Relevant bibliographies by topics / Shareholders- Management

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
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Academic literature on the topic 'Shareholders- Management'

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Published: 6 September 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Shareholders- Management"

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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (July 21, 2014): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v3i1.173.

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In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.
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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value: EVA Concept." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (January 19, 2016): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/.v3i1.173.

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<p>In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.</p>
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Gounder, Chitra Gunshekhar, and M. Venkateshwarlu. "Shareholder Value Creation: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector." Accounting and Finance Research 6, no. 1 (February 14, 2017): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/afr.v6n1p148.

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This study investigates the importance of economic value added for the shareholders’ value maximization. Economic value added (EVA) is a value based performance measurement tool that helps to settle down the management decision regarding creation of shareholders value. Very few literatures are found regarding creation of shareholder values in banks. Sample of 40 Indian commercial listed Banks and panel data are used for the period of 2001 to 2015, the empirical findings for Public limited banks and overall Indian banks revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between shareholder’s value maximization and EVA but in case of Private limited banks, DPS was found to have significant relationship with shareholder value. The Higher the value of EVA, higher shareholders value .The finding shows significant support for EVA and DPS, but it was found that EVA is not efficiently used for Analysis and decision making regarding creation of value. Thus it is suggested to focus on criteria of EVA for analyzing shareholder’s value of banks.
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Li, Weian, and Jianbo Niu. "Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 254–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p1.

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We try to explore the relation among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure and the ownership concentration costs. Different corporations have different optimal governance mechanism. Noticing the substitute relation between the level of the management-and-shareholder-conflicts and the different governance mechanism, we take use of the data from China’ stock market and conduct an empirical analysis on the influence both of the different shareholder’s participating in governance and the ownership structure over corporate performance, and have reached two conclusions. First, in the companies with a higher level of conflicts between the management and the shareholders, the shareholder will be more active in participating in governance because the benefits earned here is much more than the company with a lower level of conflicts. Second, when the other governance mechanisms in one company perform poorly, the shareholder is less active in participating in governance because the extra benefits earned here cannot offset their costs. So only in these companies with poor governance mechanisms, the shareholders’ active monitoring can produce benefits. These conclusions can help our further research on the relationship among the shareholder supervision, ownership structure and corporate value, and we should also re-evaluate some traditional theoretical viewpoints
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Xie, Yue, Tianhui Wang, Jinhua Zhang, and Na Wang. "Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective." PLOS ONE 18, no. 7 (July 19, 2023): e0288705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0288705.

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Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.
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Zhou, Tingting. "Partial privatization, control rights of large shareholders and privatized shares transfer." Nankai Business Review International 9, no. 4 (November 5, 2018): 472–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-11-2017-0060.

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Purpose The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from the perspective of large shareholders’ control rights. Design/methodology/approach Considering the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, this paper extends existing analyses to study the impact of the ultimate controller’s control rights on privatized shares transfer. This paper also investigates the relationship between excessive control rights of the largest controlling shareholder and PST in view of the principle of equity of rights and obligations. In addition to a perspective on the holding of key positions by large shareholders, this paper further explores the impacts of the ownership of the largest controlling shareholder on privatized shares transfer. Findings The results capture the fact that the higher control rights of large shareholders lead to more privatized shares transfer. After exploring the impacts of excessive control rights, the results provide evidence supporting the idea that firms with excessive numbers of directors, senior managers or supervisors who also have positions in the largest controlling shareholder’s entity are more likely to transfer privatized shares owned by private owners. In addition, the largest shareholders’ ownership also plays a role in privatized shares transfer. Originality/value This evidence suggests that the large shareholders’ control rights should be limited to an appropriate range during the process of privatization, thereby giving private shareholders more opportunity to participate in the operation of firms, strengthen the state and enhance the competitiveness of state capital.
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Oskouei, Malektaj Maleki, Hashem Nikoomaram, and Freydoon Rahnama Roodposhti. "Shareholders’ perception of management communications in annual general meetings: narrative or not?" Argumenta Oeconomica 2020, no. 2 (2020): 77–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/aoe.2020.2.04.

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This study investigates management communications in annual general meetings (AGMs) from a narrative perspective. This study evaluates the effective elements of AGMs from the shareholder’s viewpoint. According to the theoretical framework, the authors developed a conceptual model and extracted the suggested narrative model for the first time. The shareholder’s perception was measured through a questionnaire survey containing three sections – narrative, audience, and narrator – with 32 indicators from 151 shareholders measuring shareholders’ opinions about AGMs in Iran. The results indicate that although shareholders do not consider the AGM communications made by management board as a narrative, they obtain relevant information with a logical flow in AGMs, and believe that these relations are useful. The characteristics of the management board impact on the persuasiveness of their communications. The results supported the mediating effect of AGM communication between managers and shareholders
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Van der Elst, Christoph. "Shareholder activism in good and bad economic times." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 2, Special issue (2011): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2sip3.

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Over the last few years the economy shifted from fast growth to a deep financial and economic crisis. Slowly companies are returning to growth rates in 2009-2010 after a sharp fall of profits in 2007-2009. This provides an excellent backdrop to assess trends in shareholder activism, how shareholders responded to the fall in profits and how they have exercised influence in these turbulent times. This paper focuses on the activism exerted by shareholders at annual general meetings of shareholders between 2007 and 2010 via their attendance and voting at AGMs in four European countries. The main research questions answered are the way large and minority shareholders expressed their voice at general meetings of shareholders and what drives this type of shareholder activism. The drivers of shareholder activism at general meetings are empirically tested. Four factors that can influence the willingness and probability of shareholder attendance and voting turnouts that are tested are shareholder structure, corporate performance, institutional framework and size of the companies. Overall shareholder activism measured as the attendance at general meetings between 2007 and 2010 did not significantly change. It is found that the ownership structure and institutional frameworks are important drivers of shareholder attendance. Corporate performance and size have no significant impact on attendance. We conclude that shareholder activism depends on the identity of large individual shareholders shedding doubts on the effectiveness of one size fits all (mandatory) corporate governance measures.
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Li, Ting, Xinlei Zhao, and Aiwu Zhao. "Voting with hands, earnings management and corporate governance." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 2 (May 13, 2019): 178–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-02-2016-0016.

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Purpose Motivated by managers’ intentions to pursue private interests by engaging in earnings management, this paper aims to investigate whether voting with hands (shareholders cast votes on shareholder proposals) by shareholders acts as an external disciplining mechanism over earnings management relative to corporate governance. Also, as corporate governance can scrutinize managers’ behavior, this study also examines whether there is a substitutive relation between shareholder proposals and corporate governance mechanism. Design/methodology/approach First, this paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discrepancy accruals on the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals to test the incremental effect of shareholder proposals on earnings management. Second, firms receiving shareholder proposals are matched with those not receiving proposals by propensity scores, and the levels of earnings management and corporate governance between these two groups are compared by univariate analysis and OLS regressions. In addition, six portfolios are created based on whether firms receive shareholder proposals, as well as on the levels of corporate governance, to assess whether external control from shareholder proposals can substitute internal control for corporate governance in disciplining earnings management. Regressions of earnings management on corporate governance (shareholder proposals) are conducted in the sub-samples formed on shareholder proposals (corporate governance) to further explore the above substitution effects. Findings Based on a sample of 2,041 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the “For” votes received from the shareholder proposals have a significant negative relationship with the practice of earnings management, even when corporate governance is controlled. The negative relationship between shareholder proposal and magnitude of earnings management is also found to be stronger when firms have weak corporate governance. The overall evidence suggests that the external control from “voting-with-hand” shareholders has a significant impact on earnings management. In addition, shareholder proposals can substitute the monitoring mechanism for corporate governance in constraining managers’ myopic behavior. Originality/value This paper contributes to the extant literature by using the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals as a proxy for shareholder pressure and concerns. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by showing the disciplinary effect of outside shareholders on managers’ reporting behavior. Also, it contributes to the corporate governance research by presenting that shareholder proposals can substitute for the internal control of corporate governance in decreasing earnings management. This paper should be of interest to investors and standard setters.
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Ezzamel, Mahmoud, Jason Zezhong Xiao, and Rongli Yuan. "Can Small Shareholders Protect Their Interests from Expropriation: The Case of a Chinese Bank." Management and Organization Review 16, no. 1 (August 29, 2019): 139–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mor.2019.23.

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ABSTRACTThis article examines how small shareholders protected their interests from large shareholders’ expropriation by forming an alliance and taking collective action to block a convertible bonds issue by a Chinese bank that they considered harmful. Forming an alliance strengthened small shareholders’ network density, enhanced their salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency), and reduced the bank's centrality. This enabled small shareholders to change their strategy from being a subordinator to a compromiser and forced the controlling shareholders and their representatives to change their strategy from a commander to a compromiser. Apart from interest-based motives, the alliance provided small shareholders with identity-based incentives to persistently oppose expropriation by controlling shareholders. This article enriches the literature on small shareholder activism and principal-principal problem.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Shareholders- Management"

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Goodman, Jennifer Coralie. "Social shareholder engagement: How shareholders bring social, environmental and ethical concerns to the heart of management." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Ramon Llull, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/295841.

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Els accionistes sempre han estat fonamentals per entendre un negoci. I ho continuen essent avui. Tanmateix, suposar que una empresa s’ha de dirigir només per satisfer les demandes dels accionistes, i que aquests accionistes estan preocupats només per maximitzar els seus beneficis econòmics, resulta problemàtic, davant de les nombroses exigències que tant aquests accionistes com d’altres stakeholders plantegen a les empreses. En una època en què temes com el canvi climàtic i la distància creixent entre els rics i els pobres s’estan convertint en preocupacions urgents per a la societat, el paper de les empreses, les seves finalitats i les seves pràctiques s’estan qüestionant tant en l’àmbit públic, com en el privat i en l’acadèmic. La inversió responsable, els diversos tipus d’inversors, les iniciatives multistakeholder, les comunitats, les campanyes d’activisme i una varietat creixent de stakeholders plantegen múltiples i diverses demandes a les empreses, que van més enllà dels interessos econòmics. Aquesta tesi adopta la perspectiva del repte que suposa per a les empreses que es qüestionin els supòsits en què es fonamenta la seva naturalesa. Hi ha accionistes que s’impliquen en la gestió corporativa de les problemàtiques socials, mediambientals i ètiques, com els drets humans o la degradació de l’entorn. En aquest estudi, s’analitza empíricament i conceptualment aquesta “implicació de l’accionista” (shareholder engagement), que és un fenomen cada vegada més rellevant en la pràctica corporativa i en l’activitat investigadora. Oferim una nova perspectiva de la implicació de l’accionista, que identifica la seva naturalesa política i ètica. D’aquesta manera, participem i contribuïm a la literatura sobre govern corporatiu, inversió responsable, activisme social i ètica empresarial, i obrim noves vies per a la recerca futura.
Los accionistas siempre han sido fundamentales para entender un negocio. Y lo siguen siendo hoy. Sin embargo, suponer que una empresa ha de ser dirigida únicamente para satisfacer las demandas de los accionistas, y que dichos accionistas están preocupados únicamente por maximizar sus beneficios económicos, resulta problemático, a la luz de las numerosas exigencias que plantean a las empresas tanto los accionistas como otros stakeholders. En un tiempo en que determinados temas, como el cambio climático y la distancia creciente entre ricos y pobres, se están convirtiendo en preocupaciones acuciantes para la sociedad, el papel de las empresas, sus fines y sus prácticas están siendo cuestionados en los ámbitos público, privado y académico. La inversión responsable, los diversos tipos de inversores, las iniciativas multistakeholder, las comunidades, las campañas de activismo y la gran variedad de stakeholders han planteado múltiples y diversas demandas a las empresas, que van más allá de los intereses económicos. Esta tesis adopta la perspectiva del reto que supone para las empresas el cuestionamiento de las asunciones en que se fundamenta su naturaleza. Hay accionistas que se implican en la gestión corporativa de las preocupaciones sociales, medioambientales y éticas, como los derechos humanos o la degradación del entorno. En este estudio, se analiza empíricamente y conceptualmente esta “implicación del accionista” (shareholder engagement), pues es un fenómeno cada vez más relevante en la práctica corporativa y en la actividad investigadora. Ofrecemos una nueva perspectiva de la implicación del accionista, que identifica su naturaleza política y ética. De este modo, participamos y contribuimos a la literatura sobre gobierno corporativo, inversión responsable, activismo social y ética empresarial, y abrimos nuevas vías para la investigación futura.
Shareholders have always been fundamental to an understanding of the corporation. The same is true today. However, the assumptions that the firm should be run to meet only the demands of shareholders, and that those shareholders are concerned only about the maximization of financial returns, are problematic in light of the multitude of demands placed on corporations by both shareholders and other stakeholders. At a time when issues such as climate change and the widening gap between rich and poor have become pressing societal concerns, the role of business, its purposes and its practices have been challenged in the public, private, and academic spheres. Responsible investment, diverse investor types, multi-stakeholder initiatives, communities, activist campaigns, and a variety of other stakeholders have resulted in multiple and diverse demands on the company which go well beyond financial interests. This thesis takes the perspective of one such challenge to the fundamental assumptions about the nature of the firm: shareholders who actively engage with corporate management on issues of social, environmental, and ethical concern such as human rights or environmental degradation. This ‘social shareholder engagement’, an increasingly relevant phenomenon in practice and research, is explored here both empirically and conceptually. I provide a new perspective on social shareholder engagement, which identifies the political and ethical nature of these actions. In this way I engage with and contribute to the corporate governance, responsible investment, social activism and business ethics literatures and open a number of future avenues for research.
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Anastasio, Edoardo <1996&gt. "The relationship between financial risk management and shareholders value." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/20812.

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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between financial risk management (or hedging), the underinvestment problem and the increase in shareholders and firm value. To do so, we will present first the different theories and supporting evidence for the value generation capability of hedging strategies (i.e by generating tax benefits, reducing distress costs, reducing the underinvestment problemt). Moving on, we will provide a theoretical introduction to the concepts of risk, exposure, and risk management, and then we will review different schools of thought of risk management, more specifically the financial risk management, the strategic risk taking and the enterprise risk management (ERM). In the following chapter the focus will be on what different risk management strategies are implemented in the practic for hedging financial risks (interest rate, exchange rate, commodity prices), from those relying only on the use of financial instruments like derivatives, to those using operational hedges to conclude with those using a combination of boht, exploiting also the benefits of extra liquidity. The final chapter is where we will try to investigate the relationship between the use of hedging derivatives and the investment spending of italian companies from different industry sectors. After investigating that, we will see for which companies there is an effective increase in shareholders value, using a metric proposed by P. Fernandez. Our research tries to combine two different analysis to establish a potentially useful relationship also for the practice.
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Boros, Elizabeth Jane. "Minority shareholders : prevention and remedy of common grievances." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334094.

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Котенко, Олександр Олександрович, Александр Александрович Котенко, and Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Kotenko. "Protection of rights for minority shareholders in the conditions of world financial crisis." Thesis, Crimean Institute of Business, 2010. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/62411.

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Alfordy, Faisal D. "The impact of Saudi Arabian culture on minority shareholders' rights." Thesis, University of Gloucestershire, 2016. http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/4259/.

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The aim of this research study is to examine the impact of Saudi Arabian culture on corporate governance (CG) and its regulatory compliance with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. The protection of minority shareholders is a primary concern in the area of CG and particularly as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles. In Saudi Arabia, CG is a newly introduced regime. Its set of CG principles was initially issued after the first market crash in 2006, which signified the need for appropriate CG standards in Saudi Arabia because minority shareholders suffered catastrophic losses. Moreover, CG legislation in Saudi Arabia is still slowly moving from voluntary to obligatory because family-owned firms, which is the dominant form of incorporation, are stifling corporate growth by their reluctance to open their equity to outside shareholders, as argued by the OECD report of Koldertsova (2011). Hence, the conceptual framework for understanding how Saudi Culture affects minorities is based upon Hofstede’s (1980-2010) Cultural Value Dimension (CVD) model linking societal constructs with the legal and political milieu. Thus, this research sets out to examine this link in relevance to Saudi Culture. In addition, this undertaking will extend, via the second research question, to uncover other factors, such as the legal and political, influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholder rights. The findings of this study provides significant correlations between each of Hofstede’s CVDs: Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Femininity, and Long Term Orientation and the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD’s principles of CG in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the distribution of each CV dimension was found not to be the same when comparing groups of Majority and Minority shareholders. Hence, the significant correlations expose two different subcultures: an active culture pertaining to Majority shareholders and a passive culture pertaining to Minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the current legal environment guiding the CG procedures in Saudi Arabia was found to attach a low level of significance to minority shareholders in terms of: ease of litigation, establishment of specialised courts, appointment of competent qualified judges in CG commercial cases, and creation of awareness programmes for minority shareholders’ rights. In addition, the lack of a solid constitution was found to weaken popular pressure to safeguard shareholders' rights and promote a block-holding model of corporate control. Hence, due to governmental institutions falling short on their responsibilities, Saudi controlling families can practically be considered as an institution, as indicated by Institutional Theory, and this familial institution is likely to continue to manifest itself in the governance of emerging economic systems such as Saudi Arabia's as its survival is dependent on the institutional context.
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Hörner, Sven [Verfasser], Andrea [Gutachter] Szczesny, and Hansrudi [Gutachter] Lenz. "Empirical Studies on Accounting – Shareholders’ Perceptions of Earnings Quality / Sven Hörner ; Gutachter: Andrea Szczesny, Hansrudi Lenz." Würzburg : Universität Würzburg, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1218019336/34.

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Hardman, Stephen. "Can a tools-based implementation of lean in the manufacturing industry provide attractive investment opportunities for shareholders." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/6169.

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Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The concept of a business existing to fulfil the wants and needs of the various stakeholders acknowledges that the prime goal of any commercial business is that of profit maximisation and the resultant stock price maximisation (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2002:10). Any decision by the senior management or the board of an organisation should be primarily in the interest of its shareholders. It follows that any decision that does not add shareholder value subtracts from shareholder value; in other words, decisions must impact the bottom line financially. The manufacturing sector has seen its fair share of methods, interventions and programmes aimed at cost reduction and profit maximisation through a variety of total quality management (TOM), statistical process control (SPC), right/downsizing, efficiency improvements and yield maximisation. One of the most enduring and successful of these has been the advent of the lean manufacturing philosophy, defined as the complete and thorough elimination of waste to reduce the time line from receipt of customer order to delivery. It is a process-focused philosophy and not results focused, the belief being that the elimination of waste from all aspects of the process will ultimately result in financial success. Toyota have developed, and perfected more than most, the concept of lean manufacturing. They have termed their lean initiative the Toyota Production System (TPS). At the core of TPS is the concept of one piece flow controlled by customer pull. Given the success derived from TPS by Toyota it is only natural that other organisations have shown interest and have attempted, in varying degrees of success, to copy the TPS. But the magnitude of attempting to change the philosophy of an organisation in the short term is a daunting task and it is understandable why adopters of a lean way forward have rather turned to the lean tools as drivers of the process and value. The attraction of lean tools is that they can be applied in many areas of an organisation independent of one another. Organisations have a range of needs that need to be satisfied which include growth, increased profits, cash now and talent retention. The need to decide what interventions to apply when and where and what impact to profit and share value is of paramount importance to decision makers of organisations. By analysis of the results of a global industrial packaging company's efforts to implement lean through a tool-based approach, this study attempts to offer guidance to those organisations interested in implementing lean tools. The tools employed comprise four operational and three commercial tools. A financial model examining the impact of the tools on financial metrics is then developed and tested. The results show that the impact of the applied tools impact directly financial metrics used by investors to assess the relative attractiveness of an organisation's shares for the period 2003 to 2007. Further research should be conducted to determine the performance of the organisation for a ten to fifteen-year period to determine future success.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die konsep dat 'n sakeondememing bestaan om die verwagtinge en behoeftes van die onderskeie rolspelers te dien erken dat maksimale wins en die gevolglike optimale aandeleprys die primere doelwitte van enige kommersiele onderneming is (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2002:10). Enige besluit deur die senior bestuur of the direksie van 'n ondememing behoort dus primer in die belang van sodanige ondememing se aandeelhouers te wees. Gevolglik sal enige besluit wat geen waarde tot die aandeelhouer bied nie, sodanige waarde verminder en moontlik lei tot disinvestering; met ander woorde, besluite moet finansieel 'n invloed op winsgewendheid he. Die vervaardigingsektor het al verskeie metodes, ingrypings en programme beleef wat gemik is op kostevermindering en winsverhoging deur middel van 'n verskeidenheid van algehele kwaliteitsbestuur ("total quality management"), statistiese prosesbeheer ("statistical process control"), herstrukturering deur middel van sogenaamde afskaling ("rightdownsizing"), verbetering van effektiwiteit en opbrengs. Een van die standhoudendste en suksesvolste van hierdie is die skep van die "spilvrye" vervaardigingsfilosofie ("lean manufacturing philosophy") wat gedefinieer word as: die totale en volledige eliminering van verspilling om die tydsverloop tussen die ontvangs van die klient se bestelling tot die aflewering te verminder. Die aanname word gemaak dat die eliminering van verspilling vanuit alle aspekte van die proses uiteindelik finansiele sukses tot gevolg sal he. Die filosofie is dus gefokus op die proses en nie op resultate nie. Toyota het die konsep van "spilvrye"-vervaardiging ontwikkel en, meer as ander, vervolmaak en verwys na hul inisiatief as die "Toyota Production System" of TPS. Sentraal tot die TPS is die konsep van enkel-aaneenlopende produksievloei beheer deur klienteopdrag en -behoefte. As gevolg van Toyota se sukses met die toepassing van die TPS is dit te verwagte dat ander organisasies belangstelling sou toon en met wisselende sukses gepoog het om die TPS na te boots. Om die filosofie van 'n organisasie in die kort termyn te verander is so 'n omvangryke taak dat dit begryplik is waarom nuwe bekeerlinge tot die "spilvrye" -filosofie eerder "spilvrye"-instrumente verkies as die dryfvere van die proses en waarde. Die aantrekkingskrag van "spilvrye"-instrumente is dat dit onafhanklik van mekaar in baie areas van 'n organisasie deur individue, werkspanne of konsultante aangewend kan word. Insluitend groei, die verhoging van wins, kontantvloei en die behoud van talent, het organisasies uiteenlopende behoeftes wat aangespreek moet word. Dit is van die uiterste belang vir besluitnemers van organisasies om te besluit op toepaslike ingryping, wanneer en waar, asook die uitwerking op wins en aandeelwaarde. As 'n poging om belangstellende organisasies te help, bied hierdie studie 'n analise van die resultate voortspruitend uit 'n globale industriele verpakkingsmaatskappy se pogings om die "spilvrye" konsep deur middel van 'n instrument-gebaseerde benadering te implementeer. Die resultate toon dat die impak van die toegepaste instrumente 'n direkte invloed het op die finansiele meetinstrumente, wat deur beleggers aangewend word om die relatiewe aantrekkingskrag van 'n organisasie se aandele vir die tydperk 2003 tot 2007 te bepaal. Om toekomstige sukses te bepaal behoort verdere navorsing egter gedoen te word ten opsigte van die organisasie se prestasie oor 'n tien- tot vyftien-jaar tydperk.
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ZHAO, Xiaofeng. "Hello, is anybody there? Corporate accessibility for minority shareholders as a signal of agency problems in China." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2013. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd/8.

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My thesis examines whether corporate accessibility for minority shareholders, defined as the ease with which minority shareholders are able to contact corporate insiders, can be a signal of the severity of a firm’s agency problems. Using Chinese public listed firms as the testing group, I find that accessible firms are associated with less serious agency problems than is the case for non-accessible firms. Specifically, accessible firms tend to be associated with lower agency costs, lower cost of equity, higher firm valuation, and better operating performance. I also find that accessibility can signal agency problems in firms with different ownership and corporate governance structures, though the signaling effects are weaker in the firms where the incentives of insiders are tied less closely to stock price performance. Overall, my results indicate that corporate accessibility for minority shareholders is a value-relevant signal for investors to detect the quality of the publicly listed firms in China.
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Chokuda, Carias Tererai. "The protection of shareholders' rights versus flexibility in the management of companies: a critical analysis of the implications of corporate law reform on corporate governance in South Africa with specific reference to protection of shareholders." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25199.

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In June 2004 the Department of Trade and Industry embarked on a corporate law reform process which culminated in the enactment of the Companies Act 71 2008. One of the key objectives of the reform process was to provide flexibility in the formation and management of companies. As part of this goal, and by the use of the concept of alterable and unalterable provisions, the new Act unravelled some shareholder protective mechanisms provided for under the old Companies Act 61 of 1973. At the same time, it conferred increased powers on the board of directors of a company. These changes affect the power dynamic between shareholders and the board of directors within the company. Given the significant role of directors within the company, these changes give rise to concerns about shareholder protection, especially in the light of the conduct of directors in corporate scandals of the recent past. The objective of this thesis is to show where there has been a shift in the balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors and, how this shift affects shareholder protection and, whether the shift of power has been balanced by increased shareholder protection.
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Yang, Kisuk 1962. "Fundamentals of divestiture as a restructuring method : case study of LG demergers in terms of shareholders value and corporate governance in the context of Korean practice." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28283.

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Thesis (M.B.A.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-82).
This thesis is to generally review the practices and cases in the global capital market places in regard to the divestitures as one of the corporate restructuring instruments and to confirm the generally acceptable hypothesis that the most of breakup cases driven by the strategic purpose of "focus and concentration" would be justified by the enhancement of shareholders value. And the discussion expands to the divestitures in Korea introduced in late 1990s, which prevailed and practiced widely in the market ever since, but in some cases, it was combined with formation of the holding company structure in accordance to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act making the issue complicated one in regard to the reform and restructuring of major conglomerates, the "Chaebol" in Korea. The LG demerger cases were right in the center of the discussions, and this thesis is to address four hypotheses in regard to the background, key components, aftermaths, and the implication of the LG's transaction through which it would be assessed in terms of shareholders value and corporate governance in the context of Korean practice.
by Kisuk Yang.
M.B.A.
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Books on the topic "Shareholders- Management"

1

Harm, Christian. Bank management between shareholders and regulators. Vienna: Société universitaire européenne de recherches financières, 2002.

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Resti, Andrea, and Andrea Sironi, eds. Risk Management and Shareholders' Value in Banking. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118371886.

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Epstein, Edward Jay. Who owns the corporation?: Management vs. shareholders. New York: Priority Press Publications, 1986.

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Andrea, Resti, ed. Risk management and shareholders' value in banking: From risk measurement models to capital allocation policies. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007.

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Business ethics: The ethical revolution of minority shareholders. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.

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Scudder, Virgil. World class communication: How great CEOs win with the public, shareholders, employees, and the media. Hoboken, N.J: Wiely, 2012.

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Phillips, Grenville W. The administration and conduct of corporate meetings: With appendixes, precedents, and shareholders' questions. Jamaica: Canoe Press University of the West Indies, 1996.

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J, Epstein Marc, ed. The usefulness of corporate annual reports to shareholders in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: An international comparison. Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1996.

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Szewc-Rogalska, Alina. Wpływ struktur własnościowych spółek giełdowych na kreację wartości dla akcjonariuszy: Impact of ownership structures of public companies on the creation of value for shareholders. Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2012.

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Raster, Max. Shareholder-Value-Management. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-95454-1.

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Book chapters on the topic "Shareholders- Management"

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Dathe, Tracy, René Dathe, Isabel Dathe, and Marc Helmold. "Shareholders." In Management for Professionals, 159–68. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92357-0_12.

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Roberts, Richard, and Christopher Arnander. "Shareholders and management." In Take Your Partners, 129–43. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230596511_9.

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Rendtorff, Jacob Dahl. "Shareholders, management, and employees." In Cosmopolitan Business Ethics, 141–55. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315574400-14.

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Verma, Rajit, and Anil K. Mittal. "Impact of Open Offers on Shareholders’ Wealth." In Flexible Systems Management, 187–98. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8926-8_14.

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Gambarelli, Gianfranco. "An Index of De-stability for Controlling Shareholders." In Contributions to Management Science, 116–27. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95900-4_9.

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Yamada, Makiko. "Japan's Capital Market: Carte Blanche from the Shareholders." In Japan's Top Management from the Inside, 127–88. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230373693_4.

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Walters, David, and Michael Halliday. "Measuring the Value Created for Shareholders — a Marketing Strategy Perspective." In Marketing and Financial Management, 193–215. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-20931-2_6.

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Point, Sebastien. "A User’s Guide for Interpreting the CEO Letter to Shareholders." In Handbook of Top Management Teams, 663–73. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230305335_78.

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Rani, Neelam, Surendra S. Yadav, and P. K. Jain. "Innovative Mode of Financing and Abnormal Returns to Shareholders of Indian Acquiring Firms." In Flexible Systems Management, 367–83. New Delhi: Springer India, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2151-7_22.

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Wang, Hong, Jiao Gu, and Luyao Jiang. "High-Premium M&A, Financial Performance and Reduction of Major Shareholders." In Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management, 385–98. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79206-0_29.

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Conference papers on the topic "Shareholders- Management"

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Rudenok, Olha. "Strategic tools for optimizing the ownership concentration in the corporate sector." In Conferinta stiintifica internationala "Strategii si politici de management in economia contemporana", editia VII. Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53486/icspm2022.08.

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The article contains research on the listing requirements for shareholder ownership, established by stock exchanges of different countries. Stock exchanges of such countries as Ukraine, USA, Japan, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France, China, and Poland were considered for comparative analysis of listing requirements. Among the requirements for shareholder ownership of issuers were considered: the minimum Free float, the number of shareholders, the share price, the market capitalization of the tradable shares, the number of tradable shares, and requirements for minority shareholders. Also, the issue of compliance with the requirements of listing as a strategic tool for optimizing the ownership concentration was investigated. The prospects of the Ukrainian corporate sector in terms of compliance with the established listing requirements (from the standpoint of requirements for the shareholder ownership structure) were assessed. Optimizing the ownership concentration of corporations involves the distribution of ownership rights among shareholders, which will help to increase the efficiency of the company and ensure the achievement of its strategic goals.
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WANG, JUE-MING, BAO-BAO LI, and CHENG-XUAN GENG. "RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF EQUITY PLEDGE ON ENTERPRISE VALUE—TAKE SMES AS AN EXAMPLE." In 2021 International Conference on Management, Economics, Business and Information Technology. Destech Publications, Inc., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12783/dtem/mebit2021/35620.

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The pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is one of the important ways for small and medium-sized enterprises to raise funds. However, due to the complexity of controlling shareholders’ motivations for equity pledge, equity pledge has become a double-edged sword that affects the sustainable development of enterprises. This study explores the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate value by constructing an empirical model, so as to provide suggestions for small and medium shareholders, regulatory agencies and related financial institutions. The empirical results show that the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is conducive to the improvement of corporate value; however, under different macro policy adjustments, the impact of equity pledges on corporate value is different. In the period of loose monetary policy, the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity has a significant positive effect on corporate value .On the contrary, during the monetary policy tightening period, equity pledge has a significant negative impact on corporate value.
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Shingade, Sudam, Shailesh Rastogi, and Chetan Panse. "Shareholders’ Activism in India: Understanding characteristics of companies targeted by activist shareholders using discriminant analysis." In 2022 IEEE Technology and Engineering Management Conference (TEMSCON EUROPE). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/temsconeurope54743.2022.9802046.

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Naiping, Zhu, Chen Na, and Zhu Li. "Ultimate Shareholders, Cash Flow Rights, Controlling Rights and Corporate Performance." In 2010 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2010.202.

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Yuan, Tangmei. "A China Case Study on Big Shareholders' Propping and Tunneling." In 8th International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Management Society (EMIM 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emim-18.2018.11.

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Song, Kunhao. "Does the Acquisition of SolarCity Benefit Tesla's Shareholders?" In 2019 International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icemme49371.2019.00112.

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BELU, Alina Mădălina, Cătălina SITNIKOV, and Anca BĂNDOI. "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM PRACTICED BY ROMANIAN ENTITIES." In International Management Conference. Editura ASE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24818/imc/2021/04.07.

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Corporate governance defines all the principles, rules and norms that ensure the administration and management by managers of entities, in the interest of current and potential investors; this interest is classic and the most common. In its context, managers are studied in relation to shareholders. Being a political report, in which there are other stakeholders, the governance acquires an extended interest. A distinct place is occupied in the case of managers and shareholders, creditors and employees, with their claims. Corporate governance has an important role to play in protecting shareholders 'interests as it supports maximizing the value of long-term ownership of the company, and in stimulating investors' attention to the company by making the company's activities and processes transparent and efficient as investors need accurate and quality information. The purpose of the research: to determine the way in which the managers of several entities in Romania perceive the main elements of corporate governance. Method: we resorted to the approach of a statistical-mathematical analysis of quantitative type, for data collection using the questionnaire as a research tool. Findings: pursuing the purpose of analyzing corporate governance, some ideas can be advanced and developed, such as the fact that corporate governance does not only involve supervision and stimulation in order to achieve performance, it must encourage experiments and the dissemination of advanced practices, make a decisive contribution not only in defending the interests of investors but also in ensuring social stability, encouraging mobility and qualitative growth of human capital, orderly development of production processes, close correlation with cultural values.
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Li, Wanli, and Huaili Lv. "Study on the Effect of Firm's Dividends on Shareholders' Balance Mechanism." In 2009 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2009.574.

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Lan, Zhang, Ma Zhong, and Yu Chong. "Tunneling of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders in Pyramidal Ownership Structure." In 2006 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2006.313975.

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Deng, Xiaojun, and Xiaofeng Liu. "Erosion Exploration of Transfer of Control Rights of the Large Shareholder to the Benefits of Small and Medium Shareholders." In 2018 2nd International Conference on Education, Economics and Management Research (ICEEMR 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iceemr-18.2018.106.

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Reports on the topic "Shareholders- Management"

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GALYNCHIK, T., and A. KHUSAINOVA. THE DIVIDEND POLICY OF OIL AND GAS COMPANIES AS AN EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TOOL. Science and Innovation Center Publishing House, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12731/2070-7568-2021-10-5-2-65-73.

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One of the significant elements of effective management of a joint-stock company is a competent dividend policy. It should take into account the interests of both shareholders and the company itself. The article discusses the main indicators of the dividend policy of the largest public joint-stock companies in the oil and gas industry of PJSC NK Rosneft, PJSC ANC Bashneft and PJSC NK Lukoil.
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Rose, Jonathan, Josette Arévalo, Thaís Soares, Andreia Barcellos, Ruben Lamdany, and Dennis Leech. Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance. Inter-American Development Bank, September 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004486.

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The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was founded in 1959 as an initiative of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and the United States to support the development of the region through an institution in which LAC countries would play a leading role through their majority capital and voting shares but with significant participation of the United States. The Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank (the Agreement; IDB 1959/1996) articulated the desired balance of responsibilities and power between LAC and the United States. It also provided that the IDB's governance would center around three governing bodies: the Board of Governors (BOG), the Board of Executive Directors (EXD), and Senior Management. The objective of this evaluation, requested by the EXD, was to assess the extent to which existing institutional arrangements at the IDB allow it to operate effectively and efficiently while providing sufficient accountability, transparency, and stakeholder voice in decision making. The evaluation focused on four dimensions: (1) effectiveness--the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements allow the institution to effectively set strategic objectives, provide means to attain those objectives, and monitor performance; (2) efficiency--the degree to which the costs (in both money and time) of the IDB's governing bodies to perform their assigned roles and responsibilities are consistent with their priorities; (3) accountability and transparency--the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements render the IDB governing bodies accountable to its shareholders for the responsibilities delegated to them, and the ability of secondary stakeholders, such as civil society, project beneficiaries, and private sector entities, to access information; and (4) voice--the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements provide the shareholders and secondary stakeholders with an adequate voice in decision making.
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Carpenter, Marie, and William Lazonick. The Pursuit of Shareholder Value: Cisco’s Transformation from Innovation to Financialization. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, February 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp202.

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Once the global leader in telecommunication systems and the Internet, over the past two decades the United States has fallen behind global competitors, and in particular China, in mobile communication infrastructure—specifically 5G and Internet of Things (IoT). This national failure, with the socioeconomic and geopolitical tensions that it creates, is not due to a lack of US government investment in the knowledge required for the mobility revolution. Nor is it because of a dearth of domestic demand for the equipment, devices, and applications that can make use of this infrastructure. Rather, the problem is the dereliction of key US-based business corporations to take the lead in making the investments in organizational learning required to generate cutting edge communication-infrastructure products. No company in the United States exemplifies this deficiency more than Cisco Systems, the business corporation founded in Silicon Valley in 1984 that had explosive growth in the 1990s to become the foremost global enterprise-networking equipment producer in the Internet revolution. This paper provides in-depth analysis of Cisco’s organizational failure, attributing it ultimately to the company’s turn from innovation in the last decades of 20th century to financialization in the early decades of the 21st century. Since 2001, Cisco’s top management has chosen to allocate corporate cash to open-market share repurchases— aka stock buybacks—for the purpose of giving manipulative boosts to the company stock price rather than make the investments in organizational learning required to become a world leader in communication-infrastructure equipment for the era of 5G and IoT. From October 2001 through October 2022, Cisco spent $152.3 billion—95 percent of its net income over the period—on stock buybacks for the purpose of propping up its stock price. These funds wasted in pursuit of “maximizing shareholder value” were on top of the $55.5 billion that Cisco paid out to shareholders in dividends, representing an additional 35 percent of net income. In this paper, we trace how Cisco grew from a Silicon Valley startup in 1984 to become, through its innovative products, the world leader in enterprise-networking equipment over the next decade and a half. As the company entered the 21st century, building on its dominance of enterprise-networking, Cisco was positioned to upgrade its technological capabilities to become a major infrastructureequipment vendor to service providers. We analyze how and why, when the Internet boom turned to bust in 2001, the organizational structure that enabled Cisco to dominate enterprise networking posed constraints related to manufacturing and marketing on the company’s growth in the more sophisticated infrastructure-equipment segment. We then document how from 2002 Cisco turned from innovation to financialization, as it used its ample profits to do stock buybacks to prop up its stock price. Finally, we ponder the larger policy implications of Cisco’s turn from innovation to financialization for the competitive position of the US information-and-communication technology (ICT) industry in the global economy.
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Abowd, John, George Milkovich, and John Hannon. The Effects of Human Resource Management Decisions on Shareholder Value. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3148.

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