Academic literature on the topic 'Shareholder logic'
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Journal articles on the topic "Shareholder logic"
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Jansson, Andreas. "No exit!: The logic of defensive shareholder activism." Corporate Board role duties and composition 10, no. 2 (2014): 16–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv10i2art2.
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This paper examines the issue of what motivates shareholder activism. The standard explanation portrays shareholder activism as a response to poor corporate performance, but the empirical literature provides inconclusive support, indicating the need for alternative or complementary explanations. This paper contributes to the literature by showing, with the help of a case study, that shareholder activism can also be a response to increasing costs for exiting the investment, making outside shareholders increasingly exposed to expropriation risks. Significant expropriation risk can antecede a defensive type of shareholder activism characterized by intensified monitoring and reactive intervention to fend off expropriation attempts, which differs from the standard explanation in both motivation and outcome.
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Chen, Victor Zitian, and Ruth V. Aguilera. "Shareholder Logic Complexity and Agency Theory." Academy of Management Proceedings 2020, no. 1 (August 2020): 12064. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2020.12064abstract.
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Luo, Xiaowei Rose, Young-Chul Jeong, and Chi-Nien Chung. "In the Eye of the Beholder: Global Analysts’ Coverage of Family Firms in an Emerging Market." Journal of Management 45, no. 5 (October 6, 2017): 1830–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206317734899.
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How do analysts make decisions about which firms to cover? Previous research has not considered how such decisions can be influenced by cultural understandings about appropriate forms of corporate governance. Drawing upon the institutional logics perspective, we propose that analyst firms’ home-country institutional logics of corporate governance can shape analyst perception of coverage risks for family firms. Specifically, we argue that given the negative view towards family governance in shareholder-based logic, family firms are less likely to be covered by analyst firms from shareholder-based countries than by those from stakeholder-based countries. Furthermore, the coverage divergence between shareholder- and stakeholder-based analyst firms will be greater for family firms featuring higher risks of value assessment and expropriation. We test our framework in the context of global analysts’ coverage of publicly listed firms in Taiwan between 1996 and 2005 and find empirical support. Our study contributes to the institutional logics perspective by establishing the implications of corporate governance logics for analyst coverage and providing a boundary condition for agency theory. We also uncover a less-noted source of institutional variation among the analyst community.
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Emiliani, M. L. "A mathematical logic approach to the shareholder vs stakeholder debate." Management Decision 39, no. 8 (October 2001): 618–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00251740110399521.
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Schäffer, Utz, Erik Strauss, and Christina Zecher. "The role of management control systems in situations of institutional complexity." Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management 12, no. 4 (October 12, 2015): 395–424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/qram-01-2015-0010.
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Purpose – This study investigates in depth how decision-making of different organisational members is shaped by various management control systems (MCSs) that reflect different institutional logics, how the entire organisation deals with the arising institutional complexity and which role different management controls as a system play in such situations. Design/methodology/approach – A case study was conducted on a German Mittelstand firm whose MCSs were shaped by three different logics over time: a family logic, a stakeholder logic and a shareholder logic. Findings – This paper shows how different actors of an organisation confronted with institutional complexity used selective coupling of different MCS components and compartmentalizing MCS components to deal with clashing institutional logics. Thereby, it was possible for the actors to balance different sub-communities within the firm that were shaped by conflicting but yet complementary logics that were required for organisational survival. Research limitations/implications – This study contributes to the understanding of how an MCS can be exploited for organisational structural responses to multiple logics. Due to this research design, the present study deals with challenges of ex post rationalization. Practical implications – The results show options for organisational leaders to deal with different kind of worldviews (i.e. logics) that shape employees’ behaviour. Particularly, this paper explains how leaders can restructure their MCSs to influence human behaviour in times of radical change. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the literature on MCSs by showing what role MCSs play in structural responses to institutional complexity.
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Jones, Thomas M., and Will Felps. "Stakeholder Happiness Enhancement: A Neo-Utilitarian Objective for the Modern Corporation." Business Ethics Quarterly 23, no. 3 (July 2013): 349–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201323325.
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ABSTRACT:Employing utilitarian criteria, Jones and Felps, in “Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Social Welfare: A Utilitarian Critique” (Business Ethics Quarterly 23[2]: 207–38), examined the sequential logic leading from shareholder wealth maximization to maximal social welfare and uncovered several serious empirical and conceptual shortcomings. After rendering shareholder wealth maximization seriously compromised as an objective for corporate operations, they provided a set of criteria regarding what a replacement corporate objective would look like, but do not offer a specific alternative. In this article, we draw on neo-utilitarian thought to advance a refined version of normative stakeholder theory that we believe addresses a major remaining criticism of extant versions, their lack of specificity. More particularly, we provide a single-valued objective function for the corporation—stakeholder happiness enhancement—that would allow managers to make principled choices between/among policy options when stakeholder interests conflict.
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Osiyevskyy, Oleksiy. "The ultimate leadership challenge: a unique corporate theory of value-creating growth." Strategy & Leadership 44, no. 5 (September 19, 2016): 47–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sl-07-2016-0063.
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Purpose The article identifies the need for an approach beyond merely maintaining competitive advantage. In the eyes of analysts, maintaining the profitable status quo is not an option for creating shareholder value. Design/methodology/approach This masterclass develops the thesis that a strategist needs a corporate theory of value creation, something that provides ongoing guidance to the selection of positions and a vast array of strategic actions. Findings Even those who take a dim view of maximizing shareholder value would likely agree that from an enlightened stakeholder perspective management must find new, unexpected ways to grow the firm to be viable in the long term.” Practical implications A well-developed corporate theory enables fruitful thought experiments such as, “If my theory accurately describes my world, then when I select this strategic choice, the following will occur.”” Originality/value The corporate theory of value structures the logic practitioners can use, repeatedly and consistently, to assess an enormous array of possible combinations of resources and activities. The logic enables strategists to define what is special about the options that are likely to create value.
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Yoo, Taeyoun. "Coexistence of contrasting principles in corporate governance: Two tales of Japanese firms." Corporate Board role duties and composition 11, no. 2 (2015): 227–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv11i2c1art6.
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The underlying logic that shapes the coexistence of contrasting mechanisms in a firm’s governance system remains unclear. We examine the logic that promotes a hybrid form of corporate governance in functional terms. The empirical analysis of Japanese firms shows that a firm’s reliance on capital markets for resource acquisition facilitates its adoption of shareholder-oriented mechanisms, such as committee systems. In contrast, corporate performance is still influenced by some of Japanese society’s characteristic governance mechanisms, such as bank ownership. This finding illustrates that contrasting governance mechanisms coexist in a given system owing to their respective or interacting contributions to corporate performance.
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Bryan, Dick, Michael Rafferty, Phillip Toner, and Sally Wright. "Financialisation and labour in the Australian commercial construction industry." Economic and Labour Relations Review 28, no. 4 (November 14, 2017): 500–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1035304617739504.
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Financialisation and financial risk have become current buzzwords, but the connections between finance and labour are not well developed. Often labour is cast simply as the distributional victim of developments like shareholder value, the privatisation of public infrastructure and labour market reform. This article engages developments in the construction industry and locates a growing financial logic inside ‘production’ and work in that sector. Through the concepts of liquidity and risk, we identify causal connections, not just parallels, between financial innovation and the reorganisation of the logic and structure of work in the Australian construction and property services industry.
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Aerts, Walter, and Beibei Yan. "Rhetorical impression management in the letter to shareholders and institutional setting." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 30, no. 2 (February 20, 2017): 404–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aaaj-01-2015-1916.
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Purpose Using composite style measures of the letter to shareholders, the purpose of this paper is to elaborate dominant rhetorical profiles and qualify them from an impression management (IM) perspective. In addition, the paper examines how institutional differences affect rhetorical profiles by comparing intensity and contingencies of rhetorical profiles of UK and US companies. Design/methodology/approach The authors use automated text analysis to capture linguistic style characteristics of a panel of UK and US companies and employ factor analysis to determine rhetorical profiles. Next, the authors investigate company-level and country-level determinants of a company’s rhetorical stance. Findings The authors document three prominent rhetorical profiles: an emphatic acclaiming stance, a cautious plausibility-based framing position, and a logic-based rationalizing orientation. The profiles represent distinct self-presentational logics and have different readability effects. Rhetorical IM is stronger in US companies, but higher expected scrutiny in the US institutional environment affects sensitivity of rhetorical postures to message credibility and litigation risk, while marginally increasing the less litigation-sensitive defensive framing style in US letters. Originality/value The authors develop replicable archival-based measures of prominent rhetorical IM traits of the shareholder letter, based on composite style features. The authors argue that they are qualitatively different from content-based IM proxies. The authors investigate their institutional and organizational relevance by examining how company features and country-level differences affect incentives and constraints for style-based rhetorical IM.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Shareholder logic"
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Jung, Jin Wook. "Shareholder Value and Workforce Downsizing, 1981-2006." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10511.
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Even before the current economic meltdown, waves of downsizing, starting in the late 1970s, had swept corporate America, eroding workers’ expectations of economic security. But not only did downsizing become more prevalent during this period; its basic nature changed. Previously, firms had cut jobs temporarily, to adjust the size of their workforce during a downturn. Since the late 70s, firms have increasingly cut jobs in both good and bad times, in order to boost stock price. My dissertation examines the inter-group power dynamics underlying the transformation of workforce downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy. Examining both downsizing announcements from more than 700 leading U.S. corporations between 1981 and 2006, and actual implementation of the announced downsizing plans, I find at work in the process a shift in ideology, from an emphasis on corporate growth and conglomeration to an emphasis on profitability and shareholder value, an ideology that both reflects and intensifies the growing influence of shareholders over firms and the declining role of labor. My first empirical chapter examines the role of institutional investors and shareholder-value-oriented managers in the transformation. The second empirical chapter examines the potential resistance from labor unions and shows how the anti-union stance of the public policy regime in the 1980s weakened unions’ power to resist. The last empirical chapter examines the role of investors, unions, and executives in the implementation of announced downsizing plans and demonstrates the contested nature of the implementation process. Together, these three chapters illustrate the class politics simmering under the surface of the acceptance of downsizing for shareholder-value maximization, and emphasize the role of agency and power, as constructed by particular institutional logics, not only in promoting but also resisting the process of institutional change.Sociology
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Berg, Joseph, and Alexander Gyllenstierna. "Ägarnas värderingar ochbolagsstyrning i familjeföretag : En kvalitativ studie kring familjeföretagsägaresföretagsmässiga värderingar och hur det har implementeratsi bolagsstyrningen." Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för handel och företagande, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-20012.
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Bakgrund: Familjeföretag är en vanlig företagstyp både i Sverige och i världen och har vanligtvis bolagsformen aktiebolag. Definitionen av ett familjeföretag innebär att en majoritet av företaget ska ägas och kontrolleras av en familj som antingen grundat eller förvärvat företaget. Vidare ska även minst en familjemedlem vara verksam i företagsledningen. Familjeföretag ärvs vanligtvis inom familjen samtidigt som försäljning till utomstående också förekommer. I och med att andra ägare än grundarna driver företaget kan nya värderingar och preferenser ta plats i bolagsstyrningen än vad företaget grundades på. Problematiken är att få familjeföretag framgångsrikt drivs vidare efter ägarskiften. En möjlig orsak till det är förändrade representationer av värderingar och strategier, exempelvis kortsiktiga nyttor. Syfte: Rapporten syftar till att skapa en ökad förståelse för ägarnas främsta värderingar gällande sitt företagande och hur det har implementerats i bolagsstyrningen. Ägarna är valda från små och medelstora familjeföretag och har genomgått minst en form av ägarskifte. Rapporten fokuserar på de gemensamma dragen hos dessa ägare. Metod: Genom en kvalitativ metod har elva intervjuer med ägare och ledare i tio små och medelstora familjeföretag utförts. Sekundärdata har även samlats in genom företagens hemsidor och årsredovisningar. Gemensamma drag har sedan analyserats. Slutsats: Gemensamt bland studerade familjeföretagsägare värderas främst det långsiktiga ägandet och gärna genom deras barn. Vidare värderades det även att fortsätta vara en lokal aktör, öka lönsamheten och skapa tillväxt. Därför har långsiktiga investeringar gjorts och fokus har lagts på relationer till kunder, leverantörer och medarbetare. Flera ägare hade tillsatt externa individer som bland annat VD, styrelseordförande och styrelseledamöter i syfte att ta bättre beslut.Background: Family business is a common type of business both in Sweden and worldwide and usually under the form of a limited company. The definition of a family business means that a majority of the business must be owned and controlled by a family that has either founded or acquired the business. Furthermore, at least one family member must also be active in the company's management. Family businesses are usually inherited within the family, while sales to outsiders also occur. As owners other than the founders run the company, new values and preferences can appear in corporate governance. The problem is that only a few family businesses are successfully run after the change of ownership. One possible reason for this problem is changed representations of values and strategies, such as short-term benefits. Aim: This report aims to create an increased understanding of the owners' main values regarding their business and how it has been implemented in corporate governance. The owners are selected from small and medium-sized family businesses, that have undergone at least one form of ownership change. The report focuses on the collective features of these owners. Method: Through a qualitative method, eleven interviews with owners and leaders in ten small and medium-sized family companies were conducted. Secondary data has was also collected through the companies' websites and annual reports. Collective features have then been analyzed. Conclusion: Collective values among studied family business owners are primarily long-term ownership and preferably through their children. Furthermore, it was also valued to continue to be a local player, increase profitability and create growth. Therefore, long-term investments have been made, and focus has been placed on relationships with customers, suppliers and employees. Several owners had appointed external individuals such as the CEO, Chairman of the Board and Board members to make better business-related decisions.
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LI, JYUN-ZIH, and 李雋梓. "The Relationship between Electronic Voting System in Shareholder Meeting and Financial Reporting Timeliness." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi/login?o=dnclcdr&s=id=%22104CCU01736033%22.&searchmode=basic.
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碩士國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所碩士在職專班
104
This study is to investigate the impact before and after the implement of electronic voting in shareholders meeting to the financial statements bulletin. Previous literature shows that using electronic voting in shareholders meeting is the implementation of shareholder activism. The electronic voting system can also enhance shareholders voting participation rates. However, the more individual shareholders, the voting rate is relatively low. The financial statements has information content in the capital market. The market reaction is more positive for the company which announced financial statements earlier. The release timeliness of financial statements has a significant impact to enterprise and investors. This study expects that implementing electronic voting can improve the shareholders supervision effect under the shareholder activism. After the implementation of electronic voting, the financial statements will release earlier than before. The proportion of individual shareholders is higher, the effect may not be achieved. The empirical results show the company which enforcing electronic voting in shareholders meeting will release financial statement earlier than before. However, higher proportion of individual shareholder will delay to release financial statements.
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Cherng, Pey-Cherng, and 程沛誠. "Do Shareholders Benefit from Leveraged Buyouts?: An Analysis of Undervaluation and Premiums." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi/login?o=dnclcdr&s=id=%22107NCHU5304024%22.&searchmode=basic.
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碩士國立中興大學
財務金融學系所
107
This study estimates the degree of shareholder wealth gains/losses prior to firms'' leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Since the company can use earnings management to influence the market price, this study evaluates this issue at fair value. The results show that both institutional buyout (IBO) and management buyout (MBO) firms understate their earnings, the latter being more severe than the former. This situation leads MBO firms to be undervalued more seriously than IBO firms, but the former provide lower premiums than the latter. Putting them together, IBO and MBO shareholders gain and lose, respectively. These results reveal that the management of MBO firms expropriates shareholder wealth by deflating earnings to pay low transaction values relative to fair values.
Books on the topic "Shareholder logic"
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Moon, Jeremy. 6. Critical perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199671816.003.0007.
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‘Critical perspectives’ presents two systemic critiques of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which argue that CSR is fundamentally undesirable or impossible. Firstly, there is the view associated with Milton Friedman that sees CSR as contrary to the core purpose of business, as unaccountable management excess at the expense of shareholders, and as undermining of democratic accountability for public affairs. Secondly, there is the anti-corporate perspective, usually associated with critics of capitalism more generally. This view sees CSR as an extension of the underlying problems of capitalism and of corporations therein. CSR advocates generally sit between the two views, rejecting both sets of deductive logics and their respective implications for the sociability and accountability of markets.
Book chapters on the topic "Shareholder logic"
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Quinn, Sarah L. "Mortgage Bonds for the Small Investor." In American Bonds, 107–23. Princeton University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691156750.003.0006.
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This chapter looks at the postwar boom in mortgage bonds. The market heated up at the close of the 1920s as lenders marketed mortgage bonds to American families. With families now acting as investors in an unregulated financial market, these bond sales reflected the new logic of the shareholder democracy. The crux of the shareholder democracy was not just that Wall Street's markets could welcome small investors, but also that those markets should be unregulated. As the boom grew into a full-scale bubble, sellers had more reason to exploit the ignorance of small investors, and there was no real government oversight in place to stop them. Emboldened by the wartime bond drives and courted by Wall Street and advertisers, many Americans jumped into the shareholder democracy by investing in mortgage bonds. This was, in retrospect, a recipe for disaster. The collapse of this market in the early 1930s wiped out the private market for mortgage bonds completely and led to regulatory prohibitions against small-investor purchases of mortgage bonds.
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Heinemann, Kieran. "Popular Capitalism? Privatization and Demutualization in the 1980s and 1990s." In Playing the Market, 190–219. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864257.003.0007.
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While Margaret Thatcher publicly promoted a Puritan emphasis on thrift, hard work, and asceticism, the outcome of her policies stood in stark contrast to this side of her rhetoric. Her way of selling off nationalized industries allowed the British to have a heavily subsidized flutter on the stock market and increased the shareholder population to ten million investors. Reality, however, was a far cry from Thatcher’s slogan of a ‘share-owning democracy’, not least because the continued growth of large financial institutions meant that small shareholders had very little influence on corporate governance. Millions of people merely ‘stagged’ the privatization issues, meaning that they sold for a quick and easy profit in early trading. ‘Investors’ new and old applied the same short-term logic during the demutualization of major building societies like Halifax or Northern Rock during the 1990s, when ‘carpet-bagging’ became a national sport. Carpetbaggers opened accounts in societies ripe for demutualization not in order to save for a house, but to make a quick profit from selling their accounts once they were converted into shares due to the building society becoming a public company. This chapter places centre stage prominent carpetbaggers such as the former royal butler, Michael Hardern, who during the late 1990s campaigned to become a board member of all remaining building societies. The extent of ‘stagging’ and ‘carpet-bagging’ shows that popular capitalism was less an economic enfranchisement of the nation, and more an expressive culture of self-referential speculation, personal enrichment, and stock market gambling.
Conference papers on the topic "Shareholder logic"
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Schuyler, J. R. "Rational Is Practical: Better Evaluations through the Logic of Shareholder Value." In SPE Hydrocarbon Economics and Evaluation Symposium. Society of Petroleum Engineers, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/30066-ms.
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