of the company to redress for wrongdoings of the directors when those in the company’s control refuse to assert a claim usually because of a conflict of interest. The derivative suit is not only to seek recovery of damages by a plaintiff shareholder but also serves as a further threatening tool that can be a possible deterrent to the neglect of duties by directors and other officers of the company [9]. In Vietnam, the derivative suit mechanism was first adopted by Vietnamese corporate law since Decree No. 102/2010/ND-CP (Decree 102) under the term “Shareholder’s right to sue members of the Board of Management and/or Director (General Director)”, rather than “derivative suit”. The regulatory framework for derivative suits has since been revised and contemplated under the latest Law on Enterprises of Vietnam, which was passed by the National Assembly in 2014. Under this scheme, a shareholder or a group of shareholders holding at least one percent (1%) of the total number of ordinary shares in a Joint Stock Company (JSC) for six consecutive months may bring a lawsuit on behalf of the company against the directors who breach their duties. Still, the practicability and usability of this derivative suit mechanism seem questionable because of a plethora of defects and shortcomings in the statutory derivative suit along with the lack of interest in litigation on the part of shareholders. This article undertakes the analytical review of the substance of the statutory derivative suit in Vietnam and Japan and from the comparison between the two systems, provides recommendations to improve the Vietnamese legislation.
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Boussaada, Rim. "Multiple large shareholders and bank stability: the case of MENA banks." Managerial Finance 47, no. 9 (April 29, 2021): 1320–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-03-2020-0142.
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PurposeThis study aims to investigate how multiple large shareholders individually and interactively influence Middle East and North Africa (MENA) bank stability.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical framework is based on a generalized dynamic two-step system and utilizes the method of moments estimation to analyze a panel dataset of 532 bank-year observations over the 2004–2017 period.FindingsThe estimation results show that large shareholders are crucial in explaining the differences in bank stability among MENA banks. Specifically, the first- and second-largest shareholders exacerbate bank instability. However, we found that the third-largest shareholder enhances bank stability. Additionally, the coalition between the two largest shareholders increases the moral hazard problem in MENA banks and significantly decreases stability. Meanwhile, the interaction between the three largest shareholders is associated with a control contestability problem, which impels better bank stability. The results support the dispersion effect of multiple large shareholders in MENA countries.Originality/valueThe role of large shareholders in corporate governance is widely recognized. However, very little is known about the role and the real impact that multiple large shareholders may have on the banking sector. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this work is the first to analyze the relationship between multiple large shareholders and bank stability in the MENA region.
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Sikavica, Katarina, Elise Perrault, and Kathleen Rehbein. "Who Do They Think They Are? Identity as an Antecedent of Social Activism by Institutional Shareholders." Business & Society 59, no. 6 (March 29, 2018): 1228–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0007650318762752.
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Shareholder activists increasingly pressure corporations on social policy issues; yet, extant research provides little understanding of who these activists are and how they choose their corporate targets. In this article, we adopt an activist-centered approach and rely on hybrid organizational identity theory to determine, in a two-phase analysis, how shareholder activists define their economic and social identities and whether these identities are associated with specific target characteristics and tactical strategies. Our findings form the premise of a typology of institutional shareholder activists that is empirically derived and takes into account the wide range of hybrid organizational identities that shareholders exhibit. With a sample of 735 social policy shareholder proposals filed by 104 institutional shareholders in the 2009-2010 period, our study presents one of the first empirical tests examining the heterogeneity of identities within the broad stakeholder category of “social shareholder activists.” Our empirical evidence demonstrates that these shareholders’ mix of economic and social identities is systematically related to their targets’ characteristics and tactical strategies. The implications of our new typology for research on shareholder activism and the value of our findings for managers conclude this article.
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Kuo, Nan-Ting, and Cheng-Few Lee. "Earnings Management in Response to Corporate Tax Rate Reduction Under an Imputation Tax System." International Journal of Accounting 54, no. 01 (March 2019): 1950002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1094406019500021.
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Our study explores how firms respond to a tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system. By exploring Taiwanese data, we find that firms engage in significant downward earnings management preceding a tax rate reduction, and this earnings management behavior reverses in the following year. We further explore what factors drive this finding, given that corporate tax avoidance reduces shareholder imputation credits and thus generates limited tax benefits to most shareholders. We argue and find evidence that three factors explain the tax-induced earnings management: (1) financing benefits from tax savings, (2) managerial rent extraction, and (3) the influence of foreign and domestic institutional shareholders. Our results suggest that factors other than shareholder tax benefits have significant effects on corporate tax avoidance, suggesting that firms still have strong incentives to avoid taxes under an imputation tax system.