Relevant bibliographies by topics / Shareholder’s theory

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
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Academic literature on the topic 'Shareholder’s theory'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 30 June 2021
Last updated: 3 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Shareholder’s theory"

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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (July 21, 2014): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v3i1.173.

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In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.
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Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value: EVA Concept." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (January 19, 2016): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/.v3i1.173.

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<p>In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.</p>
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Jia, Zhang, and Li Yan Han. "How Does Equity Structure Impact M&A Decision? a Model Based on Private Benefits." Advanced Materials Research 271-273 (July 2011): 742–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.271-273.742.

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This paper focus on the private benefit of large shareholder’s control right within the framework of Agency Theory 2 and construct a model which can illustrate how M&A decision can be impacted by acquirer’s equity structure. The model internalizes large shareholder’s private benefit as a function of the shareholding ratio and specifies the mechanism through which large shareholder’s shareholding ratio and ownership concentration impact the M&A decision. This paper provides theoretical foundation for those empirical literatures which analyze the M&As from the perspective of Agency Theory 2.
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Lukashina, Olga, Zaiga Oborenko, and Marga Zhivitere. "Extinguishing Financial Liabilities with Equity Instruments: Theory and Practice Problems." Global Journal of Business, Economics and Management: Current Issues 6, no. 1 (October 25, 2016): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.18844/gjbem.v6i1.984.

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EU introduced “fair value” accounting rules to evaluate equity instruments issued by the debtor for creditors to extinguish financial liabilities to them. These rules are not applied if the creditor is also a direct or indirect shareholder. This paper examines approaches to the evaluation debt when the shareholder’s liabilities are capitalized. Evaluation of those debts should include an audit of the documents related to incurring of debt, followed by an analysis of the debtor’s liquid assets to secure the debt. This is necessary to prevent the use of loopholes in legislation. Then the methods of business evaluation could be applied in any private enterprise.Keywords: capitalization of debts, set-off of claims , fair value, income tax, “internal” liabilities
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Oyinloye, Lateef, Temitayo O. Olaniyan, and Bamidele O. Agbadua. "Effect of financial leverage on shareholder’s returns in a dynamic business environment." Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review 4, no. 2 (2020): 40–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgobrv4i2p4.

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Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) paper made revelations on the importance of leverage in reducing tax payment obligations. Shareholders’ return may affect the risk premium associated with the use of leverage. However, the literature on leverage and shareholder returns relationships for a dynamic business environment such as Nigeria is still growing. The one-step differenced generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator is used in analysing an unbalanced panel data of 18 insurance firms for the period 2008-2017. The data used are gleaned from the annual reports of the sampled insurance companies. Results showed that the debt ratio has a significant negative effect on shareholders’ returns. However, the results become positive and significant when debt-equity and interest coverage ratios are used as the leverage ratio. This study supports the pecking order theory. It concluded that the effect of financial leverage on shareholders’ returns depends largely on the decomposition of financial leverage; hence both theories examined are relevant. This study recommended, among other things, that there is a need for the management of insurance companies to reassess the costs and risks associated with financial leverage when financing decisions have to be made. Furthermore, high indebtedness should be trimmed to reduce its negative influence on shareholders’ returns by ensuring an appropriate finance option, which will be in accordance to maximise shareholders’ wealth.
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Miyake, Masatoshi, Mei Yu, and Hiroshi Inoue. "Mitigating risk incentives by issuing convertible bonds: A refinement to the Black–Scholes evaluation model." Journal of Financial Engineering 01, no. 03 (September 2014): 1450024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s234576861450024x.

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This study employs option pricing theory to analyze the risk incentive conflict between shareholders and creditors. It evaluates the volatility of investment projects funded by borrowed money and compares their gains for the shareholder and creditor. Our analysis is based on the recognition that shareholders' and creditors' objectives may differ. We identify the shareholder's risk incentive as a source of agency cost originating with the shareholder and find that issuing a convertible bond avoids agency cost without diluting existing shareholders' ownership. Numerical examples are shown to examine it.
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Mikalonienė, Lina. "Subsidiari akcininko atsakomybė." Teisė 76 (January 1, 2010): 176–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/teise.2010.0.217.

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Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjamas akcininko atsakomybės už bendrovės prievoles dėl nesąžiningo elgesio koncepcinis pagrindimas, kuris remiasi piktnaudžiavimo teise doktrina. Analizuojamas akcininko atsa­komybės pagal piktnaudžiavimo teise doktrinos ir akcininko deliktinės civilinės atsakomybės bendrųjų normų pagrindu santykis. Straipsnyje taip pat nagrinėjamas akcininko papildomos turtinės prievolės koncepcinis pagrindimas pagal Lietuvos Respublikos civilinio kodekso 2.50 straipsnio 3 dalį. This article explores dogmatic underpinning of piercing the corporate veil doctrine on the basis of theory on abuse of rights. The article also analysis relation between abuse of rights and tort, e.g. as basis for the shareholder’s liability in the veil piecing cases and as an independent legal ground for shareholder’s liability respectively. Theoretical foundation of the corporate veil piercing doctrine accor­ding to par. 3 Art. 2.50 of the Lithuanian Civil Code is under consideration.
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Zulkafli, Abdul Hadi, and Ahmad Husni Hamzah. "Corporate contestability and corporate expropriation." Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions 6, no. 4 (2016): 403–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/rcgv6i4c3art5.

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This paper presents evidence on the role of ownership in dealing with corporate expropriation of listed companies in Malaysia. From the perspective of expropriation, a single controlling shareholder is always associated with such behavior due to their power and control at the expense of minority shareholder. However, subsequent individual or coalition of large shareholders can be an important corporate governance tool by providing effective monitoring that would lessen the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. Relating to that, this study evaluates the role of controlling and large shareholders in dealing with corporate expropriation. It is found that there is a negative relationship between single controlling shareholders and dividend payout ratio indicating that firms with only controlling shareholder will pay a lower dividend due to possible expropriation through profit diversion by controlling shareholder. Using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for ownership contestability, the presence of large shareholders along with controlling shareholder has a positive relationship with dividend payout implying that increased contestability helps to curb the power of controlling shareholder to expropriate fund for their own benefit. In accordance with agency theory, the outcome suggests that large shareholders play a monitoring role in minimizing the Type II agency problem. It is also verifying the argument made based on the Catering Theory of Dividend that the presence of large shareholder brings benefit to all shareholders as they are able to reduce profit diversion by demanding for higher dividend.
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Marcoux, Alexei M. "A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory." Business Ethics Quarterly 13, no. 1 (January 2003): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq20031313.

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Abstract:Critics attack normative ethical stakeholder theory for failing to recognize the special moral status of shareholders that justifies the fiduciary duties owed to them at law by managers. Stakeholder theorists reply that there is nothing morally significant about shareholders that can underwrite those fiduciary duties. I advance an argument that seeks to demonstrate both the special moral status of shareholders in a firm and the concomitant moral inadequacy of stakeholder theory. I argue that (i) if some relations morally require fiduciary duties, and (ii) the shareholder-manager relation possesses the features that make fiduciary duties morally necessary to those relations, then (iii) stakeholder theory is morally lacking.
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Sollars, Gordon G., and Sorin A. Tuluca. "Fiduciary Duty, Risk, and Shareholder Desert." Business Ethics Quarterly 28, no. 2 (February 19, 2018): 203–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2017.47.

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ABSTRACT:A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory demonstrates that this argument should be modified by the recognition of a principle of desert, the shareholder desert principle (SDP). Financial theory can usefully circumscribe the duty owed to shareholders and the extent to which risk bearing justifies a claim on corporate value. When combined with the SDP, the result provides management with a guideline for what is owed to shareholders before other stakeholder non-contractual claims may be satisfied. As such, our approach provides management with some guidance through the thicket of competing stakeholder claims.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Shareholder’s theory"

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Arnou, Corentin, and Marcus Hammarstedt. "DOES IT PAY TO BE ESG? : An empirical analysis of sustainability in the Nordic countries from a risk and valuation perspective." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-185361.

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In the field of sustainable finance, Environmental-, Social- and Governance-ratings (ESG) have become an acknowledged measurement of a firm's sustainability performance. The increased awareness of sustainability issues in today's society is undeniable. However, based upon contradicting results from previous research, it was uncertain if investors were rewarding a firm’s sustainability efforts in the form of a lower cost of equity. The purpose of this thesis has therefore been to examine the relationship between sustainability, risk and valuation as well as stock-price behavior in times of crisis regarding large firms publicly listed in the Nordic countries. In order to fulfil the purpose, various multiple regression models have been conducted on quarterly data from the period between 2011 to 2020. The approach chosen to examine if ESG has a relation to the cost of equity has been to calculate the implied cost of equity inferred from consensus forecasts of future financial development and stock price at each point in time, also known as the ex-ante cost of equity. Since the independent variable ESG-score was not likely to be the sole variable to affect the independent variables in our multivariate regression models, we have followed previous studies in the choice of control variables. The empirical results of this study showed a significantly negative relationship between a firm’s ESG-score and the cost of equity. In addition, our results showed a significantly positive relationship between a firm’s ESG-score and both the price-to-earnings ratio as well as the price-to-book ratio while no significant relationship between a firm’s ESG-score and the enterprise value to earnings before interest and taxes ratio could be established. Finally, the results of this thesis showed that firms with a greater ESG-score generated excess returns during the latest market turmoil of 2020 caused by the Covid-19 outbreak. This thesis challenges the value-destruction view of ESG-efforts since our results indicate that investors are pricing sustainability risk with a negative risk premium in line with the value creation approach. No causality test has been performed during this study, however several possible mechanisms by which ESG impacts the valuation and crisis resistance have been discussed based upon previous research and the theoretical framework. We argue for the reduced cost of equity to reflect diminished information asymmetry, a larger investor base, improved growth and cash-flow opportunities as well as reduced risk for litigations as aconsequence of a more sustainable business conduct. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study on the topic has been conducted on the Nordic markets. This study fills thus a research gap on the relation between sustainability, risk andequity market valuation and we sincerely hope to have contributed to academia with new approaches.
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Suortti, Ilmari. "Shareholder Ownership and the Company as a Social Contract -Bridging the Gap." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Centrum för tillämpad etik, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-107691.

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This thesis will try to combine shareholder ownership of a company with the notion of viewing thecompany as a social contract.Even if viewing the company as a social contract is usually considered to be part of the stakeholdertheory this view is not incompatible with the shareholder centred approaches.Through motivating the social contract view of businesses and discussion the advantages ofadopting a shareholder centred approach to company ownership this thesis will form the basis of asocial contract that would be agreed by the shareholders of the company. A part of this paper will also be dedicated to discussing how the shareholders could change the current companies to reflectmore closely on the contract they would initially have agreed on.
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Solak, Ekrem. "Evolving role of shareholders and the future of director primacy theory." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31353.

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Over the last two decades, US corporate governance has witnessed a significant increase in the incidence and influence of shareholder activism. Shareholder activism, however, has been found to be inconsistent with US corporate governance which is framed within director primacy theory. In this theory, the board is able to carry out a unique combination of managerial and monitoring roles effectively, and shareholders are only capital providers to companies. Shareholder activism is normatively found inimical to effective and efficient decision-making, i.e. the board's authority, and to the long-term interests of public companies. The increasing willingness of institutional shareholders to participate into the decision-making processes of their portfolio companies is at odds with US corporate governance. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether director primacy theory should be softened to accommodate greater shareholder activism in US corporate governance. This thesis presents an analysis of the legal rules that reflect director primacy theory. In this respect, US shareholders have traditionally had limited participatory power. The way in which the courts perceived the board's authority also stymied shareholder participation. This thesis considers not only legal and regulatory developments in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, but also the governance developments through by-law amendments which could potentially make an overall change in the balance of power between shareholders and the board. Shareholders are slowly moving to the centre of corporate governance in the US. History has shown that the board of directors often failed to prevent manager-induced corporate governance failures. This thesis argues that shareholder activism is necessary for improving the web of monitoring mechanisms and for a well-functioning director primacy model. Shareholder activism forces the board to more critical about management, which is a prerequisite for the director primacy model. Therefore, this thesis argues that shareholder activism should therefore be accommodated into US corporate governance. The proposed approach addresses accountability problems more effectively than the current director primacy model while recognising the board authority and enhances decision-making processes of public companies. In this regard, it makes several recommendations to soften the current director primacy model: establishing a level playing for private ordering, adopting the proxy access default regime, the majority voting rule, the universal proxy rules, and enhancing the disclosure requirements of shareholders. The present research also demonstrates that contemporary shareholder activism involves many complexities. It contains different types of shareholder activism, which differ by objectives, tools, and motives. It could be used for purely financial purposes or non-financial purposes or both. Furthermore, the concept of stewardship has been developed to address public interest concerns, namely short-termism in the market and pressures by activist funds through shareholder activism. In this way, this thesis develops a complete positive theory about shareholder activism rather than focussing on a specific type of activism. This complete analytical framework constitutes more reliable basis to draw normative conclusions rather than focussing on a particular type of activism.
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Akin-Olugbade, B. A. "Indigenization and the feasibility of corporate control by Nigerian shareholders." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304743.

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van, de Velde Melanie. "Beyond shareholder theory : exploring effective business models balancing profits and purpose." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2018. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/30692/.

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There is increased recognition that an economy based on a ‘shareholder paradigm’ has led to detrimental outcomes for society and the environment based on the assumption that profit maximisation should occur even at the expense of silent or weak stakeholders. Theories such as corporate social responsibility (CSR), shared value and stakeholder theory have added an element of purpose to the role of business next to a profit motive. However, they focus on ‘low hanging fruits’, and fail to clarify how value creation for society is effectively integrated into strategic decisions such as “how to justify fair prices to producers in developing countries instead of minimising costs to maximise profits and shareholder return?” This study explores how to combine the best of both social and commercial logics to effectively achieve ‘profits and purpose’. In total 93 interviews were conducted across ten case studies and sector expert interviews. First, key concepts were derived from a cross-case comparison and data analysis in the context of training and employment social enterprises in the UK. To increase robustness the proposed concepts were studied in a wider context developed from: The Netherlands, India, Ecuador, US, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. Contrary to the predominant focus in the literature warning of ‘mission drift’ suggesting to prioritise ‘purpose’, this study shows that ‘leading with the business’ leads to better outcomes. By developing a business model around market demand instead of social need a stronger financial platform is created to pursue social aims, and clients can develop their potential more in line with market demand. Key factors are proposed that contribute to better outcomes including: ‘avoiding the pity purchase’ by positioning the enterprise around the value proposition; selecting markets based on commercial potential; managing a ‘blended income stream’; and providing a ‘balanced work environment’. The findings highlight that both commercial and social logics have a role to play, contrary to studies suggesting that one logic should supersede the other, but require different emphasis in each business model area. By adopting a macro-perspective the study gained further insights into incorporating ‘purpose’ as part of mainstream business. A ‘profits for purpose theory’ is proposed as alternative to CSR, shared value and stakeholder theory to legitimately allocate resources to create value for society beyond the limited scope of ‘low hanging fruits’. By integrating principles of justice at the core of the business model, businesses can empower individuals and communities to contribute their potential in return for fair rewards. As Adam Smith proposed by using the profit motive with strong principles of justice major issues in society can be prevented and addressed to create a better world for current and future generations.
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Stikeleather, James A. "Toward a Systemic Model for Governance and Strategic Management: Evaluating Stakeholder Theory Versus Shareholder Theory Approaches." Scholar Commons, 2017. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7092.

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The research’s intent is improvement in governance and strategic management initially by comparing Shareholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory and making results useful for both Practitioner and Academic audiences. A conceptual model for how a society establishes and evolves the roles it legitimizes for a business to support reasoning about those roles and the process originating the expectations, responsibilities, obligations, contributions and freedom to act in the roles is proposed. Understanding this process would enable better governance and strategic management of a firm while avoiding unintended consequences when fulfilling the role and consequences for failing the role. The model becomes a basis for comparing Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories. Context for the model comes from practitioner narratives around changes occurring in business and their themes around the relationship of a business with its ecosystem. To incorporate both the societal and business relationship components, the model building process was based upon concepts and ideas from General Systems, Economics, Sociology, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Evolution, Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems, Semiotics, as well as Business. This was an iterative abductive, inductive, deductive process with each iteration compared to relevant theory, integrated across the subject domains, then tested against other academic research on the issue, evidence of the model in practice, and a culturomics study across social and industry literature. These results are exploratory, descriptive, directional, and suggestive for future research opportunities. Problems with Stakeholder Theory are identified but potentially addressed with the conceptual model, in turn suggesting a systemic approach to governance and strategic management. It was determined that Shareholder Theory results in many unintended consequences detrimental to society and the firm. The conceptual model provides points of intervention in the process and suggests potential tooling for governance and strategic management. A side effect of the research was a perspective on the practitioner / academic divide as the research grappled with the “wicked problem” nature and transdisciplinary nature of process being described. By introducing systems and complexity paradigms in the model, potential ways to address the divide are suggested, such as 3 level analysis (micro, meso, macro).
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Patel, Samir Rajnikant. "Stochastic analysis of capital structure shareholder value and corporate risk." Thesis, Imperial College London, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/8263.

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Jung, Jin Wook. "Shareholder Value and Workforce Downsizing, 1981-2006." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10511.

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Even before the current economic meltdown, waves of downsizing, starting in the late 1970s, had swept corporate America, eroding workers’ expectations of economic security. But not only did downsizing become more prevalent during this period; its basic nature changed. Previously, firms had cut jobs temporarily, to adjust the size of their workforce during a downturn. Since the late 70s, firms have increasingly cut jobs in both good and bad times, in order to boost stock price. My dissertation examines the inter-group power dynamics underlying the transformation of workforce downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy. Examining both downsizing announcements from more than 700 leading U.S. corporations between 1981 and 2006, and actual implementation of the announced downsizing plans, I find at work in the process a shift in ideology, from an emphasis on corporate growth and conglomeration to an emphasis on profitability and shareholder value, an ideology that both reflects and intensifies the growing influence of shareholders over firms and the declining role of labor. My first empirical chapter examines the role of institutional investors and shareholder-value-oriented managers in the transformation. The second empirical chapter examines the potential resistance from labor unions and shows how the anti-union stance of the public policy regime in the 1980s weakened unions’ power to resist. The last empirical chapter examines the role of investors, unions, and executives in the implementation of announced downsizing plans and demonstrates the contested nature of the implementation process. Together, these three chapters illustrate the class politics simmering under the surface of the acceptance of downsizing for shareholder-value maximization, and emphasize the role of agency and power, as constructed by particular institutional logics, not only in promoting but also resisting the process of institutional change.
Sociology
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Dahlberg, Linnea, and Frida Wiklund. "ESG Investing In Nordic Countries : An analysis of the Shareholder view of creating value." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-149988.

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ESG ratings have become a recognised sustainability performance measurement throughout the world. The Nordic countries Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway are ranked top four in the world when it comes to ESG ratings. However, do investors in these countries recognise the sustainability performance of the firms in their investment decisions? The purpose of this study was to see if Nordic investors value ESG factors, by testing for a relationship between high ESG ratings and corporate financial performance. To be able to fulfil this purpose, several multiple regression models were conducted on data for a time-span between 2007-2017 on 108 firm observations and 995 firm-year observations. Corporate financial performance was represented by the dependent variables Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets as measurements for market and accounting performance respectively. The results showed a significant positive relationship between several ESG ratings and market performance, while no significantly positive, nor negative, relationship could be found between accounting performance and ESG ratings. Based on the results from the tests, conclusions were drawn that Nordic investors do value ESG ratings when choosing their investments, indicating that companies can benefit from having good sustainability policies. This thesis challenges the classical view of profit maximisation being the ultimate interest of shareholders, as it shows a positive relationship between ESG and financial market performance. The results indicate that investors take more factors into consideration in their investment decisions than only financial accounting returns. Therefore, conclusions have been made that the Stakeholder theory better explains value creation than the Shareholder theory does. This because the Stakeholder theory emphasises that firms maximise value by taking all stakeholders affected by their business cycle into account, not only the shareholders. Furthermore, based on the results, this thesis concludes that Nordic investors’ interests are in line with the society’s interests as they do value ESG ratings when investing. No previous study on the topic has been conducted on the Nordic market, thus this study fills a research gap on the relationship between financial performance and corporate sustainability.
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Kempe, Christian. "Cash return on capital invested als Methode zur Unternehmensbewertung : Theorie und Empirie /." Aachen : Shaker, 2003. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=010526710&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Books on the topic "Shareholder’s theory"

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Min, Sungky. Asymmetric information and shareholders' wealth. New York: Garland Pub., 1997.

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Finnegan, Peter. Review of shareholder value analysis and the underlying theory. Henley-on-Thames: Henley Management College, 1998.

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Froot, Kenneth. Shareholder trading practices and corporate investment horizons. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.

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Options based Management: Vom Realoptionsansatz zur optionsbasierten Unternehmensführung. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2006.

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Fleischer, Holger. Comparative Corporate Governance in Closely Held Corporations. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.5.

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This chapter examines issues relating to corporate governance in closely held corporations. It begins by describing the typical characteristics of closely held corporations, with particular emphasis on shareholder involvement in management, number of shareholders, share transfers, market for shares, and the broad spectrum of shareholders and applications. It then considers common governance issues and conflicts in closely held corporations and proceeds with a discussion of the governance framework for such corporations consisting of company law, model articles, articles of association, shareholder agreements, and corporate governance guidelines. It also explores the internal governance and management of closely held corporations, the governance of share transfer restrictions, and provisions for shareholder withdrawal and expulsion. The chapter concludes with an analysis of shareholder conflicts, especially oppression by majority shareholders and ex-post opportunism by minority shareholders, and how they are governed in closely held corporations.
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Rose, Amanda M. Public Enforcement. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.8.

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This chapter examines issues relating to corporate governance in closely held corporations. It begins by describing the typical characteristics of closely held corporations, with particular emphasis on shareholder involvement in management, number of shareholders, share transfers, market for shares, and the broad spectrum of shareholders and applications. It then considers common governance issues and conflicts in closely held corporations and proceeds with a discussion of the governance framework for such corporations consisting of company law, model articles, articles of association, shareholder agreements, and corporate governance guidelines. It also explores the internal governance and management of closely held corporations, the governance of share transfer restrictions, and provisions for shareholder withdrawal and expulsion. The chapter concludes with an analysis of shareholder conflicts, especially oppression by majority shareholders and ex-post opportunism by minority shareholders, and how they are governed in closely held corporations.
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Guthrie, Graeme. Caught in the middle. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190641184.003.0014.

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Board effectiveness is crucial in determining the outcome of manager-shareholder conflict, which is why so much of the policy debate surrounding corporate governance involves the extent to which boards are exposed to shareholder pressure. Policymakers are grappling with three key issues. How much are shareholders allowed to know about what is going on inside their firm? To what extent can shareholders determine how a firm is run? Are shareholders allowed to choose their own board? This chapter describes: the evolution over the last quarter century of the SEC’s disclosure rules; the restrictions it imposes on the proposals that shareholders can sponsor, especially as they relate to whether or not to sell the firm to someone else; and the ongoing battle over the extent to which a firm’s board can monopolize access to the proxy statement that is sent to shareholders at the firm’s expense.
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Pacces, Alessio M. Shareholder Activism in the CMU. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813392.003.0023.

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Hedge fund activism is on the rise in Europe. Whereas hedge funds activism has been so far largely a U.S. phenomenon, there is survey evidence suggesting that hedge funds are looking for new targets. Europe is particularly attractive in this respect because the European jurisdictions support broader rights than those available to the shareholders of a typical Delaware-incorporated U.S. public company. Shareholder rights are an important part of the activist hedge fund's toolbox, although they must be understood in light of the activist's business model. This chapter discusses hedge fund activism as a major driver of institutional shareholders' engagement, particularly in Europe. It argues that the revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD) curbs rather than supports hedge funds activism, therefore casting some doubts as to whether the SRD will effectively foster engagement and investment by institutional shareholders.
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Guthrie, Graeme. A gadfly in the ointment. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190641184.003.0001.

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Modern corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, with individual investors spreading their wealth over a large number of separate firms. This allows specialist managers to use their skills to run firms and individual investors to enjoy the benefits of diversifying the risks they face. Shareholders are able to influence the way firms are run by sponsoring proposals that are put to a shareholder vote, but few do so because they cannot share the costs of monitoring management with other shareholders and they must share the benefits with them. This chapter explains the source and consequences of the resulting free-rider problem using the example of gadfly investor Evelyn Y. Davis who, because of the personal benefits she earned from monitoring, spent decades creating havoc at firms’ annual shareholder meetings.
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Hopt, Klaus J. Groups of Companies. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.30.

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Groups of companies are common. The empirical data are heterogeneous. Agency problems arise between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders and between the shareholders and the creditors. Three regulatory models exist: regulation by general corporate and/or civil law (prototype: the UK); regulation by special group law (prototype: Germany); and regulation by areas of the law such as banking, competition, and tax. The main strategy is mandatory disclosure and group accounting. Related party transactions (including conflict of interest and tunneling) are dealt with by disclosure and consent requirements. In addition, appropriate standards for directors and controlling shareholders (corporate governance) have been developed. They become stricter, if insolvency is approaching. The concept of the shadow director extends liability to the controlling shareholder. Other mechanisms for creditor protection are indemnification, veil-piercing, subordination and substantive consolidation. A fair amount of international convergence exists as to shareholder protection, but not as to creditor protection.
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Book chapters on the topic "Shareholder’s theory"

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O’Connell, Maeve, and Anne Marie Ward. "Shareholder Theory/Shareholder Value." In Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4_49-1.

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Castelo, Branco Manuel. "Shareholder Theory." In Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility, 2136–41. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_31.

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Sminia, Harry. "Agency theory and shareholder value." In The Strategic Manager, 87–103. Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge,: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315228075-5.

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Obermeier, Georg. "Shareholder Value-Oriented Management in the Light of Gutenberg’s Theories." In Theory of the Firm, 104–18. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59661-2_6.

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Veluvali, Parimala. "Retail Shareholder Protection Under the New Indian Corporate Legislation." In Advances in Theory and Practice of Emerging Markets, 93–103. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12756-5_5.

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Schiefner, Lars, and Reinhart Schmidt. "Shareholder Value at Risk as an Instrument of Company Valuation." In Modern Concepts of the Theory of the Firm, 474–90. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-08799-2_29.

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Engel, Janina, Michela Nardo, and Michela Rancan. "Network Analysis for Economics and Finance: An Application to Firm Ownership." In Data Science for Economics and Finance, 331–55. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66891-4_14.

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AbstractIn this chapter, we introduce network analysis as an approach to model data in economics and finance. First, we review the most recent empirical applications using network analysis in economics and finance. Second, we introduce the main network metrics that are useful to describe the overall network structure and characterize the position of a specific node in the network. Third, we model information on firm ownership as a network: firms are the nodes while ownership relationships are the linkages. Data are retrieved from Orbis including information of millions of firms and their shareholders at worldwide level. We describe the necessary steps to construct the highly complex international ownership network. We then analyze its structure and compute the main metrics. We find that it forms a giant component with a significant number of nodes connected to each other. Network statistics show that a limited number of shareholders control many firms, revealing a significant concentration of power. Finally, we show how these measures computed at different levels of granularity (i.e., sector of activity) can provide useful policy insights.
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Anand, Anita Indira. "SCG and Corporate Law Theory." In Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance, 13–34. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096533.003.0002.

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This chapter discusses the existing conception of the public corporation and questions whether any of these ideas appropriately account for the rise of shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG). In particular, it considers the contractarian model of the corporation as well as the agency theory, which explains the division of ownership and control as an agency relationship that necessarily produces agency costs. The chapter also addresses a newer and contrasting idea called principal cost theory, which argues that principal (or shareholder) control also comes at a cost, resulting from shareholders’ lack of expertise and the potential for conflicts of interest among them. This theory offers an important counterpoint to the normative arguments for SCG because it emphasizes the potential failings of shareholders and challenges the supposition that they are necessarily well positioned to play an active role in governance.
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Mallon, Christopher, Shai Y. Waisman, and Ray C. Schrock. "Compromising Shareholder Claims Generally and in Listed Companies." In The Law and Practice of Restructuring in the UK and US. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198755395.003.0011.

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In both UK and US bankruptcy proceedings, shareholders rank lowest in terms of recovery. In consensual restructurings, however, shareholders in both jurisdictions may be able to position themselves to retain some potential upside in exchange for their cooperation in the restructuring process. Likewise, in the context of non-consensual arrangements, shareholders in both the US and UK may also seek to leverage their position, especially in cases where they have an influence in the restructured business, whether this is by virtue of their involvement as management or key employees, or in providing further funds to the distressed business. As a matter of UK law, various restructuring techniques exist which facilitate the compromise of shareholder rights, or allow them in certain circumstances to be left out of the restructuring entirely; we consider these techniques in this chapter. In summary however, both in the US and as a matter of UK law, a consensual solution is often the preferred route so shareholder cooperation is often sought, and to this extent the shareholders may continue to influence the restructuring process.
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Anand, Anita Indira. "Shareholders and Takeover Bids: Revisiting the Poison Pill." In Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance, 83–100. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096533.003.0006.

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This chapter assesses change-of-control transactions and the use of the defensive tactic known as the poison pill, a governance tool that often puts boards, rather than shareholders, in charge of a corporation’s response to a takeover. Much as in the MVS context, this separation of ownership of the corporation from its control may invite conflicts of interest, here between boards and shareholders. The chapter then asks how shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG) can and should inform regulation of this defensive tactic. It also considers management entrenchment theory and the shareholder-primacy norm in the context of changes of control. Both the normative and the positive aspects of SCG make it necessary to revisit the current legal balance between the interests of directors and the interests of target shareholders in takeovers.
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Conference papers on the topic "Shareholder’s theory"

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Kamenjarska, Tanja, and Igor Ivanovski. "IMPACT OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: DYNAMIC PANEL EVIDENCE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA." In Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future. Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47063/ebtsf.2020.0027.

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Corporate governance is a crucial mechanism for the organizations’ actions to maintain market successful adequate and targeted policies and long-term strategies that ensure the maximization of shareholders’ benefits. The board of directors is appointed by organizations’ shareholders and its main role is to be responsible and accountable and to ensure enforcement of the top management acts concerning the fulfillment of the shareholder’s interests. For this to be achieved, it is important for the board to be efficient, effective, and focused on protecting the organization and shareholder’s interests. Good corporate governance and more specifically, board characteristics play a central role in companies’ management, coordination, and control mechanisms. The paper analyses various theoretical and empirical findings regarding the prominence of various board characteristics within companies and particularly evaluates the impact of board characteristics on the financial performance of listed companies in the insurance industry in the Republic of North Macedonia. The financial ratio ROA is used as a proxy and as a variable for firm performance while the board experience, CEO duality, board size, board composition, and gender diversity are set to be as independent variables. Based on the variables related to board characteristics, hypotheses are developed and their impact upon firm performance is examined with the use of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), a pairwise correlation matrix, as well as with multicollinearity VIF test. In that direction, this paper aims to determine the level of effectiveness of current governance mechanisms and based on the results, propose measures and actions for successfully handling agency costs while maximizing governance capability and performance in the insurance sector in the Republic of North Macedonia.
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Zhang, Yanru. "The Analysis of Shareholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory." In 2011 Fourth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/bife.2011.117.

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Riaz, Samina. "In the Corporate Governance framework-shareholders' level of satisfaction in Pakistan." In 2010 International Conference on Financial Theory and Engineering (ICFTE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icfte.2010.5499403.

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Evripidou, Loukia. "Post crisis mega mergers and their effect on shareholders’ value." In Corporate Governance: Search for the advanced practices. Virtus Interpress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cpr19a19.

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Guest, Paul, and Marco Nerino. "Do corporate governance ratings change investor expectations? Evidence from announcements by institutional shareholder services." In New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice. Virtus Interpress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/ncpr_7.

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Adámek, Pavel. "CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTION." In Business and Management 2016. VGTU Technika, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/bm.2016.53.

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The differing views regarding the role of business in society are often presented as being placed within the stakeholder-shareholder debate. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) not only sits comfortably with the mantra of maximising shareholder value, sustainable CRS practices enhance shareholder value. The purpose of the current paper is to focus on the strategic implications of stakeholder approach in theoretical background with confrontation in a sample of Czech small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and large enterprises. Data were collected through personal questionnaires that were subsequently evaluated by dependence on the type of stakeholders and their level of significance. The findings of the research discovered considerable differences between the perception of the role and importance of the various stakeholders. The contribution of this paper derives in application of stakeholder approach in Czech enterprises. They are seen as having an obligation to consider society’s long-run needs and wants, which implies that they engage in activities that promote benefits for society.
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Nenonen, Suvi, and Kaj Storbacka. "DRIVING SHAREHOLDER VALUE WITH CUSTOMER ASSET MANAGEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN A B2B CONTEXT." In Bridging Asia and the World: Globalization of Marketing & Management Theory and Practice. Global Alliance of Marketing & Management Associations, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.15444/gmc2014.10.05.03.

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Wang, Hongwug, Songling Yang, Xin Li, Jing Li, and Jiayi Fu. "Cycle Analysis of Profits to the Majority and Minority Shareholders of Listed Companies based on the Symbiosis Theory." In 2013 International Conference on the Modern Development of Humanities and Social Science. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.4.

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"Research on the Supervision of Majority and Minority Shareholders on the Management Layer under Different Ownership Structures -Based on the Game Theory." In 2019 Annual Conference of the Society for Management and Economics. The Academy of Engineering and Education (AEE), 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.35532/jsss.v4.024.

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Kolev, Nikolay. "SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF THE RIGHT OF THE LLC SHAREHOLDER TO BE INFORMED ABOUT THE ACTIVITY OF THE COMPANY AND TO REVIEW THE COMPANY BOOKS." In THE LAW AND THE BUSINESS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 2020. University publishing house "Science and Economics", University of Economics - Varna, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.36997/lbcs2020.70.

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The report analyzes the controversial questions in the case law of the Supreme Cassation Court about the right of the LLC shareholder to be informed about the activity of the company and to review the company books. The author reviews the different competences included in the content of the said rights and their corresponding obligations of the company.
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Reports on the topic "Shareholder’s theory"

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Stoft, S., J. Eto, and S. Kito. DSM shareholder incentives: Current designs and economic theory. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), January 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10124597.

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Bargeron, Leonce, Frederik Schlingemann, René Stulz, and Chad Zutter. Do Target CEOs Sell Out Their Shareholders to Keep Their Job in a Merger? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14724.

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Sadowski, Dieter. Board-Level Codetermination in Germany - The Importance and Economic Impact of Fiduciary Duties. Association Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, May 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.53099/ntkd4304.

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The empirical accounts of the costs and benefits of quasi-parity codetermined supervisory boards, a very special German institution, have long been inconclusive. A valid economic analysis of a particular legal regulation must take the legal specificities seriously, otherwise it will be easily lost in economic fictions of functional equivalence. At its core the corporate actor “supervisory board” has no a priori objective function to be maximised – the corner stone of the theory of the firm – but its objective function will only be brought about a posteriori – should negotiations result in an agreement (E. Fraenkel). With this understanding,the paper presents six recent quasi-experimental studies on the economic (dis) advantageousness of the German codetermination laws that try to follow the rules of causal inference despite the lack of random variation. By and large they refute the hold-up model of codetermination by showing positive or nonnegative effects even on shareholder wealth – and a far-reaching improvement of the well-being of the core workforce. In conclusion, indications are offered that the shareholder primacy movement has only weakened, but not dissolved the “Deutschland AG”.
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