Journal articles on the topic 'Serbs – History'
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1
Fort, Emilie. "Bridging Past and Present Traumas: The Emergence of Kosovo Serb Ethnoscape in the Dynamic Interaction between the Enclaved Environment and History Textbooks’ Content." Nationalities Papers 47, no. 6 (June 13, 2019): 968–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.27.
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AbstractThis article deals with the use of history textbooks imported from Serbia in the specific context of Kosovo Serb enclavement. It provides a content analysis of history textbooks used by Kosovo Serb pupils in Kosovo in terms of their contribution to Kosovo Serb collective identity building. This article focuses on the interaction between the enclaved environment within which Kosovo Serbs have lived since 1999 and the narratives contained in the history textbooks, to highlight how this interaction influences the way Kosovo Serbs consider their identity. First, I start by showing that history textbooks used by Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo emphasize religious identity. Next, I argue that dialogic relation between past and present, understood through the dynamic interaction between the enclaved environment and history textbook narratives, contributes to the emergence of enclaves as ethnoscapes.
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Б. Богдановић, Бојана. "СРБИ У РУМУНСКОМ ДЕЛУ БАНАТА: ЕТНОГРАФИЈА ТЕРЕНСКОГ ИСТРАЖИВАЊА." ИСХОДИШТА 1, no. 7 (July 8, 2021): 35–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.46630/ish.7.2021.3.
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This text brings together few areas of anthropological interest, namely fieldwork methodology as well as marginal and marginalized ethnic groups and minorities (Serbs in Romania). Its aim is to present the structures, dynamics and main impressions from field researches in the villages of Romanian Banat (Кraljevac, Čanad, Felnak, Sokolovac, Lugovet and Zlatica) as it was realized during 2018 and 2019 within the project Researching the history and culture of Serbs in Romania. Investigation was focused on the ways of celebrating Christmas, Patron Saint Day and weddings among Serbs in Romania villages. These traditional elements were chosen because of the identity function they have not only for the Serbs in the country of origin, but also for the Serbs in diaspora, and thus consequently for the Serbs in Romania, and they even today (self)define ever decreasing Serbian national minority in the multicultural surroundings.
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Nazor, Ante. "Franjo Tuđman in the Sources of the Rebel Serbs at the beginning of the 1990s." Review of Croatian history 17, no. 1 (2021): 73–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.22586/review.v17i1.16548.
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This work presents some legal acts passed and initiatives launched by the Croatian government the aim of which was to protect the rights of the national minorities in Croatia and reach an agreement with the representatives of the Serbs in Croatia so as to avoid armed conflict. The facts presented in this work are important in the context of any given analysis about the issue of whether the Serbs were marginalized with the change of government in Croatia in 1990 and whether their armed rebellion was caused by actions made by the Croatian government and President Tuđman or came as a result of careful planning by proponents of the idea of Greater Serbia. We used a number of documents from the archival material of the Republic of Serbian Krajina to show what had been said and written about President Tuđman in the first half of the 1990s by political and military representatives of those Croatian Serbs that rebelled against the Croatian government and participated in the armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia. We describe how the Serb leadership in the temporarily occupied areas of Croatia accused the Croatian government and Franjo Tuđman of conducting criminal and “national-Fascist” policies against the Serbs and present the facts that completely debunk the accusations. These facts include official documents issued and decisions reached by the Croatian government about protecting the national minorities in Croatia during the mandate of President Tuđman. The work ends with the conclusion that the mentioned accusations were launched for the purpose of creating a greater Serbian state by homogenizing the Serbs.
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Lukic, Reneo. "Greater Serbia: A New Reality in the Balkans." Nationalities Papers 22, no. 1 (1994): 49–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/00905999408408309.
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“We Serbs must militarily defeat our enemies and conquer the territories we need.”Vojislav Maksimovic, MemberBosnian Serb Parliament“I don't see what's wrong with Greater Serbia. There's nothing wrong with a greater Germany, or with Great Britain.”Bosnian Serb LeaderRadovan KaradžićThe break-up of Yugoslavia has come about as a result of national, economic and political conflicts which by the end of 1987 had taken on unprecedented dimensions. At that point, latent political conflicts between various republics came into the open. More specifically, the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had turned into a low-intensity war. Under Slobodan Miloševićs leadership in Serbia, the Serbo-Slovenian conflict over Kosovo deepened, forcing other republics and provinces to take sides. The Slovenian leadership opposed a military solution to the Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. By 1990 the Serbo-Slovenian conflict had spilled over into Croatia, completely polarizing the Yugoslav political elite into two distinct camps; one encompassed Slovenia and Croatia, the other Serbia and Montenegro, with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina playing the role of unsuccessful mediators.
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Martinić Jerčić, Natko. "Political circumstances and security situation in Western Slavonia on the eve of the Greater-Serbian Aggression in 1991." Review of Croatian history 18, no. 1 (December 14, 2022): 379–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.22586/review.v18i1.24296.
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Based on archival sources and relevant literature, this paper portrays political circumstances and security situation in Western Slavonia from 1989, that is, from collapse of the communist systems in Europe and destabilisation of Yugoslavia by the political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, up until August 1991 when the overt Greater-Serbian Aggression started in Western Slavonia. Democratic processes in Europe also seized western Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia. These republics advocated either the restructure of Yugoslavia as a confederal state, or their independence in case that the political agreement with other republics about common state system was not feasible. Conversely, Serbian political leadership’s goal, supported by pro-Serbian oriented leadership of the federal Yugoslav People’s Army, was to impose Yugoslavia as a centralized state under the domination of Serbs, as the most numerous Yugoslav nation. After this policy failed, Serbian leadership attempted to create Greater Serbia which would comprise all territories which Serbian leadership considered as historically and ethnically a Serbian territory. Among others, that also included Western Slavonia where a certain part of population were ethnic Serbs. Part of these Serbs, as well as ethnic Serbs in certain other parts of Croatia, supported by Belgrade, gradually commenced rebellion against the Croatian authorities. Insurgency was led by representatives of Serbian Democratic Party whose centre was in town Knin. In the first phase of destabilisation the emphasis was on the thesis that the Serbs were endangered in Western Slavonia, in order to radicalize as many as possible, which was successfully implemented, and finally led to terrorist actions culminating with the open aggression in Western Slavonia.
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Abdula, Sevba. "Power and History in the Serbs: Historiography after 1990." Journal of Balkan Studeis 2, no. 2 (July 25, 2022): 7–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.51331/a023.
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This study aims to examine the processes brought forth in Serbian historiography using the structural nature of the mutually influential relationship between power and history as data. The study focuses on the post-1990 period and examines the history, institutions, major works, and historians of Serbian historiography. The period under study includes two distinct power eras: the nationalist transition and the postmodern period. The study examines the characteristics, structures, and dynamics of these periods within this framework and attempts to determine the continuity and differences between these two periods. The study analyzes the results of Serbian historiography’s relationship to power and history by examining the Ottoman narrative in general works on Serbian history.
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Ramet, Sabrina P. "The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia." European Legacy 20, no. 2 (December 11, 2014): 198–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2014.992161.
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Kaldis, William Peter. "The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia." History: Reviews of New Books 27, no. 3 (January 1999): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1999.10528424.
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Øyvind Hvenekilde Seim. "Including the Serbs of Croatia into Croatia's History Writing." Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 2, no. 1 (2009): 55–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ser.0.0041.
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Farley, Brigit, Tim Judah, John Lampe, and Marcus Tanner. "The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia." Slavic and East European Journal 42, no. 3 (1998): 582. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/309721.
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GAVRILOVIĆ, VLADAN. "THE SERBIAN VOJVODINA AND MONTENEGRO: 1848–1849." ISTRAŽIVANJA, Јournal of Historical Researches, no. 32 (December 3, 2021): 133–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.19090/i.2021.32.133-143.
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The revolution of 1848–1849 had a significant effect on the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, who established their own self-governing entity, the Serbian Vojvodina, within the monarchy. These events also attracted the attention of Serbs living outside the monarchy’s borders, especially those in Montenegro and, in particular, the Metropolitan of Cetinje, Petar II Petrović Njegoš. He wanted to assist his compatriots in the monarchy, and considered this action to be only the first step, albeit a very important one, in the ultimate fight for the liberation and unification of all Serbs within two independent countries: Serbia and Montenegro.
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Woodward, Susan L. "Genocide or Partition: Two Faces of the Same Coin?" Slavic Review 55, no. 4 (1996): 755–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2501235.
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Robert Hayden is not alone in wondering why the expulsion of Serbs from Croatia in 1991 and 1995 was labeled a population transfer and even justified by the logic of nation-states, while the expulsion of Muslims by Serbs in 1992-96 from an area of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Serbs claim for their state was labeled genocide and justified establishing an international war crimes tribunal. Hayden wants to protect the term genocide, and its legal standing internationally, for truly exceptional instances—to wit, the Holocaust, and nothing else until, God forbid, there should be another such instance. By contrast, he argues, population transfers, even on a massive scale and forced, are not pathological. "Ethnic cleansing" of territory in the former Yugoslavia, whether of Croatia or of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is unexceptional, a normal part of the history of the twentieth century. Although final solutions are not inevitable—Hayden criticizes Croatian President Tudjman for writings that seem to have justified the Serb expulsion as such—"ethnic cleansing" is a part of the history even of states that now sit in moral condemnation of the Balkan horrors and the Bosnian Serbs.
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Vlasidis, Vlasis. "The Serbian heritage of the Great War in Greece." Balcanica, no. 49 (2018): 189–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc1849189v.
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During the First World War Serbian soldiers were encamped or fought in different parts of Greece. Many of them died there of diseases or exhaustion or were killed in battle. This paper looks at the issue of cemeteries of and memorials to the dead Serbian soldiers (primarily in the area of Corfu, Thessaloniki and Florina) in the context of post-war relations between Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), at the attitude of post-Second World War Yugoslavia towards them, and the Serbs? revived interest in their First World War history. It also takes a look at the image of Serbs in the memory of local people.
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Prica, Bogdan. "Nationalism among the Croats." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 116-117 (2004): 103–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn0417103p.
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These are the three lectures about Croatian nationalism presented in the Serbian Culture Club in 1940. They review the history of the Croato-Serbian relations in a specific way, from the time when the Serbs settled in the regions of the former Croatian medieval state, after the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, after the fall of Bosnia in 1463 and after the Moh?cs Battle in 1526, till the period preceding World War II. Comparing Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the author points out that nationalism among the Croats appeared relatively late, that it did not have deeper folk roots and that at first it was the nationalism of the upper class. It was a feudal-estate nationalism but later there also appeared Austro-Catholic nationalism of the lower class in the regions under the Habsburgs. Enmity, hatred towards the Serbs and Serbophobia were the common features of these two nationalisms. The author points out that the feudal-estate nationalism of the upper class was caused by the state-legal and agrarian-legal regulation in the regions of the former Croatian kingdom settled by the Serbs. These regions, under the name of Military Border, were granted a special legal system. As for their state-legal status, the Serbs were completely excluded from the rule of the Croatian Ban the Croatian Assembly, and were under the jurisdiction of the Austrian military commanders ? therefore, directly under Vienna. As for the agrarian-legal status, Vienna completely freed the inhabitants of the Border from all taxes for the Croatian gentry, who had owned these regions before the Turkish offensive; the reason was to motivate the Serbs for permanent military service at the Border and to use these regulations to lure new Serbs-solders from the neighbouring Turkish Empire. And the dynastic-catholic nationalism of the lower class clashed with the Serbs, inhabitants of the Border, primarily because of the religious intolerance, of the irresistable desire to convert the Serbs into Catholicism. In addition, envy towards the Serbs in the Border area ? warriors and free men ? began to develop more and more among the Croatian peasants in the Ban?s Croatia, in the so-called provincial, who still remained the serfs of their gentry. The author underlines that the Croatian Serbophobias have deep historical and social roots, and points to the typical historical facts which confirm that. Croatian nationalism withdrew only sporadically before the Illyrian Yugoslavism, which saw several rises and falls in Croatia. Yugoslavism was strengthened only when the pressure from Vienna, Pest or the Italians was stronger and, secondly, it worked only when there were chances to realize it from Zagreb, not from Belgrade. As soon as one of these two conditions was not met, Croatian spirit exclusively prevailed. The author disagrees with those who believed that the Croatian nationalism could have been neutralized by decentralization, federalization and democratization of the common state. He thinks that the Croatian nationalist movement did not want a just arrangement of the relations with the Serbs, but Croatia with the border on the Drina, in which the Serbian nation would be stifled with the use of "modern" methods. Therefore, he believes that only a resolute resistance of the Serbs in the defence of their interests could stop Croatian chauvinism.
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Milošević, Srđan. "Land Property Regime According to the Vidovdan Constitution and the Agrarian Question in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." Tokovi istorije 29, no. 3 (December 31, 2021): 11–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31212/tokovi.2021.3.mil.11-36.
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Тhe paper discusses the attitudes of political parties on land property regimes in the context of the agrarian issue, and dynamics of the debate on this matter in the Constitutional Committee and in the Constituent National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The very notion of “agrarian question” concerns specifically small peasant landholdings in the process of development of capitalism. This question was raised in the context of the debate on socio-economic problems that were invited by, and eventually, introduced into the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Vidovdan Constitution, 1921) under the pressure of progressive opposition parties and parts of the ruling political organizations.
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Egorova, Maria A. "ON THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIANTS OF THE SERBO-CROATIAN LANGUAGE." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. "Literary Theory. Linguistics. Cultural Studies" Series, no. 2 (2021): 85–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2686-7249-2021-2-85-116.
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The issue of the status of languages that emerged on the basis of the Serbo-Croatian language after the collapse of Yugoslavia remains relevant until now. The standard Serbo-Croatian language arose in the 19th century as a common language of Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Montenegrins and existed in two main variants, “western” and “eastern”, from the very outset. These variants were close enough to maintain free communication, and at the same time, each variant had symbolic significance as a marker of the corresponding ethnic group. This article provides an outline of the history of the Serbo-Croatian language from its origin to the collapse of Yugoslavia in the light of two social functions of the language, communicative (language as a means of exchanging information) and symbolic (language as a symbol of national identity).
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Demjaha, Agon. "Inter-Ethnic Relations in Kosovo." SEEU Review 12, no. 1 (June 1, 2017): 181–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/seeur-2017-0013.
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AbstractThe paper aims to analyse the state of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs, with special focus on the period after unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008. Inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo has exclusively been over its territory since both Serbs and Albanians have made claims about history and ethno-demography to justify their alleged exclusive right to this ethnically mixed region. Consequently, inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have been rather problematic throughout the most of the 20thcentury. During this period Albanians in Kosovo have been subjected to discrimination, intimidation and even mass expulsion by Yugoslav/Serb authorities. In late 1990s, these relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have progressively worsened and finally escalated in an armed warfare in 1999.Immediately after the war, Serbs in Kosovo were occasionally exposed to acts of inter-ethnic and retaliatory violence. Inter-ethnic relations between the two major ethnicities continued to be tense and fragile after independence of Kosovo in 2008. Dramatic changes of ethnic composition structure, atrocities and huge number of refugees due to the war, have left a legacy of deep mistrust and animosities between Albanians and Serbs in the newly created state. Consequently, Serbs in Kosovo have from the beginning refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence and have rigorously refused any governance by Kosovo authorities. Serbian community, especially in the North, claims stronger territorial autonomy, even separatism and unification with Serbia. The paper claims that in Kosovo inter-ethnic and interstate relations are basically the components of the same equation. Therefore, paper concludes that only overall improvement of relations between Kosovo and Serbia could contribute to overall relaxation of inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the latest incidents between Kosovo and Serbia have increased the tensions between the two sides to alarming levels.
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Lajic-Mihajlovic, Danka. "The history of the three-part bagpipes in the light of migrations." Muzikologija, no. 3 (2003): 13–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/muz0303013l.
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Three-part bagpipes could be designated as multinational musical instruments since they are and were found in Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Ukraine and Romania. In order to determine the movement of their circulation in the past, it is important to investigate the influences that the different cultures had on one another. The central area of the vast territory where they were used coincides with the territory of Hungary when it was part of the Austrian Empire. From that fact it can be deduced that the presence of bagpipes as a common cultural element was the result of the influence of the Hungarian conquest. Another interpretation is based on data concerning Serbian migrations. The area where three-part bagpipes are spread significantly coincides with that of Serbian cultural influences. This finding is supported by linguistic research. The instrument related to bag-pipes, the double clarinet ("diple"), a traditional instrument of the Serbs, and the singing "on the bass" (a vocal counterpart of the harmonical structure of three-part bagpipes), mark the musical features that are characteristic only of Serbs and Croats, and are not found among other peoples that use three-part bagpipes. It is a delicate matter to differentiate the roles of those two peoples because of their common origins and centuries of close proximity on the territory that has recently gained the status of the republic of Croatia. However, on the basis of known data it seems that the key-role was played by Serbs. Such research is important for investigating typologies and stylistic stratigraphies of Serbian traditional music.
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Rozumyuk, V. "Contractive Practices in History of Serbo-Croatian Relations." Problems of World History, no. 15 (September 14, 2021): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2021-15-4.
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The article examines Serbo-Croatian conflict in the XX - early XXI centuries. The history of the formation of the Serbian and Croatian statehood is analyzed; the reasons for the confrontation between two close Slavic peoples are determined and the evolution of their relationship is highlighted; clarified the determinants that determine the antagonistic nature and demonstrative cruelty of the Serbo-Croatian confrontation. The formation after the “Patriotic War” of 1991-1995 of two parallel “worlds” was stated, as a result of which the Croatian and Serbian communities hardly intersect in everyday life. Constant quarrels and fights on ethnic grounds, burning of flags and desecration of state symbols have been and remain daily occurrences from the very beginning of reintegration, and war criminals convicted by an international tribunal are perceived by the two communities as national heroes and defenders of the Motherland. It points to the gradual aggravation of interethnic confrontation in Croatia and the growth of xenophobic sentiments, which has been observed recently.
The conclusion about the failure of past and modern attempts to establish Serbo-Croatian cooperation in building a common future has been substantiated. It is emphasized that the Serbo-Croatian conflict does not look exhausted, not only because of the heavy burden of the past, which causes mutual accusations and long-standing hatred. Attention is drawn to the fact that this confrontation is primarily about the future - about the fate of various national projects. The mirage of “Greater Serbia” still tempts a significant part of the Serbs, who are hatching revanchist intentions, while the Croats are determined to defend their won independence. Accordingly, under certain international conditions, the confrontation of political ambitions in the Balkans can easily flare up with renewed vigor, once again confirming the reputation of this region as a “powder keg” of Europe.
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Ђорђевић Белић, Смиљана. "ИЗ ФОЛКЛОРА СРБА У ДУНАВСКОЈ КЛИСУРИ." ИСХОДИШТА 8, no. 1 (August 18, 2022): 333–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.46630/ish.8.2022.22.
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The author of this paper conducted field research on the traditional culture and folklore of Serbs in the Danube gorge in June 2017. within the project Research of the History and Culture of Serbs in Romania. Field conversations included, in addition to topics related to traditional culture, oral history, everyday life and the like. The scientific interests and the primary area of research of the author conditioned the more intensive introduction of issues related to verbal folklore, and a relatively wide corpus of folklore material was obtained. Attention is focused on the folklore material recorded in the interview with the interlocutor from Belobreška: ballads, wedding songs, love songs. The texts are commented through the analysis of stylistic and motive characteristics and comparison with previously published variants.
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Vladisavljević, Nebojša. "Grassroots Groups, Milošević or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy over the Origins and Dynamics of the Mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s." Nationalities Papers 32, no. 4 (December 2004): 781–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0090599042000296113.
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The mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, barely noticeable from the capital initially but highly visible at the centre political stage between 1986 and 1988, played an important part in the political struggles of the late socialist Yugoslavia. The prevailing view in the literature is that Kosovo Serbs were little more then passive recipients of the attitudes and actions of high officials and dissident intellectuals. The elite thesis says that Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals initiated and guided the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, aiming to undermine the party's approach to Yugoslavia's national question and to initiate reassessment of the official policy on Kosovo and Serb–Albanian relations. According to the thesis, Milošević then took over and orchestrated the action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs in order to make the case for the removal of Kosovo's autonomy. The intellectuals and Milošević have generally supported this interpretation, claiming their role in the events leading to the constitutional change to the disadvantage of Kosovo Albanians in 1989–1990.
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Bunčić, Daniel. "All Over the Place: The Early History of the “Serbs/Slavs”." Canadian Slavonic Papers 46, no. 1-2 (March 2004): 195–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2004.11092354.
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Bartulin, Nevenko. "The Anti-Yugoslavist Narrative on Croatian Ethnolinguistic and Racial Identity, 1900-1941." East Central Europe 39, no. 2-3 (2012): 331–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763308-03903001.
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This article examines the work of leading anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century in relation to the question of race. These scholars used the discipline of racial anthropology in order to attempt to disprove the tenets of the racial supranational ideology of Yugoslavism by highlighting the ethnolinguistic-racial differences between Croats and Serbs. According to these intellectuals, the Croats were, racially speaking, purer Indo-Europeans and Slavs than the Serbs, who were in turn defined as possessing a strong Balkan Vlach racial component. Interestingly, these anti-Yugoslavist thinkers adopted the anthropological theory of Aryan-Slavic origins, as previously espoused by pan-Slavist Croat ideologists in the nineteenth century, in order to debunk the very idea of South Slav ‘national unity’ between Croats and Serbs.
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Kadria, Sali. "A VIEW ON ALBANIAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS DURING 1922-1923." Istorija 20. veka 40, no. 1/2022 (February 1, 2022): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kad.17-38.
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This scientific article aims to reflect some of the aspects of Albanian-Yugoslav relations in the years 1922-1923. During this period, there were two options facing the political leaders in Albania: Orienting their country toward Italy or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as the two countries that were interested the most on the Albanian issue. Albanian-Yugoslav relations during these years were affected by several factors, such as: the Albanian issue in Kosovo and other ethnic areas located within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; the Italo-Yugoslav rivalry in Albania, as well as the orientation of the various Albanian political groups in Albania in relation to its neighboring countries.
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Novoseltseva, Lyudmila. ""If you’re not a liberal when you’re young": to the political biography of Đorđe Stratimirović." Slavic almanac, no. 3-4 (2018): 60–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2018.3-4.1.06.
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Đorđe Stratimirović (1822-1908) is a romantic fgure in the history of the Serbian national movement in the second half of the nineteenth century. A born leader and inspirer, he played an important role in the Revolution of 1848-1849 and remained in the memory of generations as People’s General. However, his further activities were thrown out of the history of political thought of the Serbs of the Austrian monarchy as altering from his earlier views. As a mature man, he - under the infuence of political circumstances - turned from a young active liberal into a leader of the conservative direction. In 1872, he developed a program of the future moderate party, which included cooperation with the government of the Kingdom of Hungary. Given the Serbs were rather rallying around the liberals, uncompromising fghters for national rights, Stratimirović’s choice was a wrong move.
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Toal, Gerard, and Adis Maksić. "‘Serbs, You Are Allowed to be Serbs!’ Radovan Karadžić and the 1990 Election Campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Ethnopolitics 13, no. 3 (December 12, 2013): 267–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2013.860305.
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Kalic, Jovanka. "European borders in Serbian history." Balcanica, no. 52 (2021): 7–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc2152007k.
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This paper looks at the typology of borders which have traversed the Balkan lands for centuries. They have been diverse - geographical, political, economic, ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural. As a result of their length of duration, consequences and importance, they led to phenomena which can hardly be fully appreciated. Serbs lived along those borders, be they already existing or created over time. This research is focused on two borders. The one created by the division of the Roman Empire (395) and strengthened by the schism of Christianity (1054), and the other, completely different, created by the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan lands in the fifteenth century. Local Balkan borders, on the other hand, have never acquired a broader significance in the culture of this region.
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Dejić, Mirko. "How the old Slavs (Serbs) wrote numbers." BSHM Bulletin: Journal of the British Society for the History of Mathematics 29, no. 1 (November 8, 2013): 2–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17498430.2013.805559.
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Mumovic, Ana M. "DAM ON THE GREAT RUSSIAN SEA (Contribution to the interpretation of the Review of the History of Serbian Literature by A. N. Pipin)." Folia linguistica et litteraria XII, no. 35 (2021): 117–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31902/fll.35.2021.6.
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The paper aims is to present and evaluate the Review the History of Serbian Literature A. N. Pipin's as a classical history of Serbian literature that became part of the national culture. The development of the history of literature among Serbs, as an independent discipline and its modest beginnings, can be found in the first decades of the 19th century, in the time of Dositej and Vuk. In its beginnings, the history of literature was a "story" about the literary past of a nation and at its core was - criticism. This main idea as an axiom is a signpost that leads from the history of literature, which has long performed the function of criticism, to the genesis of literary criticism as the youngest branch of literary science and the way it formulated and exercised its functions in conditions when literary history was in a certain measures and history of the people. The Serbs received the first History of Serbian Literature (1865) from the pen of Pavel Jozef Šafarik (1795–1861), a Protestant and German student who served in Novi Sad. The next history of Serbian literature was also written by a foreigner, the Russian Alexander Nikolaevich Pipina (1833–1904). His Review the History of Serbian Literature (1865) has not been fully translated into Serbian. When marking questions from the new Serbian literature, Pipin's approach leads to a synthesis of ideas about cultural and political and national development. Slavery replaced the idea of revival "among Orthodox Serbs who fled to Austria". From that perspective, he views the development of national literature as an important part of culture and identity. Pipin also deals with the issue of national identity and the awakening of the national consciousness of the Slavs in his extensive study "Panslavism in the Past and Present" (1878), in which "the Serbian national question is incorporated into the general critique of Russian official policy and Slavophile orientation in the Balkans during Eastern Europe crisis". In this paper, we value his competence, cultural mission, the gift of the comparator, without which there is no great literary historian, and his practical contribution to classifying Serbian literature and culture in the European context.
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Kovic, Milos. "Knowledge or intent: Contemporary world historiography on Serbs in 19th century." Sociologija 53, no. 4 (2011): 401–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc1104401k.
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The fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of Yugoslavia brought about a complete change of the political and social context in Europe and in the world. Consequently, history, as a scholarly discipline, was also significantly transformed. In this wider context, the interpretations of the Serbian 19th century experienced far-reaching revision. Thus, it is necessary to scrutinize the main topics of the debate on 19th century Serbian history in the contemporary world historiography, as well as to examine the main causes of this academic revision.
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Levy, Michele Frucht. "“The Last Bullet for the Last Serb”:1 The Ustaša Genocide against Serbs: 1941–19452." Nationalities Papers 37, no. 6 (November 2009): 807–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990903239174.
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While participating in Hitler's Holocaust against Jews and Roma, wartime Croatia's collaborationist government, the Ustaša (Insurgent), conducted its own genocide against the Serbs within its territories. As the title of Marco Rivelli's 1978 text, Le Génocide occulté, makes clear, this phenomenon remained largely unknown in the West until the 1990s. Of the principal external actors, post-war German attention focused on the Holocaust. Italy still resists fully confronting its less than pristine role in the Balkans, so that Rivelli's work, completed in 1978, was not published in Italy until 1999. The Vatican, meanwhile, has yet to release its documents on the subject.
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Paovica, Marko. "Tri zrnca – Iz mozaika Jovana Radulovića o udesu kulturnog identiteta dalmatinskih Srba." Узданица 18, no. 2 (November 2021): 137–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/uzdanica18.2.137p.
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The paper deals with national-oriented works of Jovan Radulović from the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, based on his book dedicated to the life of Dalmatian Serbs. The first part of the paper refers to Radulović’s biographical-anthropo- logical essays on three Serbian writers from Dalmatia, as well as to his documentary prose; the analysis of Radulović’s critical views on the actual life of Serbian people in Croatia is based on a series of his interviews and polemics. The following section of the paper deals with the last part of Radulović’s book, enti- tled “The Grains (1984‒1989)”, consisting of about fifteen public speeches and newspaper articles related to the cultural assimilation of the Serbs in Croatia. Special attention is paid to the three grains, i.e. two public speeches and one newspaper article. In the first speech, Radulović documents national and cultural discrimination against Serbs in the communist Croatia, whose position is much worse than in Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the XX century. In the second speech, Radulović optimistically presents a short version of the history of defence of spiritual and national identity of the Serbs in Dalmatia. Finally, the third grain is the article in which Radulović expresses his fears about the fate of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Krayina, whose political status was determined far away from it and from the broken Yugoslavia, and he pleads for the absolute unity of the Serbian people and the leadership of the newly formed autonomous province in Croatia. On the basis of Radulović’s political views, it can be concluded that in spite of the defeat and the mass exodus, Serbs from Croatia should not give up the idea of returning to their homeland.
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Trbovich, Ana. "Nation-building under the Austro-Hungarian sceptre Croat-Serb antagonism and cooperation." Balcanica, no. 37 (2006): 195–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc0637195t.
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In the nineteenth century many European nations, including Serbs and Croats became politically conscious of their "nationhood", which became a contributory factor in the crumbling of the two great empires in Central-East Europe - the Habsburg and the Ottoman - at the beginning of the following century. The Serbs had, since medieval times, an awareness of their long history and tradition, great medieval civilization and cultural unity regardless of the fact that they lived under several different adminis?trations. As in the case of Habsburg Serbs, language and literature became building blocks of Croat national consciousness in the nineteenth century. Unlike Serb nationalism centred on people, Croat nationalism was mainly territory-related. Since both Serbs and Croats inhabited the Austro-Hungarian provinces claimed by the Croats as their "historical Right" (absorption in 1097 of the small medieval Croat state by the Hungarians is interpreted, by many Croat historians, as a voluntary act of union), the different conceptions of nationalism resulted in competing claims. Croatian politics became one of opposing any recognition of Serbian institutions and cultural characteristics without Serbs previously accepting the concept that the only "political nation" in the Austro-Hungarian Province of Croatia was Croatian. Nonetheless, Croats compromised when in need of Serb assistance in opposing Hungarian domination. In turn, Serb politics was divided between those supporting cooperation with the Croats in order to achieve greater autonomy from the Hungarians in the Dual Monarchy, and those who supported some cooperation but insisted on forming an entity separate from the Croats in the future and joining with the Kingdom of Serbia, which regained its independence in 1878. The ensuing world and civil wars brought the Croato-Serb conflict to the fore, with the first and the second Yugoslavia failing to accommodate the two nations' opposing aspirations.
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Pavlaković, Vjeran. "Symbols and the culture of memory in Republika Srpska Krajina." Nationalities Papers 41, no. 6 (November 2013): 893–909. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2012.743511.
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This article examines how rebel Serbs in Croatia reinterpreted narratives of World War Two to justify their uprising against the democratically elected Croatian government in 1990 and gain domestic and international legitimacy for the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) parastate. While scholars have written about the strategies nationalist elites used regarding controversial symbols and the rehabilitation of World War Two collaborators in Croatia and other Yugoslav successor states, the RSK's “culture of memory” has received little attention. Based on documents captured after the RSK's defeat in 1995, this article shows that it was not only the government of Franjo Tudjman that rejected the Partisan narratives of “Brotherhood and Unity,” but a parallel process took place among the leadership in the Krajina. Ultimately the decision to base the historical foundations of the Croatian Serbs’ political goals on a chauvinist and extremist interpretation of the past resulted in a criminalized entity that ended tragically for both Serbs and Croats living on the territory of the RSK.
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Ivašković, Igor. "The Implications of the “New Course” Strategy." Politička misao 56, no. 3-4 (March 11, 2020): 218–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.20901/pm.56.3-4.10.
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This article examines the political framework of “novi kurs” (“New Course”) from the beginning of the 20th century, its strategic aims and its function within the battle of different visions of a South Slavic state. The evidence shows that the new political direction contributed to the improvement of conflicting relations between Croats and Serbs, but, at the same time, it had a negative impact on the Croatian-Slovenian alliance along the Adriatic coast. In the context of the latter relation, the author analyses the reactions of Slovenians from Trieste and Primorska region who were supposed to be the collaterals due to what seemed to be an agreement between Serbs and Croats. However, although the “New Course” may be seen as long expected consensus between Croats and Serbs, a thorough analysis undermines that thesis. This became evident with the formation of two political factions within the Croatian-Serbian Coalition in which different views on the fundamental geopolitical parameters of the South Slavic state were developed.
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Lajnert, Siniša. "THE STRUCTURE, ACTIVITY AND LIQUIDATION OF THE DANUBE-SAVA VICINAL RAILWAY STOCK COMPANY DURING THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES/YUGOSLAVIA." Istorija 20. veka 40, no. 1/2022 (February 1, 2022): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.laj.39-54.
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This paper deals with the structure, activity, and liquidation of the Danube-Sava Vicinal Railway Stock Company during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia. The company, founded in 1912, was based in Budapest and constructed the following railway lines: Vukovar-Ilača and Šid-Sremska Rača-Sava. These private railway lines were exploited by the state. The stock company was solvent. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the company’s headquarters moved from Budapest to Zagreb. Shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovens/Yugoslavia, the railway lines were exploited by the Directorate of State Railways in Zagreb, but after 1921 they came under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of State Railways in Belgrade. According to the Agreement of February 7, 1931, the state redeemed the railway lines of the abovementioned company and thus the company ceased to exist. The company went into liquidation in 1932 and was shut down on April 12, 1933.
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Kovic, Milos. "Imagining the Serbs revisionism in the recent historiography of nineteenth-century Serbian history." Balcanica, no. 43 (2012): 325–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc1243325k.
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The end of the Cold War has brought about a complete change of the political and social context in the world. Consequently, history, as a scholarly discipline, has also undergone a significant transformation. In this broader context, with the destruction of Yugoslavia, the interpretations of the Serbian nineteenth century have been experiencing a far-reaching revision. It is necessary, therefore, to scrutinize the main topics of the debate on nineteenth-century Serbian history in recent world historiography, as well as to examine the main causes of this academic revision.
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Vojnovic, Zarko. "Benjamin Franklin incognito among Serbs: New mask of Joakim Vujic." Prilozi za knjizevnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor, no. 80 (2014): 63–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/pkjif1480063v.
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Joakim Vujic?s book Istino i verojatno sredstvo obogatiti se i svoju kesu puniti (Istino i verojatno sredstvo obogatiti se i svoju kesu puniti, Buda, 1829) was so far little noticed in serbian book and literature history. It was found, however, that it is not his original text, but translation of famous Bejamin Franklin?s Father Abraham?s Speech (widely known as The Way to Wealth), which was translated by then in many world languages. Paper also deals with Franklin?s presence in serbian culture of the 19th century.
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Vasin, Goran. "Serbs in the Centre of the Hungarian State: The Diocese of Buda in the long Nineteenth Century." Central-European Studies 2021, no. 4(13) (2021): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2619-0877.2021.4.5.
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The nineteenth century history of the Buda Diocese, one of the most important administrative-territorial units of the Serbian Orthodox Karlovci Metropolis, was filled with turbulent and dynamic events, as was that of the Serbs within the Habsburg monarchy. Since the diocese was located in the very centre of the Hungarian part of the empire, its position was difficult and significantly affected by events taking place on the central political stage of the country. The number of Serbs living on the territory of the monarchy was not large, which limited their opportunities and available resources. Events such as the Napoleonic wars, the revolution of 1848–1849, and attempts to resolve the national question in the second half of the nineteenth century all had a significant impact on the life of the diocese as a church unit. Many political decisions that determined the development of the empire and the position of its population were reflected in the Serbian church and its parishioners throughout the monarchy. The diocese was under the vigilant control of the Hungarian authorities, the numerous testimonies of which, at critical historical moments, increased the drama and instability of the daily life of the Serbs of the Buda Diocese.
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Krejčí, Pavel, Elena Krejčová, and Nadezhda Stalyanova. "A (Non)Existing Language – Serbo-Croatian after WWII." Balkanistic Forum 30, no. 1 (January 5, 2021): 233–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.37708/bf.swu.v30i1.15.
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After the Second World War, Serbo-Croatian was formally declared on the basis of the so-called Novi Sad Agreement (1954). Its demise is connected to the demise of the Yu-goslav Federation (1992). The sociological, historical, political and ideological rea-sons of the rejection of this glossonym (and with it the rejection of the common lan-guage) were clearly the decisive factor, but they were not always the same. The Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Montenegrins had specific reasons for this. These reasons can be revealed, inter alia, by analyzing a number of declarative, proclaiming, explanatory, defending, shorter or longer texts on the language generated by all the above-mentioned national communities which used Serbo-Croatian as their first (mother) tongue after 1990. The most recent Declaration on the Common Language (2017) is unique in this sense.
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Lampe, John R. "Introduction." East Central Europe 42, no. 1 (August 8, 2015): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763308-04201001.
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Read back from the 1990s, the scenario of a Greater Serbian agenda based in Belgrade and using Yugoslavia as a means to that end continues to tempt Western scholarship. Serbian exceptionalism thereby doomed both Yugoslavias. This special issue of East Central Europe addresses connections between Belgrade, Serbia, and Yugoslavia promoting contradictions that belie this simple scenario. Focusing on the first Yugoslavia, these six articles by younger Belgrade historians critically examine a series of disjunctures between the capital city and the rest of Serbia as well as Yugoslavia that undercut the neglected pre-1914 promise of Belgrade’s Yugoslavism. First came the failure of the city’s political and intellectual elite the First World War was ending to persevere with that promise. Most could not separate themselves from a conservative rather than nationalist reliance on the Serbian-led ministries in Belgrade to deal with the problems of governing a new state that now included many non-Serbs. From Serbian political divisions and a growing parliamentary paralysis to the Belgrade ministries’ failure to support the Serb colonists in Kosovo, problems mounted. They opened the way for King Aleksandar’s dictatorship in 1929, with initial Serbian support. But as the royal regime imposed an integral Yugoslavism on what had been the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and punished disloyalty to the Crown in particular Serbs were punished as well as non-Serbs. Their locally organized associations were also placed under royal authority, whose ministries were however no more successful in uniform administration than their predecessors. At the same time, however, Belgrade’s growing connections to European popular culture skipped over the rest of the country, Serbia included, to establish a distinctive urban identity. After the Second World War, what was now a Western identity would grow and spread from Belgrade after the Tito-Stalin split, despite reservations and resistance from the Communist regime. This cultural connection now promoted the wider Yugoslav integration that was missing in the interwar period. It still failed, as amply demonstrated in Western and Serbian scholarship, to overcome the political contradictions that burdened both Yugoslavias.
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Budding, Audrey Helfant. "Yugoslavs into Serbs: Serbian National Identity, 1961–1971*." Nationalities Papers 25, no. 3 (September 1997): 407–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999708408515.
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In an essay published in September 1962, poet Pavle Stefanovic announced that in the next census he would identify himself as a Yugoslav rather than a Serb. Writing down “Serb” on official forms, Stefanovic said, had always made the sweat break out on his forehead, plunging him into “the nightmarish vision of an individual identity imposed upon me rather than chosen by my own will, one which fills me with polar opposites: pride and shame … a feeling of innocence and of culpability.” Mixed with his pride in parts of his Serbian heritage, he explained, was horror at the atrocities committed in the name of Serbdom by the Chetniks, the Serbian monarchist forces of the Second World War. Stefanovic emphasized that he was not rejecting Serbian identity because he thought the Serbian past was worse than others. Rather, he wished to throw off the symbolic weight attached to all national pasts. By declaring himself a Yugoslav, he thought, he could show that he considered nationality merely “a sort of historic-genetic address, a fact about one's origin,” and not a primary or sacred identity. In his eyes, choosing the Yugoslav identity meant asserting his own free will against the unchosen national collective, expressing his commitment to internationalism, and separating the future from a nightmare-ridden past.
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Milošević, Srđan. "Constitution without a state: The formation of The Kingdom of SCS and "The Vidovdan" Constitution in The constitutional law curriculum in Yugoslavia's successor states." Pravni zapisi 12, no. 1 (2021): 261–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-32156.
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"The Vidovdan" Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, rendered on 28 June 1921, one hundred years after its adoption, remains an unavoidable topic and an occasion for discussions about the reasons for the failure of the Yugoslav state. The unitarian-centralist system unanimously criticized today as an inadequate constitutional form for the functioning of a complex community such as Yugoslavia was once legitimized by the concept of national unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The national conception, the type of state system, and the related disagreements are part of both the political and constitutional history of the states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This paper analyses the content of textbooks of Constitutional Law that are in use at law schools in the successor states, which have existed continuously since the breakup of Yugoslavia until today and are used to educate the vast majority of lawyers in these states. The way in which the shared constitutional history from the first decade of Yugoslavia is presented after the collapse of the socialist paradigm (that mainly was unison) largely follows the national borders of the successor states in terms of its content and interpretation.
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Zec, Dejan. "The Sokol Movement from Yugoslav Origins to King Aleksandar’s 1930 All-Sokol Rally in Belgrade." East Central Europe 42, no. 1 (August 8, 2015): 48–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763308-04201003.
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The Yugoslav Sokol movement was one of the most influential non-governmental organizations in the interwar Yugoslav Kingdom. In the course of the 1920s, it moved from an independent and idealistic organization which celebrated brotherhood between the South Slavs to being a still independent but Serb-centered organization whose version of Yugoslav integration pushed away Croats in particular. But it was only from 1929, when King Aleksandar’s royal dictatorship brought a reconstituted organization under direct state control, that it became a vehicle for official propaganda and an exponent of assimilating Serbs as well as non-Serbs under the banner of integral Yugoslavism. These efforts by the royal dictatorship in Belgrade from 1929 did not survive the king’s assassination in 1934. Helping to widen the political divide, particularly between Serbs and Croats, this official Sokol became a well-known focal point for Serb confrontation with non-Serb majorities in western and southern Yugoslavia. This article moves from the often neglected initial promise of the movement to concentrate on its role as a centerpiece in Aleksandar’s campaign to impose a Serbian-inspired Yugoslavism from Belgrade. And the centerpiece of that campaign was the all-Sokol rally organized at great expense and with great fanfare in Belgrade in 1930. This single event usefully illustrates the ambitions of the royal dictatorship to use Belgrade as a focal point for drawing the country together under a single authority.
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Олександр Вікторович Мосієнко. "AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AND RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AMONG THE PRISONERS OF WAR DURING WORLD WAR I: ANALYSIS OF PRACTICES." Intermarum history policy culture, no. 5 (January 1, 2018): 371–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.35433/history.111828.
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The article traces the peculiarities of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian propaganda on prisoners of war and interned persons. The state of the study of the topic in the modern historical literature is analyzed and unresolved aspects are indicated. The use of prisoners of war for political and military purposes was sought by both empires. In the course of the First World War, the Russian command took such a step as the formation of military units from the prisoners of war of the hostile army – Czechs, Slovaks and Serbs. These units were created not only as purely military but also political units – for the agitation of the Slavic population of Austria-Hungary to the rebellion against government. In the Habsburg monarchy also hoped to use prisoners of war to undermine the combat capability of the Russian army. For this purpose, the Austro-Hungarian camps began the differentiation of the prisoners on a national basis. Ukrainian and Polish prisoners of war of the czar’s army were under privileged conditions, better provided with food, as well as better conditions for leisure and educational practices. Significant work in this direction was deployed by Ukrainian organizations that functioned on the territory of Austria-Hungary. Political agitation was supplemented by religious, which was carried out by Ukrainian priests from Galicia and Bukovina. National-cultural propaganda of the Union of the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and the separation of prisoners on national grounds for the Austrian military command were a means of recruiting volunteers for front-line propaganda, organizing an uprising in the rear of the Russian army in the Caucasus and the Kuban. Imperial propaganda was carried out mainly through print media specifically designed for prisoners of war.A promising object of historical research is the study of the content and visual aspects of propaganda, the peculiarities of the cooperation of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian authorities with representatives of national organizations in organizing propaganda among prisoners of war.
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Sretenovic, Stanislav. "French cultural diplomacy in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in the 1920s." European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire 16, no. 1 (February 2009): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13507480802655352.
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Foster, Samuel. "Dejan Djokić, Pašić and Trumbić: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." European History Quarterly 43, no. 2 (April 2013): 351–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0265691413478542k.
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Martinovic, Borja, Jolanda Jetten, Anouk Smeekes, and Maykel Verkuyten. "Collective memory of a dissolved country: Group-based nostalgia and guilt assignment as predictors of interethnic relations between diaspora groups from former Yugoslavia." Journal of Social and Political Psychology 5, no. 2 (January 15, 2018): 588–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v5i2.733.
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In this study we examined intergroup relations between immigrants of different ethnic backgrounds (Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks) originating from the same conflict area (former Yugoslavia) and living in the same host country (Australia). For these (formerly) conflicted groups we investigated whether interethnic contacts depended on superordinate Yugoslavian and subgroup ethnic identifications as well as two emotionally laden representations of history: Yugonostalgia (longing for Yugoslavia from the past) and collective guilt assignment for the past wrongdoings. Using unique survey data collected among Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks in Australia (N = 87), we found that Yugoslavian identification was related to stronger feelings of Yugonostalgia, and via Yugonostalgia, to relatively more contact with other subgroups from former Yugoslavia. Ethnic identification, in contrast, was related to a stronger assignment of guilt to out-group relative to in-group, and therefore, to relatively less contact with other subgroups in Australia. We discuss implications of transferring group identities and collective memories into the diaspora.
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Bjelica, Slobodan. "Transformations of the ”autonomus Vojvodina” idea." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 137 (2011): 509–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn1137509b.
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The idea of an autonomous region of Vojvodina had its origins in Serbian political thought and the new political, demographic and cultural circumstances and opportunities which emerged beginning in the 17th century. During the 1848 Revolution Serbs within the Habspburg monarchy proclaimed a new political entity, ?Serbian Vojvodina?, which incorporated parts of southern Hungary, Croatia and the Military Border. The Hungarian governments? refusal to countenance what it saw as separatism led to a bloody civil war. In November 1849, following the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, emperor Franz Joseph granted the Serbs a territory larger than they demanded, which led to their being outnumbered by other ethnic communities. This duchy lasted only for a decade. In a self-proclaimed effort to break with the complex problems of the past and to take into account the particularities of local history, ethnic structure, and cultural distinctiveness, the communist government of Yugoslavia awarded territorial autonomy to Vojvodina in the aftermath of the Second World War.
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Dronov, Aleksandr M. "The Military Frontier of the Habsburg Monarchy between the Croatian and Serbian Ideas of National Integration (1826–1848)." Slavic World in the Third Millennium 15, no. 3-4 (2020): 7–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2412-6446.2020.15.3-4.01.
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From the 1820s to the 1840s, the borderland between the Austrian and Ottoman empires witnessed the creation and development of national movements among Serbs and Croats who lived in administrative and political units with special legal status. One of these territories was the Military Frontier, which turned into a battlefield between the Croatian “Illyrians” (Zagreb) and the Serbian “rodoljubs” (Matica Srpska) for the sympathy of the population. The massive territory and dense population of the Military Frontier attracted the architects of territorial and national integration, and the paramilitary population was considered an instrument in achieving political goals. The population of the Military Frontier spoke the Shtokavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian (which also spread, for example, in Dalmatia and Slavonia), and for this reason the Illyrians took this dialect as the basis for Croatian literary language. In doing so, they were able to spread their ideas through printed materials, which they circulated in the Military Frontier. However, the Serbian “rodoljubs” suspected the Croats of wanting Croatisation and Catholicisation. Both national movements built their agitation on the basis of a historical narrative; Serbs by referring to heroes of Serbian history, and Illyrians by amalgamating Serbian and Croatian heroes together to create a single pantheon for all South Slavs. The Serbian Principality (under the rule of the Ottoman Empire) also claimed their share in the future Serbian unification. For its ruling elite, the Hungarian Srem with the residence of the Serbian Metropolitan was of particular interest. Some Croatian and Serbian politicians worked on a plan of joint action regarding the Military Frontier and turned to Polish émigrés for support.