Journal articles: 'Share ownership'

1

Guirdham, Maureen, and Siew Choo Tan. "Equalising Share-Ownership." Economic Affairs 7, no. 3 (February 1987): 31–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.1987.tb01843.x.

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HINDMOOR, ANDREW. "Free Riding off Capitalism: Entrepreneurship and the Mondragon Experiment." British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (January 1999): 217–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123499220091.

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As the deficiencies of central planning have become more obvious, shares in market socialism have risen. Whilst accepting the case for competitive markets, market socialists question the desirability of and the need for capitalist forms of private property and share a commitment to more inclusive forms of ownership. Whilst this leaves open the question of precisely what form of ownership is appropriate, many have advocated the use of labour co-operatives in which (i) only those who work for a firm are entitled to a share of its ownership, (ii) all those who work for a firm are entitled to a share of its ownership, and in which consequently (iii) profits and (iv) decision making are shared.

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White, Robert, Bruce Tranter, and Dallas Hanson. "Share ownership in Australia." Journal of Sociology 40, no. 2 (June 2004): 99–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1440783304042870.

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Wang, Hong Yang. "A Secure Image Watermarking Using Visual Cryptography and Discrete Fractional Fourier Transform." Applied Mechanics and Materials 577 (July 2014): 754–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.577.754.

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In this paper we proposed a secure image watermarking algorithm for digital image using the visual cryptography (VC) and discrete fractional Fourier transform (DFRFT). We use the visual secret sharing scheme to construct two shares, namely, master share and ownership share. Features of the original image are extracted using Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF), and are used to generate the master share. Ownership share is generated with the help of secret image (watermark) and the master share, using VC technique. In case of any dispute, the master shares and ownership shares can be stacked together to give the copyright image verifying the ownership about the host image. In order to achieve the robustness and security, the properties of VC, DFRFT and NMF are used in our scheme. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme is strong enough to resist various signal processing operations.

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Simón Moreno, Héctor, Núria Lambea Llop, and Rosa Maria Garcia Teruel. "Shared ownership and temporal ownership in Catalan law." International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 9, no. 1 (April 10, 2017): 63–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlbe-09-2016-0015.

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Purpose The global economic crisis and the housing bubble meltdown have had a significant impact on the Spanish property market. As a result, the homeownership–tenancy dichotomy has become a matter of discussion, and efforts are made to discover formulas that provide affordable, stable and flexible housing access. Taking this background into account, the Catalan lawmaker has implemented the so-called “intermediate tenures” (temporal ownership and shared ownership) into the Catalan Civil Code, which are conceived as a middle ground between ownership and renting. This paper aims to explores how these “intermediate tenures” work. Design/methodology/approach These tenures are conceived as a middle ground between ownership and renting and may be used for a variety of purposes. As the Catalan lawmaker has fragmented the right of ownership on the basis of English law, which is a great breakthrough regarding the long-standing conception of the right of ownership in continental legal systems, the paper explores how these “intermediate tenures” work, as regulated in Act 19/2015, in a comparative perspective. Findings The paper offers an overview of how these “intermediate tenures” are regulated and which are the problems arising from legislation and the potential uses. Originality/value As the temporal ownership confers on the titleholder the domain of an asset for a specifically defined period of time, it does not conform to the right of ownership as it is currently conceived in continental European legal systems, given that it is based on the English leasehold; shared ownership confers on the buyer a property share in the thing, entitling him to the full possession, use and exclusive enjoyment of the thing and to gradually acquire the remaining share. Both are based on the English shared ownership scheme and leasehold, and are legal transplants worth to be analysed.

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Lamba, Asjeet S., and Geof Stapledon. "What motivates block share ownership?" Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 2 (2014): 349–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2c4p1.

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Diffuse share ownership is not as pronounced in the U.S. as many would assume. This has led to a body of research examining large shareholders, or blockholders. Issues addressed include whether firms with a blockholder perform better or worse than widely-held firms; whether firms with a blockholder pay their executives differently to widely-held firms; and whether the presence of a blockholder increases or decreases the incidence takeovers. Another issue, which this paper explores, is what motivates block share ownership. Bebchuk (1999a, 1999b) develops a model which predicts that a firm is more likely to have a controlling blockholder if the anticipated private benefits of control at that firm are comparatively large. This paper examines the factors associated with ownership structure among publicly traded Australian firms. Our results indicate that private benefits of control are a significant factor in explaining the differences in ownership structure among Australian firms. As importantly, we also find that the relationship between the existence of a blockholder and private benefits of control is endogenous. That is, the presence of a controlling blockholder strongly influences the prevalence of these private benefits of control.

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Edwards, Jeremy S. S., and Alfons J. Weichenrieder. "Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation." German Economic Review 5, no. 2 (May 1, 2004): 143–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-6485.2004.00100.x.

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Abstract Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The results show that, for most types of largest shareholder, the beneficial effects on minority shareholders of increased ownership (greater monitoring of management, and reduced incentives to exploit minority shareholders due to greater cash-flow rights) are at least as large as, and sometimes significantly larger than, the harmful effect (greater private benefits of control due to greater control rights).

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8

Fogarty, Michael P. "Share ownership plans: Employees’ views." Policy Studies 7, no. 3 (January 1987): 30–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01442878708423472.

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9

Saunders, Peter. "Privatization, Share Ownership and Voting." British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 (January 1995): 131–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007092.

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Popular support for the British government's privatization programme has never exceeded 40 per cent of the electorate, and by the end of the 1980s, huge public flotations of industries like water and the electricity suppliers and generators were taking place in the teeth of widespread popular opposition. The evidence on voting behaviour suggests, however, that it was the Labour party rather than the Conservatives which lost electoral support as a result of the privatization programme. This Research Note offers an explanation for this apparent paradox.

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GROUT, PAUL. "The Wider Share Ownership Programme." Fiscal Studies 8, no. 3 (August 1987): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.1987.tb00300.x.

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11

Dobbins, Richard, and Norman H. Cuthbert. "U.K. Share Ownership 1966–1980." Management Research News 8, no. 3 (March 1985): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb027862.

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12

Çelik Şimşek, N., and B. Uzun. "USING 3D BIM MODEL FOR THE VALUE-BASED LAND SHARE CALCULATIONS." ISPRS Annals of Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences IV-4/W4 (November 13, 2017): 173–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/isprs-annals-iv-4-w4-173-2017.

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According to the Turkish condominium ownership system, 3D physical buildings and its condominium units are registered to the condominium ownership books via 2D survey plans. Currently, 2D representations of the 3D physical objects, causes inaccurate and deficient implementations for the determination of the land shares. Condominium ownership and easement right are established with a clear indication of land shares (condominium ownership law, article no. 3). So, the land share of each condominium unit have to be determined including the value differences among the condominium units. However the main problem is that, land share has often been determined with area based over the project before construction of the building. The objective of this study is proposing a new approach in terms of value-based land share calculations of the condominium units that subject to condominium ownership. So, the current approaches and its failure that have taken into account in determining the land shares are examined. And factors that affect the values of the condominium units are determined according to the legal decisions. This study shows that 3D BIM models can provide important approaches for the valuation problems in the determination of the land shares.

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13

Toukan, Amjad. "Privately held or publicly owned? Large shareholders and corporate control – evolutionary game theoretic analysis." Corporate Ownership and Control 12, no. 4 (2015): 141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i4p10.

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I use evolutionary game theoretic techniques to model the interaction between managers and shareholders and describe the equilibrium ownership structure arrived at in different legal environments. The decision to go public and the shape of the ownership structure itself depend on the particular combination of ownership that maximizes the initial owners’ wealth. Owners/managers and large shareholders exert costly efforts to increase their share of the value of the public firm. The respective shares and the listing decision are affected by the efficiency of the judiciary and law enforcement system

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Ablyatipova, N., and Kunitsa. "Problems of Legal Regulation of Issues of Redistribution of Shares in the Right of Common Property." Bulletin of Science and Practice 7, no. 9 (September 15, 2021): 460–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.33619/2414-2948/70/42.

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The article is devoted to the peculiarities of legal regulation of the redistribution of shares in the right of common share ownership. The authors examine issues of the overall legal characteristics of the share ownership, the possibility of redistribution of shares, judicial practice is analyzed. It is concluded that it is necessary to improve legislative norms that regulate the possibility of redistribution of shares when using maternal funds

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15

Friedman, Benjamin M. "Economic Implications of Changing Share Ownership." Journal of Portfolio Management 22, no. 3 (April 30, 1996): 59–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1996.409552.

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16

Estrin, Saul, Paul Grout, Sushil Wadhwani, S. J. Nickell, and Mervyn King. "Profit-Sharing and Employee Share Ownership." Economic Policy 2, no. 4 (April 1987): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1344552.

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17

Smith, David. "Economic Implications of Changing Share Ownership." CFA Digest 27, no. 1 (February 1997): 58–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v27.n1.23.

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18

GROUT, PAUL. "WIDER SHARE OWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3, no. 4 (1987): 13–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/3.4.13.

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19

Cosh, Andy, Paul M. Guest, and Alan Hughes. "Board Share-Ownership and Takeover Performance." Journal of Business Finance Accounting 33, no. 3-4 (April 2006): 459–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00615.x.

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20

DAVIS, E. H. "Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership." Fiscal Studies 7, no. 2 (May 1986): 54–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.1986.tb00422.x.

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21

Lau, Sie Ting, and Thomas H. Mclnish. "Administration of Foreign Share Ownership Restrictions." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 01, no. 04 (December 1998): 497–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091598000296.

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In many cases foreign ownership restrictions have led to the division of the shares of a firm's stock into foreign and local tranches traded separately. We examine two problems connected with the separation of the market for foreign and local shares. We show that when separate trading in the foreign and local shares begins liquidity is reduced, especially for local investors. Further, we document a number of cases of uncompensated wealth transfers from foreign to domestic investors. To address these two problems, we propose a system in which all shares are traded in a single market and foreign holders are required to purchase Foreign Ownership Registration Rights (FORRs) in a separate market. We argue that this system will increase liquidity for both local and foreign investors. We also propose a number of rules concerning the way these restrictions are administered. These rules are designed to reduce agency problems such as uncompensated wealth transfers and to increase fairness.

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22

Hyman, J., H. Ramsay, J. Leopold, L. Baddon, and L. C. Hunter. "The Impact of Employee Share Ownership." Employee Relations 11, no. 4 (April 1989): 9–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01425458910133941.

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23

Azar, José, and Xavier Vives. "Common Ownership and the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis." AEA Papers and Proceedings 109 (May 1, 2019): 322–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20191066.

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We extend the model in Azar and Vives (2018) to allow for investment and show that higher effective market concentration (augmented by common ownership) leads to lower equilibrium wages, real interest rates, lower output, lower labor share, and lower capital share as well (under a mild condition). We calibrate a multisector sector model of the US economy and find that the rise in common ownership may account for the broad evolution of labor and capital shares in the period 1985-2015 while measured increases in concentration cannot (under plausible values for elasticity parameters).

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Khong, Yeen Lai,, Peck Ling, Tee, and Mahendra Kumar A/l Chelliah. "The Effects of Insider Ownership Capital Structure of Main Board Listed Companies." Research in Economics and Management 2, no. 1 (January 22, 2017): 43. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/rem.v2n1p43.

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<em>In this paper, researcher tends to discuss the “internal control protects shareholders from agency problem”. The term of insider ownership refer to the shareholders who manage the company as well. In other words, the managers are also the owner of the company. Hence, the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers will reduce as the higher on concentration insider ownership. In this study, insider ownership expressed as the percentage of the firm’s outstanding share held by the insider. Insider ownership can be classified into outstanding share held by directors, director’s family members (e.g., spouse and siblings), board members and employees’ share option scheme committees. Family or insider groups as a significant shareholder is more likely to be interested in control benefit as well as profit and decision making (Teall, 2007). Small firms usually are higher in insider ownership than outsider control. When a firm expands the business through public listing, the ownership will distribute ownership opportunity to the public. In Malaysia, when go to public listing, the 30% shares must hold by bumiputra. If there are non-bumiputra companies, the companies will gather 30% shares from outsiders who are bumiputra to meet the listing requirement.</em>

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Moser, William J. "The Effect of Shareholder Taxes on Corporate Payout Choice." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, no. 4 (December 2007): 991–1019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000003471.

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abstractThis study investigates whether the difference in individual shareholder tax rates between dividend income and capital gain (the dividend tax penalty) affects a firm's choice between distributing funds to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. The results of this study suggest that, in periods in which the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to distribute funds to shareholders through share repurchases as opposed to dividends. The results also indicate that the relation between the dividend tax penalty and corporate payout choice is affected by the types of shareholders who own stock in the firm. As tax-disfavored institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to repurchase shares as opposed to distributing dividends. In contrast, as tax-favored institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are less likely to repurchase shares as opposed to distributing dividends. As senior managerial share ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to make distributions to shareholders in the form of share repurchases.

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Balakrishna, Sridhar. "Institutional Ownership, Analyst Following, and Share Prices." CFA Digest 42, no. 4 (November 2012): 82–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v42.n4.71.

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27

Bos, Dieter, and Lorenz Nett. "Employee Share Ownership and Privatisation: A Comment." Economic Journal 101, no. 407 (July 1991): 966. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2233868.

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28

Edwards, Huw T. "International Share Ownership, Profit Shifting and Protectionism." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 164, no. 2 (2008): 280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245608784514527.

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Golbe, Devra L., and Ingmar Nyman. "How do share repurchases affect ownership concentration?" Journal of Corporate Finance 20 (April 2013): 22–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.11.002.

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30

Oei, Rosalyn, Alan Ramsay, and Paul Mather. "Earnings persistence, accruals and managerial share ownership." Accounting & Finance 48, no. 3 (September 2008): 475–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629x.2007.00248.x.

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31

Michie, Jonathan, and Christine Oughton. "Employee share‐ownership trusts and corporate governance." Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society 1, no. 3 (September 2001): 4–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14720700110397738.

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32

Aspara, Jaakko, Henrich Nyman, and Henrikki Tikkanen. "Influence of share ownership on repeat patronage." Journal of Customer Behaviour 7, no. 2 (June 16, 2008): 149–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1362/147539208x325920.

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Cúlacháin, Maoilíosa Ó. "The eircom employee share ownership plan (ESOP)." Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 8, no. 1 (February 2002): 114–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/102425890200800116.

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Estrin, Saul, Paul Geroski, and Geoff Stewart. "Employee share ownership, profit-sharing and participation." International Journal of Industrial Organization 6, no. 1 (March 1988): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(88)90002-1.

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35

Fernando, Chitru S., Vladimir A. Gatchev, and Paul A. Spindt. "Institutional ownership, analyst following, and share prices." Journal of Banking & Finance 36, no. 8 (August 2012): 2175–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.03.026.

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Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos. "Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly." Portuguese Economic Journal 15, no. 3 (June 8, 2016): 173–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10258-016-0119-4.

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37

Li, Yongqing, Jinghui Liu, and Ian Eddie. "Share types and earnings management: Evidence from Chinese listed companies." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 2 (2011): 271–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2c2p4.

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This study contributes to the literature on the ownership structure by investigating the effect of special share types on the practice of earnings management in China. Equity ownership in listed Chinese companies have five different types: state-owned shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-shares, and B- & H-shares, which is a phenomenon unique to the Chinese equity market. Empirical analysis shows that different share types and mixed ownership structure significantly affects the company’s earnings management. Using a sample of 544 listed Chinese company-years, this study finds that the state-owned shares and legal person shares are positively associated with earnings management. However, the proportion of B- & H-shares is not related to earnings management. In addition, empirical results also show evidence in support of a positive relationship between the proportion of A-shares and earnings management. These findings indicate that transferral of more state-owned shares and legal person shares to the public can mitigate earnings management. However, because currently in China shares are still largely owned by the state or legal persons, the magnitude of earnings management may be maintained at a high level. In addition, due to tradable A-shares has a positive relation with earnings management, holding a large proportion of A-shares still cannot effectively constrain earnings manipulation, which suggests that China’s ownership structure reform may not be highly successful as China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) expected. In achieving a better corporate governance practice, further structure reform is essential

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38

Keef, Stephen P. "Employee share ownership and job attitudes: The effects of share sale." Asia Pacific Journal of Management 11, no. 1 (April 1994): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01731874.

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Hofmann, Felix, Andranik Tumasjan, and Isabell Melanie Welpe. "Employee Share Ownership and Innovative Work Behavior: Does Ownership Foster Innovative Behaviors?" Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, no. 1 (August 2018): 12507. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2018.12507abstract.

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Boshoff, Christo, and Noxolo E. Mazibuko. "Share ownership in a retail firm: An exploratory study of employee perceptions." South African Journal of Business Management 26, no. 1 (March 31, 1995): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajbm.v26i1.818.

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The job performance of employees of South African firms is often viewed as poor, particularly in respect of productivity. Managers are at times perplexed that some employees work hard and are efficient while others underperform. In this study we explore the concept of job performance and potential means to improve the job performance of employees in a retail environment. Share ownership by employees and encouraging them to identify with the organization (organizational commitment) as means of enhancing job performance are the foci of the study. Contrary to expectations it was found that share ownership does not influence job performance directly. In other words, employees who own shares are not better performers than those who do not own shares. Share ownership does, however, reduce the propensity to resign. Share owners are thus more likely to remain with the firm than those who do not own shares. It was also found that share ownership did not influence organizational commitment. Encouraging employees to join the firm's employee share ownership scheme will thus not enhance identification with the firm. The empirical results have shown however, that there is a positive relationship between organizational commitment and job performance. At least for this sample of retail employees, job performance can be enhanced by encouraging them to accept and identify with the firm's goals, values and objectives (organizational commitment). At the same time their propensity to resign and leave the firm will be reduced. To enhance organizational commitment (and thus job performance), two approaches could be used. By providing employees with interesting, challenging jobs and regular feedback on job performance, they will become more committed to the organization. Secondly, by encouraging feelings of group cohesion among employees, positive perceptions and attitudes toward the organization as a whole will grow. Positive feelings about both the job itself and co-workers can thus enhance job performance in a retail environment and reduce the harmful impact of labour turnover.

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Cobanoglu, Ferit, Erol Ozkan, and Atila Altintas. "Farmers' Perceptions of Smallholding Co-Ownership Problems." Outlook on Agriculture 40, no. 4 (December 2011): 299–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.5367/oa.2011.0062.

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This paper provides an overview of some of the land ownership consolidation programmes that have been attempted in a number of countries, and examines in more detail the present situation in Turkey. Much of the rural land in Turkey is fragmented, and the structural problems created by co-ownership of small properties will probably influence the viability of future farming in the country. This paper identifies the attitudes of co-owner farmers to the disposal of their own share to one of their heirs when that share's value is paid at the current market value of the land. Ninety farmers who owned their landholdings were interviewed. Answers to the survey questions were analysed with a logit model, and the maximum likelihood method was employed to estimate the model. The results indicate that a farmer's level of education and acceptance of the trend towards the disposal of an owned shared parcel to a third person are positively related to the likelihood that the farmer will choose to pass on the shared parcel of land to an heir. This is true provided that the share value the farmer is likely to recover is the current market value of the land.

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Hrovatin, N., and S. Uršič. "The determinants of firm performance after ownership transformation in Slovenia." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 169–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(02)00006-5.

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In the last decade there has been an extensive debate in transition countries on whether ownership matters for company performance. The key issue has been whether outsider ownership outperforms insider ownership. This paper examines the influence of several variables — insider ownership, ownership by the state and municipalities, market share and the share of exports — on company performance in a sample of 488 Slovenian industrial companies after their ownership transformation. Econometric estimations demonstrate, contrary to the expectations based on previous Slovenian studies, that insider ownership does enhance performance. Market share has the expected positive influence on value added, whereas the influence of exports is negative due to the export reorientation to Western markets and the exchange rate policy in 1998. The effect of state ownership is statistically insignificant.

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Jehu, Philip, and Mohammad Azhar Ibrahim. "Board of Directors’ Interest in Share Ownership and Earnings Management." Indian-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Finance 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 33–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.52962/ipjaf.2019.3.1.63.

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In this study, we examine the effect of directors’ ownership on earnings management practices. Explicitly, we draw from the agency theory to distinguish between ownership by non-executive directors and ownership by executive directors to investigate reasons for directors and managerial opportunistic behaviour. Utilising data from a sample of 864-firm-year observations ranging from 2009 to 2017 period, we test our hypothesis through OLS regression. We find that non-executive directors’ interests in shareholding are significantly associated with higher levels of earnings management. We observed a decrease in abnormal accruals on the overall basis of the combined ownership of both executive and non-executive directors. Overall, ownership by all directors combined significantly reduces managerial opportunism. By contrast, there is no evidence that executive directors’ ownership mitigates managerial opportunism. This paper contributes to corporate governance literature, particularly when the independence of board members is essential. This study disaggregates board ownership into executive holdings and non-executive holdings, dimensions which were hitherto rendered as managerial ownership or board ownership. These findings imply firms’ corporate governance policy and regulations.

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Siregar, Nolita Yeni, and Fitria Rahayu. "Pengaruh Corporate Governance Terhadap Restatement dan Dampaknya Terhadap Harga Saham." Jurnal Ilmiah ESAI 12, no. 2 (July 23, 2018): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.25181/esai.v12i2.1098.

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This study aims to prove empirically the influence of corporate governance proxied by the size of the board of commissioners, the independence of the board of commissioners, the size of the audit committee, managerial share ownership and institutional share ownership as well as its impact on stock prices. The data used in this research is secondary data. The population in this study is a public listed company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2013-2015. The analysis technique used is logistic regression analysis. The test results prove that the size of the board of commissioners, the size of the audit committee and managerial share ownership, negatively negatively affect the restatement, while the independence of the board of commissioners and institutional ownership have no significant significant effect on the restatement and restatement negatively effect on stock prices.Â Keywords: Board size, board independence, audit committee , managerial share ownership, institutional share ownership, restatement, stock priceÂ

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Burson, Jonathan J., and Marlin R. H. Jensen. "Institutional ownership of dual-class companies." Journal of Financial Economic Policy 13, no. 2 (February 19, 2021): 206–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfep-04-2020-0061.

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Purpose This study aims to examine institutional ownership of companies that go public with dual-class share structures. Design/methodology/approach Several recent studies have discussed the potential advantages and disadvantages of the dual-class structure, which allows founders and insiders to maintain control of the firms they created through superior voting rights. Institutional investors oppose the dual-class structure, arguing that inferior voting rights make it difficult to respond to poor governance or performance. Previous research has shown the early value-added to the dual-class firm declines through time. This study examines institutional ownership of dual-class companies through time and compares institutional investments in initial public offerings with perpetual superior-class structures versus those with provisions to sunset those shares to one-share, one-vote structures. Findings Evidence suggests that institutional investors view perpetual dual-class structures as potentially riskier in terms of poor governance or performance and prefer dual-class companies with sunset provisions. Originality/value This study suggests that founders and insiders should consider either the dual-class structure with a sunset provision or if they choose the perpetual dual-class, it should include some type of event-driven safeguards.

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Blasi, Joseph, Douglas Kruse, and Richard B. Freeman. "Broad-based employee stock ownership and profit sharing." Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership 1, no. 1 (June 11, 2018): 38–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpeo-02-2018-0001.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review the historical background for broad-based ownership in the USA, the development of forms of employee ownership and profit sharing in the USA, the research literature on employee ownership and profit sharing and related employee participation, the development of policy and options for new policies. Design/methodology/approach It is a literature review. Findings There are four reasons to be interested in employee stock ownership and profit sharing today: first, employee share ownership and profit sharing can increase worker pay and wealth and broaden the overall distribution of income and wealth, a key ingredient for a successful democracy. To be a tool for reducing inequality, employee stock ownership and profit sharing must be spread more widely and meaningfully than it is today. Second, employee share ownership and profit sharing provide incentives for more effort, cooperation, information sharing and innovation that can improve workplace performance and company productivity. Third, employee share ownership and profit sharing can save jobs by enhancing firm survival and employment stability, with wider economic benefits that come from decreasing unemployment. Fourth, employee share ownership and profit sharing can create more harmonious workplaces with greater corporate transparency and increased worker involvement in their work lives through access to information and participation in workplace decisions. Research limitations/implications Growth has been extraordinarily sluggish in the recovery from the Great Recession and has weakened in advanced countries over a longer period, leading some analysts to believe that the authors have entered a new economic era of small to modest growth. This may turn out to be true, which will increase the importance of growth-enhancing policies. The evidence that firms with employee stock ownership and/or profit-sharing perform better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership would boost the country’s lagging growth rate. The evidence that employee share ownership firms preserve jobs and survive recessions better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership could help stabilize the economy when the next recession comes down the pike. Practical implications Because there may be informational or institutional barriers about the benefits of ownership and sharing and the ways firms can introduce such programs that government can help overcome. Government has often played a role in promoting performance-enhancing work practices to enhance overall economy-wide outcomes from higher productivity and innovation, such as the long history of agricultural extension services (since 1887) to spread information on best practices in farming, and employer education on safety practices conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Social implications Because of the “externalities” – effects that extend beyond the firm and its members – that greater ownership/profit sharing can bring us. If employee ownership and profit sharing lead to fewer layoffs and firm closures, this can reduce recession-created drops in consumer purchasing power and aggregate demand; government expenditures on unemployment compensation and other forms of support; decreased tax base for supporting schools and infrastructure; and potentially harmful social and personal effects, such as marital breakups and alcohol abuse. Apart from unemployment, more broadly shared prosperity and lower inequality may also have wider benefits for macroeconomic growth, stability and societal outcomes, as described by a number of social scientists. To the extent the ownership and profit sharing is a public good, a nudge in policy to consider the idea makes sense. Originality/value Because it is hard to find policy options that are as bipartisan as the shares policy. In The Citizens’ Share, and in other articles and venues, the authors lay out the areas in which there is evidence or logic for in-depth development of, and experimentation with, several broad policy directions, with the details to be worked out by members of Congress based on their deliberations.

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Hoover, Brett C. "The "Ownership" of Churches: Ethnic, Racial, and Language Groups in U.S. Catholicism." Eurostudia 12, no. 1 (May 8, 2017): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1041665ar.

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Traditional understandings of ownership emphasize legal or economic property rights, but these conceptions come up short when examining faith communities in the United States context, where congregants often feel and act as “owners,” regardless of legal property rights. International migration to the United States further complicates this “felt ownership” within faith communities, as distinct racial, ethnic, or language groups compete or cooperate around their claims of ownership. In those Roman Catholic faith communities known as “shared parishes,” where multiple racial, ethnic, or language groups have separate worship and ministries but share facilities and leadership (Hoover 2014), the complex negotiations of sharing demonstrate the power dynamics between groups. A two-year case study of three such parishes in the Los Angeles area shows how the “felt ownership” of particular groups is privileged or limited by the various factors that shape the often asymmetrical power dynamics between the groups in U.S. society.

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McConville, David, John Arnold, and Alison Smith. "Employee share ownership, psychological ownership, and work attitudes and behaviours: A phenomenological analysis." Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 89, no. 3 (March 2, 2016): 634–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joop.12146.

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Lajar, Stephanie Natalia Ingi, and Almatius Setya Marsudi. "DAMPAK KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL, KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL, LIKUIDITAS, PROFITABILITAS, DAN KEBIJAKAN UTANG TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN DI INDUSTRI PERTAMBANGAN INDONESIA." BALANCE: Jurnal Akuntansi, Auditing dan Keuangan 18, no. 2 (January 16, 2022): 148–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.25170/balance.v18i2.3133.

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This study tries to see the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, liquidity, profitability, and debt policy on dividend policy. Managerial ownership is measured by the ratio of the number of shares owned to total shares; institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of share ownership in the ownership structure, the current ratio is measured by dividing assets and current liabilities, debt policy is measured by dividing total debt by total equity, profitability is measured by dividing net income with total assets. Profitability is calculated by dividing net income by total assets. This study uses purposive sampling by taking data from 20 mining companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011-2019. The technique of testing the hypothesis with multiple regression. This study proves that institutional ownership and debt policy affect the company's dividend policy. Meanwhile, managerial ownership, liquidity, and profitability do not affect dividend policy.

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Weissbourd, Jenny, Maureen Conway, Joyce Klein, Yoorie Chang, Douglas Kruse, Melissa Hoover, Todd Leverette, Julian McKinley, and Zen Trenholm. "Race and gender wealth equity and the role of employee share ownership." Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership 4, no. 2 (November 16, 2021): 116–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpeo-08-2021-0008.

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PurposeThe paper discusses the relationship between systemic inequity and wealth disparity and advocates for expanding employee share ownership as a strategy to address divides in income and wealth by race and gender. It targets diverse actors including policymakers, philanthropic leaders and social investors and presents a set of policy proposals and practice ideas that seek to advance a broader understanding of employee share ownership and build the capacity of key organizations to support employee-owned businesses.Design/methodology/approachThis paper draws on data indicating positive outcomes from employee share ownership programs (ESOPs) related to job quality, economic stability and wealth-building, as well as widespread political support for ESOPs.FindingsThis paper suggests that employee share ownership can help to strengthen job quality and address race and gender income and wealth gaps. It argues that there is both public support and a range of different strategies actors can implement to expand awareness and access to different forms of employee share ownership.Research limitations/implicationsAdditional research focused on other forms of employee share ownership (beyond ESOPs) is needed to deepen understanding of how each form can play a role in addressing racial and gender wealth inequities. The paper acknowledges that despite the potential of employee share ownership to mitigate racial and gender wealth gaps, additional simultaneous strategies are required to address the range of systemic barriers that have disproportionately limited women and people of color's participation in ESOPs.Practical implicationsPolicymakers are actively seeking new proposals, while philanthropic leaders, social investors and others are also eager to build awareness and understanding of employee ownership models and develop the institutional capacity necessary to support strong employee-owned businesses. This paper directly responds to these needs and contributes to a broader collaborative effort to spread employee share ownership policies and practices that support economic recovery and lay the foundation for a more equitable and resilient economy.Social implicationsEmployee share ownership is not yet a strategy that is well understood among policymakers and the public, but it connects to and supports outcomes that are top of mind for many, including increasing local ownership and bolstering local economies, helping small business owners retire in ways that preserve local jobs and businesses, strengthening job quality and workforce development, addressing racial inequity and economic inequality and providing workers greater voice and agency. This paper seeks to connect employee ownership to these high-priority issues and support efforts by a range of organizations to implement policy and practice solutions.Originality/valueThis paper fulfills an identified need to aggregate recent research on the relationship between employee share ownership and wealth inequities on the basis of race and gender. It also offers a timely argument that employee ownership strategies can play an important role in responding to the challenges facing communities and workers – particularly women workers and workers of color – as we rebuild from the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Share ownership'

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