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Journal articles on the topic 'Setting mechanism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 25 May 2024

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Gorokh, Artur, Siddhartha Banerjee, and Krishnamurthy Iyer. "From Monetary to Nonmonetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies." Mathematics of Operations Research 46, no. 3 (2021): 835–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1098.

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Nonmonetary mechanisms for repeated allocation and decision making are gaining widespread use in many real-world settings. Our aim in this work is to study the performance and incentive properties of simple mechanisms based on artificial currencies in such settings. To this end, we make the following contributions: For a general allocation setting, we provide two black-box approaches to convert any one-shot monetary mechanism to a dynamic nonmonetary mechanism using an artificial currency that simultaneously guarantees vanishing gains from nontruthful reporting over time and vanishing losses i

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ANDERSON, J. T. "SCALE-SETTING WITHOUT THE HIGGS MECHANISM." Modern Physics Letters A 03, no. 16 (1988): 1629–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021773238800194x.

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It is shown for the Higgs model that ɸ*ɸ must have a lower bound in order to assure the gauge convariance of Aµ and remove the non-analytic singularities of ϕ and Aμ. The boundary value is evaluated and provides a scale without the Higgs mechanism.

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Guo, Mingyu. "VCG Redistribution with Gross Substitutes." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, no. 1 (2011): 675–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7883.

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For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit. However, in general, under the VCG mechanism, payments flow out of the system of agents, which reduces the agents' utilities. VCG redistribution mechanisms aim to return as much of the VCG payments as possible back to the agents, without affecting the desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Most previous research on VCG redistribution mechanisms has focused on settings with homogeneous items and/or settings

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Romano, Giulia, Gianluca Tartaglia, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti. "Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (2021): 5682–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16713.

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We study the problem of designing posted-price mechanisms in order to sell a single unit of a single item within a finite period of time. Motivated by real-world problems, such as, e.g., long-term rental of rooms and apartments, we assume that customers arrive online according to a Poisson process, and their valuations are drawn from an unknown distribution and discounted over time. We evaluate our mechanisms in terms of competitive ratio, measuring the worst-case ratio between their revenue and that of an optimal mechanism that knows the distribution of valuations. First, we focus on the iden

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Bigi, Adriana, Silvia Panzavolta, and Katia Rubini. "Setting Mechanism of a Biomimetic Bone Cement." Chemistry of Materials 16, no. 19 (2004): 3740–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cm049363e.

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Biswas, Sharlene, and Chris Akroyd. "The governance of inter-firm co-development projects in an open innovation setting." Pacific Accounting Review 28, no. 4 (2016): 446–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/par-03-2016-0030.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the governance of inter-firm co-development in an open innovation setting and show how a stage-gate product development process can be used to support this relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopt a qualitative case-study approach informed by ethnomethodology. Data were obtained via semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Findings They found that in an open innovation setting – where the producing partner relies on a research partner for all product development activities – a stage-gate product development process can

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7

Imamura, Kenzo, and Yasushi Kawase. "Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints." Theoretical Economics 20, no. 2 (2025): 481–509. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6039.

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This study investigates efficient and strategy‐proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints—ordered accessibility—for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is Pareto‐efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy‐proof (GSP). Then we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show an example where the SD mechanism with a dynamically constructed order satisfies PE, IR, and GSP if o

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Ruan, Zhi Gang, and Yi Xue Ren. "Specialties Problems and Countermeasures in Higher Vocational Road and Bridge Engineering." Applied Mechanics and Materials 556-562 (May 2014): 889–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.556-562.889.

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By analyzing the current situation of higher vocational road and bridge engineering setting in our country, this paper summarizes the problems existing in current professional settings. According to our country's vocational education development demand and road and bridge engineering industry needs, this paper puts forward improvement suggestions and countermeasures to various problems from the aspects of professional macro planning, the establishment of linkage mechanism of local education authorities and higher vocational colleges, and setting up professional evaluation mechanism.

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Liu, Yu Quan, Huang Sheng Hua, and Li Wang. "Improved Control Model for Relay Protective Settings Remote Control and its Application." Applied Mechanics and Materials 313-314 (March 2013): 347–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.313-314.347.

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For a long time, settings complexity makes the settings remote modification technology is difficult to be applied on the relay protective devices effectively. To solve the key technical problems of relay protective devices settings remote modification, this paper makes an in-depth research of setting group remote control model. The setting group remote control model based on protective relaying and fault information system is proposed with the setting group services mapping between IEC61850 and IEC60870-5-103. The setting group remote control models working mechanism is deeply analysed via the

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10

Zhang, Lianzhen, Rangang Yu, Qingsong Zhang, Rentai Liu, Huijun Feng, and Yuntian Chu. "Permeation grouting diffusion mechanism of quick setting grout." Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 124 (June 2022): 104449. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tust.2022.104449.

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11

He, Di, Wei Chen, Liwei Wang, and Tie-Yan Liu. "Online learning for auction mechanism in bandit setting." Decision Support Systems 56 (December 2013): 379–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2013.07.004.

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Soudée, E., and J. Péra. "Mechanism of setting reaction in magnesia-phosphate cements." Cement and Concrete Research 30, no. 2 (2000): 315–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0008-8846(99)00254-9.

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Gerstgrasser, Matthias, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart De Keijzer, Philip Lazos, and Alexander Skopalik. "Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 1973–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.

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We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units

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Curry, Michael, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, et al. "Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, no. 9 (2024): 9626–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28819.

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Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing dynamic mechanisms for welfare is relatively well understood. However, there has been less work on optimizing for other goals (e.g., revenue), and without restrictive assumptions on valuations, it is remarkably challenging to characterize good mechanisms. Instead, we turn to automated mechanism design to find mechanisms with good performance in specific problem

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Chen, Xujin, Xiaodong Hu, Tie-Yan Liu, et al. "Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 56 (July 27, 2016): 429–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.5100.

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This paper concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms, and study the maximization of social welfare (i.e., the aggregated value of completed jobs) by competitive analysis. We first derive two lower bounds on the competitive ratio of any deterministic IC mechanism to c

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Abe, Takaaki, Yukihiko Funaki, and Taro Shinoda. "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation." Games 12, no. 3 (2021): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12030064.

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This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects’ decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor’s choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences.

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Savina, S. V. "MECHANISM SETTING MINIMUM WAGE: WORLD PECULIARITIES AND RUSSIAN FEATURES." Social & labor researches 40, no. 3 (2020): 112–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.34022/2658-3712-2020-40-3-112-122.

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Amaya, Carlos Andrés. "Interest rate setting and the colombian monetary transmission mechanism." Ensayos sobre Política Económica, no. 36 (June 2006): 48–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/espe.5002.

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ANDERSON, J. T. "SCALE-SETTING WITHOUT THE HIGGS MECHANISM: NON-ABELIAN SYMMETRY." International Journal of Modern Physics A 07, no. 01 (1992): 201–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217751x92000132.

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For the non-Abelian Higgs model it is shown that the coupled equations of motion for Aμ, ϕ and ϕ* have nonanalytic singularities which must be removed if the equations are integrable. Current conservation is found to remove the singularities in the vector-field equation and give a mass scale independent of V and the Higgs mechanism. The self-consistent field solutions for Aμ and the ϕ fields give either (1) the Higgs mechanism, zero current and the pure-gauge solution, or (2) nonzero current, a gauge-covariant solution and the mass scale independent of V and the Higgs mechanism.

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20

Narayana, Sushirdeep, and Ian A. Kash. "Fair and Efficient Allocations with Limited Demands." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (2021): 5620–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16706.

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We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior of the classic Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) mechanism in this setting and show it is fair but only weakly Pareto optimal and inefficient in many natural examples. We propose as an alternative the Least Cost Product (LCP) mechanism, a natural adaptation of Maximum Nash Welfare to this setting. We characterize the structure of allocation of the LCP mechanism in t

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Zhang, Hanrui, Yu Cheng, and Vincent Conitzer. "Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (2021): 5789–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16725.

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We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove hardness results when the revelation principle does not necessarily hold, as well as when types have even minimally different preferences. In light of these hardness results, we focus on truthful mechanisms in the setting where all types share the same preference over outcomes, which is motivated by applications in, e.g., strategic classification. We present a nu

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22

Henmi, Nobuhiko, and Michihiko Tanaka. "Amplifying Mechanism Vibration Settling by External Impact Damper." International Journal of Automation Technology 3, no. 3 (2009): 304–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/ijat.2009.p0304.

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Displacement amplifying mechanism for piezoelectric actuators using an elastic guide, such as parallel translation with flexure hinges, to avoid solid-friction-induced stick-slip movement has poor damping. Residual vibration lengthens settling time in quick driving. An impact damper uses collision energy rather than friction to dissipate vibration and operates without compromising the flexure guide’s non-stick-slip movement. Impact dampers are divided into external and loading impact dampers. An external impact damper is applied here to settle transient amplifying-mechanism vibration and to de

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23

Kantor, N. "Conditions for the effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting norms of administrative law: concepts and varieties." Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, no. 6 (December 27, 2023): 451–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2023.06.77.

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Based on the analysis of various approaches, the conditions of effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting norms of administrative law are outlined: concepts and varieties, and the author's point of view is expressed on some fundamental aspects of the problem. It is noted that the conditions for the effectiveness of the goal-setting mechanism of administrative law norms in comparison with the effectiveness of the legal regulation mechanism, the effectiveness of administrative law norms or their implementation have their own specifics, but in general, the same theoretical models are th

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Huo, Da, Zhenzhe Zheng, and Fan Wu. "Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 39, no. 13 (2025): 13944–52. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33525.

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The correlation of values commonly exists in auctions, which can be further exploited to improve revenue. However, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to manually design the optimal auction mechanism. Data-driven auction mechanisms, powered by machine learning, enable to design auctions directly from historical auction data, without relying on specific value distributions. In this work, we synthesize the learning-based auction and the characteristics of strategy-proofness in the correlated value setting, and propose a new auction mechanism, namely Conditional Auction Net (CAN). The

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Berzins, D. W., S. Abey, M. C. Costache, C. A. Wilkie, and H. W. Roberts. "Resin-modified Glass-ionomer Setting Reaction Competition." Journal of Dental Research 89, no. 1 (2009): 82–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022034509355919.

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Resin-modified glass ionomers (RMGI) set by at least 2 mechanisms dependent upon reactant diffusion prior to gelation. Each reaction’s kinetics and setting mechanism may rely on and/or compete with the other. In this study, we investigated RMGI setting reaction interactions using differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) by varying light-cure initiation times. A RMGI was analyzed with isothermal and dynamic temperature scan DSC with light-curing occurring immediately, or at 5 or 10 minutes after mixing as well as without light-activation. Results show that as time allowed for the acid-base react

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Efimova, E. "Setting of Minimal Wages: Foreign Experience and Russian Practice." World Economy and International Relations, no. 2 (2011): 24–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2011-2-24-35.

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The paper examines and compares the systems of minimum wage settings existing in foreign countries and the Russian Federation. The comparisons are made in the following directions: methods of minimum wage setting, coverage of the employees, frequency of adjustment and availability of sub-minimum rates for young workers. As a result of this analysis the author offers recommendations how to improve the mechanism for setting minimum wages in the Russian Federation at whole and its particular regions.

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Isaieva, N. І. "Strategic Goal-Setting as a System-Creating Factor of Strategizing the Socio-Economic Development of the Country." Business Inform 3, no. 518 (2021): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2021-3-6-11.

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The present day strategizing is a single technological complex and a continuous process of creating a National strategy for socio-economic development. The National strategy is a comprehensive document containing the most important directions, mechanisms, methods of public administration, which are based on long-term priorities, goals and objectives of the policy of public authorities. In order to implement the National strategy, documents of the State strategic management system are developed, agreed on long-term socio-economic goals and priorities. Therefore, the creation of a mechanism of g

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Barberis, Sergio Daniel. "Mechanism, explanatory pluralism and efficient coding explanation in neuroscience." Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento 9, no. 1 (2017): 9–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.14650.

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There is a growing debate within the philosophical community about the unity or disunity of neuroscience. The new Mechanist philosophers claim that neuroscience exhibits a mosaic unity –one in which different explanatory models may contribute to the explanation of some explanandum phenomenon ? by setting causal constraints on the space of possible mechanisms for ?. Non-mechanist philosophers frequently adopt some form or another of explanatory pluralism. In this paper I argue, first, that Mechanism is compatible with a popular version of explanatory pluralism, which I call causally restricted

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Szweda, Jan, Zdenek Poruba, Roman Sikora, and Jiří Podešva. "Computational Analysis of Mechanism Operability." Applied Mechanics and Materials 315 (April 2013): 879–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.315.879.

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This article deals with a way of interpretation the results of numerical simulations solved for the mechanism of lifting platform. Subject of analysis is the atypical design solution of lifting mechanism with one degree of freedom, which members are connected by revolute joints and linear sliding guidance. The mechanism movement is provided by linear hydromotors. Computational simulations are carried out by FEM, where linear coupling equations are used for modeling of revolute joints and linear sliding guidance is modeled by structural contact of rail and slider. The way of modeling and parame

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Choi, Yoonseok, and Sunghyun Kim. "Testing an alternative price-setting behavior in the new Keynesian Phillips curve: Extrapolative price-setting mechanism." International Review of Economics & Finance 44 (July 2016): 253–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.019.

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Shin, Suho, Seyed A. Esmaeili, and MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi. "Replication-proof Bandit Mechanism Design with Bayesian Agents." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 39, no. 19 (2025): 20453–60. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i19.34253.

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We study the problem of designing replication-proof bandit mechanisms when agents strategically register or replicate their own arms to maximize their payoff. Specifically, we consider Bayesian agents who only know the distribution from which their own arms' mean rewards are sampled, unlike the original setting of by Shin, Lee, and Ok AISTATS'22. Interestingly, with Bayesian agents in stark contrast to the previous work, analyzing the replication-proofness of an algorithm becomes significantly complicated even in a single-agent setting. We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for an alg

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Antonova, Anastasiia. "Price-Setting in Ukraine: Evidence from Online Prices." Visnyk of the National Bank of Ukraine, no. 248 (June 30, 2019): 4–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.26531/vnbu2019.248.01.

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This study examines price duration and price-setting mechanisms in Ukraine using web-scraped prices. I found that the mean average duration of prices is about 2 months. Average price duration is lower for those products that are more exposed to temporary price changes (sales). Moreover, imported goods have a higher average price duration compared to domestic goods. In terms of the price-setting mechanism, the data supports timedependent price setting behavior over state-dependent. The evidence of time-dependent price setting is 1) the size of price change being positively related to the age of

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Das, Sankar Narayan, Swaprava Nath, and Indranil Saha. "OMCoRP: An Online Mechanism for Competitive Robot Prioritization." Proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling 31 (May 17, 2021): 112–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icaps.v31i1.15953.

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We propose a collision-avoiding mechanism for a group of robots moving on a shared workspace. Existing algorithms solve this problem either (a) in an offline manner using the source-destination information of all the robots or (b) in an online manner with cooperative robots. We take a paradigm shift to the setting with competitive robots, that may strategically reveal their urgency of reaching the destinations and design online mechanisms that take decisions on-the-fly, reducing the overhead of an offline planning. We propose a mechanism OMCoRP in this setting that ensures truthful revelation

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Ron, Shiri, and Daniel Schoepflin. "On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 39, no. 13 (2025): 14070–78. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33540.

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We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategyproofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review 2017], strengthens the well-known concept of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). Loosely speaking, it ensures that even agents who struggle with contingent reasoning can identify that their dominant strategy is optimal. Thus, one would hope to design OSP mechanisms with good approximation guarantees. Unfortunately, Ron [SODA 2024] has showed that deterministic OSP mechanisms fail to

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Ma, Tian Yang, and Shi Qi Li. "Analysis Methods of Mechanism Life from its Dynamic Performance." Applied Mechanics and Materials 365-366 (August 2013): 249–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.365-366.249.

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With the dynamic mechanisms requirements on high performance and long Life, a Life-analysis method based on index of its dynamic performance is worked out. By setting a systematic model of mechanism with its parameters, synthesizing characteristic changes of key components as well as its adjustment ability to control the system, different conditions of the mechanisms Life have been worked out. Related tests proved its efficiency.

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Touriya Bassidi, Lahcen Mountassir, Hicham Banouni, Hassan Nounah, and Khalid Bouabid. "Ultrasonic Inspection of the Setting Mechanism of Glass Ionomer Cement." Russian Journal of Nondestructive Testing 56, no. 12 (2020): 1005–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1061830920120025.

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Kim, Jaejoong, Sang Wan Lee, Seokho Yoon, Haeorm Park, and Bumseok Jeong. "Neurocomputational mechanism of controllability inference under a multi-agent setting." PLOS Computational Biology 17, no. 11 (2021): e1009549. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009549.

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Controllability perception significantly influences motivated behavior and emotion and requires an estimation of one’s influence on an environment. Previous studies have shown that an agent can infer controllability by observing contingency between one’s own action and outcome if there are no other outcome-relevant agents in an environment. However, if there are multiple agents who can influence the outcome, estimation of one’s genuine controllability requires exclusion of other agents’ possible influence. Here, we first investigated a computational and neural mechanism of controllability infe

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Ross, D. K. "A mechanism for setting the scale for gauge coupling constants." Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General 21, no. 4 (1988): 1103–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/21/4/035.

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Sotomayor, Marilda. "A Dynamic Price-Setting Mechanism for a Hybrid Matching Market." Brazilian Review of Econometrics 23, no. 2 (2003): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/bre.v23n22003.2727.

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After observing the problem of the intimate wear market of Nova Friburgo with the distribution of its product both in Brazil and abroad, we designed a dynamic allocation mechanism that sets the prices according to the demand from the buyers, based on their preferences, and that yields an allocation for the core of the market game in a finite number of steps. With this scheme, all agents are simultaneously present and all sellers sell to both national and international markets. We prove that the core allocation produced by this mechanism provides the lowest price among all outcomes for the core

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Bondar, Ana-Nicoleta. "Biophysical mechanism of rhomboid proteolysis: Setting a foundation for therapeutics." Seminars in Cell & Developmental Biology 60 (December 2016): 46–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.semcdb.2016.09.006.

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Ladron de Guevara, P., and P. Patel. "Analysis of Using Irp as A Launch Price Setting Mechanism." Value in Health 20, no. 9 (2017): A744. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2017.08.2063.

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Chen, Xu, Andre Sutrisno, and Leslie J. Struble. "Effects of calcium on setting mechanism of metakaolin-based geopolymer." Journal of the American Ceramic Society 101, no. 2 (2017): 957–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jace.15249.

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Kong, Yuqing, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao, and Fang-Yi Yu. "Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical Estimation." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 02 (2020): 2095–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5583.

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We study learning statistical properties from strategic agents with private information. In this problem, agents must be incentivized to truthfully reveal their information even when it cannot be directly verified. Moreover, the information reported by the agents must be aggregated into a statistical estimate. We study two fundamental statistical properties: estimating the mean of an unknown Gaussian, and linear regression with Gaussian error. The information of each agent is one point in a Euclidean space.Our main results are two mechanisms for each of these problems which optimally aggregate

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Bao, Ergute, Yizheng Zhu, Xiaokui Xiao, et al. "Skellam mixture mechanism." Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 15, no. 11 (2022): 2348–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.14778/3551793.3551798.

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Deep neural networks have strong capabilities of memorizing the underlying training data, which can be a serious privacy concern. An effective solution to this problem is to train models with differential privacy ( DP ), which provides rigorous privacy guarantees by injecting random noise to the gradients. This paper focuses on the scenario where sensitive data are distributed among multiple participants, who jointly train a model through federated learning , using both secure multiparty computation ( MPC ) to ensure the confidentiality of each gradient update, and differential privacy to avoi

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Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pál, and Balasubramanian Sivan. "Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms." Operations Research 69, no. 6 (2021): 1805–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2121.

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How to optimize posted price mechanisms? The sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanism is one of the widely used selling mechanisms in practice. In this mechanism, the seller presents each buyer with a price sequentially and the buyer can either accept or reject the mechanism's offer. Despite the widespread use of the SPP mechanism, the problem of optimizing prices in this mechanism has not been fully addressed. In a paper entitled, “Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms,” H. Beyhaghi, N. Golrezaei, R. Paes Leme, M. Pal, and B. Sivan construct SPP mechanisms by con

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Liu, Shangkun, Wei Shen, Chase Q. Wu, and Xukang Lyu. "Optimizing Temperature Setting for Decomposition Furnace Based on Attention Mechanism and Neural Networks." Sensors 23, no. 24 (2023): 9754. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23249754.

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The temperature setting for a decomposition furnace is of great importance for maintaining the normal operation of the furnace and other equipment in a cement plant and ensuring the output of high-quality cement products. Based on the principles of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs), long short-term memory networks (LSTMs), and attention mechanisms, we propose a CNN-LSTM-A model to optimize the temperature settings for a decomposition furnace. The proposed model combines the features selected by Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (Lasso) with others suggested by domain expe

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Flammini, Michele, Bojana Kodric, and Giovanna Varricchio. "Strategyproof Mechanisms for Friends and Enemies Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 02 (2020): 1950–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5565.

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We investigate strategyproof mechanisms for Friends and Enemies Games, a subclass of Hedonic Games in which every agent classifies any other one as a friend or as an enemy. In this setting, we consider the two classical scenarios proposed in the literature, called Friends Appreciation (FA) and Enemies Aversion (EA). Roughly speaking, in the former each agent gives priority to the number of friends in her coalition, while in the latter to the number of enemies.We provide strategyproof mechanisms for both settings. More precisely, for FA we first present a deterministic n-approximation mechanism

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Ludwig, Jens, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan. "Mechanism Experiments and Policy Evaluations." Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 3 (2011): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.17.

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Randomized controlled trials are increasingly used to evaluate policies. How can we make these experiments as useful as possible for policy purposes? We argue greater use should be made of experiments that identify the behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions, what we call “mechanism experiments.” These types of experiments can be of great policy value even if the intervention that is tested (or its setting) does not correspond exactly to any realistic policy option.

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Pei, Yan. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design of Evolutionary Computation." Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2015 (2015): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/591954.

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We consider algorithmic design, enhancement, and improvement of evolutionary computation as a mechanism design problem. All individuals or several groups of individuals can be considered as self-interested agents. The individuals in evolutionary computation can manipulate parameter settings and operations by satisfying their own preferences, which are defined by an evolutionary computation algorithm designer, rather than by following a fixed algorithm rule. Evolutionary computation algorithm designers or self-adaptive methods should construct proper rules and mechanisms for all agents (individ

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Kantor, N. Yu. "Effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting norms of administrative law: concept, essence and meaning." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 1, no. 80 (2024): 462–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2023.80.1.70.

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Based on the analysis of various approaches, theoretical and legal ideas regarding the effectiveness of the goal-setting mechanism of administrative law norms have been determined, and the author’s point of view has been expressed on some fundamental aspects of the problem. It is noted that the author is a supporter of the so-called complex approach, according to which the evaluation of any phenomenon from the point of view of its effectiveness has a multifaceted orientation. At the same time, it should be noted that, taking into account the specificity and content of the mechanism of go

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