Relevant bibliographies by topics / Shareholders

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Shareholders'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 June 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Shareholders"

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Miyake, Masatoshi, Mei Yu, and Hiroshi Inoue. "Mitigating risk incentives by issuing convertible bonds: A refinement to the Black–Scholes evaluation model." Journal of Financial Engineering 01, no. 03 (September 2014): 1450024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s234576861450024x.

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This study employs option pricing theory to analyze the risk incentive conflict between shareholders and creditors. It evaluates the volatility of investment projects funded by borrowed money and compares their gains for the shareholder and creditor. Our analysis is based on the recognition that shareholders' and creditors' objectives may differ. We identify the shareholder's risk incentive as a source of agency cost originating with the shareholder and find that issuing a convertible bond avoids agency cost without diluting existing shareholders' ownership. Numerical examples are shown to examine it.
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Gounder, Chitra Gunshekhar, and M. Venkateshwarlu. "Shareholder Value Creation: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector." Accounting and Finance Research 6, no. 1 (February 14, 2017): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/afr.v6n1p148.

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This study investigates the importance of economic value added for the shareholders’ value maximization. Economic value added (EVA) is a value based performance measurement tool that helps to settle down the management decision regarding creation of shareholders value. Very few literatures are found regarding creation of shareholder values in banks. Sample of 40 Indian commercial listed Banks and panel data are used for the period of 2001 to 2015, the empirical findings for Public limited banks and overall Indian banks revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between shareholder’s value maximization and EVA but in case of Private limited banks, DPS was found to have significant relationship with shareholder value. The Higher the value of EVA, higher shareholders value .The finding shows significant support for EVA and DPS, but it was found that EVA is not efficiently used for Analysis and decision making regarding creation of value. Thus it is suggested to focus on criteria of EVA for analyzing shareholder’s value of banks.
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Smitiukh, Andrii. "The grounds of the shareholder’s withdrawal from the limited liability companies and legal entities of the similar corporate forms: the comparative legal aspect." Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 188–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.1.2020.38.

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The article presents the result of comparative legal studies of the grounds of the shareholder’s withdrawal from the limited liability companies as well as legal entities of the similar corporate forms provided by the laws of some countries (namely Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom). It is concluded that in most legal systems the ground of the withdrawal is a set of facts composed of the main element – the declaration of will of the shareholder to terminate the corporate relationship of participation and an additional element of a subjective or objective nature. The aforesaid additional element of the objective nature in turn may be expressed by law in evaluation category or not. The additional elements of the set of facts composimng the ground of the withdrawal has been classified in the article. So, an additional element of the set of facts of the subjective nature is a declaration of will of the rest of shareholders to allow the shareholder’s withdrawal. An additional element of the set of facts of the subjective nature may be provided by law in a «simple» way as a circumstances established by the company’s articles of association or as an important decision of the general shareholders meeting objected by the minor shareholder or as a cause expressed by law in evaluation categories as a material breach of rights and interests of the shareholders by the company or other shareholders («just cause», «good cause», «justes motif», «the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of shareholders» etc.). The correlation between the nature of additional elements of the ground of the shareholder’s withdrawal and the mode of the withdrawal has been investigated. The court mode of the shareholder’s withdrawal is always provided if an additional element of the set of facts composing the ground of the withdrawal is expressed in evaluation categories as a material breach of rights and interests of the shareholder by the company or other shareholders. The different additional elements of the set of facts composing the ground of the shareholder’s withdrawal may be provided by the law of the same legal system for judicial and non-judicial modes of the withdrawal.
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Fegyveresi, Zsolt. "Shareholders' Right to Information − A Comparative Analysis of Hungarian and Romanian Company Law." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae Legal Studies 9, no. 1 (December 2, 2020): 39–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.47745/ausleg.2020.9.1.03.

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"This study examines one of the basic rights of shareholders, the right to information in Hungarian and Romanian company law. The right to information is a non-property, organizational right originating from the shareholder’s membership right, which is related to the convening of the general meeting of the company limited by shares and the voting right that can be exercised there. The right to information is the individual right of the shareholder and the individual obligation of the company. The right to information belongs to all shareholders, regardless of the extent of their fi nancial contribution. The exercise of the right to information is a fundamental principle and serves the protection of the shareholder, but, in addition to its protective nature, it stands at the basis of the preparation of the decisions of the company’s shareholders."
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Guo, Ruining, and Ziyang Li. "CSR Initiatives of Controlling Shareholder in Share Pledge Firms: Sustainable Orientation or Interim Plan?" E3S Web of Conferences 409 (2023): 04001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202340904001.

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This paper investigates the effects of share pledge by controlling shareholder on corporate social responsibility and the mechanism through which stock pledge affects CSR. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2008 to 2020, we find that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) than other firms. Their CSR also perform better even when all pledge funds are invested to shareholders themselves rather than to the company’s operation. We then provide evidence to show that the motivating effect of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on CSR is related to controlling shareholder’s incentives to improve corporate value to prevent loss of corporate control and reduce the risk of stock price crash. These results consistently suggest that controlling shareholders employ corporate social responsibility as an effective way to reduce the risk of controlling right transfer.
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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value: EVA Concept." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (January 19, 2016): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/.v3i1.173.

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<p>In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.</p>
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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (July 21, 2014): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v3i1.173.

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In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.
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Chuan, Lin, and Zhai Haomiao. "Major Shareholders’ Reduction and the Risk of Stock Price Crash." Journal of Asian Research 7, no. 3 (July 20, 2023): p11. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jar.v7n3p11.

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This paper takes China Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as samples to empirically test the impact of major shareholder reduction on the risk of stock price crash. This paper finds that the reduction of major shareholders promotes the risk of stock price crash of listed companies, that is, compared with listed companies without major shareholders’ reduction, the risk of stock price crash of listed companies with major shareholders’ reduction is higher, and this conclusion still holds after controlling the conservative factors. Further examination shows that the major shareholder’s manipulation of information has an impact on the risk of stock price crash, and the impact of major shareholder’s reduction on the risk of stock price crash is more obvious in China state-owned enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, enterprises in the bull market period and enterprises in areas with low market investors.
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Vutt, Andres, and Margit Vutt. "Shareholder Exit in Estonian Private Limited Companies: Proposals of the Company Law Revision Working Group." Juridica International 30 (October 13, 2021): 140–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/ji.2021.30.16.

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Private limited companies are small, closed companies in which, as a rule, there are few shareholders. Regrettably, conflicts arise between shareholders that cannot be resolved in such a way that the persons in dispute remain shareholders, since protracted litigation reduces the value of the company and may lead to the closing of the business. For resolving such situations, several countries have made provisions in their laws for the possibility of shareholder exit. Current Estonian law does not provide for shareholder exit. The law regulates only a shareholder’s expulsion, but this remedy is not widely used in practice, since its scope is so limited. This mechanism cannot be used for solving the problems in most cases. There are some other possibilities for shareholder exit, but they are merely theoretical and have not been proved in case law. A review of Estonia’s company law commenced in 2016, and the working group presented its proposals for amending the relevant laws in 2019. One proposal made by the revision working group was to bring into the law provisions governing shareholder exit. Under the proposals made, shareholder exit would be possible only for a valid reason and as ultima ratio. The right to claim for exclusion of a shareholder is held by any shareholder(s) having at least 50% of the votes. If a shareholder is excluded from the company, the court has to determine the compensation to be paid to the departing shareholder, taking into account the rules on capital maintenance.
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Gratham, Ross. "The Unanimous Consent Rule in Company Law." Cambridge Law Journal 52, no. 2 (July 1993): 245–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300095155.

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In the history of the modern company the shareholder has held a privileged position, for although the company's separate identity is the fundamental tenet of company law the shareholder's place as proprietor has only recently been questioned. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that for nearly a century the unanimous assent of shareholders has held the status of an overriding authority, able to cure procedural defects, overcome statutory requirements and validate almost any act within the capacity of the company. In its most recent application in Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty. Ltd., where the consent of shareholders was held to bind the company to a guarantee, we have a striking example of the authority accorded to the wishes of shareholders.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Shareholders"

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Jansson, Andreas. "Collective Action Among Shareholder Activists." Doctoral thesis, Växjö : Växjö University Press, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:vxu:diva-1665.

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Pajuste, Anete. "Corporate governance and controlling shareholders." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-537.

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The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries.
Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004
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Stratton, M. Lee. "Directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/6561.

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Since the 1902 decision of Percival v. $Wright\sp1,$ Canadian common law has provided that directors generally have no fiduciary duties to shareholders. Shareholders have continued to assert that directors have such duties, however. Moreover, shareholders have been attracted by the allure of the rigorously restitutionary remedies imposed on fiduciaries. Cases in which share holders have made claims of fiduciary duty against directors since the law reforms of the 1960s and 1970s are examined. The law reformers expected that the courts would develop the law of fiduciary relations within the corporation. Moreover, the nature of securities law reforms confronted the courts with the previously noted gulf between the statutory fiduciary obligations imposed on directors and insiders of widely-held corporations and the lack of such obligations in private companies. This review of judicial decisions begins with an examination of the compulsory acquisition cases which preceded the statutory take-over bid reforms. These cases arise from facts which would constitute take-over bids under the statutory reforms of the 1960s. In these cases, we see a very limited attempt by the judiciary to impose fiduciary obligations of good faith and candour in favour of minority shareholders. The courts' sense of commercial morality seems to have been stirred in these cases, a morality engendered by the arbitrary expropriation permitted by the statutory compulsory acquisition provisions. An examination of latter day cases involving claims of fiduciary duty show that the decisions are sprinkled with references to commercial morality. Despite this moral impetus, the courts seem unwilling to venture beyond the perceived constraints of the corporations statutes. This unwillingness, coupled with the courts' inability to articulate a uniform rationale for imposing fiduciary duties on directors in favour of shareholders contribute to the unsatisfactory state of the law. (Abstract shortened by UMI.) ftn$\sp1$ (1902) 2 Ch 421.
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Goodman, Jennifer Coralie. "Social shareholder engagement: How shareholders bring social, environmental and ethical concerns to the heart of management." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Ramon Llull, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/295841.

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Els accionistes sempre han estat fonamentals per entendre un negoci. I ho continuen essent avui. Tanmateix, suposar que una empresa s’ha de dirigir només per satisfer les demandes dels accionistes, i que aquests accionistes estan preocupats només per maximitzar els seus beneficis econòmics, resulta problemàtic, davant de les nombroses exigències que tant aquests accionistes com d’altres stakeholders plantegen a les empreses. En una època en què temes com el canvi climàtic i la distància creixent entre els rics i els pobres s’estan convertint en preocupacions urgents per a la societat, el paper de les empreses, les seves finalitats i les seves pràctiques s’estan qüestionant tant en l’àmbit públic, com en el privat i en l’acadèmic. La inversió responsable, els diversos tipus d’inversors, les iniciatives multistakeholder, les comunitats, les campanyes d’activisme i una varietat creixent de stakeholders plantegen múltiples i diverses demandes a les empreses, que van més enllà dels interessos econòmics. Aquesta tesi adopta la perspectiva del repte que suposa per a les empreses que es qüestionin els supòsits en què es fonamenta la seva naturalesa. Hi ha accionistes que s’impliquen en la gestió corporativa de les problemàtiques socials, mediambientals i ètiques, com els drets humans o la degradació de l’entorn. En aquest estudi, s’analitza empíricament i conceptualment aquesta “implicació de l’accionista” (shareholder engagement), que és un fenomen cada vegada més rellevant en la pràctica corporativa i en l’activitat investigadora. Oferim una nova perspectiva de la implicació de l’accionista, que identifica la seva naturalesa política i ètica. D’aquesta manera, participem i contribuïm a la literatura sobre govern corporatiu, inversió responsable, activisme social i ètica empresarial, i obrim noves vies per a la recerca futura.
Los accionistas siempre han sido fundamentales para entender un negocio. Y lo siguen siendo hoy. Sin embargo, suponer que una empresa ha de ser dirigida únicamente para satisfacer las demandas de los accionistas, y que dichos accionistas están preocupados únicamente por maximizar sus beneficios económicos, resulta problemático, a la luz de las numerosas exigencias que plantean a las empresas tanto los accionistas como otros stakeholders. En un tiempo en que determinados temas, como el cambio climático y la distancia creciente entre ricos y pobres, se están convirtiendo en preocupaciones acuciantes para la sociedad, el papel de las empresas, sus fines y sus prácticas están siendo cuestionados en los ámbitos público, privado y académico. La inversión responsable, los diversos tipos de inversores, las iniciativas multistakeholder, las comunidades, las campañas de activismo y la gran variedad de stakeholders han planteado múltiples y diversas demandas a las empresas, que van más allá de los intereses económicos. Esta tesis adopta la perspectiva del reto que supone para las empresas el cuestionamiento de las asunciones en que se fundamenta su naturaleza. Hay accionistas que se implican en la gestión corporativa de las preocupaciones sociales, medioambientales y éticas, como los derechos humanos o la degradación del entorno. En este estudio, se analiza empíricamente y conceptualmente esta “implicación del accionista” (shareholder engagement), pues es un fenómeno cada vez más relevante en la práctica corporativa y en la actividad investigadora. Ofrecemos una nueva perspectiva de la implicación del accionista, que identifica su naturaleza política y ética. De este modo, participamos y contribuimos a la literatura sobre gobierno corporativo, inversión responsable, activismo social y ética empresarial, y abrimos nuevas vías para la investigación futura.
Shareholders have always been fundamental to an understanding of the corporation. The same is true today. However, the assumptions that the firm should be run to meet only the demands of shareholders, and that those shareholders are concerned only about the maximization of financial returns, are problematic in light of the multitude of demands placed on corporations by both shareholders and other stakeholders. At a time when issues such as climate change and the widening gap between rich and poor have become pressing societal concerns, the role of business, its purposes and its practices have been challenged in the public, private, and academic spheres. Responsible investment, diverse investor types, multi-stakeholder initiatives, communities, activist campaigns, and a variety of other stakeholders have resulted in multiple and diverse demands on the company which go well beyond financial interests. This thesis takes the perspective of one such challenge to the fundamental assumptions about the nature of the firm: shareholders who actively engage with corporate management on issues of social, environmental, and ethical concern such as human rights or environmental degradation. This ‘social shareholder engagement’, an increasingly relevant phenomenon in practice and research, is explored here both empirically and conceptually. I provide a new perspective on social shareholder engagement, which identifies the political and ethical nature of these actions. In this way I engage with and contribute to the corporate governance, responsible investment, social activism and business ethics literatures and open a number of future avenues for research.
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Abdou, Majdi A. "Towards a new solution of minority shareholder protection in Libya : letting the minority shareholders have a voice." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6423/.

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The study develops a framework for improving corporate governance mechanisms in Libya that takes into account its specific environment of weak formal enforcement and its corporate ownership structure, which is based on concentrated state ownership. The central goal of the research is to establish an adequate protection system for minority shareholders that can contribute to the development of an efficient and healthy commercial environment in Libya. To do so, the study examines the current solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between shareholders adopted by Libyan law under art 159 of Libyan Economic Activity Act (LEAA 2010): the minority shareholders’ actions. Using a social and economic analysis and a black letter approach, this study presents a novel analytical framework that formulates an appropriate solution for controlling conflict of interests between shareholders in Libya. To that end, the study addresses the following questions: how effective is the current mechanism for dealing with the conflict of interest between shareholders in Libya? What are the economic and social implications of the different proposed approaches? What elements determine which approach is preferable in Libya? And, finally, what are the challenges that the proposed law reform may face? To answer these questions, firstly, it is necessary to consider the general framework of corporate governance in Libya, examine the country’s current position as an economy in the early stages of transformation and analyse the potential impact of this transformation on corporate governance. Following this, I locate the dimensions of the conflict of interest problem between the minority and majority shareholders in Libya through analysing literature of corporate governance with regard to the minority-majority shareholder problem and applying it to the case of Libya. After that, I examine the efficacy of the current mechanism available in Libyan law (minority shareholders actions) as a solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between the minority shareholders and the majority shareholders in Libyan companies. However, the current approach is not appropriate for Libya for several reasons that relate to either the efficiency of the approach itself or its application and enforcement in Libya. After examining other possible solutions (e.g. a prohibition strategy), I propose the self-enforcing model as the most appropriate solution since it contributes to companies being able raise capital from investors, and it also lowers the number of conflict of interest transactions and makes a company’s transactions more efficient. Finally, the self-enforcing model does away with the need for external monitoring. However, this is not the end of the story; adopting such a model will inevitably lead to some potential risks (such as the risk that the minority shareholders may abuse their rights), which will require the formulation and adoption of new and specific strategies of corporate governance that are appropriate to Libya.
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Yeo, Boon Hong. "Antigreenmail charter amendments and shareholders’ wealth." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/25689.

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From time to time, firms do repurchase their shares. An open market repurchase or a general tender offer does not have the effect of transfering wealth from one group of shareholders to another. This is in contrast to a privately negotiated premium repurchase from a single block holder where the remaining shareholders are excluded from participating in the offer. This type of targeted share repurchasing has been observed before - or in connection with - a takeover attempt and often has the effect of terminating the takeover attempt. Such a targeted share repurchase is commonly referred to as "greenmail". The price is usually at a premium over the prevailing market price and the seller will typically agree to abstain from acquiring any more of the company's voting stock. The non-participating shareholders stand to lose from both the premium paid out of corporate assets and the loss of a potential takeover offer premium. Recently, firms have been proposing to institute antigreenmail charter amendments that would prevent management from engaging in greenmail. Such a proposal may or may not be in the best interest of shareholders. This paper attempts to measure the economic significance of an antigreenmail proposal. The methodology chosen is that of an event-time study. The magnitude of abnormal returns is used to gauge its significance in relation to the day that the market learns of the antigreenmail charter amendment. The "stockholder interest hypothesis" predicts that the proposal is undertaken with the interest of shareholders in mind and thus stock prices should react positively to the announcement. However, the results obtained do not support that hypothesis. Stockholders seem to suffer a statistically significant decline in the value of their shares around the day when news of such proposals reach the market. This result is also inconsistent with previous empirical evidence on targeted repurchases and standstill agreements.
Business, Sauder School of
Graduate
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Levy, Marc. "Shareholders' control in complex corporate structures." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209768.

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In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with

indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers.

Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between

them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this

influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the

Banzhaf index. This thesis develops models to measure the Banzhaf indices in any ownership structure (pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures). The models are then applied to real cases studies such Colruyt, Elia, Lafarge and Allianz.
Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Salim, Mohammad Rizal. "Shareholders' rights and remedies in Malaysia." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.560579.

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This thesis investigates the laws on shareholders' rights and remedies in Malaysia from a comparative perspective. Law is given a broad meaning which gives this research a multidisciplinary character. British colonial business interests resulted in the transplantation of Malaysia's corporate and other commercial laws; this transplantation process continues in the post-colonial period due to the desire to conform to internationally recognised norms and standards and the lack of local innovation. The interaction of the transplanted laws with institutions and other elements in the local setting creates gaps between the law-in-the-books and law-in-action. In particular, the transplanted governance regime which focuses on the director-shareholder agency problem is inappropriate for an environment where controlling shareholders created the largest agency problems. Malaysians are also reluctant to seek redress through the official legal system (again a product of transplantation) for cultural, historical, political and economic factors. The poor quality of the legal institutions, access to court issues, poor public governance and the abdication of the judiciary of its' duties to protect individual rights vis-a.-vis the state further compromised the value of the law-in-the-books. These are compounded by the uncritical and often inappropriate reliance to case laws of other Commonwealth countries, and the general apathy of the judiciary to the rights of shareholders. In conclusion, it is argued that the law-in-the-books may appear to provide adequate protection to shareholders; however the value of the law must be examined in a larger perspective. The administration and implementation of the law as well as a healthy respect for the rule of law is as important as the substantive law itself.
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Brandon, Sonia. "Institutional shareholders preferences on corporate governance." Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2018. https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/institutional-shareholders-preferences-on-corporate-governance(c51aee2b-6275-4d3b-97de-535db646942e).html.

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The study examines the association between institutional shareholdings in FTSE ALL Share firms and corporate governance from 2006 to 2010. Institutions are believed to invest in firms with better corporate governance, to help meet their fudiary duties. The evidence is consistent with this view, that institutional investors do tilt their portfolios' to firms with better governance. However, when examining ownership at various levels only block-ownership at ≤10% had a positive significant association to corporate governance. It was also found that institutional shareholder became more sensitive after the 2007-8 financial crisis. Finally, when exploring the association for different types of institution, it was found that investment advisors and hedge funds were the most sensitive to corporate governance. The study provides a contribution to knowledge on institutional ownership, as it provides the first evidence on the institutional investor preferences on corporate governance within the UK and which elements are the most important to institutions.
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Blanchard, Julian. "Information needs and rights of shareholders /." Title page, contents and abstract only, 1999. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phb6392.pdf.

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Books on the topic "Shareholders"

1

Shareholders' rights. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010.

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Stedman, Graham. Shareholders' agreements. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 1990.

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Muth, Graham. Shareholders' agreements. 6th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012.

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Sean, FitzGerald, and Cadman John, eds. Shareholders' agreements. 5th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009.

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Dennis, Campbell, Powers Jennifer, and Center for International Legal Studies., eds. Shareholders' liability. London: Graham & Trotman/M. Nijhoff, 1994.

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Hollington, Robin. Shareholders' rights. 4th ed. London: Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 2004.

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Stedman, Graham. Shareholders' agreements. London: Longman, 1986.

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Stedman, Graham. Shareholders' agreements. 3rd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998.

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Minority shareholders' remedies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

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Henry Cooke,Lumsden plc (firm), ed. Perks for shareholders. London: Henry Cooke,Lumsden plc, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "Shareholders"

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Raval, Vasant. "Shareholders." In Corporate Governance, 93–104. Boca, Raton : CRC Press, 2020. |: Auerbach Publications, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003031796-7.

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Dathe, Tracy, René Dathe, Isabel Dathe, and Marc Helmold. "Shareholders." In Management for Professionals, 159–68. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92357-0_12.

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Pisacane, Giovanni. "Shareholders and Board of Shareholders." In Corporate Governance in China, 35–53. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3911-9_4.

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Dine, Janet, and Marios Koutsias. "Shareholders’ remedies." In Company Law, 189–219. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-01562-4_10.

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Hudson, Alastair. "Shareholders’ rights." In Understanding Company Law, 148–66. Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315158099-10.

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Lessambo, Felix I. "Shareholders’ Equity." In Financial Statements, 141–58. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15663-2_11.

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Chang, Soonpeel Edgar. "Shareholders’ meeting." In Indonesian Company Law, 55–90. New York, NY: Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429503603-5.

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Carmo, Marcelo José do, Mário Sacomano Neto, and Julio Cesar Donadone. "Shareholders' acquisitions." In Financialisation in the Automotive Industry, 53–61. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003161141-4.

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Lessambo, Felix. "Shareholders Actions." In U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions, 79–87. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85735-6_6.

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Lessambo, Felix I. "Shareholders’ Equity." In Financial Statements, 127–43. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99984-5_11.

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Conference papers on the topic "Shareholders"

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Rudenok, Olha. "Strategic tools for optimizing the ownership concentration in the corporate sector." In Conferinta stiintifica internationala "Strategii si politici de management in economia contemporana", editia VII. Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53486/icspm2022.08.

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The article contains research on the listing requirements for shareholder ownership, established by stock exchanges of different countries. Stock exchanges of such countries as Ukraine, USA, Japan, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France, China, and Poland were considered for comparative analysis of listing requirements. Among the requirements for shareholder ownership of issuers were considered: the minimum Free float, the number of shareholders, the share price, the market capitalization of the tradable shares, the number of tradable shares, and requirements for minority shareholders. Also, the issue of compliance with the requirements of listing as a strategic tool for optimizing the ownership concentration was investigated. The prospects of the Ukrainian corporate sector in terms of compliance with the established listing requirements (from the standpoint of requirements for the shareholder ownership structure) were assessed. Optimizing the ownership concentration of corporations involves the distribution of ownership rights among shareholders, which will help to increase the efficiency of the company and ensure the achievement of its strategic goals.
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WANG, JUE-MING, BAO-BAO LI, and CHENG-XUAN GENG. "RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF EQUITY PLEDGE ON ENTERPRISE VALUE—TAKE SMES AS AN EXAMPLE." In 2021 International Conference on Management, Economics, Business and Information Technology. Destech Publications, Inc., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12783/dtem/mebit2021/35620.

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The pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is one of the important ways for small and medium-sized enterprises to raise funds. However, due to the complexity of controlling shareholders’ motivations for equity pledge, equity pledge has become a double-edged sword that affects the sustainable development of enterprises. This study explores the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate value by constructing an empirical model, so as to provide suggestions for small and medium shareholders, regulatory agencies and related financial institutions. The empirical results show that the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is conducive to the improvement of corporate value; however, under different macro policy adjustments, the impact of equity pledges on corporate value is different. In the period of loose monetary policy, the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity has a significant positive effect on corporate value .On the contrary, during the monetary policy tightening period, equity pledge has a significant negative impact on corporate value.
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Wai, Chen Thim. "The Novel Laws On Shareholders’ Meetings Affecting Minority Shareholders In Malaysia." In ILC 2017 - 9th UUM International Legal Conference. Cognitive-Crcs, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.12.03.5.

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Berglund, Tom, and Naufal Alimov. "Institutional shareholders and corporate governance." In Corporate Governance: Search for the advanced practices. Virtus Interpress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cpr19a5.

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Vutt, Andres, and Margit Vutt. "Adoption of Shareholder Resolutions in Post-COVID Era. Example of Estonian Law." In The 8th International Scientific Conference of the Faculty of Law of the University of Latvia. University of Latvia Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/iscflul.8.2.31.

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In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic forced the world to find the right balance between protecting health, minimizing economic and social disruption and retaining the rights of individuals. States imposed a number of restrictions in order to prevent the spread of the pandemic, including restrictions on the movement of persons and restrictions on gathering. Traditionally, shareholders' meetings of companies have been taken place in the form of physical meetings. Company law also been based on the assumption that meetings are held physically. In the new situation, it was no longer possible to hold meetings in this way, at least for some time. This forced companies to use digital solutions. The legislator was also faced with the question of how to resolve this situation. Different countries reacted differently in order to find company law solutions. In Estonia, new rules were adopted in May 2020 that allowed legal persons to adopt decisions using digital solutions, among other things, it is allowed to make decisions in a full virtual meeting. The central question in the way companies make decisions is whether the use of virtual solutions is possible, but whether the law provides companies with sufficiently flexible options, which would enable decisions to be taken in the light of the specificities and needs of each company and whether such practices ensure the exercise of shareholders' rights. This article analyses whether and how these objectives have been achieved in Estonian law. There are three ways to adopt company’s resolutions in Estonia: a meeting, a written resolution or a vote by letter. Meetings can take place physically, virtually or in a hybrid form. It is not possible to infringe the rights of the shareholder in making a written resolution, since if such a method is used, the resolution decision is adopted only if all shareholders agree. In the case of voting by letter, the law does not take into account the fact that in a shareholder of a public limited company has the right to receive information from directors only at the general meeting. Therefore, the future case-law must lay down the principles of communication between the shareholder and the public limited company in the situation when the resolution has been adopted by using such option. The law stipulates that if digital means are used to hold a meeting, shareholders must be guaranteed all the same rights as they have in the event of a physical meeting. Since these rules have been in force only for a short period of time, there are no court cases based on them. Although the legal literature has been expressed some views on the use of digital solutions, it is not yet known how the courts will resolve these issues if disputes arise.
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Shingade, Sudam, Shailesh Rastogi, and Chetan Panse. "Shareholders’ Activism in India: Understanding characteristics of companies targeted by activist shareholders using discriminant analysis." In 2022 IEEE Technology and Engineering Management Conference (TEMSCON EUROPE). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/temsconeurope54743.2022.9802046.

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Lu, Fan. "Can shareholders of Tesla really benefit?" In 2019 International Conference on Education Science and Economic Development (ICESED 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icesed-19.2020.6.

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Jiming, Li, and Xu Kai. "Notice of Retraction: Controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and interests conflicts: Evidence from family firms in China." In 2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icebeg.2011.5882110.

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Kamenjarska, Tanja, and Igor Ivanovski. "IMPACT OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: DYNAMIC PANEL EVIDENCE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA." In Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future. Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47063/ebtsf.2020.0027.

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Corporate governance is a crucial mechanism for the organizations’ actions to maintain market successful adequate and targeted policies and long-term strategies that ensure the maximization of shareholders’ benefits. The board of directors is appointed by organizations’ shareholders and its main role is to be responsible and accountable and to ensure enforcement of the top management acts concerning the fulfillment of the shareholder’s interests. For this to be achieved, it is important for the board to be efficient, effective, and focused on protecting the organization and shareholder’s interests. Good corporate governance and more specifically, board characteristics play a central role in companies’ management, coordination, and control mechanisms. The paper analyses various theoretical and empirical findings regarding the prominence of various board characteristics within companies and particularly evaluates the impact of board characteristics on the financial performance of listed companies in the insurance industry in the Republic of North Macedonia. The financial ratio ROA is used as a proxy and as a variable for firm performance while the board experience, CEO duality, board size, board composition, and gender diversity are set to be as independent variables. Based on the variables related to board characteristics, hypotheses are developed and their impact upon firm performance is examined with the use of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), a pairwise correlation matrix, as well as with multicollinearity VIF test. In that direction, this paper aims to determine the level of effectiveness of current governance mechanisms and based on the results, propose measures and actions for successfully handling agency costs while maximizing governance capability and performance in the insurance sector in the Republic of North Macedonia.
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Bag, Samiran, and Feng Hao. "E2E Verifiable Electronic Voting System for Shareholders." In 2019 IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing (DSC). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/dsc47296.2019.8937711.

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Reports on the topic "Shareholders"

1

Bouton, Laurent, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Antonin Macé, and Dimitrios Xefteris. Voting in Shareholders Meetings. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29005.

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Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6765.

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Hirst, E., and S. Hadley. Effects of resource acquisitions on electric-utility shareholders. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), May 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10156385.

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Moeller, Sara, Frederik Schlingemann, and Rene Stulz. Do shareholders of acquiring firms gain from acquisitions? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9523.

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Ammer, John, Sara Holland, David Smith, and Francis Warnock. Look at Me Now: What Attracts U.S. Shareholders? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12500.

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Bouton, Laurent, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Antonin Macé, Adam Meirowitz, Shaoting Pi, and Dimitrios Xefteris. Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30757.

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Becker, Bo, Henrik Cronqvist, and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach. Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17393.

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Harford, Jarrad, Dirk Jenter, and Kai Li. Conflicts of Interests Among Shareholders: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13274.

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Rajan, Raghuram, Pietro Ramella, and Luigi Zingales. What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w31054.

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Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen, and Charles C. Y. Wang. Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17127.

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